Farewell!

No abstract available for this article.     

I Can't Relax! You're Driving me Quasi!

Robust Realists think that there are irreducible, non‐natural, and mind‐independent moral properties. Quasi‐Realists and Relaxed Realists think the same, but interpret these commitments differently. Robust Realists interpret them as metaphysical commitments, to be defended by metaphysical argument. Quasi‐Realists and Relaxed Realists say that they can only be interpreted as moral commitments. These theories thus pose a serious threat to Robust Realism, for they apparently undermine the very possibility of articulating the robust metaphysical commitments of this theory. I clarify and respond to this threat, showing that there is in fact space to develop and defend a robust moral ontology.     

Modality,Si! Modal Logic,No!

This article is oriented toward the use of modality in artificial intelligence (AI). An agent must reason about what it or other agents know, believe, want, intend or owe. Referentially opaque modalities are needed and must be formalized correctly. Unfortunately, modal logics seem too limited for many important purposes. This article contains examples of uses of modality for which modal logic seems inadequate.I have no proof that modal logic is inadequate, so I hope modal logicians will take the examples as challenges.Maybe this article will also have philosophical and mathematical logical interest.