The organization of motivated and conditional reflex processes

Recent observations on the plasticity of brain and behavior relationships indicate that the temporary connections between environmental and neuroanatomical substrates have tremendous specificity but at the same time are very plastic. Establishment of a conditional reflex by stimulation of the hippocampal pyramidal layer and/or the mesencephalic reticular formation did not interfere with the differential stimulation of very near points in the same structures. These correlations between brain and behavior confirmed the earlier belief that the development of temporary connections between environment and brain is an elementary process of the central nervous system. Complex behavioral functions are organized through both neuronal and humoral afferentation. Data accumulated recently indicate that the descending forebrain influence is inhibitory in the brain stem and diencephalon and controls the sensory input in a somatomotor-specific and situation-specific manner. Humoral factors affecting thresholds can change the dynamic equilibrium existing between ascending excitatory and descending inhibitory systems; these alterations always follow the rule of situation and somatomotor specificity.     

Summation of excitatory and inhibitory control produced by traditional tone-shock contingencies and autocontingencies

Previous research has demonstrated that rats can use unsignaled shock to predict subsequent periods free from shock. This shock-no shock stimulus arrangement, termed an autocontingency, has appeared less likely to exert behavioral control when a traditional tone-shock contingency was simultaneously available. The present research examined the generality of CS-US contingency dominance in a conditioned suppression paradigm by using a summation test in which “probe” stimuli derived from tone-shock contingencies were superimposed upon responding maintained by an autocontingency. In experiment 1, an inhibitory CS accelerated responding only when responding was normally suppressed by the autocontingency. In experiment 2, an excitatory CS failed to yield conditioned suppression during an inhibitory (accelerative) period produced by the autocontingency. Unlike our previous findings (e.g., Davis, Memmott & Hurwitz, 1975), these results do not support a general notion of tone-shock contingency dominance over autocontingencies. Behavioral control by autocontingencies appears robust and “holds its own” in summation with both excitatory and inhibitory CSs derived from traditional contingencies.     

Dreaming and REM sleep are controlled by different brain mechanisms

The paradigmatic assumption that REM sleep is the physiological equivalent of dreaming is in need of fundamental revision. A mounting body of evidence suggests that dreaming and REM sleep are dissociable states, and that dreaming is controlled by forebrain mechanisms. Recent neuropsychological, radiological, and pharmacological findings suggest that the cholinergic brain stem mechanisms that control the REM state can only generate the psychological phenomena of dreaming through the mediation of a second, probably dopaminergic, forebrain mechanism. The latter mechanism (and thus dreaming itself) can also be activated by a variety of nonREM triggers. Dreaming can be manipulated by dopamine agonists and antagonists with no concomitant change in REM frequency, duration, and density. Dreaming can also be induced by focal forebrain stimulation and by complex partial (forebrain) seizures during nonREM sleep, when the involvement of brainstem REM mechanisms is precluded. Likewise, dreaming is obliterated by focal lesions along a specific (probably dopaminergic) forebrain pathway, and these lesions do not have any appreciable effects on REM frequency, duration, and density. These findings suggest that the forebrain mechanism in question is the final common path to dreaming and that the brainstem oscillator that controls the REM state is just one of the many arousal triggers that can activate this forebrain mechanism. The "REM-on" mechanism (like its various NREM equivalents) therefore stands outside the dream process itself, which is mediated by an independent, forebrain "dream-on" mechanism.     

Assessment of pointer dog behavior

Studies of behavioral traits of the “Arkansas Line of nervous pointer dogs” are well documented (Murphreeet al., 1969). Demonstrations of drug effects on these traits, as measured on the standardized behavior test and expressed as “Morbidity Score,” have been disappointing, despite other evidence of effectiveness of drug treatments such as modification of operant performance (Murphreeet al. 1974c). A simple reproducible test with high interrater reliability is presented here. Subjects were nine nervous dogs that received placebo, pimozide, and chlordiazepoxide in a double-blind crossover design. Both drugs significantly attenuated “human avoidance,” a nervous trait. Placebo had no effect. The chlordiazepoxide effect was maximal on the first day of administration, returning to baseline three to four days after the last dose. The pimozide maximal effect was on day 4, with return to baseline six to nine days after the last dose. In addition to the aberrant behavior of the nervous pointer, hyperresponsiveness to dopaminergic stimulation and increased levels of L-DOPA in the cisternal spinal fluid were observed.     

