Primate social cognition and the origins of language

Are the cognitive mechanisms underlying language unique, or can similar mechanisms be found in other domains? Recent field experiments demonstrate that baboons' knowledge of their companions' social relationships is based on discrete-valued traits (identity, rank, kinship) that are combined to create a representation of social relations that is hierarchically structured, open-ended, rule-governed, and independent of sensory modality. The mechanisms underlying language might have evolved from the social knowledge of our pre-linguistic primate ancestors.     

The language of social pretend play

The literature dealing with the structure and communication of social pretend play activity in preschool-age children is examined. The two objectives of this review were to determine (1) whether there are any differences in the linguistic forms and expressions children use in pretend as opposed to nonpretend activity and (2) whether age-related differences appear in the language of social pretending over the preschool years. The results of a cross-sectional study of a number of linguistic features occurring in the pretend and nonpretend activities of 35 dyads of children are also presented. The evidence supports the hypotheses that the language of social pretending differs from that of other social activities at several levels of language organization and that some of these differences in the “language of social pretending” appear at different ages during the preschool years. Suggestions are made for further research on the communicative techniques by which social pretend interactions are achieved.     

Of substance: The nature of language effects on entity construal

Shown an entity (e.g., a plastic whisk) labeled by a novel noun in neutral syntax, speakers of Japanese, a classifier language, are more likely to assume the noun refers to the substance (plastic) than are speakers of English, a count/mass language, who are instead more likely to assume it refers to the object kind [whisk; Imai, M., & Gentner, D. (1997). A cross-linguistic study of early word meaning: Universal ontology and linguistic influence. Cognition, 62, 169–200]. Five experiments replicated this language type effect on entity construal, extended it to quite different stimuli from those studied before, and extended it to a comparison between Mandarin speakers and English speakers. A sixth experiment, which did not involve interpreting the meaning of a noun or a pronoun that stands for a noun, failed to find any effect of language type on entity construal. Thus, the overall pattern of findings supports a non-Whorfian, language on language account, according to which sensitivity to lexical statistics in a count/mass language leads adults to assign a novel noun in neutral syntax the status of a count noun, influencing construal of ambiguous entities. The experiments also document and explore cross-linguistically universal factors that influence entity construal, and favor Prasada’s [Prasada, S. (1999). Names for things and stuff: An Aristotelian perspective. In R. Jackendoff, P. Bloom, & K. Wynn (Eds.), Language, logic, and concepts (pp. 119–146). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] hypothesis that features indicating non-accidentalness of an entity’s form lead participants to a construal of object kind rather than substance kind. Finally, the experiments document the age at which the language type effect emerges in lexical projection. The details of the developmental pattern are consistent with the lexical statistics hypothesis, along with a universal increase in sensitivity to material kind.     

The harms of ignoring the social nature of science

In this paper I argue that philosophers of science have an obligation to recognize and engage with the social nature of the sciences they assess if those sciences are morally relevant. Morally-relevant science is science that has the potential to risk harm to humans, non-humans, or the environment. My argument and the approach I develop are informed by an analysis of the philosophy of biology literature on the criticism of evolutionary psychology (EP), the study of the evolution of human psychology and behaviour. From this literature, I tease out two different methods of scientific critique. The first I call the “truth-detectional” approach. Those who take this approach are first and foremost concerned about the truth of EP claims as that truth can be determined by evidence. The second I call the “social-dimensional” approach. Those who take this approach talk about the production and truth of EP claims but within a social framework. On this account, the legitimacy and perceived legitimacy of EP claims are not separate from the institutional and social processes and values that lend to their production. I show that the truth-detectional approach risks harms to society and to the philosophy of science, but that the social-dimensional approach avoids these harms. Philosophers of science, therefore, should take a social-dimensional approach to the assessment of morally-relevant science.

     

Ordinary language: The contributions of Gilbert Ryle and John Austin to the experimental analysis of behavior

The aim of this paper is to show how "conceptual analysis"-the philosophical method used by Gilbert Ryle and John Austin-can contribute to behavior analysis in general and in particular to the elucidation and development of views put forward by B. F. Skinner. One of the key requirements is a sensitivity to the precise circumstances in which particular combinations of words are uttered. Without such sensitivity, it is difficult to make informed decisions as to when ways of talking should be changed and when they should be left as they are.     

Investigating the motivations underlying harmful social behaviors and the motivational nature of social norms

The present research applies a self‐determination theory framework to capture the broad spectrum of reasons why individuals engage in harmful normative behaviors. This correlational study (N = 242) focused on harmful behaviors that were either supported by one's in‐group or not. Participants whose in‐group encourages them to engage in a harmful behavior reported stronger motivation, both self‐determined and non‐self‐determined. Perceiving strong in‐group norms in favor of these behaviors was associated positively with the non‐self‐determined motivation pertaining to introjected regulation. The more participants agreed with an in‐group norm in favor of a harmful behavior, the stronger their self‐determination for engaging in this behavior. Results are discussed in light of self‐determination theory, normative models of social influence, and intergroup theories.     

On the role of language in social choice theory

Axiomatic characterization results in social choice theory are usually compared either regarding the normative plausibility or regarding the logical strength of the axioms involved. Here, instead, we propose to compare axiomatizations according to the language used for expressing the axioms. In order to carry out such a comparison, we suggest a formalist approach to axiomatization results which uses a restricted formal logical language to express axioms. Axiomatic characterization results in social choice theory then turn into definability results of formal logic. The advantages of this approach include the possibility of non-axiomatizability results, a distinction between absolute and relative axiomatizations, and the possibility to ask how rich a language needs to be to express certain axioms. We argue for formal minimalism, i.e., for favoring axiomatizations in the weakest language possible.     

Aspects of language pragmatics and the social perception of lying

Two experiments were conducted in order to examine the influence of linguistic and extralinguistic variables on the attribution of lying. In the first experiment, one of two tape recordings of a target person, who responded either true or false to a list of adjectives, was evaluated by 83 subjects. The subjects' task was to attempt to discover when the target person was not telling the truth. The stimulus tapes were constructed such that the time between the adjective and the target person's response was systematically varied and the adjectives varied on the likability of a person possessing that trait. Overall, it was found that if the target person responded either too quickly or too slowly the subjects attributed his response as a lie more often than if the delay was more intermediate in duration (p<0.01). The adjective likability value in combination with the true or false response of the target person also contributed to the attribution of lying (p<0.01). In the second experiment, the adjectives were rescaled on another dimension thought to influence the attribution of lying: the degree to which the adjective is true of the general population. The results suggest that this new scale is related to the degree to which lie attributions are made.This research was supported in part by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development under Research Grant 1 P01 HD-01762-01 and the National Institute of Mental Health under Research Grant MN 08260.