海德格尔探问“诗的本质”

《荷尔德林和诗的本质》一文,是海德格尔于风起云涌的二十世纪三十年代发表的唯一一篇论文。他强调,"我的思想和荷尔德林的诗歌处于一种非此不可的关系中"。海德格尔认为,《荷尔德林和诗的本质》以五个具有"确定次序"与"内在联系"的中心诗句为提示,将诗的本质性的本质端到我们眼前。通过悉心释读荷尔德林的诗,海德格尔引领读者从"之间"即存在本身的"显-隐二重性运作"的不可同一的"相关性"上来思索"诗的本质",为我们理解人的本质、大地的本质乃至理解贯穿整个西方思想史的"诗与哲学之争"都提供了一种另类眼光。     

海德格尔论荷尔德林的诗

正如“苏格拉底与悲剧的本质”成为亚里士多德“诗学”的副标题一样,《荷尔德林与诗的本质》或许也能成为海德格尔“未写出”的《诗学》的副标题。下面我将要指出,《荷尔德林和诗的本质》,在纳粹时期充当了海德格尔“未写下的”《政治学》的副标题。 为了使这一论断得以成立,应当对《荷尔德林和诗的本质》一文发表的一些事实加以澄清。这篇海德格尔于1936年4月在罗马意大利日尔曼文学研究院作的讲演,首先刊登在1936年12月的《内在世界》这本杂志上。当海德格尔1944年发表《荷尔德林诗的解释》时,他把《荷尔德林和诗的本质》包括在内,并将这篇文章附在他的另一篇讲演《还乡——致亲友》之后一同印出。这本书的第二版于1951年发行,它保持了这样的次序,即将1936年的演讲置于1943年的那篇演讲之后,扩充版包括两篇附加的文章,即1939年的讲演《当节日的时候》以及1943年的一篇短文《思念》,它们被排在这一版的第三和第四的位置上。     

身体的位置:海德格尔空间思想演进的存在论解析

海德格尔空间思想研究中有一个聚讼纷纭的难题,即如何理解身体与空间的关系。在《存在与时间》中,海德格尔一方面肯定了身体与空间的本质联系,另一方面又回避了对两者关系的主题化探讨,使得这一问题更加扑朔迷离。本文试图证明海德格尔对空间问题持续数十年的探讨中始终隐含着一种身体视角。身体视角不仅为我们提供了一条统贯的线索来追寻海德格尔空间思想前后期嬗变的内在逻辑,也成为理解其空间观念存在论涵义的关键所在。可以说海德格尔空间思想的最大秘密和内在动力就是身体模棱两可的存在论地位。     

诗与思——海德格尔的《荷尔德林与诗的本质》

语言是海德格尔晚期主要的研究,而诗是最纯粹的语言;语言是存有之屋,解明语言之存有即开显道之存在。海德格尔是透过诗之言说,来指向道的超越性。对海德格尔而言,荷尔德林是最纯粹的诗人,其作品《荷尔德林与诗的本质》以荷尔德林及其诗作来讨论诗与语言的本质。海德格尔的诗之理论可分成三点:1.诗是所有艺术形式之本质,但并不意味所有的艺术形式均可化约为诗。2.诗是所有艺术形式之本质,此一事实乃建立于语言本质之上;即真理的兴发及无遮蔽。3.诗包含了语言与艺术作品之显现。以诗与思的本质作为出发,解明诗的语言即是真理的生发,诗作为语言最高的艺术形式,真理的语言即是诗,而诗则是作为语言艺术最高的真理本质。     

美的规定与存在的追问——评张贤根《存在·真理·语言-海德格尔美学思想研究》

在《存在·真理·语言—海德格尔美学思想研究》中,张贤根认为,海德格尔的美学思想揭示了现代美学思想的存在维度,并把现代美学思想建基于其上。对海德格尔美学思想整体及其各个部分之间内在关联的把握,凸显出作者超出一般学者的哲学素养与思想能力。作者采用现象学显现的方法,从敞开的层面来言说和把握海德格尔美学思想,为海德格尔美学思想的研究提供了一个新的视角。     

关于海德格尔存在论美学的思考

作为西方现代最有深度也最有争议的哲学思想家之一的海德格尔,其思想分为两个重要的时期:前期其思想代表作是《存在与时间》,主要以追问"存在"为主;后期思想代表作则是《艺术作品的本源》,通过对艺术本源的追问,从而做出对真理的解答。在探讨海德格尔的存在论美学思想时,首先应该知道海德格尔的存在论美学将诗论和艺术论置于其存在论视野中,正因为如此其美学思想具有了新的理论维度。所以探讨海德格尔的美学思想,必须要深入理解和探讨存在论、诗论和艺术论。     

论海德格尔思想道路的“转折”——以“实际生活经验”为视点

要理解海德格尔在20世纪30年代的思想"转折",最为关键之处就是返回"实际生活经验"的"动荡"特征而对运动性存在重新彻底肯认,返回"实际生活经验"的"前理论"特征而对运动性存在更加原初地言说。把握住这一点,就能更加恰当地理解他"转折"后的方法和思想,从而更加深入地把握其整条思想道路。     

如何理解海德格尔之“缘在”的“真理”与“非真理”?

