Who's Right About the Right? Comparing Competing Explanations of the Link Between White Evangelicals and Conservative Politics in the United States

Five competing explanations for why white evangelicals hold right‐of‐center political attitudes are examined using data from the 2000–2004 National Election Studies. Dependent variables include attitudes about abortion, homosexuality, immigration, national defense, and social spending. The five competing explanations accounting for conservative positions are: religiosity, moral standards traditionalism, gender and family ideology, class culture, and cultural geography. Moral standards traditionalism attenuated the evangelical effect on attitudes about abortion, homosexuality, and social spending. Religiosity and male‐dominant gender ideology attenuated the effect on abortion and homosexuality only. In a second set of models, which include members of all major religious groups, these three variables, together with low levels of education, were significantly associated with conservative attitudes. Moral standards traditionalism demonstrated the most consistent, and generally the strongest, effects across dependent variables.     

Is There a Right to Have Rights? The Case of the Right of Asylum

In dialogue with the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib the author draws on the idea of a right to have rights and raises the question under which political conditions asylum can be a subjective right for political refugees. He argues that mere spontaneous acts of humanitarianism will not suffice to define the institutional commitments of liberal democracies in refugee policy. At the same time, no duty for any particular state to take up refugees can be derived from a right to have rights. The quest for institutional solutions for a timely migration and asylum policy will rather enhance the discourses on the self-understanding of liberal democracies. With a critical eye on German asylum legislation and legal practice, the author contends that it will be a task of any co-ordinated European right of asylum to define political persecution in relation to the first dimension of human rights in order to differentiate the right of asylum from immigration legislation.     

A Right of Rebellion in the Mengzi?

Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars see this as grounding a right of popular rebellion. I argue that the text of the Mengzi reveals a more mixed view, and does so in two respects. First, it suggests that the people are sometimes permitted to participate in a rebellion but not permitted to decide for themselves when rebellion is warranted. Second, it gives appropriate moral weight not to the people’s judgments about the justifiability of rebelling, but rather to certain affections and behaviors that closely track their life satisfaction. I contend that in both respects the permissions Mengzi grants the people fall short of a proper right of rebellion. I conclude that the more historical account of Mengzi’s “just revolt theory” suggests an intriguing division of deliberative labor, and note some of the advantages of this account.     

What is the Right to Exclude Immigrants?

It is normally taken for granted that states have a right to control immigration into their territory. When immigration is raised as a normative issue two questions become salient, one about what the right to exclude is, and one about whether and how it might be justified. This paper considers the first question. The paper starts by noting that standard debates about immigration have not addressed what the right to exclude is. Standard debates about immigration furthermore tend to result either in fairly strong cases for open borders or in denials that considerations of justice apply to immigration at all, which results in state discretion positions. This state of debate is both theoretically unsatisfactory and normatively implausible. The paper therefore explores an alternative approach to the right to exclude immigrants from the perspective of recent debates about the territorial rights of states. The right to exclude claimed by states is analysed and it is shown to differ both conceptually and normatively from rights to impose political authority within a territory. The paper finally indicates how this analysis might broaden the focus of debates about immigration and suggest alternative regimes of migration regulation the possibility of which is obscured by traditional justice approaches.     

A Right to Understand Injustice: Epistemology and the “Right to the Truth” in International Human Rights Discourse

People's “right to truth” or their “right to know” about their government's human rights abuses is a growing consensus in human rights discourses and a fertile area of work in international and humanitarian law. In most discussions of this right to know the truth, it is commonly seen as requiring the state or international institutions to provide access to evidence of the violations. In this paper, I argue that such a right naturally has many epistemic aspects, and the tools of social epistemology can be helpful in elucidating what such a right entails. As a beginning for this project, I draw on those resources to argue that the right to know the truth is only meaningful if it includes a right to understand the abuses, and that such understanding can only come through the development of community epistemic capacities. Given this, I further argue that the state has a duty to support the development of these capacities, and that a critical place for beginning this process is in public schools.     

