认知闭合需要、框架效应与决策偏好

在带有模糊性的决策情境中,决策者个人的认知特征会对其判断决策产生重要影响。通过实验的方法,考察了认知闭合需要和特征框架效应对个体决策偏好的影响。93名工商管理硕士（MBA）参与了实验,研究的结果支持了本研究的3个假设,即认知闭合需要与特征框架效应不仅对被试的决策偏好存在显著的影响,而且二者还存在显著的交互作用。具体来说,研究发现,在模糊情境中：高认知闭合需要的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而低认知闭合需要的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;接收到正向框架信息的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而接收到负向框架信息的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;认知闭合需要与特征框架对被试的决策偏好还存在显著的交互作用。研究结论为根据个体认知闭合需要的水平来选拔决策者、利用框架效应来影响个体的信息加工方式进而提高决策质量提供了理论依据     

不确定性容忍度对模糊决策中决策偏好的影响及其情景依赖性*

研究以Ellsberg选瓶任务为决策材料,探讨了不同任务特征下个体不确定性容忍度对模糊决策中决策偏好的影响。结果发现,获益情景下:高概率时高、低容忍度个体对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均偏好模糊规避;中概率时低容忍度个体比高容忍度个体表现出更低程度的模糊规避,前者倾向于模糊中立,后者倾向于模糊规避;低概率时两者对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均倾向于模糊中立。损失情景下:高概率时两者对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均倾向于模糊寻求;中概率时低容忍度比高容忍度个体更偏好模糊寻求,前者倾向于模糊寻求,后者倾向于模糊中立;低概率时两者对模糊选项的选择无显著差异,均倾向于模糊规避。这表明,不确定性容忍度对模糊决策偏好产生作用,但这种作用会受到损益概率和损益结果的影响,具有情景依赖性。     

不确定性容忍度、损益概率及延迟风险对延迟选择的影响

研究通过两个实验考查了不确定性容忍度及相关变量对延迟选择的影响,其中实验1采用2（不确定性容忍度：高/低）×2（概率水平：高/中）被试间实验设计;研究2将实验任务设定在有延迟风险情景下中等概率水平,采用单因素（不确定性容忍度：高/低）被试间实验设计.实验1结果表明：不确定性容忍度与概率水平存在交互作用：中等概率时,低容忍度个体比高容忍度个体更偏好延迟选择,高概率时,两者的延迟选择无显著差异,都偏好于选择决策.实验2结果表明：在有延迟风险中等概率时,高、低容忍度个体的决策偏好无显著差异,都偏好选择决策.结论：不确定性容忍度对延迟选择存在影响且受概率水平和延迟风险的调节.     

不同模糊程度下模糊决策的决策偏好

该研究采用艾尔斯伯格悖论的变式,选取二择一的迫选任务,旨在探讨不同球数和不同模糊程度下模糊决策的决策偏好。结果发现,球数的不同对决策的偏好基本上没有影响;而模糊程度的不同,对决策的偏好有影响。具体表现为：模糊程度较高时,被试倾向于模糊厌恶,模糊程度较低时倾向于模糊寻求。     

决策者角色及相关变量对风险偏好的影响

采用IAT技术测查被试的内隐自尊, 并引入收益和损失两种任务框架, 综合探讨了内隐自尊水平、任务得失框架对自我决策和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果发现：(1)在收益框架下, 被试为他人决策时更冒险, 而在损失框架下, 为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (2)与为自我决策相比, 低内隐自尊者为他人决策时更冒险, 而高内隐自尊者为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (3)内隐自尊水平与任务框架的交互作用及内隐自尊水平、任务框架和决策者角色之间的三级交互作用均不显著。依据相关的理论和发现对这种结果进行了分析和讨论。     

真实和虚拟金钱奖赏影响风险决策行为*

在风险情境下人类如何决策是长久以来心理学和经济学研究中一个极具挑战性的核心问题。众多研究采用真实或虚拟金钱作为奖赏强化物来探索风险决策行为的过程和机制,但对金钱奖赏真实性如何影响决策了解很少。仿真气球冒险任务(BART：Balloon Analogue Risk Task)可以在实验室条件下有效评估个体在真实社会中的风险行为。本研究采用 BART任务,通过两个实验探讨和比较了真实与虚拟金钱奖赏对风险决策行为的影响。实验一的结果发现,与虚拟金钱奖赏相比,真实金钱奖赏情境下的风险决策更容易受上一次决策结果的影响,上一次决策失败会导致被试的风险偏好水平显著降低(平均吹气球的次数显著减少),同时决策失败(气球吹爆)次数也显著减少,提示真实金钱奖赏下有更强的反馈学习效应。实验二重复了实验一的结果,并进一步发现,虚拟金钱奖赏的幅度对被试的风险决策行为没有影响,而真实金钱奖赏的幅度能显著改变被试的风险决策行为,较大幅度的真实金钱奖赏可以显著降低被试的风险偏好水平,但这种奖赏幅度对风险偏好的调控效应只对感觉寻求水平低的被试有效,感觉寻求水平高的被试不受影响。这些发现表明真实与虚拟金钱奖赏对风险决策行为有不同的影响。我们的结果可以用风险决策的后悔理论或齐当别模型来解释。     

