When can we say 'if'?

In this study, we focus on the conditions which permit people to assert a conditional statement of the form 'if p then q' with conversational relevance. In a broadly decision-theoretic approach, also drawing on hypothetical thinking theory [Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.], we predicted that conditional tips and promises would appear more useful and persuasive and be more likely to encourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the cost of the action p was lower and (c) the benefit of the consequence q was higher. Similarly, we predicted that conditional warnings and threats would be seen as more useful and persuasive and more likely to discourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the benefit of the action p was lower and (c) the cost of the consequence q was higher. All predictions were strongly confirmed, suggesting that such conditionals may best be asserted when they are of high relevance to the goals of the listener.     

When is guessing incorrectly better than studying for enhancing memory?

Recently, Kornell, Hays, and Bjork (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 35:989-998, 2009) demonstrated that incorrect guessing can benefit subsequent memory to a greater degree than can an equivalent amount of study time. We explored this intriguing finding to determine which factors moderate the advantage of incorrect guessing relative to study. In contrast to the findings of Kornell et al., our Experiment 1 revealed that incorrect guessing resulted in worse performance than did studying and that the number of incorrect guesses did not moderate the effect. In contrast, Experiment 2 revealed that the timing of subsequent study moderated the effectiveness of incorrect guessing over study. Final test performance was greater for incorrectly guessed items than for prestudied items when a subsequent study opportunity occurred immediately after the pretrial, whereas the pattern reversed when subsequent study was delayed. This crossover interaction emerged largely because prestudy items showed a classic spacing effect, whereas the guess items did not. One plausible explanation for the absence of a spacing benefit for guess items is that delaying the subsequent study trial increases source-monitoring errors during retrieval, such that participants confuse their original guess with the correctly studied target. However, Experiment 3 provided evidence against this source-monitoring account. We concluded by discussing other possible accounts of why the timing of study could moderate the effectiveness of incorrect guessing.     

When can we trust theF-approximation of the box-test?

Consider a multivariate context withp variates andk independent samples, each of sizen. To test equality of thek population covariance matrices, the likelihood ratio test is commonly employed. Box'sF-approximation to the null distribution of the test statistic can be used to computep-values, if sample sizes are not too small. It is suggested to regard theF-approximation as accurate if the sample sizesn are greater than or equal to 1+0.0613p ²+2.7265p-1.4182p ^0.5+0.235p ^1.4* In (k), for 5p30,k20.This research was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through Ste 405/2-1.     

When is one head better than two? Interdependent information in group decision making

Research on information exchange in group decision making has frequently assumed that information items have independent meanings. Relaxing this assumption raises new issues and presents new possibilities. In the experiment presented here, dyads worked on hidden profile decision tasks in which pairs of unshared information items had interdependent meanings. Dyad decisions were more likely to be accurate when each pair of interdependent items was allocated to a single member (a “connected” hidden profile) than when each pair of interdependent items was separated between the two members (a “disconnected” hidden profile). These information distributions influenced the degree to which dyads considered unshared information. Cognitive load was manipulated, and it impaired decision makers’ ability to identify connections among interdependent information items. The differentiated distribution of information inherent in transactive memory systems moderated the negative effects of cognitive load on dyad decisions.     

When is it Selectively Advantageous to Have True Beliefs? Sandwiching the Better Safe than Sorry Argument

Several philosophers have argued that natural selection will favor reliable belief formation; others have been more skeptical. These traditional approaches to the evolution of rationality have been either too sketchy or else have assumed that phenotypic plasticity can be equated with having a mind. Here I develop a new model to explore the functional utility of belief and desire formation mechanisms, and defend the claim that natural selection favors reliable inference methods in a broad, but not universal, range of circumstances.     

When is a diagnosis worth making? A statistical comparison of two prediction strategies

For a setting in which the sole goal is to predict a criterion accurately, two strategies are compared, (1) multiple linear regression directly from a set of predictors and (2) using predictors to diagnose individuals and then using only the diagnosis to predict the criterion. These are mathematical models of two common methods for making clinical predictions. This article derives equations for each statistical strategy's validity (and a formula comparing them, for a special case). Prediction accuracies are compared over a simplified but broad parameter space and four conclusions follow. Changing disorder prevalences (in the range 0.1 to 0.5) have small effect on the relative preferability of the two strategies; the effect of varying prevalence differs according to population separation on predictors and criterion. As within-population covariances of predictors with criterion decline below zero (assuming variables are scaled so that the less common population scores higher on predictors and criterion), diagnoses become increasingly preferable as a prediction strategy; as they rise above zero the opposite trend is observed. As populations become better separated on predictors or criterion, diagnoses compare more favorably. Most importantly, over almost all of the parameter space which one would expect to encounter in clinical psychology and psychiatry, multiple linear regression is much superior.     

