Proxy “Actualism” *

Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have recently proposed a new form of actualism. I characterize the general form of their view and the motivations behind it. I argue that it is not quite new – it bears interesting similarities to Alvin Plantinga’s view – and that it definitely isn’t actualist. * I would like to thank Rae Langton, Jim Pryor, Robert Stalnaker, Ed Zalta, and, especially, an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for very helpful comments. Thanks also to Andrew Cortens, Michael Jubien, and an audience at the ANU for helpful discussion of an early version of this paper.     

Toleration and Cultural Controversies*

Multicultural societies are far more likely than others to include minorities committed to the pursuit of practices that offend the majority, and treating the cultural commitments of all citizens fairly will require some set of guiding principles to distinguish tolerable ‘cultural controversies’ from intolerable ones. This paper does not directly address the moral question at stake here (i.e. demarcating the limits of toleration) but rather seeks to provide a politically justifiable normative argument to explain when tolerant restraint is necessary, permissible or prohibited. This argument emerges from a concern to treat the cultural commitments of all citizens fairly. In turn, the argument indicates a potential reconciliation of the ‘politics of toleration’ with the ‘politics of respect’. *I would like to thank Stephen De Wijze, Hillel Steiner, Thomas Uebel, Peter Jones and Res Publica’s anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. I would also like to thank the ESRC for providing funding.     

Child age, parent and child gender, and domain differences in parents’ attributions and responses to children’s outcomes

The influence of children’s age, and parents’ and children’s gender on parents’ attributions and emotional and behavioral responses to their children’s successful and unsuccessful social and academic outcomes, was investigated. Seventy-six dual-parent families (mothers and fathers) of fifth (n=28), eighth (n=23), and eleventh grade (n=25) children participated. The results of this study suggest that from fifth grade on, at least, the ways parents explain the causes of and respond to their children’s social behavior and academic outcomes involves a complex interaction of children’s age, children’s gender, parents’ gender, domain, and outcome. Results are discussed in terms of children’s socialization. This paper is based in part on a master’s thesis at Clark University by the first author. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Providence, RI, April 1994. The authors would like to thank the parents, teachers, and school administrators of Holden and Auburn, Massachusetts, who participated in this project. We would also like to thank Kristen Rotis and Leslie Edwards for their tireless help in revising and preparing the questionnaires, and for entering data for this project.     

Changes in masculine and feminine traits over time: A meta-analysis

Sixty-three samples providing single-sex means on the Bem Sex-Role Inventory [BSRI; S. L. Bem (1974) “The Measurement of Psychological Androgyny,”Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 42, pp. 155–162] and 40 reporting similar data on the Personal Attributes Questionnaire [PAQ; J. T. Spence and R. L. Helmreich (1978)Masculinity and Feminity, Austin University of Texas Press] for American undergraduates were located and analyzed. Women’s scores on the BSRI-M and PAQ-M (masculine) scales have increased steadily over time (r’s = .74 and .43, respectively). Women’s BSRI-F and PAQ-F (feminine) scale scores do not correlate with year. Men’s BSRI-M scores show a weaker positive relationship with year of administration (r = .47). The effect size for sex differences on the BSRI-M has also changed over time, showing a significant decrease over the twenty-year period. The results suggest that cultural change and environment may affect individual personalities; these changes in BSRI and PAQ means demonstrate women’s increased endorsement of masculine-stereotyped traits and men’s continued nonendorsement of feminine-steretyped traits. A version of this paper was presented at the 1995 annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, August 11–15, New York. I. would like to thank Abigail J. Stewart and Randy J. Larsen for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.     

A Just Global Economy: In Defense of Rawls

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls does not discuss justice and the global economy at great length or in great detail. What he does say has not been well-received. The prevailing view seems to be that what Rawls says in The Law of Peoples regarding global economic justice is both inconsistent with and a betrayal of his own liberal egalitarian commitments, an unexpected and unacceptable defense of the status quo. This view is, I think, mistaken. Rawls’s position on global or international economic justice is richer, more nuanced, and generally more compelling than his critics have been willing to acknowledge. My aim in this essay is to sympathetically set out, and then defend against two common families of objection to, Rawls’s position on global or international economic justice. Objections of the first sort reject Rawls’s position as inadequately attentive to the material and economic interests of individual persons worldwide. Objections of the second sort reject it as inadequately attentive to the material and economic interests of well-ordered peoples. Throughout the paper I develop several arguments implicit in The Law of Peoples but not well-developed there as well as offer some additional arguments of my own consistent with the spirit of The Law of Peoples and Rawls’s work more generally. I conclude with some brief remarks expressing two worries I have about Rawls’s position – one concerning global public goods, the other concerning the formation of a morally adequate and effective political will within the international context under contemporary conditions. I wish to thank Alyssa Bernstein, Allen Buchanan, Samuel Freeman, John Hardwig, John Mandle, Rex Martin, Jim Nickel, Walter Riker, Kok-Chor Tan, and Leif Wenar for helpful comments or instructive conversation regarding earlier drafts of this paper.     