青少年决策中的风险选择框架效应

以181名青少年(初二、高二、大二)为被试,探究其在不同决策领域(生命、娱乐、学业)的风险选择框架效应及其在年级、风险偏好水平上的特点.结果表明:(1)框架效应程度与决策领域有关,被试在生命和娱乐领域的决策问题上倾向于风险寻求.(2)不同年级被试的决策结果受问题框架的影响,大学生在生命问题上倾向于风险寻求,初中生在娱乐问题上倾向于风险寻求,高中生在学业领域上倾向于风险规避.(3)不同风险偏好水平被试的决策结果受问题框架的影响,风险偏好水平高的被试在生命、娱乐问题上倾向于风险寻求,风险偏好水平低的被试在学业问题上倾向于风险规避.     

内隐自尊和风险偏好对大学生职业决策的影响

为研究影响大学生职业决策的影响因素和决策有效性,实验一、二分别从决策者心理特征（内隐自尊与风险偏好）和职业方案特征（框架效应与风险水平）入手,考察二者对大学生职业决策行为的影响。结果发现：内隐自尊和风险偏好的高低显著影响大学生择业倾向性;大学生对风险水平不同的职业方案的选择倾向由低到高依次为冒险、折中、保守方案;职业决策存在明显的框架效应。研究表明,大多数大学生倾向于选择保守的职业方案;高风险偏好的大学生倾向于选择冒险的职业方案;高内隐自尊大学生倾向于主动择业;积极表述的职业方案更受大学生所青睐。     

模糊决策的情境依赖性

实验1采用艾尔斯伯格悖论的研究范式,探究被试对模糊的厌恶倾向以及在决策过程中所采用的决策策略。结果发现：被试对确定选项和模糊选项的选择存在差异;在肯定形式下倾向于确定选项,而在否定形式下则倾向于模糊选项,采用了利益最大化策略。实验2采用艾尔斯伯格悖论的变式,通过操纵概率和任务类型,发现：模糊决策具有情境依赖性,并非任何情况下个体都厌恶模糊。当风险选项不能满足自己的需要,即获胜机率比较小时,人们会偏向模糊选项。     

风险偏好、信息完整性对职业决策信息加工的影响

本研究旨在探讨个体风险偏好如何影响信息加工过程;同时呈现信息的完整性是否影响个体信息加工过程。以31名正在求职的大学生为被试,探讨了他们在信息板上进行职业决策的信息加工过程。结果显示：(1) 低风险偏好者比高风险偏好者更关注与概率相关的线索;(2) 当信息不完整时,个体在决策中增加了对概率相关线索的关注;(3) 信息完整性对个体决策信息加工过程并未产生显著的影响。     

Group Decision Makers' Preferences Modelling within the Goal Programming Model: An Overview and a Typology

The Goal Programming (GP) model is one of the first models that have been developed to deal with managerial decision‐making problems where several incommensurable and conflicting objectives are involved. The GP variants integrate the decision maker's preferences differently. This model has also been applied to group decision‐making situations. The aim of this paper is to propose a new typology based on preferences articulation of decision makers through the GP model. This typology is based on the articulation and the elucidation process of the group decision makers' preferences. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reference-dependent utility with shifting reference points and incomplete preferences

Many empirical studies have shown that people's preferences are reference-dependent. Previous theoretical studies of reference-dependence assumed that the reference point was fixed and then imposed the usual assumptions of decision theory, in particular completeness of preferences. This paper gives preference foundations for additive reference-dependent utility when the reference point varies across decisions and is one of the options in the decision maker's opportunity set. This decision situation is common, for example because usually the retention of the status quo is an available option, but is difficult to handle axiomatically because it implies incompleteness of preferences. The results of this paper provide tools to extend existing theories of reference-dependent preferences, such as prospect theory, to new and empirically important decision contexts.     

