Reconsidering Relational Anthropology: A Critical Assessment of John Zizioulas's Theological Anthropology

Abstract:  There has been an increasing emphasis in theological anthropology on the constitution of the person through their relation to God, others, self and the world. In focusing on the relational dimensions of personhood other important facets have not received sufficient attention: the doctrine of sin, the discontinuity between divine and human persons and human embodiment in the world. This article offers a critical assessment of John Zizioulas's anthropology which can be considered a paradigmatic example of a relational anthropology. Although the concerns raised are in relation to Zizioulas's work, many of them are instructive for relational anthropologies more generally.     

'Instrument of the union of hearts': The Theology of Personhood and the Bishop

This article explores Schlatter's doctrine of the Trinity in the light of the contemporary debate, focusing on the relation of the economic and the ontological Trinity. It is shown that Schlatter relates God's triune being and God's trinitarian action through the notion of love – where God's love ad extra as well as ad intra is oriented toward the particular in such a way as to enable true otherness. It will be argued, moreover, that Schlatter's contribution to the contemporary trinitarian debate lies in propounding an applied trinitarian theology which is faithful to its object. When God in himself and in relation to creation is oriented toward and actively seeks the other, then theology cannot talk about God's being apart from the actuality of his actions in this world.     

Catholic, Calvinist, and Lutheran Doctrines of Eucharistic Presence: A Brief Note towards a Rapprochement

This article explores Schlatter's doctrine of the Trinity in the light of the contemporary debate, focusing on the relation of the economic and the ontological Trinity. It is shown that Schlatter relates God's triune being and God's trinitarian action through the notion of love – where God's love ad extra as well as ad intra is oriented toward the particular in such a way as to enable true otherness. It will be argued, moreover, that Schlatter's contribution to the contemporary trinitarian debate lies in propounding an applied trinitarian theology which is faithful to its object. When God in himself and in relation to creation is oriented toward and actively seeks the other, then theology cannot talk about God's being apart from the actuality of his actions in this world.     

Divine Action and the Trinity: A Brief Exploration of the Grounds of Trinitarian Speech about God in the Theology of Adolf Schlatter

This article explores Schlatter's doctrine of the Trinity in the light of the contemporary debate, focusing on the relation of the economic and the ontological Trinity. It is shown that Schlatter relates God's triune being and God's trinitarian action through the notion of love – where God's love ad extra as well as ad intra is oriented toward the particular in such a way as to enable true otherness. It will be argued, moreover, that Schlatter's contribution to the contemporary trinitarian debate lies in propounding an applied trinitarian theology which is faithful to its object. When God in himself and in relation to creation is oriented toward and actively seeks the other, then theology cannot talk about God's being apart from the actuality of his actions in this world.     

Evolution as Revelation of a Triune God

In 1917 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin wrote an essay that proposes union as a way to observe how the process of evolution takes place. He spent the remainder of his life broadening and sharpening the vision, which was based on union in nature. We propose that this vision and the historical development of thermodynamics and classical statistical mechanics offer insight into union and even into the divine life that many Christians believe to be triadic. We briefly situate union in the triune divine life in early Christian tradition as it was believed and practiced. We then interpret three stages of development in the sciences of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics that support the theme of union in nature. Next we describe the development of Teilhard's thought during his scientific career and his tests of the theme of union, principally in his private journals, now being edited. We offer examples of Teilhard's application of union to his own spiritual life and compare his understanding of union with those of Paul the Apostle and John of the Cross. Finally, although the Christian God's triadic life was not a particular concern of Teilhard, we propose union in nature as a vestige of the divine life.     

A Parsimonious Model of Divine Simplicity

Many recent treatments of divine simplicity have been highly critical of traditional accounts of the doctrine. Critics have challenged whether the doctrine is coherent and whether it can be squared with a robust theology of the triune God. Yet the theological tradition is largely persuaded that the doctrine of divine simplicity is not only coherent and true, but also that the doctrine of divine simplicity is needed for an account of the Trinity that does not fall into the trap of tritheism. In addition, both Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions include conciliar and confessional support for the doctrine, and allow for more than one way of accounting for the doctrine. This essay offers a constructive account that seeks to avoid some of the most significant concerns raised in the recent theological and philosophical literature. It depends in important respects upon work being done in analytic theology on the use of models in theology, adopted (with suitable amendments) from the philosophy of science. After giving some dogmatic context, three versions of divine simplicity are laid out. Then, a parsimonious version of the doctrine is set forth and considered as a potentially fruitful model, which may have theological utility. The essay ends with some remarks about the way in which this new model of the doctrine may have value in ecumenical theology.     