Rules as the Impetus of Cultural Evolution

In this paper I put forward a thesis regarding the anatomy of “cultural evolution”, in particular the way the “cultural” transmission of behavioral patterns came to piggyback, through us humans, on the transmission effected by genetic evolution. I claim that what grounds and supports this new kind of transmission is a complex behavioral “meta-pattern” that makes it possible to grasp a pattern as something that “ought to be”, i.e. that transforms the pattern into what we can call a rule. (Here I draw especially on the philosophical insights of Wilfrid Sellars.) In this way I interlink empirical research done in evolution theory with some more speculative philosophical theories, thus shedding new light on the former and adding an empirical footing to the latter.     

A brainstem “mini-discharge” syndrome (anesthesia dolorosa)

Chronic pain consisting of anesthesia dolorosa secondary to bilateral interruption of the trigeminal nerves is presented as a brain stem reticular denervation syndrome. Electrothalamograms revealed fast frequency discharges in the mesothalamic prerubral and centermedian reticular formation. Mesothalamic electrical stimulation attenuated the discharges. Pain and other symptoms presumably of brainstem origin also were attenuated or abolished by therapeutic electrical stimulation twice daily. It is postulated that brain stem-represented behavioral generators are implicated by the reticular discharges in order to produce the complex symptomatology. Consequently the symptom complex is collectively identified as a brainstem “mini-discharge” syndrome. A theoretical discussion is presented to defend the thesis that reticular denervation-induced low threshold discharge system accounts for the episodic states of pain, dyskinesia, mood, and memory disturbances.     

Cardiac arrhythmias in the monkey during classically conditioned fear and excitement

Rhesus monkeys(Macaca mulatto) were tested in classic aversive and appetitive conditioning paradigms following complete coronary artery occlusion (CO) to test the hypothesis that “emotional stress” induces ventricular arrhythmias. Findings were based upon conditioning trials conducted for one or more weeks after occlusion in 13 animals. When all data from each animal for the week following CO were considered, there was no demonstrable tendency for arrhythmias to increase during “fear” conditioned to unavoidable electric shock or during “excitement” in anticipation of food. However, selected trials from six monkeys did reveal instances when changes in the frequency of occurrence of arrhythmias were coupled with behavioral conditioning. While analysis of these trials did not reveal any simple relationship between emotional stress and the development of ventricular arrhythmias after myocardial infarction, certain of the behavioral situations may be more potentially arrhythmogenic than others. For these selected trials, with respect to control, the number of arrhythmias may have increased or decreased upon presentation of the conditional stimulus; the exact response appears to depend upon the immediate physiologic status of the animal as well as on the behavioral condition. “More stressful” situations, such as aversive conditioning, are not necessarily associated with greater numbers of arrhythmias than were “less stressful” situations, such as appetitive conditioning. Arrhythmias appear to occur more frequently when an animal’s heart rate is within a given range; this may reflect underlying cardiac sympathetic and parasympathetic nerve activity.     

Can Multimodal and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy be Reconciled?

The purpose of this article is to determine whether two distinct modes of cognitive-behaviour therapy—Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) and Multimodal Therapy (MMT)—can be reconciled. This quest in the spirit of integrationism is pursued along three lines of inquiry: Do we talk about schools, approaches, or techniques? A reconciliation between MMT and REBT as systems seems not to be feasible, just because of the simple fact that MMT is not a new school with an idiosyncratic theory, whereas REBT is. However, REBT is also a congenial approach consisting of various eclectic techniques, as is MMT. It is explained how the A-B-C format and firing orders of the BASICI.D. modalities stem from an S-O-R model. Furthermore, the circular character of the various modalities (thinking, feeling, and behaving) is recognised both in MMT and in REBT. The techniques used in REBT and MMT overlap for 65–80%, according to a comparative perusal of Ellis's and Lazarus's presentations of preferred techniques. This means that MMT and REBT, as an approach with distinct techniques, “must” be very similar in practice. The conclusion is that philosophically Ellis and Lazarus see eye-to-eye and that MMT and REBT overlap a great deal. But a fusion is not yet at hand. At best the two can be described as two sides of one coin. “When you wake up in the morning, Pooh,” said Piglet at last, “what's the first thing you say to yourself?” “What's for breakfast?” said Pooh. “What do you say, Piglet?” “I say, I wonder what's going to happen exciting today?” said Piglet. Pooh nodded thoughtfully. “It's the same thing,” he said. “What's that?” the Unbeliever asked. “Wisdom from a Western Taoist,” I said. “It sounds like something from Winnie-the Pooh,” he said. “It is,” I said. From The Tao of Pooh Benjamin Hoff (1982)     

