道德与关系惩罚对初中生公共物品困境中合作行为的影响

本研究模拟公共物品两难困境范式,以初中生为被试,通过两个实验分别考察道德惩罚和关系惩罚对不同性别和社会价值取向个体合作行为的影响。结果发现:(1)两种惩罚条件下初中生的合作水平均显著高于无惩罚条件,但当惩罚撤除后只有关系惩罚条件下的效应还存在;(2)初中女生在两种惩罚条件下的合作水平均显著高于无惩罚条件,而男生只在关系惩罚条件下出现该情况;(3)亲社会取向与亲自我取向初中生在两种惩罚阶段均表现出更高的合作水平,但在惩罚撤除后,只有亲社会取向者保持了高合作水平。这些结果表明,关系惩罚的作用较为持久,且对男生的影响更为突出,不过两种惩罚在亲社会取向者身上均显现出延后效应。     

公共物品困境中惩罚的形式与作用

公共物品困境中对惩罚的操纵表明：惩罚搭便车可以维持群体内的合作行为。早期研究表明, 惩罚的设置有助于建立社会合作规范, 有代价惩罚、利他惩罚和第三方惩罚等惩罚形式为间接互惠提供了合理的解释。随着实证研究的进一步深入, 惩罚表现出新的形式, 如自私惩罚和反社会惩罚, 被惩罚者的威胁报复将使合作者不再继续惩罚搭便车行为, 导致合作行为的减少直至消失。正当性理论、道德情感理论和文化基因协同进化理论表明惩罚的存在具有一定的必要性和价值, 惩罚的作用存在框架效应。本文介绍了一些有关的中介变量, 如利他、信任、声誉、文化、期望等, 可以对惩罚作用的积极面和破坏性予以适当的解释, 也为合作的心理机制研究提供新的视角。     

公正世界信念对第三方惩罚的影响：来自ERP的证据

采用事件相关电位技术（ERP）考察公正世界信念对第三方惩罚的影响。（1）行为结果显示,高公正世界信念个体的第三方惩罚显著多于低公正世界信念个体,低公正世界信念个体在高不公正提议下的第三方惩罚显著增加;（2）ERP结果显示,高公正世界信念个体比低公正世界信念个体诱发了更大的MFN波幅和更小的P300波幅,且高公正世界信念个体的MFN波幅在高、低不公正提议下没有差异,低公正世界信念个体在高不公正提议下的MFN波幅明显更大。这说明相比低公正世界信念个体,高公正世界信念个体所持有的公正认知强烈且稳定,个体做出第三方惩罚更多基于自身对于公正结果的预期,而非外部条件。     

公平与惩罚价格对第三方惩罚需求的影响

为了探讨第三方惩罚的影响因素,分析个体在不同公平情境下面临不同的惩罚成本时会采取怎样的第三方惩罚行为,本研究以171名大学生为被试,采用2×2的混合实验设计,通过设置高低两种不公平情境和3种惩罚价格,对被试的第三方惩罚需求进行实验研究。结果显示,个体的第三方惩罚需求都有随着惩罚价格的升高而降低的趋势;不公平程度显著影响第三方惩罚需求。研究表明,惩罚成本显著影响个体的第三方惩罚的实施;在低不公平情境中,被试面对不同惩罚成本时其第三方惩罚行为之间无显著差异,即各种惩罚成本下出现第三方惩罚行为的可能性均较小;而在高不公平情境中,被试面对不同惩罚成本时的第三方惩罚行为之间差异显著,惩罚成本越低出现第三方惩罚的可能性越大。     

