Name that tune: Identifying popular recordings from brief excerpts

We tested listeners’ ability to identify brief excerpts from popular recordings. Listeners were required to match 200- or 100-msec excerpts with the song titles and artists. Performance was well above chance levels for 200-msec excerpts and poorer but still better than chance for 100-msec excerpts. Performance fell to chance levels when dynamic (time-varying) information was disrupted by playing the 100-msec excerpts backward and when high-frequency information was omitted from the 100-msec excerpts; performance was unaffected by the removal of low-frequency information. In sum, successful identification required the presence of dynamic, high-frequency spectral information.     

How probable is probably? It depends on whom you're talking about

Two studies tested whether people interpreted verbal chance terms in a self‐serving manner. Participants read statements describing the likelihood of events in their own future and in the future of a randomly chosen other. They interpreted the chance terms numerically. Chance terms were interpreted as denoting a higher probability when they were used to describe the likelihood of pleasant events in one's own future than when they were used to describe the likelihood of pleasant events in someone else's future (Study 1). Similarly, chance terms were interpreted as denoting a lower probability when they were used to describe the likelihood of unpleasant events in one's own future than when they were used to describe the likelihood of unpleasant events in someone else's future (Studies 1 and 2). These differences occurred primarily when the risk statements were threatening. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How people cope with uncertainty due to chance or deception

In making social judgments people process effects caused by humans differently from effects caused by non-human agencies. We assume that when they have to predict outcomes that are attributed to non-human causes, people acknowledge their ignorance and try to focus on what is most diagnostic. However, when events are attributed to human agency, they believe that nothing is arbitrary and that one can understand the decision situation well enough to eliminate error. If so, then people should behave differently when an uncertainty is attributed to chance (a non-human agency) or to deception (a human agency). We tested this prediction using the probability-matching paradigm and found reasonable support for our analysis in four experiments. Individuals who attributed uncertainty to deception were less likely to adopt the optimal rule-based strategy than those who attributed it to chance. Indeed, only when the former were prevented from thinking about and elaborating the outcomes (the high-interference condition in Experiment 3) was their performance comparable to the level of individuals in the chance condition.     

Wagering demonstrates subconscious processing in a binary exclusion task

We briefly presented either the letter 'b' or the letter 'h' to participants who were instructed to respond by saying the letter that was not shown. This binary version of the exclusion task avoids problems with assessing baseline completion rates. When the letters were shown for 5-10 ms participants erroneously responded with the shown letter at a rate greater than chance. They were capable of following the instructions when the letter was shown for longer (15 ms). Given the chance to wager low or high on their choices after short duration stimuli, participants declined to wager high even when they were correct. Taken together these results suggest that the briefly presented stimuli were processed subconsciously.     

Chance events in career development: Influence, control and multiplicity

This article reports three studies on the nature and impact of chance events. The first study investigated chance events in terms of the dimensions of influence and control. The second and third studies investigated the effects of multiplicity of chance events on career development are in terms of respondents’ own careers and then in terms of career scenarios. Results indicated that chance events can be characterized by the interactive influence of influence and control. High influence and low control chance events had the biggest impact on career development. When there is a connection between multiple chance events, the impact is greater than when unrelated chance events occur. The finding was confirmed regardless of whether individuals rated their own experiences or those presented in scenarios. However, it was also found that negative outcome chance events had the greatest impact regardless of whether such events were single or multiple influences on individuals’ careers. The results provide further support for the integration of chance events into the Chaos Theory of Careers.     

Effect of small cue-response separation on pattern discrimination in macaques (Macaca fuscata and M. mulatta)

In order to elucidate the nature of the effect of small cue-response separations on pattern discriminations by monkeys, three studies were performed. When training on a pattern discrimination with a cue-response separation was discontinued during performance at the chance level, there was no saving on the rate of learning a second task (with identical cues but a different cue-response separation) relative to the performance of naive control animals. By contrast, when training was discontinued at a performance level a little better than chance, there was significant saving on learning a second task. After learning the second task, a third task with new pattern cues was learned, with marked saving on the duration of performance at the chance level. The results indicate that during the initial stage of performance at the chance level, monkeys do not attend to cues if there is even a small separation between the cue and the response site.     