Gender sceptics and feminist politics

Some feminist gender sceptics hold that the conditions for satisfying the concept woman cannot be discerned. This has been taken to suggest that (i) the efforts to fix feminism’s scope are undermined because of confusion about the extension of the term ‘woman’, and (ii) this confusion suggests that feminism cannot be organised around women because it is unclear who satisfies woman. Further, this supposedly threatens the effectiveness of feminist politics: feminist goals are said to become unachievable, if feminist politics lacks a clear subject matter. In this paper, I argue that such serious consequences do not follow from the gender sceptic position. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the ‘Stirling Political Philosophy Group’ meeting and am grateful to those present for their constructive criticisms. I am also grateful to Alan Millar, the anonymous referees for this journal and Jenny Saul (who has read more than one version of this paper!) for their detailed and extremely helpful comments and suggestions.     

Rigid Designators for Properties

Here I defend the position that some singular terms for properties are rigid designators, responding to Stephen P. Schwartz’s interesting criticisms of that position. First, I argue that my position does not depend on ontological parsimony with respect to properties – e.g., there is no need to claim that there are only natural properties – to get around the problem of “unusual properties.” Second, I argue that my position does not confuse sameness of meaning across possible worlds with sameness of designation, or rigid designation. Third, I argue that my position does not founder by way of failing to assign rigidity the work of grounding a posteriori necessity. I thank Steve Schwartz and Bernard Linsky for helpful feedback on this paper     

Jewish pioneers on Canada’s prairies: The Lipton Jewish agricultural colony

This article offers a detailed analysis of the forces that shaped the Lipton colony in its 50-year existence, one of several dozen attempts to establish Jewish agricultural settlement on Canada’s Western prairies. Comparing both the particularities and the common features of Lipton with those of other colonies will allow strengthening some of the commonly accepted generalizations regarding these colonies, while at the same time showing other assumptions to be questionable or even myth. * A detailed discussion of the Jewish agricultural colonies in Western Canada may be found in Yossi Katz and John C. Lehr, The Last Best West: Essays on the Historical Geography of the Canadian Prairies (Jerusalem, 1999). Other sources discussing the colonies and the reasons for their establishment and ultimate disappearance are: Louis Rosenberg, “Jewish Agriculture in Canada” YIVO Annual of Social Sciences 5 (1950), 205–215; Louis Rosenberg, Canada’s Jews: A Social and Economic Study of the Jews of Canada in the 1930s (Montreal, 1931); Abraham J. Arnold, “The Contribution of the Jews to the Opening and Development of the West” Transactions of the Manitoba Historical Society Series 3 no. 3, (Winnipeg, 1968–’69).     

Adorno vs. Levinas: Evaluating points of contention

Although Adorno and Levinas share many arguments, I attempt to sharpen and evaluate their disagreements. Both held extreme and seemingly opposite views of art, with Adorno arguing that art presents modernity’s highest order of truth and Levinas denouncing it as shameful idolatry. Considering this striking difference brings to light fundamental substantive and methodological incompatibilities between them. Levinas’ assertion of the transcendence of the face should be understood as the most telling point of departure between his and Adorno’s critiques of instrumental reason. I attempt to explain why Levinas believed this move was justifiable and how Adorno would understand Levinas’ notion of illeity as a cultural byproduct and a form of dogmatism. Adorno’s historical and sociological account of the disenchantment of the world and the destruction of aura within a culture fully administered by scientific rationality and economic reductionism sharply contrasts to Levinas’ transcendental phenomenology, and I argue that Adorno’s thoroughgoing refusal to constrain dialectical reflection is ultimately more compelling. This paper benefited from exchanges with Jay Bernstein, Bob Scharff, Gregg Horowitz, David Wood, Max Pensky, Scott Bakker, and critics of the earlier version of this argument presented at the 2004 meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. I also thank unnamed reviewers from Continental Philosophy Review for their generous and thoughtful comments and the members of the University of New Hampshire Center for Humanities for their financial support.     