Depression in the Context of Disability and the “Right to Die”

Arguments in favor of legalized assisted suicide often center on issues of personal privacy and freedom of choice over one's body. Many disability advocates assert, however, that autonomy arguments neglect the complex sociopolitical determinants of despair for people with disabilities. Specifically, they argue that social approval of suicide for individuals with irreversible conditions is discriminatory and that relaxing restrictions on assisted suicide would jeopardize, not advance, the freedom of persons with disabilities to direct the lives they choose. This paper examines the idea promoted by some proponents of assisted suicide that it is reasonable to be depressed about one's diminished quality of life in cases of irreversible illness or disability and, therefore, such depression should not call into question the individual's competence to request assistance in dying. The concept of rational depression is defined and examined in the context of: four real-life cases involving individuals with disabilities who requested assistance in dying; a set of criteria commonly applied to decision-making to determine rationality; and research bearing on the emotional status of people with disabilities. It is concluded that although disability is associated with particular socially mediated stressors, there is no theoretical or empirical evidence to indicate that depression and its role in the right to die is dynamically different, more natural, or more reasonable for disabled people than for non-disabled people.     

Freud was Right… About the Origins of Abnormal Behavior

Freud's psychodynamic theory is predominantly based on case histories of patients who displayed abnormal behavior. From a scientific point of view, Freud's analyses of these cases are unacceptable because the key concepts of his theory cannot be tested empirically. However, in one respect, Freud was totally right: most forms of abnormal behavior originate in childhood. In this paper various factors are discussed that play a role in the etiology of abnormal behavior in children and adolescents. Furthermore, problems are signaled that hinder effective interventions for disordered youths.     

Psychological Deprogramming–Reprogramming and the Right Kind of Cause

This paper makes use of an example of Williams’s (1970), an example involving so-called psychological deprogramming–reprogramming, in arguing that procedures such as Teletransportation would not provide what matters to us in our self-interested concern for the future. This is so because the beliefs and other psychological states of a resultant person would not be appropriately causally dependent on any beliefs or other psychological states of the original person.     

How Does Kant Justify the Universal Objective Validity of the Law of Right?

Abstract

Since more than 50 years Kant scholars debate the question whether the Law of Right as introduced in the Metaphysics of Morals by Kant can be justified by the Categorical Imperative. On the one hand we have those who think that Kant’s theory of right depends from the Categorical Imperative, on the other hand we find a growing group of scholars who deny this. However, the debate has been flawed by confusion and misunderstanding of the crucial terms and principles. Therefore, my first task will be to clarify these terms and principles by introducing distinctions that have been neglected too often. After this I try to show a) that the Law of Right can in fact be justified by using the testing method the Categorical Imperative prescribes and b) that there is no other way to justify it. Doing this I criticize in detail the new arguments adherents of the independence thesis have recently put forward.     

Right hemisphere metaphor processing? Characterizing the lateralization of semantic processes

Previous laterality studies have implicated the right hemisphere in the processing of metaphors, however it is not clear if this result is due to metaphoricity per se or another aspect of semantic processing. Three divided visual field experiments varied metaphorical and literal sentence familiarity. We found a right hemisphere advantage for unfamiliar sentences containing distant semantic relationships, and a left hemisphere advantage for familiar sentences containing close semantic relationships, regardless of whether sentences were metaphorical or literal. This pattern of results is consistent with theories postulating predominantly left hemisphere processing of close semantic relationships and predominantly right hemisphere processing of distant semantic relationships.     

Did the Interpreters Get it Right? Genesis 2-3 Reconsidered

A response to James Barr on the issue of how to depict God'swords in Genesis 2:17 if the warning of death as a consequenceof disobedience appears unrealized in the subsequent narrative.Barr's point that ‘lie’ is an inappropriate depictionis accepted, but the issue is recast in terms of whether God'swords would be sheqer, unreliable. An interpretation of theoverall narrative, congruous with the decision about the natureof God's words, is offered.     

Do Trompe l'oeils Look Right When Viewed from the Wrong Place?

Picture perception and ordinary perception of real objects differ in several respects. Two of their main differences are: (1) Depicted objects are not perceived as present and (2) We cannot perceive significant spatial shifts as we move with respect to them. Some special illusory pictures escape these visual effects obtained in usual picture perception. First, trompe l'oeil paintings violate (1): the depicted object looks, even momentarily, like a present object. Second, anamorphic paintings violate (2): they lead to appreciate spatial shifts resulting from movement. However, anamorphic paintings do not violate (1): they are still perceived as clearly pictorial, that is, nonpresent. What about the relation between trompe l'oeil paintings and (2)? Do trompe l'oeils allow us to perceive spatial shifts? Nobody has ever focused on this aspect of trompe l'oeil perception. I offer the first speculation about this question. I suggest that, if we follow our most recent theories in philosophy and vision science about the mechanisms of picture perception, then, the only plausible answer, in line with phenomenological intuitions, is that, differently from nonillusory, usual picture perception, and similarly to ordinary perception, trompe l'oeil perception does allow us to perceive spatial shifts resulting from movement. I also discuss the philosophical implications of this claim.     