On modeling the creativity and the concept of Chef-D’oeuvre

The problem of modeling the creativity is shown to be entirely connected with another mysterious challenge — the “Explanatory Gap” between the concepts of “Brain” and “Mind”. We use the Natural Constructive Cognitive Architecture, with its important feature being the combination of two subsystems, for generation of new information and for its conservation. “Brain” is considered as records of the raw images of real objects (individual objective information), while “Mind” refers to individual subjective information created inside the cognitive system (symbols). We argued that creativity can be treated as “an effort to bring a piece of personal “Brain” into the “Mind” and World”. Specific thinking mode (intellectual panic or throes of creativity) is shown to enhance the creative work resulting in over-mobilization and even enriching personal deep inside (“Brain”) experience. It is simulated by chaotic jumps of the noise amplitude around abnormally high value. The nature of Aesthetic Emotions and the concept of Chef-D’oeuvre are analyzed. It is shown that they are caused by the “recognition paradox”: an object seems both, familiar but unusual. This occurs if the “Brain” does see its subtle features, while the “Mind” does not realize. Bright aesthetic emotions (goosebumps) are caused by irregular excitation of implicit associations provided by weak (“gray”) connections of the halo neurons (simulating the subconsciousness). General formula for Chef-D’oeuvre in science and art could be expressed as “condensed capacity to see the invisible, to combine the incompatible”.     

The Spontaneous Generation of the Human in the “Heng Xian”

This essay argues that the “Heng Xian” bridges between two distinct discourses that were both prevalent in the late fourth century. One discourse focused on the origination of the natural world through a spontaneous process of differentiation, a position familiar from the Daodejing and “Tai yi sheng shui.” The other focused on the specific ways in which different kinds of things live, a position known primarily from Ru discussions centering on the concept of xing 性, the nature or spontaneous reactions of a particular kind of thing. The “Heng Xian” attempts to account for the specificity of human life—including language and social organization—while remaining within a naturalistic view grounded in spontaneity. The essay concludes by reflecting on what the “Heng Xian” tells us about the status of human institutions.     

The neural pathways mediating quiet-biting attack behavior from the hypothalamus in the cat: A functional autoradiographic study

Electrical stimulation of the region of the lateral hypothalamus produced a consistent form of quiet-biting attack behavior in cats. In one series of experiments, cats, implanted with electrodes from which attack had been elicited, were anesthetized and then were injected with a bolus of ¹⁴C-2-deoxyglucose at the same time as electrical stimulation was delivered through the attack electrodes. Brains prepared for X-ray autoradiography revealed that lateral hypothalamic stimulation activated the classical medial forebrain bundle pathway supplying the septal region, diagonal band, lateral preoptic area, and ventral tegmental region. Stimulation of quiet-attack sites in perifornical hypothalamus resulted in the activation of a much more extensive projection system which included the central and lateral tegmental fields of the midbrain and pons, and central gray region, as well as the structures described above. In a second series of experiments, ³H-leucine was placed into the region of the electrode tip from which attack was elicited in order to identify more precisely the pathways arising from that site. In general, tritiated amino acid radioautography replicated the ¹⁴C-2-deoxyglucose findings. In addition, the amino acid radioautographic data revealed the presence of extensive projections from perifornical hypothalamus to such pontine structures as the nucleus locus coeruleus, motor nucleus of NV , and the lateral pontine tegmental field. The functional connections between the lateral hypothalamic “attack region” and lateral preoptic zone were also confirmed by electrophysiological methods.     

Toward operationalizing a psychoeducational definition of learning disabilities

An operational definition of “learning disabilities” is presented from the standpoint that classificatory psychoeducational definitions must ultimately relate to educational processes. Thus the condition should be described in terms of abilities crucial to educational achievement, and noneducational criteria should not be employed. It is pointed out that the most generally accepted current definition — which identifies children as “learning-disabled” on the basis of behavioral criteria, while excluding others because of etiological and other nonbehavioral factors — overlooks functional similarities among such groups as educable mentally retarded and emotionally disturbed children. These similarities warrant the inclusion under the rubric of “learning-disabled” of some children who may also be grouped within other diagnostic categories. Consequently, the profferred definition is based on a primary concern with day-to-day learning and management issues. Concepts subtended by the definition are operationally defined, and its relationship to programming is discussed.     