‘God … or a Bad,or Mad,Man’: C.S. Lewis's Argument for Christ – A Systematic Theological,Historical and Philosophical Analysis of Aut Deus Aut Malus Homo

The proposition that Jesus was ‘Bad, Mad or God’ is central to C.S. Lewis's popular apologetics. It is fêted by American Evangelicals, cautiously endorsed by Roman Catholics and Protestants, but often scorned by philosophers of religion. Most, mistakenly, regard Lewis's trilemma as unique. This paper examines the roots of this proposition in a two thousand year old theological and philosophical tradition (that is, aut Deus aut malus homo), grounded in the Johannine trilemma (‘unbalanced liar’, or ‘demonically possessed’, or ‘the God of Israel come amongst his people’). Jesus can only be understood in the context of the Jewish religious categories he was born into; therefore, for Lewis, Jesus is who he reveals himself to be. Jesus' self‐understanding reflects his identity, his triune salvific role; this is for Lewis, the transposed reality of divine Sonship. Reason and logic are paramount here, reflected in the structure of Lewis's argument. Lewis's trilemma is not so much a proof of God's existence, but a question, a dilemma, where each and every person must come to a decision. For all its perceived faults, its simplistic language, Lewis's trilemma still is a very successful piece of Christian apologetic, grounded in a serious philosophical and theological tradition.     

Trinity and Creation

A theology of creation requires clarity about trinitarian doctrine, especially the relation of the one divine essence to the three persons, the distinction between immanent and transitive acts, and the indivisibility of God's outer works. The triune God is one undivided essence in an irreducible threefold personal modification. The persons of the godhead are distinguished from each other by mutual relations and by each person's proper characteristics; these relations constitute God's immanent perfection anterior to creation. The work of creation is a non-necessary, novel and voluntary work of the Trinity. As an outer work it demonstrates God's unity: the work of creation is not divisible into three distinct actions. But distinct and eminent appropriation of specific acts to specific persons is permissible if each person is understood as a mode of the one divine essence. Creation is thus a common work of the undivided three-in-one; there are not three creators, but three who create.     

Liturgy: Divine and Human Service

Liturgy has been the forum for the enactment of a diverse range of theologies, at times stressing the human, at times the divine. Following Emmanuel Levinas, this article understands the meaning of liturgy as ' a movement of the Same towards the Other which never returns to the Same .' Whether directed towards God, or expressive of human longing, the structure of liturgy is essentially ' for -the-Other.' This movement out of self is seen when one considers liturgy as the 'work of the people,' where 'work' is understood as Œuvre rather than travail . To say that liturgy is œuvre is to situate its significance not in the activity of the subject who has a concern to achieve or realise something through his own effort, but in the Other who inspires the work. The activism of travail finds its counter in the essential passivity of œuvre . By recognising this the horizontal and vertical elements within divine liturgy can be brought together in a mutually indispensable way. As essentially 'for-the-Other,' responsible service, which is at one and the same time divine service and human service, is at the heart of the liturgy. In liturgy we are drawn out of ourselves in a 'movement of the Same towards the Other which never returns to the Same' and which is positively experienced as responsibility. It is not that we first worship and then are called unto service in a movement out of self towards the Otherness of God and thereafter towards the Otherness of the other person. The movement out of self – liturgy – is at one and the same time worship and ethics, an ethical worship, in which justice is rendered both to God and to the other person.     

God and Personality

Among the traditional list of divine attributes it is commonly said that God is a person. Making a distinction between being a person and having a personality, it is argued that God cannot be a person because it makes no sense to think of him as having a personality. Problems with the notion of divine personality are considered stemming from God's perfection, his infinity, his omniscience, his rationality, his morally good nature and his gender neutrality. Three generic types of response to these problems are considered, but each is found wanting. It is concluded that the problems with personality apply as much to the human case as to the divine.     

The Necessities of Perfect Freedom

This article is a reflection on Augustine's suggestion that Christians have significant theological reasons to accept that freedom need not be correlated with having choices. Following his lead, I explore questions about freedom and agency raised by the perfect freedom of the saints in heaven, Jesus' sinless earthly life and the freedom with which the triune God is eternally blessed. My thesis is that those who worship the triune God and praise the sinless perfection of Christ and the heavenly saints have reason to accept a ‘normative’ conception of freedom, according to which certain kinds of necessity are not merely compatible with perfect freedom but intrinsic to it.     

