The personal sense of power

Scholars who examine the psychological effects of power have often argued that possessing power shapes individual behavior because it instills an elevated sense of power. However, little is known about the personal sense of power because very few studies have examined it empirically. In studies involving a total of 1,141 participants and nine different samples, we found that the personal sense of power was coherent within social contexts; for example, individuals who believed that they can get their way in a group also believed that they can influence fellow group members' attitudes and opinions. The personal sense of power was also moderately consistent across relationships but showed considerable relationship specificity; for example, individuals' personal sense of power vis-à-vis their friend tended to be distinct but moderately related to their personal sense of power vis-à-vis their parent. And the personal sense of power was affected not only by sociostructural factors (e.g., social position, status) but also by personality variables such as dominance.     

耻感与存在

本文从存在本体论维度审视耻与耻感。耻以否定性方式表达了人的内在规定性,耻感则是以否定性方式把握善。耻感形成于对善、自我及二者差距的自觉意识。耻感是一种积极的道德情感,它既是道德自律的内在根据,亦是道德义务、责任、良心的特殊存在方式。有耻无违是社会风尚清明的基本条件之一。     

The sense of diachronic personal identity

In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpretation of the Lockean account of diachronicity (i.e., one’s sense of personal identity over time) via psychological connectedness falls prey to breaks in one’s personal narrative. I argue that recent case studies show that while this critique may hold with regard to some long-term autobiographical self-knowledge (e.g., episodic memory), it carries less warrant with respect to accounts based on trait-relevant, semantic self-knowledge. The second issue I address concerns the question of diachronicity from the vantage point that there are (at least) two aspects of self—the self of psycho-physical instantiation (what I term the epistemological self) and the self of first person subjectivity (what I term the ontological self; for discussion, see Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474–518, 2012). Each is held to be a necessary component of selfhood, and, in interaction, they are appear jointly sufficient for a synchronic sense of self (Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474–518, 2012). As pertains to diachronicity, by contrast, I contend that while the epistemological self, by itself, is precariously situated to do the work required by a coherent theory of personal identity across time, the ontological self may be better positioned to take up the challenge.     

The authority of the moral sense

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

The sense of incredibility in ethics

Philosophical Studies - It is often said that normative properties are “just too different” to reduce to other kinds of properties. This suggests that many philosophers find it...     

The influence of goals on sense of control

We examined the influence of goals on sense of control relative to that experienced when taking action randomly. In the experimental task, participants controlled the direction of a moving dot by pressing the left and right keys at will without a specific goal (the control condition), directed the moving dot to a destination as often as possible (the strong goal condition), or kept the moving dot in the central area of the screen (the weak goal condition) for as long as possible. The results showed that the strong goal impaired the sense of control, but the weak goal did not exert an influence. We concluded that the goal-based expectation influenced sense of control, but the goal-directed action selection did not. Furthermore, we proposed a modified comparator model of the sense of control, offering a promising approach to integration of the predictive and postdictive processes involved in the sense of control.     

The time windows of the sense of agency

The sense of agency depends on some internal cues that derive from action control, as well as external cues like contextual information and prior information (degree of contingency between an action and is effect). We assessed whether external agency cues are combined with internal agency cues to affect the sense of agency. In two experiments participants performed a movement (button press) that elicited, after a varying delay, an effect (ball appearing on a screen), and reported their sense of agency over the effect (full, partial or no-agency) while internal cues (premotor information) and external cues (contextual and prior information) were manipulated. We assessed the effect of agency cues on the delays at which the sense of agency varied. The delays were increased with premotor signals but were decreased with contextual information. These findings favour a model of integration of internal and external agency cues over time.     

Making sense: The work of Eugene Gendlin

This and the following papers were presented at a symposium organized by David M. Levin honoring the work of Eugene Gendlin at meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, Boston, October, 1992.     

The development of time sense in middle adulthood

The focus of this paper is on the normal, intrapsychic, subjective experience of time in a developmental context. Time sense in middle age is determined less by the chronological age markers of forty or sixty and more by powerful, complex dynamic factors. Issues such as physical aging and illness, relationship to spouse and children, death of parents, and retirement will be explored in terms of how time is experienced.     

The sense of life time in human development

The subjective sense oflife time is the medium within which issues of identity and growth take place. Youth, middle age, early old age, and old age are each presented as developmental stages with dominant experiences oflife time. Directivity, or purposeful movement toward a goal, is then related to the experience of future and occurs in the gap between present and future. The sense of now in old age is viewed as a stage in the life cycle with the potential for unique personal creativity and growth, being free from bondages found at other points in the life cycle.