The transience of constructed preferences

A large body of research suggests that preferences are constructed rather than merely accessed in the course of making decisions. The current research examines the stability of constructed preferences over time. Preferences for various factors relevant to a job choice were measured prior to presentation of the job‐choice task, at the point of decision, and again following a delay. It was found that relative to baseline pre‐decision levels, preferences shifted to provide stronger support for the emerging decision. Preference changes proved to be transient, receding to baseline after 1 week (Experiment 1), and even within 15 minutes (Experiment 2). These findings, which can be interpreted in terms of decision‐making by constraint satisfaction, suggest that preferences are constructed to serve the decision at hand, without constraining the decision maker in future decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Feasibility OF Collectives' Actions

Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: (1) show that there is a good case for revising decision theory so as to allow it to apply non-vacuously to agents with incomplete preferences, and (2) to identify one substantive criterion that any such non-standard decision theory must obey. Our criterion, Competitiveness, is a weaker version of a dominance principle. Despite its modesty, Competitiveness is incompatible with prospectism, a recently developed decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences. We spend the final part of the paper showing why Competitiveness should be retained, and prospectism rejected.     

Are intertemporal preferences contagious? Evidence from collaborative decision making

Prior research has provided substantial insight into individuals’ intertemporal preferences (i.e., preferences about delayed rewards). In the present study, we instead investigated the preferences of small groups of individuals asked to express collective intertemporal decisions. The paradigm consisted of three phases. During the precollaboration and postcollaboration phases, participants completed an intertemporal decision task individually. During the collaboration phase, participants completed a similar task in small groups, reaching mutually-agreed-upon decisions. The results suggest that group preferences were systematically related to the mean of the group members’ precollaboration preferences. In addition, collaborative decision making altered the group members’ intertemporal preferences. Specifically, individuals’ postcollaboration preferences converged toward the preferences of their respective groups. Furthermore, we found that individuals’ postcollaboration preferences were independently related to both their precollaboration preferences and the preferences of the other group members, suggesting that individuals’ postcollaboration preferences represented a revision of their precollaboration preferences based on the preferences observed in other group members. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that similar patterns of results were found whether participants were making matching judgments or binary choices.     

Contingent Weighting in Self-Other Decision Making

Three studies are presented that examine the decision-making processes that lead advisors to have preferences distinct from personal decision makers (Kray & Gonzalez, 1999). Advising and personal decision making were hypothesized to invoke different interpersonal frames, which lead to different weighting of decision attributes. Alternatively, advisors might simply exert less effort in decision making for others than do personal decision makers. In Study 1, the contingent weighting of attributes was examined in two decision-making tasks (choice vs. matching). Advisors were more likely to choose in a manner consistent with "what most people would prefer" than personal decision makers, but no differences in preferences were observed in the matching task. Advisors subsequently reported experiencing less regret and blame and more strongly preferred the chosen alternative than did personal decision makers. In Study 2, advisors considered more decision attributes to be important in the abstract compared to personal decision makers, and the choice pattern of Study 1 was replicated. In Study 3, advisors and personal decision makers generated more considerations when making a decision compared to individuals making decisions in the abstract. Finally, the preferences of personal decision makers were more consistent with their reported attribute importance judgments than were those of advisors. In total, the results suggest advisors incorrectly infer others' preferences, rather than suffer from a deficit of motivation, when giving advice. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

Who Takes the Lead in Risky Decision Making? Effects of Group Members' Risk Preferences and Prototypicality

In two experiments, we studied the effects of (a) the extent to which group members are risk seeking in comparison with others in the group and (b) group member prototypicality (the extent to which individuals hold group-typical risk preferences) on the likelihood that group members will take the lead in risky decision making. Participants were led to believe that they engaged in a four-person group discussion and received bogus feedback about their own risk preferences, the risk preferences of the other group members, and the risk preferences of their group as a whole. In Experiment 2, we also manipulated the framing of the decision problem (gain vs. loss frame). Results supported the hypotheses that (a) more risk seeking members are more likely to take the lead and (b) prototypical members are more likely to take the lead when the problem facing the group is ambiguous (i.e., when group risk preferences and decision framing are incongruent), whereas nonprototypical members are more likely to take the lead when the problem facing the group is relatively clear-cut (i.e., when group risk preferences and decision framing are congruent).     

情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响

两个实验考察了情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果表明:(1)获益框架下,悲伤情绪比愉悦情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,自我决策比预期他人决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(2)损失框架下,愉悦情绪比悲伤情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,预期他人决策比自我决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(3)在自我决策时,愉悦情绪在损失框架下比在获益框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好,悲伤情绪在获益框架下比在损失框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好;在预期他人决策时,无论是愉悦情绪还是悲伤情绪,损失框架均比获益框架诱发了更强的风险偏好。