The Role of Evidence Diversity and Explanation in 4- and 5-Year-Olds’ Resolution of Counterevidence

Three experiments examined whether 4- and 5-year-olds can explicitly revise uncertain beliefs in light of disconfirming evidence. We considered 2 factors that might influence belief revision: a) the type and variability of evidence provided, and b) whether children generated an explanation of their initial hypothesis. When provided with limited observed evidence, children revised their belief about their initial guess greater than chance expectations, but differences were not observed when the quality of the explanation was considered (Experiment 1). In a similar paradigm, children revised their beliefs more often than chance when asked to explain or describe their initial belief when shown more diverse counterevidence (Experiment 2) or when told that their initial belief was incorrect (Experiment 3). Overall, these data suggest that preschoolers have nascent capacities for explicit belief revision in light of counterevidence.     

Accuracy of judgments of sexual orientation from thin slices of behavior.

In this research the authors examined the accuracy of judging sexual orientation on the basis of brief observations or "thin slices" of nonverbal behavior. In Study 1, sexual orientation was judged more accurately than chance, with judgments being more accurate when based on dynamic nonverbal behavior (10-s and 1-s silent video segments) than on static information (a series of 8 still photographs). Gay men and lesbians were more accurate than heterosexuals in judging still photographs and 1-s clips but not in 10-s clips. In Study 2, judgments based on 10-s dynamic figural outline displays containing primarily gestural information were more accurate than chance.     

阈上和阈下不同情绪线索对返回抑制的影响

为检验返回抑制是否受线索生物学意义的调节, 分别在实验一和实验二中以阈上和阈下不同情绪效价(高兴、生气和中性)的面孔为外源性线索, 变化同时提示位置的多寡, 要求被试对靶子尽可能快而准地作探测反应。实验一发现, 三种线索情况下均出现返回抑制且效应量无显著差异; 实验二发现, 线索为中性面孔时出现返回抑制, 线索为高兴和生气面孔时未出现返回抑制。说明返回抑制受线索生物学意义的调节。阈下线索的生物学意义(情绪效价)能得到自动加工, 从而影响空间注意的转移和返回抑制机制的功用; 阈上线索的情绪效价被清晰感知时, 自上而下的注意控制机制使线索的生物学意义被忽略, 从而阻碍情绪效价功能的发挥。     

Recognising what you like: Examining the relation between the mere-exposure effect and recognition

The perceptual fluency/attributional model of the mere-exposure effect proposed by R. F. Bornstein and P. D'Agostino (1992) predicts that when recognition of a previously presented stimulus is above chance, feelings of fluency associated with that stimulus are discounted and thus the amount of fluency (mis)attributed to liking is reduced. This correction process results in smaller mere-exposure effects for supraliminal stimuli than for “subliminal” stimuli because when recognition is below chance participants are unaware of the source of fluency and they do not engage in correction. We tested this prediction in three experiments by presenting photographs of faces (Experiments 1 and 2) and polygons (Experiment 3) at varying exposure frequencies for 40 ms and 400 ms durations. Contrary to the prediction of the model, a significant mere-exposure effect was only found when recognition performance was at its highest level. Furthermore, across the three experiments liking and recognition were positively correlated.     

Child and Adult Sensitivity to Gender Information in Patterns of Facial Motion

Sixty 5-year-olds and 120 adults participated in research that examined the development of sensitivity to gender information in patterns of facial motion. Subjects were asked to identify the gender of static or dynamic versions of point-light stimulus faces. The dynamic facial displays were filmed either while the stimulus recited the alphabet or while they were engaged in an interaction. Although adults' levels of identification accuracy were greater than those obtained by children, both age groups were able to identify the gender of dynamic facial displays at greater than chance levels. However, adults were able to identify the gender of both reciting and interacting faces, whereas children could only discriminate sex at greater than chance levels when observing interacting faces.     