“仁者”还是“智者”：第三方惩罚对惩罚者声誉的影响

第三方惩罚会对惩罚者的声誉产生显著影响,然而就影响的方向而言,现有文献给出了不同答案。上述问题的一个潜在原因是先前研究未能区分声誉的不同维度以及惩罚的不同动机与形式。通过将温暖-能力双维度结构引入惩罚者的声誉,实验结果显示,第三方惩罚从总体上降低了人们对惩罚者在温暖维度上的评价而提高了对其在能力维度上的评价。调节效应分析表明,动机被归因为集体聚焦的惩罚进一步提升了其对能力的正面作用而减缓了对温暖的负面作用,并且惩罚者的合作水平越高,其动机被归因为集体聚焦的程度也越高。针对不同惩罚形式的进一步分析显示,当惩罚动机被归因为个体聚焦时,经济惩罚对温暖的负面作用显著高于社会惩罚,而在集体聚焦的归因下经济惩罚对能力的正面作用显著低于社会惩罚。     

支付与报复：成本形式对第三方惩罚的影响

第三方惩罚不仅对惩罚成本的数量敏感,也对成本形式敏感。在保持成本数量相等的情况下,不同形式的惩罚成本会对第三方惩罚的频率产生不同影响。相较支付形式,当惩罚成本采取报复形式时,被试的第三方惩罚频率显著下降。进一步的实验表明,惩罚频率的变化并非因为不同的成本形式所隐含的风险水平有所差异,而是因为被试对不同的成本形式赋予了不同的主观价值。进一步探索更多形式的惩罚成本是未来研究的重要方向。     

第三方惩罚对合作的溢出效应：基于社会规范的解释

第三方惩罚对合作的维系可能来自经济功能或规范提示功能。先前研究没有区分这两种功能, 因而未能回答：当惩罚不足以影响违规收益时, 是否还能促进合作?实验1 (N = 252)发现即使第三方惩罚无法降低违规收益, 依然能抑制自利行为。实验2 (N = 179)发现受过惩罚的违规者在其后的独裁者博弈表现出了更高的合作水平。2(是否旁观惩罚)×2(旁观前后)设计的实验3 (N = 179)显示, 旁观惩罚后被试的合作水平显著高于旁观前, 也高于未旁观惩罚的被试。后两个实验中, 社会规范在惩罚与合作之间均起中介作用。这进一步证实惩罚对合作的促进在很大程度上是通过规范激活来实现的, 并存在两种溢出效应：惩罚抑制了曾经的违规者(纵向溢出效应)和旁观者(横向溢出效应)在新博弈情境下的自私行为。这两种溢出效应的发现补充了文献中占主导地位的经济学解释, 并为理解人类社会长时间、大规模的合作提供了新视角。     

慢性应激事件对第三方惩罚的影响及其个体差异

本研究以法学和非法学学生为被试,重大考试为慢性应激源,考察意图和结果不同的法律情境下,慢性应激对第三方惩罚的影响。结果发现：(1) 意图清晰度和结果严重程度显著预测惩罚强度;(2) 法学被试中,慢性应激增加惩罚倾向,当案件意图模糊结果轻时,负性情绪在应激和惩罚强度间起中介作用;(3) 应激对第三方惩罚的影响受他人视角下的个体公正敏感性的调节。本研究有助于更好理解应激对社会决策的影响,也为司法实践提供了参考。     

社会价值取向和反馈方式对公共物品困境中决策行为的影响

本研究通过模拟投资实验和问卷来探讨重复型公共物品困境中社会价值取向（SVO）与信息反馈方式对决策行为的影响。结果表明：(1)合作型SVO的个体比非合作型个体表现出更多的合作行为;(2)SVO与信息反馈方式的交互作用岁实验轮次越来越显著,非合作型的个体会受信息反馈方式的影响,而合作型个体则不易受反馈方式的影响;(3)与无反馈的条件相比,集体反馈倾向于促进个体的合作行为,个体反馈倾向于抑制合作行为,但反馈所造成的适应性改变使情况更为复杂。     