When are we better than them and they worse than us? A closer look at social discrimination in positive and negative domains

This article argues that in-group favoritism occurs on positive and negative dimensions only when the dimensions of comparison provide an appropriate and meaningful basis for self-other definition, that is, when traits comparatively and normatively fit in-group-out-group categorizations. Three studies are reported in which groups were evaluated on positive or negative traits that varied in their degree of normative fit to in-group and out-group identity. In line with predictions, fit rather than stimulus valence was the crucial determinant of (a) in-group favoritism and (b) absolute level of differentiation between groups. Implications of the findings for explanations of positive-negative asymmetry and broader understandings of intergroup discrimination are discussed.     

When More is Better than Less; Three Theories of Psychosis—Projection, Double Bind, and Possession

Three psychological theories of psychosis are described, each of which has standing in psychiatry. Defined by the terms projection, double bind, and possession, they initially appear to have little or nothing in common to explain psychosis, but converge at four points: (1) A high degree of anxiety precipitated by a dilemma or conflict perceived to be unsolvable by the person; (2) the anxiety triggers a shift from one thought or motive in the direction of its opposite, because the original was believed too antagonistic to the wishes of significant others; (3) the opposite, in order to remain opposite, requires that the original thought or motive be forgotten, (4) a singular means to produce and reinforce forgetting is the interposition of psychiatric symptoms. In psychiatry today treatment would fit more consistently with the three theories taken as a whole rather than any one, and a rationale for this viewpoint is elaborated.     

What can we learn about physical laws from the fact that we have memories only of the past?

Not much. I demonstrate this by constructing a model of a memory system governed by deterministic, time reversible laws only, thereby showing that the mere fact of our having memories solely of the past does not necessitate an indeterministic, time asymmetric or stochastic physics, essentially thermodynamic processes or a primitive notion of time asymmetric causation.     

When choice is demotivating: can one desire too much of a good thing?

Current psychological theory and research affirm the positive affective and motivational consequences of having personal choice. These findings have led to the popular notion that the more choice, the better-that the human ability to manage, and the human desire for, choice is unlimited. Findings from 3 experimental studies starkly challenge this implicit assumption that having more choices is necessarily more intrinsically motivating than having fewer. These experiments, which were conducted in both field and laboratory settings, show that people are more likely to purchase gourmet jams or chocolates or to undertake optional class essay assignments when offered a limited array of 6 choices rather than a more extensive array of 24 or 30 choices. Moreover, participants actually reported greater subsequent satisfaction with their selections and wrote better essays when their original set of options had been limited. Implications for future research are discussed.     

When can feedback-seeking behavior result in a better performance rating? Investigating the moderating role of political skill

Feedback-seeking behavior is generally used to acquire job-related information that enables performance improvement. However, it can also be a form of impression management that improves an employee’s reputation. In this study, we show that employees who hold an image enhancement motive are more likely to seek feedback from their supervisors. Further, this feedback-seeking behavior mediates the relationship between the image enhancement motive and task performance ratings, consistent with the self-concept enhancing tactician (SCENT) model. However, we additionally incorporate socioanalytic theory to demonstrate that this indirect effect is moderated: the image enhancement motive translates into greater feedback-seeking behavior and task performance ratings only for employees with high political skill, who are capable of acting on their image enhancement motive successfully.     

Cognitive subprocesses of mental rotation: why is a good rotator better than a poor one?

The Vanderberg-Kuse Mental Rotation Test is a standard test of mental rotation ability. Recent experiments have demonstrated that mental rotation is a complex cognitive process wherein different subprocesses (focused attention, visual scanning, perceptual decision, visual memory) play important roles in performance. We classified the population as good and poor rotators by performance of mental rotation (ns = 47: 22 men and 25 women, respectively; mean age: 20.7 yr.). To examine differences cognitive subprocesses of mental rotation of these two groups were compared. There were significant differences between poor and good rotators in performance on Raven's test and the Pieron Focused Attention test scores. The good rotators scored better because their perceptual decision-analytical intelligence (Raven) and focused attention scores were higher.     