Big-five personality differences of cheaters and non-cheaters

Infidelity is a major factor in causing marital dissolution and dissatisfaction in North America. Similarities in personality traits influence the desire for a monogamous relationship commitment. The present study examined differences between cheaters and non-cheaters on Goldberg’s (1990) “Big-Five Personality Factors”: Extroversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect-Openness. One hundred and four participants volunteered to answer a questionnaire on personality traits about themselves and their monogamous partners. A total of 45 males and 59 females rated themselves and an equal number of partners on the traits (n = 208). Results revealed statistically significant differences between cheaters and non-cheaters on the five-factor model. Differences were also found between both of the group’s perceptions of themselves and their monogamous partners on these factors. We wish to thank the editor and reviewers of this journal for their helpful and precise comments towards revisions of this publication. The primary author also wishes to thank Dr. Kevin Alderson for his suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Big-five personality differences of cheaters and non-cheaters

Infidelity is a major factor in causing marital dissolution and dissatisfaction in North America. Similarities in personality traits influence the desire for a monogamous relationship commitment. The present study examined differences between cheaters and non-cheaters on Goldberg’s (1990) “Big-Five Personality Factors”: Extroversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect-Openness. One hundred and four participants volunteered to answer a questionnaire on personality traits about themselves and their monogamous partners. A total of 45 males and 59 females rated themselves and an equal number of partners on the traits (n = 208). Results revealed statistically significant differences between cheaters and non-cheaters on the five-factor model. Differences were also found between both of the group’s perceptions of themselves and their monogamous partners on these factors. We wish to thank the editor and reviewers of this journal for their helpful and precise comments towards revisions of this publication. The primary author also wishes to thank Dr. Kevin Alderson for his suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Democracy,Equality and Toleration

In this paper I comment on a recent “letter” by Burleigh Wilkins addressed to nascent egalitarian democracies which offers advice on the achievement of religious toleration. I argue that while Wilkins’ advice is sound as far as it goes, it is nevertheless underdeveloped insofar as his letter fails to distinguish two competing conceptions of toleration – liberal-pluralist and republican-secularist – both of which are consistent with the advice he offers, but each of which yields very different policy recommendations (as can be seen by consideration of The United States v. Lee in America and, I’affaire du foulard in France). I argue that a democratic society of equals must be committed to liberal-pluralist rather than republican-secularist toleration. Some material in this paper is drawn from Catriona McKinnon, Toleration: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006). This paper was written during a Fellowship on the Philosophy Program, School of Advanced Study, University of London. I am grateful to the University of York for a sabbatical term, and the Leverhulme Trust for a Study Abroad Fellowship, during which this paper was written. I would like to thank John Horton and Cécile Laborde for very useful written comments, and two anonymous referees for The Journal of Ethics for their reports.     

Shared structure need not be shared set-structure

Recent semantic approaches to scientific structuralism, aiming to make precise the concept of shared structure between models, formally frame a model as a type of set-structure. This framework is then used to provide a semantic account of (a) the structure of a scientific theory, (b) the applicability of a mathematical theory to a physical theory, and (c) the structural realist’s appeal to the structural continuity between successive physical theories. In this paper, I challenge the idea that, to be so used, the concept of a model and so the concept of shared structure between models must be formally framed within a single unified framework, set-theoretic or other. I first investigate the Bourbaki-inspired assumption that structures are types of set-structured systems and next consider the extent to which this problematic assumption underpins both Suppes’ and recent semantic views of the structure of a scientific theory. I then use this investigation to show that, when it comes to using the concept of shared structure, there is no need to agree with French that “without a formal framework for explicating this concept of ‘structure-similarity’ it remains vague, just as Giere’s concept of similarity between models does ...” (French, 2000, Synthese, 125, pp. 103–120, p. 114). Neither concept is vague; either can be made precise by appealing to the concept of a morphism, but it is the context (and not any set-theoretic type) that determines the appropriate kind of morphism. I make use of French’s (1999, From physics to philosophy (pp. 187–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) own example from the development of quantum theory to show that, for both Weyl and Wigner’s programmes, it was the context of considering the ‘relevant symmetries’ that determined that the appropriate kind of morphism was the one that preserved the shared Lie-group structure of both the theoretical and phenomenological models. I wish to thank Katherine Brading, Anjan Chakravartty, Steven French, Martin Thomson-Jones, Antigone Nounou, Stathis Psillos, Dean Rickles, Mauricio Suarez and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and criticisms, and Gregory Janzen for editorial suggestions. Research for this paper was funded by a generous SSHRC grant for which I am grateful     

Emergence and reduction: Reply to Kim

In this paper I examine Jaegwon Kim’s view that emergent properties are irreducible to the base properties on which they supervene. Kim’s view assumes a model of ‘functional reduction’ which he claims to be substantially different from the traditional Nagelian model. I dispute this claim and argue that the two models are only superficially different, and that on either model, properly understood, it is possible to draw a distinction between a property’s being reductively identifiable with its base property and a property’s being reductively explainable in terms of it. I propose that we should take as the distinguishing feature of emergent properties that they be truly novel properties, i.e., ontologically distinct from the ‘base’ properties which they supervene on. This only requires that emergent properties cannot be reductively identified with their base properties, not that they cannot be reductively explained in terms of them. On this conception the set of emergent properties may well include mental properties as conceived by nonreductive physicalists.     

