Children's metacognitive judgments in an eyewitness identification task

Two experiments examined children's metacognitive monitoring of recognition judgments within an eyewitness identification paradigm. A confidence-accuracy (CA) calibration approach was used to examine patterns of calibration, over-/underconfidence, and resolution. In Experiment 1, children (n=619, mean age=11 years 10 months) and adults (n=600) viewed a simulated crime and attempted two separate identifications from 8-person target-present or target-absent lineups given lineup instructions that manipulated witnesses choosing patterns by varying the degree of social pressure. For choosers, but not nonchoosers, meaningful CA relations were observed for adults but not for children. Experiment 2 tested a guided hypothesis disconfirmation manipulation designed to improve the realism of children's metacognitive judgments. Children (N=796, mean age=11 years 11 months) in experimental and control conditions viewed a crime and attempted two separate identifications. The manipulation had minimal impact on the CA relation for choosers and nonchoosers. In contrast to adults, children's identification confidence provides no useful guide for investigators about the likely guilt or innocence of a suspect. These experiments revealed limitations in children's metacognitive monitoring processes that have not been apparent in previous research on recall and recognition with younger children.     

Implicit diagnosticity in an information-buying task. How do we use the information that we bring with us to a problem?

Past research suggests that people may make use of diagnosticity information when explicit data regarding P(D | H) and P(D | ? H) are given to them. However, people fall victim to pseudodiagnosticity biases and ignore P(D | ? H) when such data must be actively sought. This series of four experiments utilized judgment problems in which subjects have knowledge of P(D | ? H) but must recognize the relevance of that knowledge for the judgment at hand. It was hypothesized that subjects who genuinely understood the role of P(D | ? H) in hypothesis testing would respond to this manipulation of implicit diagnosticity by exhibiting greater confidence and lesser information buying when given evidence of relatively high diagnosticity. In the first three studies, subjects attempted to judge the guilt or innocence of suspects in several fictional crimes. In the fourth experiment, subjects attempted to judge the club membership status of students at their own university. Greater amounts of information were bought when the only available information was of low diagnosticity. Subjects also expressed greater confidence in judgments made using highly diagnostic information. However, within the legal scenario, sensitivity to diagnosticity was dependent upon the implication of the cues received. Results are discussed with respect to Bayesian probability, expected value theory, and a confidence criterion model of information purchasing.     

The effects of proportion,strength and value orientation of arguments on decision-making

Presented 120 males and 300 females with a summary of arguments concerning a court case. The information varied in the proportion and strength of arguments for either the defense or the prosecution. Based on the relevant arguments version of the cultural value hypothesis, it was predicted that: (a) proportion of arguments is directly related to subjects' ratings of probability of guilt; (b) fewer arguments are needed to move subjects toward innocence than toward guilt; (c) strong minority defense arguments ate more effective than weak ones in allowing subjects to adhere to their initial value; and (d) strong prosecution arguments result in higher probability of guilt ratings than do weak prosecution arguments. Data supported each of these hypotheses.     

Reactions of Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication1

An important aspect of conflict resolution by judgment of a third party is the extent to which participants and observers are satisfied that both the procedure and the outcome are fair and impartial. Male undergraduates participated in a business simulation, which resulted in a controversy placing them in the position of defendants in a trial. An examination was then made of the effects of adversary and nonadversary procedures, prior belief about guilt, and favorableness of the judgment on participant subjects’perceptions of the adjudication. Another group of subjects who had no prior information about the guilt or innocence of the defendent served as observers. Participant subjects viewed the adversary procedure as most fair and satisfying. They were also most satisfied with judgments resulting from the adversary procedure, independently of pretrial belief or favorableness of verdict. Participants also preferred innocent to guilty verdicts, regardless of their pretrial belief. Subjects who held a pretrial belief of innocence were particularly dissatisfied with guilty verdicts and with the nonadversary trial procedure. Observers also found the adversary procedure to be most fair, and expressed a preference for innocent verdicts.     

The effects of feedback about self and others on the recall and judgments of feedback-relevant information

After people have received feedback about the outcome of their behavior, their responses to information bearing on the validity of this feedback may be influenced by their desire to maintain a favorable self-image. This experiment investigated the cognitive mediators of these responses. Subjects who received negative feedback about their performance on an intelligence test disparaged intelligence tests in general and judged a report they had read to be unfavorable to intelligence tests. Nevertheless, they recalled more arguments in the report that were favorable to intelligence tests than did positive feedback recipients. These results contradicted the hypothesis that subjects selectively attend to information that helps them to maintain a positive self-concept in light of negative information about themselves. Rather, they may attempt to refute arguments that support the validity of the negative feedback they receive, and this relatively greater processing may facilitate the recall of these arguments later on. In contrast, there was no evidence that subjects try to refute information that calls the validity of positive feedback into question. Results had implications for two additional issues: first, whether the effect of performance feedback depends on whether it is received before or after information bearing on its validity; second, whether feedback has similar effects on recall and judgments by persons to whom it does not directly pertain.     

