Natural, unnatural, and supernatural concepts

Five experiments investigating information-processing consequences of concept naturalness and unnaturalness are reported. In particular, an attempt is made to examine the separate and joint effects of simplicity and entrenchment upon reasoning with natural and unnatural concepts. The experiments employed four variants of a concept-selection task in which subjects characterized the state of an object at some future time on the basis of information about the object at that time and at some earlier time. In all five experiments, both simplicity and entrenchment affected ease of information processing. The last two experiments showed that the effect of simplicity was greater than that of entrenchment. An informationprocessing model of task performance provided a very good account of the latency and error data. Scores from the concept-selection task correlated with scores from a set of psychometric inductive-reasoning tests; indeed, the correlations were higher than those usually found between cognitive task performance and psychometrically measured intelligence. Processing of nonentrenched concepts may provide a useful means for studying the nature of intelligent performance.     

A triarchic theory of intellectual development during adulthood

A triarchic theory of intellectual development during adulthood is proposed. The theory comprises three parts: a contextual part that emphasizes the role of intelligence in successful adaptation to the environment; a componential part that specifies the mental mechanisms and processes underlying intelligent behavior; and an experiential part that indicates that intelligence is best manifested in instances in which the task or situation requiring the application of these processes is relatively novel or is becoming automatized. A selective and brief review of the literature on adult intellectual development is provided as evidence for the triarchic theory. The triarchic theory is then compared with four other theoretical approaches to adult intellectual development. It is argued that the triarchic theory provides new insights regarding the ways in which intelligence changes from early to middle to late adulthood and suggests certain properties of tasks and situations that make them more or less useful as measures of intelligence at various points in adult intellectual development.     

The intelligent infant: Theoretical implications

In the present essay, the fact that preferences for visual novelty during infancy are related to later performance on intelligence tests was interpreted to mean that intelligence is continuous from infancy. It was suggested that the bases of both continuity and the general factor in intelligence reside in the same small set of basic cognitive processes. It was also noted that intelligent behavior on the part of the infant raises a question about the relative importance of automatic and effortful processes in intelligence. The development of a valid test of infant intelligence was seen as an aid to clarifying the role of hereditary and environmental influences on intelligence and in furthering our understanding of mental retardation. In brief, the manner in which infants distribute their attention to novel and previously exposed stimuli reveals the origins of cognition. The origins of cognition are the origins of intelligence.     

Intelligence research at the interface between differential and cognitive psychology: Prospects and proposals

There seems to be widespread agreement among theoreticians and methodologists alike that new approaches to studying intelligence should somehow combine the differential and cognitive (information-processing) approaches that have been used in the past, and that the combination should somehow enable the investigator to isolate components of intelligence that are elementary (at some level of analysis). Researchers disagree, however, as to how the differential and cognitive approaches should be combined, and consequently, in how elementary components of intelligence should be isolated and in what they are. How does an investigator choose from among the multiple paths available for theory and research? In this article, I propose some guidelines that may help investigators make informed choices. The article is divided into three major parts. In the first, I propose guidelines for choosing from among various methodologies for studying intelligence, and then describe briefly at least some of the methods that meet (or come close to meeting) these guidelines. In the second part, I propose guidelines for the specification of subtheories (and eventually, full-fledged theories) of intelligence, and illustrate how these guidelines can be met. Finally, I describe the direction in which I believe our subtheories and methods should lead us.     

Discrepancies Between Implicit and Explicit Self‐concepts of Intelligence Predict Performance on Tests of Intelligence

Three studies investigated the correspondence between implicit and explicit self‐concepts of intelligence and how that correspondence is related to performance on different intelligence tests. Configurations of these two self‐concepts were found to be consistently related to performance on intelligence tests in all three studies. For individuals who self‐reported high intelligence (high explicit self‐concept), a negative implicit self‐concept (measured with the Implicit Association Test) led to a decrease in performance on intelligence tests. For participants whose self‐report indicated a low self‐concept of intelligence, positive automatic associations between the self and intelligence had a similar effect. In line with a stress hypothesis, the results indicate that any discrepant configuration of self‐concepts will impair performance. Importantly, the prediction of performance on intelligence tests by the self‐concept of intelligence was shown to be independent of self‐esteem (Study 3). Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Six authors in search of a character: A play about intelligence tests in the year 2000

Six points of view regarding the future of intelligence testing are considered, and a combined, “prototypical” point of view is synthesized that seems to represent a consensus of authors regarding the directions in which intelligence testing and research on intelligence are going. The past history and present status of intelligence testing and research are briefly considered, and then their future is discussed. The future seems to include assessment of various kinds of components of intelligence—performance components, acquisition components, transfer components, and metacomponents. The distinction between academic and everyday intelligence is discussed, as are the cultural and temporal limits of any one notion of intelligence. Finally, the usefulness of the notion of intelligence as a prototype of people's beliefs is considered.     