Internal,External and Intra-Individual Relations

In this paper I argue that there are in fact external relations in Russell’s sense. The level at which we are forced to acknowledge them is, however, not the level of relations between concrete individual objects. All relations of this kind, which I will call “inter-individual” relations, can be construed as supervenient on the monadic properties of their terms. But if we pursue our ontological analysis a little bit deeper and consider the internal structure of a concrete individual, then we will inevitably find irreducible external relations. I mean for example the relation of instantiation (in the frame of a realist’s theory) or that of concurrence (in the frame of a trope theory). I will show that such “intra-individual” relations – the relations that make up the internal structure of a concrete individual out of more primitive metaphysical “building blocks” like universals or tropes – could not (even in principle) be construed as supervenient. I should like to thank David Frost for brushing up my English and the Austrian Foundation for the Promotion of Scientific Research (FWF) for the financial support.     

Canada’s Same-Sex Marriage Law: Exception to or Exemplar of Canada’s Family Policy?

Family policy in Canada is primarily concerned with assisting parents raise their children. This fairly singular approach to family policy is ironic given that Canada does not have a nationally-coordinated family policy. The development of a national family policy has been hampered by Canada’s decentralized governmental structure (i.e., federal and provincial, as well as territorial, governments) and other factors such as diverse geography and different traditions (e.g., a tradition of common law in English Canada, and civil law in Quebec). A recent addition to Canada’s family policy is Bill C-38, The Civil Marriage Act (2005), the law legalizing same-sex marriage. To put Canada’s same-sex marriage law into context, this article presents some preliminary statistics about same-sex marriage in Canada, and considers whether same-sex marriage legislation is a good example of Canadian family policy, or an exception to the rule that Canadian family policy focuses primarily on helping parents socialize their children.     

Moore’s Paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox

One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly, while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations, I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry highlighted by Moore’s Paradox.     

Normative Naturalism and the Relativised <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Priori</Emphasis>

Summary  In this paper I address some shortcomings in Larry Laudan’s normative naturalism. I make it clear that Laudan’s rejection of the “meta-methodology thesis”, or MMT is unnecessary, and that a reformulated version MMT can be sustained. I contend that a major difficulty that attends Laudan’s account is his contention that a naturalistic philosophy of science cannot accommodate any a priori justification of methodological rules, and consider what sort of naturalism might best replace Laudan’s. To do this, I discuss Michael Friedman’s account of a relativised a priori and show that it is consistent with naturalistic philosophy of science and that it can help form the basis of a plausible normative naturalism. In particular, this discussion shows that Laudan’s rejection of any a priori justification of methodological rules is unjustified and inconsistent with scientific practice. Finally, I point the way to a version of normative naturalism that includes MMT and accounts for the role of constitutive a priori principles within science.     

Elijah Levita: a Jewish Hebraist

Elijah Levita’s (c. 1469–1558) study of Hebrew was part of the longtime Jewish occupation with the language of Scripture. Yet much of Levita’s scholarship was at odds with prior Jewish approaches to Biblical language and the transmission of the Biblical text. In his many works, Levita provides a critical account of the development of Hebrew, Aramaic, and the masoretic scribal traditions. This article examines the relationship between Levita’s critical approach to the Bible and the Christian context within which he worked. With the rise of Christian Hebraism, an increasingly sophisticated and sustained discourse on Hebrew developed outside of Jewish circles. This created an alternative setting within which Levita could produce scholarship that challenged prior Jewish notions of language and the Bible. The viability of Levita’s scholarship was no longer contingent on Jewish reception alone, allowing him to express critical ideas without fear of internal censure and without assuming the hermeneutical posture typical of pre-modern Jewish scholarly expression. This article has benefited from conversations with advisors at Columbia University and with colleagues at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley. In particular, I would like to thank Wim Smit (z”l) and Jennifer Greenfield for shaping my studies of early-modern European intellectual life and my colleague Naomi Seidman for helping me to better tell the story. Thanks to Kenneth Stow, Arthur Lesley, and unnamed third and fourth readers of this essay for their helpful suggestions.