Defending the Faith(s)? Democracy and Hereditary Right in England

The persistence of traditional monarchies in modern societies, which are otherwise characterized by democratic and egalitarian values, remains a paradox in the social sciences. In part this is attributable to the lack of psychological investigation into the relationship between subject and sovereign, and in particular the ways in which the political and social values of the citizenry shape understandings of a hereditary monarch's right to represent a national community. Adopting the qualitative analysis methods of discursive psychology and grounded theory, the current study examines vernacular accounts of nationhood and monarchy in England in both formalized conversational interviews (n = 60) and impromptu street interviews (n = 56). Focusing on accounts of Prince Charles's recent proposal to change the role of the monarch, from “Defender of the (Christian) Faith” to “Defender of Faiths,” those in favor treated it as a positive step towards reflecting a diverse (religious) community, bringing the monarchy into line with current concerns of pluralism and upholding values of personal choice and individual rights. Participants who rejected the proposed change in title construed it as antithetical to these values in terms of reflecting personal stake and interest, an abuse of power, or an imposition on other faiths. In all accounts, the prime concern was in safeguarding the political and social values of the citizenry. In conclusion it is argued that the study of subjects' relationship to the monarch, its function and legitimacy, can provide an opportunity to examine how values can characterize a national community and facilitate national diversity.     

What is the Right Thing to Say? Agreement among Perceivers on the Supportiveness of Statements

Most social support theory implies that there are objectively supportive people and statements. Yet there is little agreement among perceivers that some people are more supportive than others. Nonetheless, there might be better agreement regarding supportive statements. In three studies, children, college students, and members of a clinical training program rated the supportiveness of specific statements presented by text or video. Agreement among perceivers accounted for only 11% of the variance (range = 8%–12%). Perceivers disagreed because of their traitlike perceptual biases, as well as perceivers’ idiosyncratic tastes. Implications for social support theory were discussed.     

Is Happy Facial Expression Identified by the Left or Right Hemisphere？

1IntroductionCorrectly identifying other people′s facial ex-pressions of emotions is important to human socialinteraction in all societies.Many studies suggestthat the identification of facial expressions in par-ticular and perceptual processing of emotional infor-mation is carried out mainly by the right hemi-sphere of the brain[1￣7].Damage to the righthemisphere generally produces more significant im-pairment in recognition of all facial expressions ofemotion than damage to the left hemisp…     

What Right to Die?

This letter first discusses two meanings of a "right to die." In the popular sense, the term refers to a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. In the strict sense, the term signifies an affirmative right to obtain death--a right to suicide. The letter then explores the legal implications of a suicide right. This right would extend to competent adults, mature minors, and probably also incompetent persons. Counselors would have to inform clients of the suicide option. Intervention to prevent suicide could trigger civil liability. Suicidal intentions would not justify involuntary commitment. Consent would become a defense to homicide.     

“Getting the Knowledge Right”: Patient Communication,Agency, and Knowledge

In 2013, in accordance with a provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010), the U.S. government began fining hospitals with “excessive” patient readmission rates. Those working to respond to this issue have identified discharge communication with patients as a critical component. In response to this exigency and to contribute to the conversation in the medical humanities about the field’s purview and orientation, this article analyzes studies of and texts about communication in health and medicine, ultimately arguing that the on-going circulation of compliance rhetoric and assumptions has limited efforts to improve patient communication. The article, furthermore, considers that humanist ideals of agentic action, the patient-centered care movement’s emphasis on the patient, and biomedicine’s tendency to treat evidence-based knowledge as fixed and given may have combined to support a rationale for using patient adherence to treatment guidelines as metrics in measurement studies designed to identify effective communication strategies. Finally, the article proposes that those working in the medical humanities consider the value of interdisciplinary posthumanist scholarship—specifically, its treatment of agency and knowledge as emergent, distributed, and contingent—and its potential to transform or extend in productive ways the conversation about what constitutes effective communication with patients.