Not Three People: The Fundamental Themes of Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology as Seen in To Ablabius: On Not Three Gods

Gregory of Nyssa's small text On Not Three Gods has often been treated as a key statement of his supposedly "pluralistic" and/or "social" Trinitarianism. I argue, first, that Gregory's intention here is to shift discussion away from a focus on the possible analogies between the divine life and three seemingly distinct human beings, toward themes more fundamental in his theology. Second, I offer a reading of On Not Three Gods to show how Gregory's Trinitarian theology—as all pro–Nicene theologies—revolves around a strong commitment to the unity of the divine power and activity and an equally strong insistence that all statements about the divine life and persons are governed by an account of the divine incomprehensibility.     

Gregory of Nyssa and Divine Simplicity: A Conceptualist Reading

Andrew Radde‐Gallwitz probes Gregory of Nyssa on divine simplicity, a topic that Radde‐Gallwitz treated earlier in a book‐length monograph and takes further here in response to critics. As he notes, the Cappadocians and their opponents shared belief in divine simplicity. But for Gregory, simplicity functions as part of affirming the co‐equal divinity of the Father and Son, against his opponents. Radde‐Gallwitz lists six negative claims that Gregory’s understanding of divine simplicity supports: (1) God is immaterial; (2) God is without parts; (3) God does not possess any perfection “by acquisition”; (4) God does not possess any perfection “by participation”; (5) in God, there is no mixture or conflux of qualities, especially opposite qualities; (6) in God, there are no degrees of more or less. Yet with regard to positive statements about God’s perfections—for example the relation of God’s goodness to God’s wisdom—things are more difficult, as Radde‐Gallwitz shows. Interpreters of Gregory have differed sharply on this issue, in part because Gregory does not make his position crystal clear. Radde‐Gallwitz himself earlier held that Gregory considers God to have real but non‐definitive perfections distinct from the divine essence. Indebted to Richard Cross, however, Radde‐Gallwitz here adjusts his view, distinguishing more firmly between the divine essence itself and our limited concepts. He draws upon the Platonic distinction between natural and conventional naming, which differ in their accounts of what makes words meaningful. Arguing that Gregory is a “naturalist,” he reads Gregory’s texts on divine simplicity in this light.     

Rationalizing Socrates’ daimonion

That Socrates took himself to possess a divine sign is well attested by ancient sources. Both Plato and Xenophon mention Socrates’ daimonion on numerous occasions. What is problematic for contemporary scholars is that Socrates unfailingly obeys the warnings of his sign. Scholars have worried that Socrates seems to ascribe greater epistemic authority to his sign than his own critical reasoning. Moreover, he never so much as questions the authority of his sign to guide his actions, much less its divine nature. Socrates’ unquestioning obedience to his sign thus appears to be in conflict with another of Socrates’ defining characteristics: namely, his relentless rationality. However, Socrates does not seem to recognize such inconsistency. The problem of the daimonion, then, is this: is Socrates’ professed commitment to rationality consistent with his unquestioning deference to his daimonion’s warnings? And if so, how? In this paper, I first discuss several solutions to the problem of the daimonion. I aim to show that none of the accounts of Socrates’ sign that have appeared in the scholarly literature are adequate. I then propose a new account of the daimonion, which, I argue, secures the rationality of Socrates’ obedience to his divine sign.     

The Dialectic of Divine Love: Pannenberg's Hegelian Trinitarianism

Abstract: In this study of Pannenberg's social trinitarianism, I first present his Hegelian‐dialectical approach to the problem of the unity and plurality in God, highlighting his many innovations, such as the mutual reciprocity of the divine persons, the mutual mediation of the divine essence and the three persons, the essence as self‐manifestation and a force field, the Holy Spirit as the divine essence, which is love. Second, I discuss serious reservations about some of the consequences of these innovations, such as the monarchy of the Spirit, the elevation of the divine essence as an entity above the three persons, the failure to explain the specificity and equality of each person, and others.     