Development of "hot" executive function: the children's gambling task

Development of affective decision-making was studied in 48 children at two ages (3 and 4 years) using a simplified version of the Iowa Gambling Task (). On each of 50 trials, children chose from 1 of 2 decks of cards that, when turned, displayed happy and sad faces, corresponding to rewards (candies) won and lost, respectively. Cards in 1 deck offered more rewards per trial, but were disadvantageous across trials due to occasional large losses; cards in the other deck offered fewer rewards per trial, but were advantageous overall. On later trials, 4-year-olds made more advantageous choices than 3-year-olds, and 4-year-olds made more advantageous choices than would be expected by chance, whereas 3-year-olds made more disadvantageous choices than would be expected by chance. These findings, which were especially pronounced for girls, indicate that affective decision-making develops rapidly during the preschool period, possibly reflecting the growth of neural systems involving orbitofrontal cortex.     

Evidence for a confidence–accuracy relationship in memory for same- and cross-race faces

Discrimination accuracy is usually higher for same- than for cross-race faces, a phenomenon known as the cross-race effect (CRE). According to prior research, the CRE occurs because memories for same- and cross-race faces rely on qualitatively different processes. However, according to a continuous dual-process model of recognition memory, memories that rely on qualitatively different processes do not differ in recognition accuracy when confidence is equated. Thus, although there are differences in overall same- and cross-race discrimination accuracy, confidence-specific accuracy (i.e., recognition accuracy at a particular level of confidence) may not differ. We analysed datasets from four recognition memory studies on same- and cross-race faces to test this hypothesis. Confidence ratings reliably predicted recognition accuracy when performance was above chance levels (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) but not when performance was at chance levels (Experiment 4). Furthermore, at each level of confidence, confidence-specific accuracy for same- and cross-race faces did not significantly differ when overall performance was above chance levels (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) but significantly differed when overall performance was at chance levels (Experiment 4). Thus, under certain conditions, high-confidence same-race and cross-race identifications may be equally reliable.     

Simple rotary motion is integrated across fixations

Participants were shown a line rotating at a constant angular velocity and were asked to judge whether motion was continuous or whether the line jumped (i.e., moved either forward or backward in the rotary cycle). In two experiments, the participants were significantly better than chance in detecting these jumps in simple rotary motion even when the jumps occurred during a saccade. Moreover, in Experiment 2, when the jump occurred during a saccade followed by a masking flash, perception of the jump was at least as good as when it occurred during a fixation followed by a masking flash. These results complement and extend the findings of Verfaillie and co-workers, who found that perceptions of some changes in biological motion were as good across fixations as when they occurred during a fixation. These findings are in contrast to the common finding, in the reading literature, that people are consciously "blind" to many changes in the text and to those, in the scene perception literature, in which detection of static changes across fixations is above chance but plausibly well below the level that would be expected if the change occurred during a fixation.     

Handedness and lateral positioning in heterosexual couples: Are men still strong-arming women?

This study examined the way in which heterosexual couples arrange themselves while walking together. In same-handed couples, significantly more females were on the males' preferred (dominant) side than expected by chance — especially when the partners were touching. Apparently, handedness and lateral positioning combine to reflect a male-dominance tendency in this type of situation. In opposite-handed couples, males and females put their dominant sides together, especially when touching. Social implications of these findings and suggestions for future research are also discussed.     

Analogical reasoning and the differential outcome effect: transitory bridging of the conceptual gap for rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Monkeys, unlike chimpanzees and humans, have a marked difficulty acquiring relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks that likely reflect the cognitive foundation upon which analogical reasoning rests. In the present study, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed a categorical (identity and nonidentity) RMTS task with differential reward (pellet ratio) and/or punishment (timeout ratio) outcomes for correct and incorrect choices. Monkeys in either differential reward-only or punishment-only conditions performed at chance levels. However, the RMTS performance of monkeys experiencing both differential reward and punishment conditions was significantly better than chance. Subsequently when all animals experienced nondifferential outcomes tests, their RMTS performance levels were at chance. These results indicate that combining differential reward and punishment contingencies provide an effective, albeit transitory, scaffolding for monkeys to judge analogical relations-between-relations.     

