Kant on Acting from Juridical Duty

ABSTRACT

A much debated passage in the Metaphysics of Morals often leads commentators to believe that it is not possible to act from juridical duty. On the one hand, Kant says that all lawgiving includes an incentive ‘which connects a ground to determining choice to this action subjectively with the representation of the law’ (MM: 218). On the other hand, he claims that juridical lawgiving ‘does not include the incentive of duty in the law’ (MM: 219). The first claim seems to entail that agents can perform a juridical duty for the sake of that duty; the second seems to entail that agents cannot perform a juridical duty for the sake of that duty. This paper shows that it is possible to reconcile both passages and to claim that one can act from juridical duty in Kant’s terms. First, it gives an account of what can be called the paradox of juridical duties. Second, it discusses briefly how responses to the paradox remain somewhat unsatisfactory. Finally, it clarifies how agents can act with no other incentive but the actual juridical duty without endangering the Kantian morality-law divide.     

现代伦理学:在康德与卢梭之间

本文为纪念康德逝世 2 0 0周年而作 ,反省的主要问题是现代意义上的各种伦理学的核心形态可能是什么。文章分析了康德所受卢梭影响的性质 ,以及两者之间仍然存在的巨大差别 ,指出现代意义上的规范伦理学的基本位置大致还是处在康德与卢梭之间。     

The Priority Principle from Kant to Frege

In a famous passage (A68/B93), Kant writes that “the understanding can make no other use of […] concepts than that of judging by means of them.” Kant's thought is often called the thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts. We find a similar sounding priority thesis in Frege: “it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation and the Boolean mode […] that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgments.” Many interpreters have thought that Frege's priority principle is close to (or at least derivable from) Kant's. I argue that it is not. Nevertheless, there was a gradual historical development that began with Kant's priority thesis and culminated in Frege's new logic.     

康德关于责任的普遍命令

康德提出责任的普遍命令 ,并由此建立起纯粹的动机论。他的绝对的道德义务和动机论遭到了边沁、黑格尔、叔本华等思想家的批驳 ,但他们并未正确指出康德伦理学的根本缺陷。本文力图指出康德关于责任的普遍命令的证明本身所包含的逻辑错误 ,由此揭示康德动机论的内在矛盾     

Comment by James Turner Johnson

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"Just War Theory in Comparative Perspective: AReview Essay" by Simeon O. Ilesanmi Journal of Religious Ethics 28.1 (Spring 2000)