Karl Barth and the Purification of Divine Simplicity

Johnson investigates Karl Barth's critical appropriation of the doctrine of divine simplicity. While Barth is critical of traditional formulations of the doctrine, he understands himself to be refining the doctrine rather than rejecting it. Barth notes that Scripture attributes a diverse set of perfections to God in describing his salvific actions. These diverse perfections, however, have a fundamental unity: God does not contradict himself, but rather his perfections describe his unified, trustworthy agency. For this reason, we can know that in God's inmost being, God is not self‐contradictory but utterly unified or simple in his self‐fidelity. Johnson points out that a key element of Barth's doctrine of God is that it can never be the mere deduction of an abstract, transcendent entity; rather, it must begin with the transcendent God's relationship to creation, and therefore must begin with Jesus Christ, who reveals the true being of God. Johnson identifies three guidelines for speaking of Barth's doctrine: each one of God's perfections must be seen as perfections of his one divine being; God's one being does not exist above and behind his revealed perfections; and God's revealed perfections are essential to his divine nature. On this basis, Johnson explores what Barth has to say about the relationship between God's freedom and his self‐fidelity, including as this regards his freedom to live his one eternal life for us.     

The Consubstantial Otherness of God: Divine Simplicity and the Trinity in Hans Urs von Balthasar

Martin explores divine simplicity according to the twentieth‐century Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar. She grants that Balthasar does not provide a traditional presentation of the attribute of divine simplicity. In his doctrine of the Trinity, Balthasar emphasizes such themes as distance, “hiatus,” and infinite difference, none of which seems to promise a robust doctrine of divine simplicity. Indeed, some have suggested that Balthasar's Trinitarian theology does not allow for traditional claims about divine simplicity. Martin argues, however, that one finds in Balthasar's Trinitarian theology the doctrine of divine simplicity, assumed as an internalized starting point and rooted in his understanding of the analogia entis. This can be seen, for example, in his various engagements with Aquinas as well as with contemporary thinkers such as Gustav Siewerth and Erich Przywara. Likewise, when addressing the issue of whether the Trinitarian Persons can be “counted” according to our normal understanding of number, he insists with Evagrius that God is simple. In the same context, he similarly draws upon Plotinus, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, Tertullian, Ambrose, and Aquinas. Martin therefore gives particular attention to the Theo‐Logic and to Balthasar's affirmation in his Trinitarian theology of the points that the divine Persons are fully God, the divine attributes are identical with each other in God, and the distinction of Persons has to do not with three parts of God but with opposed subsistent relations.     

Skepticism and faith in Shestov’s early critique of rationalism

Shestov’s work can be summed up under six headings. Three are sharp contrasts, three are paradoxes. (1) First there is the contrast between Shestov the person, who was moderate, competent, and calm, and Shestov the thinker, who was extreme, incandescent, and impassioned. (2) Then there is the contrast between his critique of reason, his acceptance of irrationalism, and the means by which he attacks the former and defends the latter: namely, careful rational argument. Sometimes he argues like a lawyer (after all, he had a law degree from Moscow University). (3) Shestov speaks repeatedly of the “horrors and atrocities of human existence.” But his examples are always drawn from history or literature, never from his own life, although we know that he experienced much horror. (4) Nietzsche is the thinker whom he invokes most frequently, and most warmly. Yet, paradoxically, Shestov completely ignores most of Nietzsche’s central themes. (5) Shestov’s skeptical doubts are mostly directed at rationalism; he is not skeptical about the existence or benevolence of God. Yet he is explicitly skeptical about divine omniscience and implicitly skeptical about divine omnipotence in a metaphysical sense, though not in its ethical application. (6) Shestov has a deep faith that God can undo all the horrors of life, putting an end to all suffering. At the same time he knows that this will not, and cannot, happen, since the very idea of undoing the past, erasing its horrors, is conceptually incoherent.     

The Livingness of God; or,the Place of Substance and Dynamism in a Theology of the Divine Perfections

Theological reflection on the divine character is serviceable to the extent that it prevents the livingness of the triune God – and so the subject matter of theology – from disappearing behind rigorous consideration of the perfections themselves. The topic of God's livingness, in other words, informs the locus de Deo as a whole. The present article begins with a biblical‐dogmatic proposal for the form and content of this livingness: God's life in and for the world, it is proposed, is at every point rooted in the life which God has from himself as Father, Son and Spirit. Two clarifications are subsequently offered. An appeal to the livingness of God should be distinguished both from an abstract rejection of ‘substance’ language and from a conceptualization of reality under a general theory of the forward advancement of the world process.