Judgement of lateral orientation for previously seen and unseen photographs of faces

In Study 1, 56 undergraduates judged whether each member of two sets of unseen photographs of faces was shown in the original or reversed orientation. Performance was at chance level, indicating that they could not perform this task. In Studies 2 and 3, the first of which involved unanalyzed data from previously-published work, an investigation was made of identification of orientation for faces which had been laterally reversed in the course of experiments on recognition memory. For a total of 406 subjects, over-all identification accuracy was about 60%, which was above chance. However, subjects were correct more often on normal (unchanged) than on reversed (changed) faces and were generally more likely to identify a face as normal when they were certain than when they were uncertain in their initial recognition judgement. It was concluded that identification performance could largely be accounted for by a response strategy model in which subjects judged orientation on the basis of their subjective familiarity with the face. Together, these studies demonstrate that subjects could not usually detect the lateral orientation of previously-seen or of unseen photographs of faces.     

Illusory Personal Control as a Determinant of Bet Size and Type in Casino Craps Games1

Langer's (1974, 1975) theory regarding the conditions under which subjects performing a chance task will suffer from an illusion of control over the outcome has specified 6 conditions proposed to enhance the illusion ofcontrol in chance tasks. A number of studies have applied her theory and predictions to gambling, a real‐world arena of chance tasks where participants have been observed to act as if the outcomes are controllable by the use of various “logical” (acting on the “gambler's fallacy”) and superstitious strategies (e. g., blowing on dice). Thus far, however, these studies have not been conducted in naturalistic gaming environments and have yielded mixed results regarding the operation of the illusion of control. The present research offers the first study of the operation of the illusion of control in such a real‐world context. In order to examine the effects of active vs. passive task participation (a variable hypothesized by Langer to affect the illusion of control), patrons of Reno casinos were observed placing craps bets on their own and another yoked patron's dice rolls. It was hypothesized that subjects would (a) place higher bets and (b) place more “difficult” bets (e. g., where only one specific number, as opposed to any of several numbers, may win) on their own rolls (when they would experience the illusion of control over the outcome) than on other patrons' roles (when they would not experience such an illusion). That is, players were expected to generally adopt riskier betting strategies when throwing the dice. Results supported the hypotheses.     

Perceiving minimal distinctions in ASL under normal and point-light display conditions

Perceptual confusions within 36 formationally minimal pairs of signs were assessed for native signers under two conditions of video presentation: (1) normally lighted black-and-white displays and (2) point-light displays constructed by affixing 26 points of retroreflective tape on the fingertips, back knuckles, and wrists and 1 point on the nose of the signer. Nine pairs were selected for each of the formational parameters of handshape, location, movement, and orientation. For each minimal pair, a native signer constructed and signed an ASL sentence that was syntactically and semantically appropriate for both members of the pair. Fourteen highly fluent ASL users responded by selecting a picture appropriate to the viewed sentence, thus avoiding contamination by English. For both viewing conditions, subjects discriminated the minimal pairs significantly better than chance. Performance was better (1) when location or orientation differentiated the signs than when movement or handshape did and (2) in normal lighting than in the point-light displays. With the point/light displays, discrimination of location, movement, and orientation was poorer and handshape discrimination was at chance. The discussion considers (1) the confusion of signs in the absence of linguistic redundancy, (2) the effectivenese of the point-light configurations as “minimal cues” for the contrasts, and (3) the efficacy of using these point-light configurations to reduce the information in ASL to a narrow bandwidth.     

Confirmation Bias in General Aviation Lost Procedures

Pilots, students and orienteers completed three tasks in which they imagined that they were lost. For each task, participants were provided with a map and instructed to select one of three provided features to help them decide if they were at a certain (incorrect) location. One feature was unique to the correct location; the other two features were consistent with locations in both the incorrect location and the correct location. The unique feature was therefore the ‘correct’ choice to make. Only orienteers chose the unique feature at a rate significantly higher than chance; all other groups performed either at or worse than expected by chance. Attempts to increase the rate of disconfirming choices were largely ineffective. Findings suggest that when they are lost, both pilots and psychology students, but not orienteers, adopt a confirmatory approach to ascertain their location, which may put pilots who are already lost at even greater risk. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.