Internet experts' planning of explanations for laypersons: a Web experimental approach in the Internet domain

How flexible are Internet experts in taking the perspective of laypersons? A Web experimental approach is presented that examines the Internet experts' perspective taking in planning explanations for laypersons. The Internet was the topic to be communicated and it also provided the means to implement the experimental method. Participants rated how extensively they would treat some specific concepts when explaining a topic such as the WWW. Independent variables were the addressee's intention, their level of domain knowledge, and the importance of the concepts to be evaluated. The results show that the experts preferred planning strategies that integrated all three types of information. Though their planning decisions were mainly guided by conceptual constraints, the Internet experts also took into account information about the addressee's intention and prior knowledge.     

Expertise and estimating what other people know: the influence of professional experience and type of knowledge

There is ample evidence that estimations of what other people know are often biased in the direction of one's own knowledge. Yet, it is still unclear if this bias is influenced by expertise. In Study 1, computer experts estimated the distribution of Internet concepts and general knowledge concepts among students. These estimations were compared with norm values and with estimations obtained from a sample of laypersons. Laypersons showed a stronger bias than experts. Study 2 revealed that knowledge estimations can be influenced by labeling knowledge items as specialist knowledge. The results are suggestive of ways in which communication between experts and laypersons could be enhanced. Especially in asynchronous communication situations, as for example in the use of e-mail based hot lines, if experts are to communicate effectively, they must make accurate assumptions about laypersons' knowledge of the topic.     

How to refer to ‘diabetes’? Language in online health advice

The adaptation of vocabulary between communication partners, i.e. the lexical entrainment phenomenon, is well documented. This study investigates whether the phenomenon can also be found in computer‐mediated communication between experts and laypersons. The respondents, who are medical experts (n = 46), answered to fictitious patients' queries on health problems. Language technicality within patients' queries was manipulated. One version contained certain concepts in everyday language, the other in technical language. Do experts adapt the vocabulary in their replies to that in the inquiry? Detailed analyses provide evidence that experts not only use the inquiry vocabulary, but also adapt the content of their answers to the technicality of the inquiry. Surprisingly, though queries differ in the use of vocabulary experts attributed very similar prior knowledge to the fictitious patient while providing them with very different replies. The results are discussed with respect to the implications for health counselling and for theoretical assumptions about adaptation in net‐based discourse. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Addiction and Responsibility: A Survey of Opinions

ABSTRACT

This article reports the result of a survey about causal beliefs, normative conceptions and moral evaluations of addicts and addiction in the general population. Specifically, we focused on four issues: To what extent are the normative conceptions of addiction current in the philosophical and scientific literature reflected in laypersons' conception of addiction? How do laypersons rate addicts on perceived responsibility? Which factors influence laypersons' responsibility attributions in the context of addiction? What feelings and attitudes (anger/sympathy/help-giving intentions) do laypersons have toward addicts? We found that, although laypersons seem to assume a weakness view of addiction, their patterns of responsibility attributions vary depending on type of drugs combined with perceived severity of outcome, where the latter even overrides the attributional effects of the actor's perceived control over events. Some explanations of the data are suggested, and various consequences with respect to help-giving behavior, are discussed.     

Casuistic Reasoning in Expert Narratives on Healthy Eating

Individualisation of healthy eating is a broad tendency in Western culture and is becoming a popular ideal in nutrition science. Public perception of dietary knowledge is central to this individualisation and many experts now aim to present dietary knowledge in a way which relates to individual experience, as well as a casuistic style in which particular cases are discussed in relation to general, universal principles. Analysis of casuistic narrative styles in the public communication about healthy eating by experts makes explicit their flexible use of both particular cases and universal claims, in which clinical and personal cases are narratively employed by the experts to invite readers to personally consider dietary knowledge. Such casuistic narration by experts relates human agency and particular bodies to universal concepts in a way that has generative and critical functions with respect to dietary knowledge and understanding. The public articulation of clinical narratives by experts make salient the intersubjective emergence and accumulation of dietary knowledge between expert reasoning and lay understanding. Personal narratives have an essential role in presenting casuistic reasoning through experts’ personal lives and making their own bodies relevant to public communication about healthy eating. This emphasises the experts’ personal agency in relationship to common norms and general knowledge. Furthermore, both clinical and personal narratives are used by experts in their assessment of the shortcomings in public health messages. Experts’ casuistic narration thus does not merely construct credibility but has epistemic functions in constructing dietary knowledge tangible with respect to actual eating practices.     

Knowledge restructuring in expertise development: Evidence from pathophysiological representations of clinical cases by students and physicians

The present study was conducted to investigate qualitative changes that occur in the structure of knowledge in acquiring medical expertise. Therefore, the representation of pathophysiological knowledge was compared in subjects at four different levels of expertise. Subjects studied four clinical cases under three different time constraints, and provided a diagnosis and a pathophysiological explanation for the signs and symptoms in each case. Both diagnostic accuracy and quality of explanations increased with level of expertise. The explanations of experts, however, were less elaborate and less detailed than those of students. Constraining processing time affected the quality of explanations of advanced students, but not that of experts; conversely, the elaborateness and level of detail of explanations was affected in experts but not in students. The findings are explained by a network model integrating the two-world hypothesis in which biomedical and clinical knowledge are organised as two worlds apart (Patel, Evans, & Groen, 1989a, b) and the hypothesis of knowledge encapsulation in which biomedical knowledge becomes encapsulated into clinical knowledge (Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1992).     