When can we choose to forget? An ERP study into item-method directed forgetting of emotional words

Emotionally arousing information is treated in a specialised manner across a number of different processing stages, and memory for affective events is often found to be heightened by virtue of this. However, in some cases, emotional experiences might be the very ones that we would like to forget. Here, two item-method directed forgetting studies are presented which investigate people's ability to intentionally forget affective words when stimuli and memory instructions are presented simultaneously. In the first experiment an interaction between task instruction and emotional content was evident in a diminished directed forgetting effect for emotional words, suggesting that they may be relatively resistant to deliberate forgetting. The interaction between instruction and emotion appeared both in free recall of words and in a yes-no recognition task. In the second study, an ERP procedure was utilised to investigate whether emotion modulates the effects of instruction during the initial encoding of stimuli. Recognition data again showed a clear interaction between instruction and emotion, with a reduced directed forgetting effect for emotional words. The ERP data demonstrated evidence for individual effects of both emotion and instruction during encoding; however, despite this, no evidence for an interaction between these factors was evident in the ERP data. As such, we conclude that even when study items are presented simultaneously with their associated memory instructions, neither does emotion prevent differential processing of directed forgetting instruction, nor does memory instruction prevent differential processing of emotion during early encoding. Implications are discussed in relation to the directed forgetting literature and more broadly with respect to circumstances under which emotion and cognitive processing work in parallel or in competition with each other.     

Charting the development of representational skills: When do children know that maps can lead and mislead?

This study was conducted to test Perner's (1991) hypothesis that 3-year-olds fail the false belief task because they cannot metarepresent (represent a representation's sense and reference). Preschoolers made and interpreted symbolic maps, and were tested on their understanding of the implications of following an incorrect map (false belief test). Young 3-year-olds showed some ability to make and use maps but performed poorly on the false belief tests. Children were more likely to use an incorrect map to predict behavior if the represented object was missing instead of in a wrong location. Many children were also able to predict that someone who used an incorrect map would not “find” the object. These results contradict Perner's hypothesis and suggest that representational skills develop gradually rather than appearing in a radical conceptual shift at age 4.     

When can an object feel heavier than itself? Perceived heaviness of a wielded object depends on grasp position

Perceived heaviness is a function of how an object resists being moved, and such resistance is determined by object mass and the distribution of that mass relative to the wrist. Whereas mass is independent of grasp position on an object, distribution of mass relative to the wrist is not. Therefore, perceived heaviness should vary with grasp position. Blindfolded participants wielded internally weighted cylindrical objects while grasping them at different distances from the centre of mass. They rated how heavy each object felt at each location relative to a standard object. The results show that objects felt heavier as they were grasped farther from the centre of mass, highlighting the role of the touch system in controlling movement.     

When do infants understand that they can obtain a desired part of a composite object by grasping another part?

When do infants start to understand that they can grasp an object by its handle when the interesting part is out of reach? Whereas it is known from preferential looking tasks that already at three months of age infants show surprise when all parts of an object do not move together, little is known about when infants are able to use such knowledge in an active grasp situation. To answer this question we presented six, eight, and 10 month-old infants in a cross-sectional and a longitudinal study with a white cardboard handle within reach and a bright ball at the end of the handle and out of reach. A trick condition, where the handle and the ball seem attached but were not, was added to get an indication of the infant's expectation by observing a possible surprise reaction.Results show that 6-month-olds’ most frequent first behaviors consisted in pointing toward the ball without grasping the handle, or grasping the handle without looking at the ball until it moved. In addition, they often did not look surprised in the trick condition. Eight- and 10-month-olds most often grasped the handle while looking at the ball, and showed clear surprise in the trick condition. This was interpreted as showing that around eight or 10 months, infants take a significant step in understanding the cohesiveness of composite objects during grasping.     

Observer ratings of health and sickness: can other people tell us anything about our health that we don't already know?

After administering interviews covering health conditions, physical limitations, optimism, and affect to 851 older adults, interviewers rated the health and sickness of the interviewees. Observers' ratings of health and sickness were more highly correlated with the severity of participants' self-reported health conditions than were participants' self-ratings of health. This finding is likely attributable to participants' self-ratings of health being more highly correlated with their optimism and positive affect than the observers' ratings. Participants rated as sicker and less healthy at baseline were at a 3 times greater risk for mortality over 114 months. This association was independent of participants' self-rated health as well as demographics, self-reported health conditions, years of smoking, physical limitations, body mass index, optimism, and affect.     

Why is p = .90 better than p = .70? Preference for definitive predictions by lay consumers of probability judgements

What do people regard as an informative and valuable probability statement? This article reports four experiments that show participants to have a clear preference for more extreme and higher probabilities over less extreme and lower ones. This pattern emerged in Experiment 1, in which no context was provided, and was further explored in Experiment 2 within a positive and a negative context. The findings were further confirmed in Experiment 3, which employed a Bayesian framework with revisions of opinions. Finally, Experiment 4 showed how preference for high probabilities can lead people to prefer an overconfident to a more well-calibrated (accurate) forecaster. The results are interpreted as manifestations of a search for definitive predictions principle, which asserts that high probabilities are preferred to medium ones and often favored over the corresponding complementary low probabilities on the basis of their capacity to predict the occurrence of single outcomes.