Evaluating sex discrimination claims: the mediating role of attributions.

The role of attributions in judgments of sex discrimination was examined in 2 laboratory experiments. In Study 1, participants read 1 of 12 brief scenarios in which limited information about the strength of evidence against a fictitious corporation and occupational gender stereotype were manipulated. Results suggested that attributions mediated the relationships between participants' gender, strength of evidence, and discrimination judgments. In Study 2, participants were provided with 1 of 3 detailed, typewritten summaries of evidence presented in a sex discrimination trial. Results indicated that jurors' gender was again significantly related to attributions and to sex discrimination judgments even in the face of substantial objective information related to the case. The variance in observers' judgments associated with gender, however, appeared to be greatest when information about the organization's guilt or innocence was equivocal.     

The accuracy of meta-metacognitive judgments: regulating the realism of confidence

Can people improve the realism of their confidence judgments about the correctness of their episodic memory reports by deselecting the least realistic judgments? An assumption of Koriat and Goldsmith's (Psychol Rev 103:490-517, 1996) model is that confidence judgments regulate the reporting of memory reports. We tested whether this assumption generalizes to the regulation of the realism (accuracy) of confidence judgments. In two experiments, 270 adults in separate conditions answered 50 recognition and recall questions about the contents of a just-seen video. After each answer, they made confidence judgments about the answer's correctness. In Experiment 1, the participants in the recognition conditions significantly increased their absolute bias when they excluded 15 questions. In Experiment 2, the participants in the recall condition significantly improved their calibration. The results indicate that recall, more than recognition, offers valid cues for participants to increase the realism of their report. However, the effects were small with only weak support for the conclusion that people have some ability to regulate the realism in their confidence judgments.     

Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

Utilization of base-rate information during feeling-of-knowing judgments.

We examined whether subjects use base-rate information about item difficulty when making feeling-of-knowing judgments for items they failed to recall. First, the subjects attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions. Then, for those items they recalled incorrectly, half of the subjects received information about the normative probability of recall of each item while judging their feeling of knowing. The other subjects made their feeling-of-knowing judgments without receiving any base-rate information. Finally, all subjects had a forced-choice recognition test on those items to validate the accuracy of their feeling-of-knowing judgments. Relative to the no-base-rate information group, the base-rate group had lower feelings of knowing for normatively difficult items and higher feelings of knowing for normatively easier items. Subjects who had received base-rate information during the judgment state had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than subjects who did not receive base-rate information. However, even the predictions from subjects who received base-rate information were not significantly more accurate for predicting subsequent recognition than were the predictions derived from normative information alone.     

Prior knowledge is more predictive of error correction than subjective confidence

Previous research has demonstrated that, when given feedback, participants are more likely to correct confidently-held errors, as compared with errors held with lower levels of confidence, a finding termed the hypercorrection effect. Accounts of hypercorrection suggest that confidence modifies attention to feedback; alternatively, hypercorrection may reflect prior domain knowledge, with confidence ratings simply correlated with this prior knowledge. In the present experiments, we attempted to adjudicate among these explanations of the hypercorrection effect. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants answered general knowledge questions, rated their confidence, and received feedback either immediately after rating their confidence or after a delay of several minutes. Although memory for confidence judgments should have been poorer at a delay, the hypercorrection effect was equivalent for both feedback timings. Experiment 2 showed that hypercorrection remained unchanged even when the delay to feedback was increased. In addition, measures of recall for prior confidence judgments showed that memory for confidence was indeed poorer after a delay. Experiment 3 directly compared estimates of domain knowledge with confidence ratings, showing that such prior knowledge was related to error correction, whereas the unique role of confidence was small. Overall, our results suggest that prior knowledge likely plays a primary role in error correction, while confidence may play a small role or merely serve as a proxy for prior knowledge.     

The role of prior knowledge in explaining hypothetical events

Having subjects explain a hypothetical future event biases their subjective likelihood estimates for that event. However, Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, and Hirt (1983, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 1127–1143) found that the biasing effects of an explanation task were reduced when subjects formed an initial impression based on the information (prior to the explanation task). Nonetheless, there are no doubt many factors that may influence subjects' ability to form strong initial impressions. The present studies address two of these factors. Experiment 1 used both subjects who were knowledgeable and unknowledgeable (naive) about a stimulus domain (football). Experiment 2 used only knowledgeable subjects, but gave these subjects information about unfamiliar teams and players. Subjects first read information about teams in an upcoming game and were then asked to explain a hypothetical victory by one team. They then made judgments about the actual future game and recalled the information. Only knowledgeable subjects given an initial impression set and given information that was easily integrated with past knowledge were able to resist the explanation bias. All other subjects demonstrated judgments that were strongly biased in the direction of the outcome explained. An examination of the relation between judgment and recall implied that knowledgeable and naive individuals differed in the ways they made judgments.     