在海德格尔之《存在与时间》中,"缘在"(Dasein)的"真理"(本真状态)与"非真理"(非本真状态)乃是两个关键性的词语。但是,关于它们的确切含义及其思想意义,海德格尔自己在该书中并没有非常明确的交代,这个问题至今依然是迷雾重重。本文试图借助于海德格尔早期弗莱堡时期的"实际生活经验"思想(尤其是它的"前理论"和"动荡"这两个基本特征),来澄清如何理解《存在与时间》中"缘在"的"真理"与"非真理"这个问题。     

“最后之神”的理解难度

"最后之神"问题是海德格尔研究中的一个难点问题。与时下的做法不同,本文并不急于对这一概念进行思想史上的追溯与评价,或将其与不同文化中的宗教观进行比较,而是试图从这个概念本身的理解难度入手来澄清海德格尔的所说。理解的难度主要来自三个方面:首先是海德格尔独特的思想进路与概念术语系统所带来的难度,其次是神的问题在海德格尔存在史思想整体中的特殊难度,最后是来自事情本身的难度。最终我们将看到,一旦对海德格尔关于最后之神的论述中的难度有所理解,我们自身就来到这一难度面前。因而,最后之神的问题在某种意义上就是这个"难度"本身。     

海德格尔“存在的末世论”的解释学意义——《阿那克西曼德的箴言》再解读

本文副标题中的“再解读”三字,表示我对海德格尔解读阿那克西曼德箴言的一种反思和“视野融合”,并没有否定海德格尔的解读的意思,而是试图从中阐发出一种隐藏的含义。当然,这种含义也许是海德格尔自己也没有想到的,但它有可能暴露出海德格尔思想中的深刻矛盾的根源。一海德格尔在《阿那克西曼德的箴言》一文中,阐述了他对存在的一种“末世论”(Eschatologie)的理解:存在者之存在把自身聚集(λεγεσθαι,λογοs)到其命运的终结之中。迄今的存在本质沉沦于它的尚被遮蔽着的真理中。存在之历史把自身聚集到这种分离之中。在这种分离…     

Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Reconsidered in Light of Tugendhat’s Critique

Ernst Tugendhat’s critique of Martin Heidegger’s conception of truth is an ongoing topic in Heideggerian scholarship. In this paper, I contribute to the ongoing exchange between defenders of Heidegger and those who are in agreement with Tugendhat. Specifically, I contend that Tugendhat’s criticisms fail to situate Heidegger’s account of truth within his broader phenomenological–hermeneutic project. In the end, Tugendhat’s critique is grounded upon philosophical assumptions that Heidegger is bringing under question by rethinking the concept of truth. I suggest that thinking through Tugendhat’s critique and attempting to formulate an adequate Heideggerian response gives us a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his general philosophical project.     

Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single,Objective World

Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests (focusing, in particular, on work by John Haugeland), and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of Bernard Williams and Adrian Moore), I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject‐matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like.     

Heidegger and Foucault: On the Relation Between the Anxiety–Engendering–Truth and Being-Towards-Freedom

In his very last, now famous, interview, Michel Foucault states that his philosophical thought was shaped by his reading of Heidegger, even though he does not specify what aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy inspired him in the first place. However, his last interview is not the only place where Foucault refers to Heidegger as his intellectual guide. In his 1981/1982 lecture course, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault confesses that the way Heidegger conceptualized the relationship between subject and truth was a starting point for him for thinking about the relationship between truth, subject, subjective-transformation, and freedom. Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to reconstruct the Foucault-Heidegger encounter from the perspective of subject-truth relation. I will ask how Heidegger and Foucault conceptualized the relationship between truth, self-transformation, and freedom. And I will claim that for both Foucault and Heidegger, freedom lies in constantly and creatively repeating the traditional possibilities of existence in order to question the reified patterns of interpretation, and in order to reveal the anxiety–engendering–truth that what is regarded as natural and inevitable in human life is historically contingent and transformable.     

Tugendhat's Idea of Truth

This paper argues that Tugendhat's critique of Heidegger's existential conception of truth as disclosedness is usually misunderstood. The main claim of this paper is that Tugendhat insists against Heidegger on certain conventional features of truth such as conformity of the law of non‐contradiction, not because he adheres to an ideal of truth as correctness; rather, he proposes an alternative existential conception of truth in terms of an active, critical or self‐critical, engagement with untruth. Various recent objections to Tugendhat's critique of Heidegger are discussed against the background of his alternative and are rejected. The paper concludes by outlining several challenges to Tugendhat's alternative existential conception of truth.     