Visual awareness and the levels of processing hypothesis: A critical review

Does a visual percept emerge to consciousness in a graded manner (i.e. evolving through increasing degrees of clarity), or according to a dichotomous, “all-or-none” pattern (i.e. abruptly transitioning from unawareness to awareness)? The level of processing hypothesis (LoP; B. Windey and A. Cleeremans, 2015) recently proposed a theoretical framework where the transition from unaware to aware visual experience is graded for low-level stimulus representations (i.e. stimulus “energy” or “feature” levels) whereas it is dichotomous for high-level (i.e. the perception of “letters”, “words” or “meaning”) stimulus perception. Here, we will critically review current behavioral and brain-based evidence on the LoP hypothesis and discuss potential challenges (such as differences in LoP conceptualizations, awareness scale related issues, attentional confounds and divergences on experimental factors or statistical analyses) which might be of use for future research within the field. Overall, the LoP hypothesis is a recent and promising proposal that attempts to integrate divergent evidence on the graded vs. dichotomous emergence of awareness debate. Whereas current evidence validates some of the assumptions proposed by the LoP account, there is still much work to do on both methodological and experimental levels. Future neuroimaging studies might help to disentangle the current complex pattern of results found in LoP studies and, importantly, shed some light on the ongoing debate about the search for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC).     

Perceptual hysteresis in the judgment of auditory pitch shift

Perceptual hysteresis can be defined as the enduring influence of the recent past on current perception. Here, hysteresis was investigated in a basic auditory task: pitch comparisons between successive tones. On each trial, listeners were presented with pairs of tones and asked to report the direction of subjective pitch shift, as either “up” or “down.” All tones were complexes known as Shepard tones (Shepard, 1964), which comprise several frequency components at octave multiples of a base frequency. The results showed that perceptual judgments were determined both by stimulus-related factors (the interval ratio between the base frequencies within a pair) and by recent context (the intervals in the two previous trials). When tones were presented in ordered sequences, for which the frequency interval between tones was varied in a progressive manner, strong hysteresis was found. In particular, ambiguous stimuli that led to equal probabilities of “up” and “down” responses within a randomized context were almost fully determined within an ordered context. Moreover, hysteresis did not act on the direction of the reported pitch shift, but rather on the perceptual representation of each tone. Thus, hysteresis could be observed within sequences in which listeners varied between “up” and “down” responses, enabling us to largely rule out confounds related to response bias. The strength of the perceptual hysteresis observed suggests that the ongoing context may have a substantial influence on fundamental aspects of auditory perception, such as how we perceive the changes in pitch between successive sounds.     

Understanding the Heart-Mind Within the Heart-Mind of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nèiyè</Emphasis> (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Inward Training</Emphasis>)

The Nèiyè 內業 (Inward Training) talks of “a heart-mind (xīn 心) within a heart-mind” that is somehow connected to or prior to language. In the context of the overall advice on looking “inward” or “internally” as part of the meditation and mysticism practice that the Nèiyè introduces, this talk of a heart-mind within a heart-mind arguably invites comparisons with a Cartesian “inner theater” conception of mentality. In this paper, I examine the “inner” talk of the Nèiyè in order to tease out its identifiable commitments in philosophical psychology. I consider the ways in which the “inner” talk of the text might be read as marking out one or more of three different inner/outer distinctions, and I argue that we can consistently read the Nèiyè without seeing it as marking any inner/outer distinction that is related to what is often referred to in English as “inner experience.”     

Sites of Plasticity in the Neural Circuit Mediating Tentacle Withdrawal in the Snail Helix aspersa: Implications for Behavioral Change and Learning Kinetics

The tentacle withdrawal reflex of the snail Helix aspersa exhibits a complex combination of habituation and sensitization consistent with the dual-process theory of plasticity. Habituation, sensitization, or a combination of both were elicited by varying stimulation parameters and lesion condition. Analysis of response plasticity shows that the late phase of the response is selectively enhanced by sensitization, whereas all phases are decreased by habituation. Previous data have shown that tentacle withdrawal is mediated conjointly by parallel monosynaptic and polysynaptic pathways. The former mediates the early phase, whereas the latter mediates the late phase of the response. Plastic loci were identified by stimulating and recording at different points within the neural circuit, in combination with selective lesions. Results indicate that depression occurs at an upstream locus, before circuit divergence, and is therefore expressed in all pathways, whereas facilitation requires downstream facilitatory neurons and is selectively expressed in polysynaptic pathways. Differential expression of plasticity between pathways helps explain the behavioral manifestation of depression and facilitation. A simple mathematical model is used to show how serial positioning of depression and facilitation can explain the kinetics of dual-process learning. These results illustrate how the position of cellular plasticity in the network affects behavioral change and how forms of plasticity can interact to determine the kinetics of the net changes.     