The effect of information overlap on communication effectiveness

It makes sense that the more information people share, the better they communicate. To evaluate the effect of knowledge overlap on the effectiveness of communication, participants played a communication game where the "director" identified objects to the "addressee". Pairs either shared information about most objects' names (high overlap), or about the minority of objects' names (low overlap). We found that high-overlap directors tended to use more names than low overlap directors. High overlap directors also used more names with objects whose names only they knew, thereby confusing their addressees more often than low-overlap directors. We conclude that while sharing more knowledge can be beneficial to communication overall, it can cause communication to be locally ineffective. Sharing more information reduces communication effectiveness precisely when there is an opportunity to inform-when people communicate information only they themselves know.     

Knowing Who Knows: Laypersons' Capabilities to Judge Experts' Pertinence for Science Topics

Because modern societies are built on elaborate divisions of cognitive labor, individuals remain laypersons in most knowledge domains. Hence, they have to rely on others' expertise when deciding on many science‐related issues in private and public life. Even children already locate and discern expertise in the minds of others (e.g., Danovitch & Keil, 2004). This study examines how far university students accurately judge experts' pertinence for science topics even when they lack proficient knowledge of the domain. Participants judged the pertinence of experts from diverse disciplines based on the experts' assumed contributions to texts adapted from original articles from Science and Nature. Subjective pertinence judgments were calibrated by comparing them with bibliometrics of the original articles. Furthermore, participants' general science knowledge was controlled. Results showed that participants made well‐calibrated pertinence judgments regardless of their level of general science knowledge.     

Expert knowledge as mnemonic cues

It is proposed that expert knowledge can operate as a cognitive cueing structure for the acquisition and retention of new information in memory. Two experiments are reported which demonstrate that expert knowledge about football and clothing can act as mnemonic cues for the recall of information newly associated with that knowledge. In Experiment 1 expert terms from the domains of football and clothing and those neutral nouns paired with them were both better recalled by experts than by non-experts. In Experiment 2 passages containing information contrary to factual knowledge about football and clothing were recalled better by experts than by non-experts, in spite of the fact that information in the passages contradicted what the experts already knew. The results of the two experiments were interpreted as showing that expert knowledge provides mental cues that have desirable mnemonic properties such as constructibility, associability, discriminability and invertibility. Also, the interpretation of expert knowledge as a cognitive cueing structure is compared to Ausubel's ideas regarding advance organizers.     

The (Mis)understanding of Scientific Uncertainty? How Experts View Policy-Makers,the Media and Publics

Abstract

Frequent claims that publics ‘misunderstand’ science ignore the contested definition of scientific uncertainty itself. Scientific uncertainty means different things in the natural sciences, social sciences and the humanities, while public controversies show that interpretations of scientific uncertainty have different implications for policy and decision-making. This prompts analysis of the ways that experts view scientific uncertainty and how they characterise the (mis)understandings of this uncertainty by policy-makers, media and publics. Experts from diverse academic fields define scientific uncertainty differently depending on their disciplinary background. For example, mathematics provides experts from the natural sciences with a practice language that facilitates communication with those sharing this cultural competence, but it does not suffice for engaging with wider audiences. Further, experts’ views of diverse publics come across as folk theories, in Arie Rip's terms, which, compiled from disparate pieces of information, can be used to fill a gap in the knowledge about publics.     

Knowledge in the information society

The German Council for Research, Technology and Innovation defines the “information society” as a type of society where the acquirement, storage, processing, exchange, diffusion and utilization of knowledge inclusive of their technological possibilities of interactive communication, here become increasingly important. In this notion, knowledge has become the decisive factor for economic growth and technological advance. As a social scientist I transform the term “information society” into processes of automatization of knowledge, which is called its informatization and computerization. It is argued that these processes affect the societal condition of knowledge in that the part of knowledge relating to the contents diminishes while the importance of the technical and/or formal part increases. In contrast to the claim of many social scientists, this trend does not lead to a superficial or shallow type of knowledge. What is changing is the social requirement of professional skills and qualifications. The great looming question about information society then is: Which knowledge do people need to behave competently, effectively and successfully in a world full of computers? The structure of this article is as follows. First I will have a look at the micro‐level of the composition of knowledge, next I will proceed to the historical shift from subject‐specific knowledge to media‐competence and finally I will talk about the meaning of the evolving dominance of—what I will call “media‐competent experts”.     

Judgment and decision-making: experts' and novices' evaluation of chess positions

The present study examined how experts differ from nonexperts in estimation and evaluation during a judgment-and-decision task. In the experiment, the performance of 125 chess players (21 women and 104 men) whose mean age was 32.5 yr. (SD = 13.3) was examined to assess decision processes with an emphasis on postdecision differentiation and consolidation. Chess players of differing skill made evaluations of a complex middle-game chess position. The experimental condition was made by the means of chess articles with enclosed information, either about the current chess position or about other similar positions. Both novices and experts upgraded their chosen alternative in a postdecision phase more than intermediate level chess players did. Various explanations of these results are discussed.     