Why Tugendhat's Critique of Heidegger's Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem1

With what right and with what meaning does Heidegger use the term ‘truth’ to characterize Dasein's disclosedness? This is the question at the focal point of Ernst Tugendhat's long‐standing critique of Heidegger's understanding of truth, one to which he finds no answer in Heidegger's treatment of truth in §44 of Being and Time or his later work. To put the question differently: insofar as unconcealment or disclosedness is normally understood as the condition for the possibility of propositional truth rather than truth itself, what does it mean to say – as Heidegger does – that disclosedness is the “primordial phenomenon of truth” and what justifies that claim? The central aim of this paper is to show that Tugendhat's critique remains unanswered. Recent Heidegger scholarship, though it confronts Tugendhat, has not produced a viable answer to his criticism, in part because it overlooks his basic question and therefore misconstrues the thrust of his objections. Ultimately, the paper suggests that what is needed is a re‐evaluation of Heidegger's analysis of truth in light of a more accurate understanding of Tugendhat's critique. The paper concludes by sketching the profile of a more satisfactory reply to Tugendhat's critical question, advocating a return to Heidegger's ‘existential’ analyses in Being and Time in order to locate the normative resources Tugendhat finds lacking in Heidegger's concept of truth.     

Heidegger’s Nietzsche

ABSTRACT

Heidegger maintained that Nietzsche was a metaphysical thinker. What did he mean by that? Not that Nietzsche advanced purely theoretical doctrines that might be perfected or refuted by rational argument. Instead, he meant that Nietzsche’s thinking is a ‘representational thinking’ (vorstellendes Denken) that preserves a commitment to a conception of truth as correctness (Richtigkeit). Nietzsche’s apparent denials of the intelligibility of truth, Heidegger argues, are in fact expressions of our growing insensitivity to truth understood as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit). Nietzsche’s thinking is thus deeply attuned to metaphysics as Heidegger came to understand it in the late 1930s, namely as a forgetting of being (Seinsvergessnheit), beginning with Plato. His interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought, particularly the idea of eternal recurrence, changed less because he changed his mind about Nietzsche than because he reconceived the philosophical tradition since Plato as metaphysical, and so reframed his own project as an attempt to think beyond metaphysics.     

On the Mind Dependence of Truth

The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true of w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A” as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway.     

Overcoming Philosophy: Heidegger, Metaphysics, and the Transformation to Thinking

Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics is central to his attempt to re-instantiate the question of being. This paper examines Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics by looking at the relationship between metaphysics and thought. This entails an identification of the intimate relationship Heidegger maintains exists between philosophy and metaphysics, an analysis of Heidegger’s critique of this association, and a discussion of his proposal that philosophy has been so damaged by its association with metaphysics that it must be replaced with meditative thinking. It is not quite clear, however, how the overcoming of metaphysical thinking is to occur especially given Heidegger’s insistence that relying on human will to effect an alteration in thinking simply re-instantiates the metaphysical perspective to be overcome. While several critics have argued Heidegger has no solution to this issue, instead holding that thought must simply be open to being’s ‘self’-transformation if and when it occurs, I turn to Heidegger’s notion of trace and a number of scattered comments on the relationship between meditative thinking and willing as non-willing to show Heidegger: (a) was aware of this issue; and (b) tried to resolve it by recognising a reconceptualised notion of willing not based on or emanating from the aggressive willing of metaphysics.     

On Heidegger's Root and Branch Reformulation of the Meaning of Transcendental Philosophy

Over the past decades there has been increasing interest in the idea that Heidegger was a “transcendental philosopher” during the late 1920s. Furthermore, a consensus has started to emerge around the idea that Heidegger must be thought of as a transcendental thinker during this time. For the most part this means to first experience how Heidegger's work inherits this term from Kant or Husserl so that one can then experience how Heidegger creatively adapts this inheritance. The aim of this paper is to show that such an approach is unhelpful. The aim of this paper is instead to show that transcendental philosophy bears a wholly renewed meaning in Heidegger's fundamental ontology and that this meaning must be understood in an intrinsic connection with the fundamental-ontological problem of transcendence. Articulating this connection will show how Heidegger makes transcendental philosophy properly phenomenological.     

Heidegger on Plato,truth, and unconcealment: The 1931–32 lecture on The Essence of Truth

This paper discusses Heidegger's 1931–32 lecture course on The Essence of Truth. It argues that Heidegger read Platonic ideas, not only as stage‐setting for the western philosophical tradition's privileging of conceptualization over practice, and its correlative treatment of truth as correctness, but also as an early attempt to work through truth as the fundamental experience of unhiddenness. Wrathall shows how several of Heidegger's more‐famous claims about truth, e.g. that propositional truth is grounded in truth as world‐disclosure, and including Heidegger's critique of the self‐evidence of truth as correspondence, are first revealed in a powerful (if iconoclastic) reading of Plato.