The breathing bear with preterm infants: Effects on sleep,respiration, and affect

This study investigated the sleep/wake states, respiration, and affective behaviors of premature infants who were provided à “breathing” bear in the isolette from 33 to 35 weeks conceptional age (CA). The Breathing Bear is à source of rhythmic stimulation that is optional for the infants. Its “breathing” reflects the breathing rate of the individual infant. At 33 weeks CA, 27 premature infants were provided à Breathing Bear (BrBr) and 26 were given à Non-Breathing Bear (N-BrBr). At 35 weeks, interfeed observations for an average of 1.7 hours were made of the babies' states and state-specific behaviors, along with respiration recordings. By 35 weeks, the BrBr babies showed less wakefulness, more quiet sleep, fewer startles in quiet sleep, and less crying than the N-BrBr babies. In addition, they were more likely to smile and N-BrBr babies were more likely to grimace in active sleep. These findings replicate and extend previous reports of effects of the Breathing Bear on neurobehavioral organization. They also suggest that less negative affect is expressed by the BrBr babies; and they point to the importance of future study of preterm infants' affective expressions, both in sleep and in waking.     

Effectiveness of an mHealth Intervention for Infant Sleep Disturbances

Bedtime problems and night wakings are highly prevalent in infants. This study assessed the real-world effectiveness of an mHealth behavioral sleep intervention (Customized Sleep Profile; CSP). Caregivers (83.9% mothers) of 404 infants (age 6 to 11.9 m, M = 8.32 m, 51.2% male) used the CSP (free and publicly available behavioral sleep intervention delivered via smartphone application, Johnson’s® Bedtime® Baby Sleep App). Caregivers completed the Brief Infant Sleep Questionnaire–Revised (BISQ-R) at baseline and again 4 to 28 days later. Changes in sleep patterns were analyzed, based on sleep problem status (problem versus no problem sleepers; PS; NPS). Sleep onset latency improved in both groups. Earlier bedtimes, longer continuous stretches of sleep, as well as decreased number and duration of night wakings, were evident in the PS group only. The BISQ-R Total score, total nighttime sleep, and total 24-hour sleep time improved for both groups, with a greater change for the PS group. Further, caregivers of infants in the PS group decreased feeding (bedtime and overnight) and picking up overnight, and perceived better sleep. Bedtime routine regularity, bedtime difficulty, sleep onset difficulty, and caregiver confidence improved for both groups, with the PS group showing a greater magnitude of change. Thus, a real-world, publicly available, mHealth behavioral sleep intervention was associated with improved outcomes for older infants. Intervention recommendations resulted in changes in caregivers’ behavior and improvements in caregiver-reported sleep outcomes in infants, in as few as 4 days.     

The development of representational play in chimpanzees and bonobos: Evolutionary implications,pretense, and the role of interspecies communication

This research investigates the development of symbolic or representational play in two species of the genus Pan, bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). The participants varied not only by species, but also as to whether they had become proficient in communicating with humans via a set of arbitrary visual symbols, called lexigrams. Using a developmental sequence of representational play based on McCune, we found every level that children manifest to be constructed by Pan. The most robust and regular ontogenetic sequence for both bonobos and chimpanzee was not McCune's five-level progression, but a three-step ontogenetic sequence: Level 1 (no representation, no pretense) precedes Levels 2–4 (representation but no pretense), which in turn precedes Level 5 (includes pretense as well as representation). A linguistic system for interspecies communication was necessary for Level 5 representational play and “true” pretense. Human scaffolding produced developmental progress within sequences for all the apes, except the bonobo who lacked a system of interspecies communication. This evidence suggests that the potential for representational play and its social stimulation were present in the common ancestor of bonobos, chimpanzees and humans five million years ago.     

Causes of young children's confusion of same and different

Three experiments are reported that explore 3-year-olds' and adults' understanding of the words, same and different. In the first, 3-year-olds selected a bead that was “the same color as” or “a different color from” a target bead. In the second, 3-year-olds selected a bead that was “the same in some way as” or “different in some way from” a target bead. Contrary to results reported previously, the majority of consistent responders chose a bead identical with the target in response to the different instruction in both experiments. The rates of both incorrect different responding and incorrect same responding were greater in Experiment II than in Experiment I. In Experiment III, adults chose objects that were “the same as” or “different from” a target; unlike the children, they never chose a target-identical object in response to different instructions. It is argued that children and adults treat same and different differently, and that children's task performance is influenced by three factors: semantic, pragmatic, and nonlinguistic.