Assessing Knowledge Through Gesture: Using Children's Hands to Read Their Minds

Is the information that gesture provides about a child's understanding of a task accessible not only to experimenters who are trained in coding gesture but also to untrained observers? Twenty adults were asked to describe the reasoning of 12 different children, each videotaped responding to a Piagetian conservation task. Six of the children on the videotape produced gestures that conveyed the same information as their nonconserving spoken explanations, and 6 produced gestures that conveyed different information from their nonconserving spoken explanations. The adult observers displayed more uncertainty in their appraisals of children who produced different information in gesture and speech than in their appraisals of children who produced the same information in gesture and speech. Moreover, the adults were able to incorporate the information conveyed in the children's gestures into their own spoken appraisals of the children's reasoning. These data suggest that, even without training, adults form impressions of children's knowledge based not only on what children say with their mouths but also on what they say with their hands.     

It's not what you are,it's what you know: experience,beliefs, and the detection of deception in employment interviews

This study investigated the ability of more or less experienced employment interviewers and laypersons to detect deception in employment interviews. Although correct beliefs about indicators of deception led to higher deception detection accuracy, more experienced employment interviewers did not show more accurate beliefs about indicators of deception and did not perform better at detecting deception than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. Furthermore, more experienced interviewers showed a less‐pronounced tendency of judging messages as true irrespective of their actual truthfulness (truth bias) than less experienced interviewers and laypersons. It is suggested that experience in employment interviewing does not automatically lead to higher deception detection abilities in employment interviews, but that correcting people's beliefs about indicators of deception can do so.     

Gurus,Mystics, and Medicine Men: On Transcending Anger

Many contemporary Western writers, both professional helpers and laypersons, often urge expression of anger as a key to healthy living. There are many experts, perhaps best described as sharing a mystical orientation, who offer a different perspective on how to handle anger. This article attempts to relate the unity of their thinking as well as to suggest that the time is overdue for consideration of viable alternatives to expressing strong negative feelings.     

Learning of nondomain facts in high- and low-knowledge domains

Research on expertise has repeatedly documented that experts learn new information better than do novices, but only when the information is relevant to the expert's domain. It was found in Experiment 1 that participants showed superior learning and recall of a large quantity of new, non-domain-relevant facts about concepts within their domain of high knowledge than about concepts for which they had low domain knowledge. Experiment 2 investigated whether the participants' superior recall of new facts related to concepts within their domain of high knowledge was due to the number of prior facts associated with the concept or to the prior frequency of repetition of those concepts. It was found that participants' recall of new facts was better for concepts with 5 prior associated facts than for concepts with a single prior association but that the number of previous repetitions of each concept did not affect the level of recall for the new facts.     

"How long will I suffer?" versus "How long will you suffer?" A self-other effect in affective forecasting

This research presents evidence that people predict longer durations of negative affect for others than for themselves. It is argued that this self-other effect is based on the asymmetric availability of knowledge about psychological strategies that reduce negative affective experiences. Specifically, because people have available knowledge about their own coping strategies, they use this information when making predictions about their affect. The lack of information about others' coping strategies leads to longer predictions of affect duration for others, creating the self-other effect. A series of studies demonstrated this self-other effect, its source, and its boundary conditions. Specifically, the self-other effect occurred for negative but not for positive events, it was stronger when participants predicted affect duration for unfamiliar others than when participants predicted affect duration for familiar others, and the impact of the self versus other focus on affective forecasts was mediated by the availability of knowledge about coping strategies. In addition, alternative explanations for the self-other effect were ruled out. The implications for biases in affective forecasting are discussed.     

Communication of Genetic Risk Information to Daughters in Families with Fragile X Syndrome: The Parent’s Perspective

Parental approaches to communicating information about genetic disorders to their children may be an important determinant in how the children manage stress as well as their adjustment and adaptation to that information. We explored communication patterns through structured interviews with 46 parents of daughters who learned about their genetic risk status as minors. Three different levels of knowledge about fragile X syndrome were explored: 1) informing that it has been diagnosed in the family and is an inherited disorder, 2) informing about the possibility of a daughter being a carrier, and 3) if testing had been done, informing the daughter of her actual carrier status. Additionally, parental perceptions of their daughter’s understanding of the information were explored along with frequency of discussions. We found that communication about genetic risk was initiated by the parents. Five disclosure patterns were identified with variations in style, content, and frequency of communication related to the information that was being disclosed. Aspects of resilient communication were present for all levels of disclosure; however, as the information became more personally relevant for the daughter such as disclosure about the possibility of “being a carrier” for fragile X syndrome and there was uncertainty regarding potential outcomes, the conversations included fewer resilient characteristics. Uncertainty about what and how to present information may negatively affect a parent’s ability to include elements of resilient communication when disclosing genetic risk information.