加工水平对普通话与粤语记忆语言依赖效应的影响

通过两个实验,考察了加工水平对普通话和粤语记忆语言依赖效应的影响。实验1考察了在有意学习中的记忆语言依赖效应。结果表明,测验的语言环境对再认有重要影响。被试在粤语测验环境下对学习过的韩国语词再认反应时短,误报率却低,辨别力强,“记得”反应占优势。实验2考察了无意学习中的记忆语言依赖效应。结果表明,被试在粤语测验环境下,对评定过的韩国语词再认反应时短,误报率却高,辨别力差,但“记得”反应占优势;但在普通话测验环境下,对评定过的韩国语词再认反应时长,误报率却低,辨别力强,“知道”和“猜测”反应增加。整个研究表明,记忆的语言依赖效应在有意学习和无意学习中都存在,但有不同的趋势,表明加工水平是影响普通话和粤语记忆语言依赖效应的重要变量     

Recognition and recall in short-term memory

A signal detection analysis of confidence judgments in short-term memory was used to investigate the difference in the amount of information required in memory for recognition and recall. In yoked recognition and recall experiments, subjects learned lists of five paired-associates and were probe-tested for one of them either by a recall or yes-no recognition procedure. This method permitted examination of the effect of serial position on the obtained differences in information in memory.     

Test expectancy and question answering in prose processing

Two experiments were conducted to study the effects of expectanices about test format (recall versus recognition) upon the retention of information from prose. In each study subjects expecting recall recalled better than those expecting a multiple-choice test. Serial position analysis in Experiment 1 suggested differential use of study time in groups expecting different types of test. Examination of study time use in Experiment 2 indicated that subjects expecting multiple-choice showed greater variability in the use of time spent reading prose segments. They were also more likely to employ idiosyncratic orders of reading segments. In general the results seem compatible with the theoretical model of Gillund and Shiffrin (1984) emphasizing the ratio of two types of coding.     

Guilty or Not Guilty? A Look at the “Simulated” Jury Paradigm1

Three experiments examined the effects of real versus hypothetical consequences on juridic decision-making. Real consequences subjects believed their judgments would actually determine what happened to the defendant, while hypothetical consequences subjects believed the study simply dealt with jury decision-making. In Experiment I, the defendant's character attractiveness had no influence on guilt judgments made by real consequences subjects but did so for hypothetical consequences subjects. In addition, character attractiveness affected recommendations of punishment for both real and hypothetical consequences subjects. In Experiment II, the defendant's physical attractiveness influenced neither real nor hypothetical consequences subjects on either the guilt or punishment measures. Experiment III showed that real consequences subjects recalled more situational evidence of the case than did hypothetical consequences subjects. In all three studies, more guilty verdicts occurred in the real consequences condition than in the hypothetical consequences condition. It was concluded that much current research on hypothetical juries may be misleading and that more attention should be given in the future to the variable of real versus hypothetical consequences. Possible mediating factors leading to real and hypothetical consequences differences were explored.     

Developmental changes in predicting one's own span of short-term memory

Developmental changes in the accuracy of predicting one's own recall were studied, using preschool, third grade, and college subjects in Experiment 1 and third grade and college subjects in Experiment 2. Experiment 1 showed that prediction accuracy increased from the preschool to the college years, subjects were not influenced by a potential “expectancy” bias in the procedure, and only third grade subjects were influenced by the presence of norms about peer performance. Experiment 2 showed that third graders and college subjects lower their predictions in the face of “false” norm information, with college subjects being the only group to under predict actual recall in both experiments. Thus, although adults are significantly more accurate than elementary shool children in estimating short-term recall, their susceptibility to norm information suggests that even they have uncertainty about their exact capabilities.     

Actor-observer differences in realism in confidence and frequency judgments

Taking a social psychological approach to metacognitive judgments, this study analyzed the difference in realism (validity) in confidence and frequency judgments (i.e., estimates of overall accuracy) between one's own and another person's answers to general knowledge questions. Experiment 1 showed that when judging their own answers, compared with another's answers, the participants exhibited higher overconfidence, better ability to discriminate correct from incorrect answers, lower accuracy, and lower confidence. However, the overconfidence effect could be attributable to the lowest level of confidence. Furthermore, when heeding additional information about another's answers the participants showed higher confidence and better discrimination ability. The overconfidence effect of Experiment 1 was not found in Experiment 2. However, the results of Experiment 2 were consistent with Experiment 1 in terms of discrimination ability, confidence, and accuracy. Finally, in both experiments the participants gave lower frequency judgments of their own overall accuracy compared with their frequency judgments of another person's overall accuracy.     

The effects of prior expectations and outcome knowledge on polygraph examiners' decisions

The present study deals with the question of whether judgments made by experts working in familiar contexts are affected by prior expectations and beliefs. Two experiments in which prior expectations were manipulated were designed to determine whether and to what extent polygraph examiners are affected by their prior expectations when analyzing and interpreting polygraph charts. Prior expectations affected the examiners' judgments when the polygraph charts did not include clear indications of guilt or innocence, but when the objective physiological evidence included strong indications which clearly contradicted the examiner's expectations, judgments were not affected by these expectations. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.