“惩前毖后”与“率先垂范”：第三方干预行为的影响效应

第三方干预是维持和发展社会规范的关键力量,对整个人类群体具有进化意义。补偿和惩罚是第三方干预的两种主要形式,二者均是维护社会规范的重要力量,具有恢复得失平衡以及促进规范遵从的积极作用。研究者广泛认可威慑效应是第三方惩罚促进规范遵从的主要作用机制,然而也有许多研究结果与该假说相悖。除威慑作用外,第三方干预行为作为高代价信号,也具有澄清社会规范、改变人们规范知觉的作用,这暗示着信号效应可能也是第三方干预促进规范遵从的重要作用机制。探究第三方惩罚促进规范遵从的边界条件、检验第三方补偿等非破坏性措施在维护社会规范方面的有效性是未来研究的重要方向。     

A motivational perspective on punishment in social dilemmas

In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behaviour while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behaviour and to increase cooperation is to establish a sanction system in that private resources are invested by individuals to punish uncooperative interaction partners. The present review is intended to provide an overview concerning motivational determinants of punishment in social dilemma situations. Specifically, we (a) outline that fairness concerns and revenge motivate individuals to punish uncooperative other individuals, (b) show that this is done especially when they possess the basic motivational orientation of a prevention focus. We (c) illustrate that individuals do not punish to acquire a good reputation in the eyes of others, and (d) elaborate on whether individuals punish to regulate satisfaction. Finally, we present empirically neglected motivational factors in studies on punishment in social dilemmas and discuss limitations and possible future directions in this field of research.     

The Advantage of Democratic Peer Punishment in Sustaining Cooperation within Groups

In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behavior while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behavior and to increase cooperation is to establish a system of costly peer punishment, that is, the possibility for every individual involved in the dilemma to impose costly punishment on interaction partners. However, recent research revealed that, in contrast to a situation without punishment, peer punishment is inefficient and maladaptive in the sense that the total payoff is reduced and punishment of cooperative individuals (i.e., antisocial punishment) is possible. In the present work, we propose that a system of democratic peer punishment, that is, direct and equal participation of each individual in the punishment decision‐making process with punishment only executed when a majority has voted for its execution, can address the shortcomings of a peer punishment system. Using iterated public goods games, we show higher cooperation levels, higher total payoffs, and reduced executed punishment in the democratic compared with a peer punishment system. Moreover, we document that fairness perceptions, satisfaction, and interpersonal trust are increased in the democratic punishment system. Implications for how cooperation and democratic punishment systems may evolve are discussed. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vigilant Self‐regulation and Costly Punishment in Public Goods Situations

Applying regulatory focus theory to the context of social dilemma situations, the present research demonstrates that individual differences in vigilant, prevention‐focused self‐regulation predict the tendency to invest private resources to punish uncooperative interaction partners (costly punishment), a behaviour that typically has strong positive effects on the collective level of cooperation. Analyses further support the distinctiveness of the vigilance system proposed in regulatory focus theory (prevention focus) in comparison with general defensive inhibitory tendencies (measured with Carver and White's Behavioral Inhibition System scale). Results document that individual differences in prevention‐focused self‐regulation but not differences in general defensive inhibitory tendencies are positively related to costly punishment. In sum, the findings indicate that vigilant, prevention‐focused self‐regulation plays a crucial role in the context of sanctions that enforce cooperation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The devil you know: the effects of identifiability on punishment

Prior research has confirmed Thomas Schelling's observation that people are more sympathetic and hence generous toward specific identified victims than toward “statistical” victims who are yet to be identified. In the study presented in this article we demonstrate an equivalent effect for punitiveness. We find that people are more punitive toward identified wrongdoers than toward equivalent, but unidentified, wrongdoers, even when identifying the wrongdoer conveys no meaningful information about him or her. To account for the effect of identifiability on both generosity and punitiveness, we propose that affective reactions of any type are stronger toward an identified than toward an unidentified target. Consistent with such an account, the effect of identifiability on punishing behavior was mediated by self‐reported anger. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

第三方惩罚中的规范错觉：基于公正世界信念的解释

惩罚规范在一定程度上会影响个体的惩罚行为, 但个体对惩罚规范的感知与实际规范之间可能存在差异, 这被称为规范错觉。为了更好地从这一角度理解第三方惩罚, 我们需要回答的是：第三方惩罚中是否存在规范错觉?如果存在, 其方向如何?会对个体自身的惩罚行为产生何种影响?实验1 (N = 449)和实验2 (N = 134)的结果表明, 在违规情境中, 人们往往低估了他人的惩罚水平, 这导致自身较低的惩罚行为。实验3 (N = 164)和实验4 (N = 284)进一步发现, 较弱的公正世界信念导致人们对他人惩罚水平的低估, 从而影响了自身的惩罚行为, 而社会距离调节了公正世界信念对规范错觉的影响。上述结果表明, 规范错觉会受到内部(公正世界信念)和外部(社会距离)两个参照点的影响, 同时也在一定程度上说明第三方惩罚是一种注重维护规范的积极行为、而非注重个人收益的策略行为。     

Personality,Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts Towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility

Contributions in the public goods game—a classical social dilemma situation—have been shown to depend strongly on the presence versus absence of punishment or sanctions for free riders. Also, there appear to be noteworthy individual differences in the degree to which decision makers cooperate. Herein, we aimed to bring these two lines of research together. Firstly, we predicted that both presence of punishment and high dispositional Honesty–Humility (as conceptualized in the Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to experience model of personality) should yield higher contributions. Secondly, and more importantly, we expected an interaction, such that only those low in Honesty–Humility would condition their behaviour on the presence versus absence of punishment, thus employing cooperation strategically. In line with the hypothesis, the results of two experiments (one of which comprised a longitudinal design) corroborated that the degree to which decision makers shift towards higher contributions when punishment is introduced depends on their dispositional level of Honesty–Humility. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game: The effect of exit on cooperation and social welfare

The prisoner's dilemma game is a mixed‐motive game that offers two players the simultaneous choice between a cooperative and a defective alternative. An often neglected aspect of such a binary‐choice game, however, is that in many real‐life encounters, people can choose not only to cooperate or defect, but they also have a third option: to exit the social dilemma. Although in the literature a consensus has emerged that the addition of an exit opportunity benefits cooperation, there is only scant research into its effect on social welfare. In order to allow a direct comparison of cooperation rates and welfare levels across binary‐choice and trinary‐choice games, in this study, we used a design in which the same participants played similar games with and without an exit option (i.e., a within‐subjects design), and this in a range of structural variations. The findings of our study indicated that the aggregated outcome of both players is generally lower in games with an exit option than in games without an exit option. Moreover, our results showed that the efficiency of the exit option strongly depends on the specific outcome structure of the game (in terms of its endowment size, (a)symmetry, and level of noncorrespondence). In the discussion, it is argued that the implementation of an exit option as a strategy to increase social welfare should be critically assessed.     

A Description–Experience Gap in Social Interactions: Information about Interdependence and Its Effects on Cooperation

In social interactions, decision makers are often unaware of their interdependence with others, precluding the realization of shared long‐term benefits. In an experiment, pairs of participants played an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under various conditions involving differing levels of interdependence information. Each pair was assigned to one of four conditions: “No‐Info” players saw their own actions and outcomes, but were not told that they interacted with another person; “Min‐Info” players knew they interacted with another person but still without seeing the other's actions or outcomes; “Mid‐Info” players discovered the other's actions and outcomes as they were revealed over time; and “Max‐Info” players were also shown a complete payoff matrix mapping actions to outcomes from the outset and throughout the game. With higher levels of interdependence information, we found increased individual cooperation and mutual cooperation, driven by increased reciprocating cooperation (in response to a counterpart's cooperation). Furthermore, joint performance and satisfaction were higher for pairs with more information. We discuss how awareness of interdependence may encourage cooperative behavior in real‐world interactions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.