Infant recognition memory and later intelligence

The present study asked if tests of visual recognition memory during infancy based on differential fixation to novel and previously seen targets are valid predictors of later intelligence for children scoring in the normal to superior range of intelligence. Statistically significant and moderate correlations of .37 and .57 were obtained between infant recognition memory scores obtained at four to seven months and later vocabulary tests of intelligence, for 54 children tested at four and for 39 children seen at seven years, respectively. The coefficients did not vary by sex, and were independent of differences in socio-economic status.     

Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids

In contrast to earlier views that argued for a particular kind of concept (e.g. prototypes), several recent accounts have proposed that there are multiple distinct kinds of concepts, or that there is a plurality of concepts for each category. In this paper, I argue for a novel account of concepts as pluralistic hybrids. According to this view, concepts are pluralistic because there are several concepts for the same category whose use is heavily determined by context. In addition, concepts are hybrids because they typically link together several different kinds of information that are used in the same cognitive processes. This alternative view accounts for the available empirical data, allows for greater cognitive flexibility than Machery's recent account, and overcomes several objections to traditional hybrid views.     

The intelligence of the Mongoloids: A psychometric, evolutionary and neurological theory

This paper presents a theory of the intelligence of the Mongoloids consisting of three linked sub-theories. The first concerns the psychometric features of Mongoloid intelligence and proposes that Mongoloids are characterised by high general intelligence (Spearman's g), high visuospatial abilities and low verbal abilities. Mongoloid abilities also display slow maturation in infancy and early childhood. It is proposed that this pattern of abilities cannot be explained in environmental terms and should be regarded as substantially genetically programmed. The second sub-theory presents an evolutionary explanation for this pattern of abilities in Mongoloids, whereby it is proposed that the extreme cold of the ice ages acted as a selection pressure for increases in Spearman's g and the visuospatial abilities. The low verbal abilities and slow maturation rates are interpreted as by-products of these adaptations. The third sub-theory presents a neurological model for the Mongoloid brain in which it is proposed that cortex devoted to the visuospatial abilities was expanded at the expense of the cortex devoted to the verbal abilities. The implication that there exists a negative correlation between the visuospatial abilities and the verbal abilities is considered in the concluding part of the paper and shown to be correct.     

Aptness in metaphor

We propose that in understanding a metaphor, an individual sees a concept from one class or domain in terms of its similarity in two different respects to a concept from another class or domain. The two kinds of similarity are within-domain similarity, or the degree to which two concepts occupy similar positions with respect to their own class or domain; and between-domain similarity, or the degree to which the classes or domains occupied by the concepts are themselves similar. To test this dual notion of similarity, we obtained ratings of the aptness of 64 metaphors from one group of subjects and ratings of their comprehensibility from another group of subjects. The terms of the metaphors had been scaled (based on the ratings of pretest subjects) to give measures of distance both within and between domains. Aptness of metaphors related positively to betweendomain distance, negatively to within-domain distance, and not at all to overall distance. Metaphors are thus perceived as more apt to the extent that their terms occupy similar positions within domains that are not very similar to each other. Comprehensibility also related to aptness. In a second experiment, subjects ranked a set of terms as possible completions for metaphors. For both groups of subjects in this experiment, the rank of an alternative's within-domain distance correlated with its relative popularity. Quantitative models, patterned after a model proposed by D. Rumelhart and A. A. Abrahamson (Cognitive Psychology, 1973, 5, 1–28) for analogical reasoning, afforded significant prediction of the choices of the group of subjects in which all the possible completions of a metaphor were from a single domain. The same models did not predict the choices of a group of subjects in which the possible completions of the metaphors were from different domains.     

Intergenerational transfer of individual differences in hereditary monarchs: genetic, role-modeling, cohort, or sociocultural effects?

Individual differences may be transferred across generations through either genetic inheritance, identification with role models, cohort effects, or sociocultural influences. Each of these four possible mechanisms makes different predictions regarding what traits display intergenerational continuities, the pattern of relationships between an individual and his or her relatives, as well as the relative impact of same-sex and cross-sex relationships. A sample of 342 hereditary monarchs was drawn from 14 European nations. These rulers, along with their parents, grandparents, and predecessors, were then assessed on the variables of intelligence, morality, eminence, leadership, life span, and reign span. Theoretically significant interaction effects were also operationalized using such moderator variables as genetic relationship, years of overlap in lives, age difference, difference in reign midpoints, and sex. The intergenerational transfer of intelligence and life span appears to be best explained by genetics, whereas the transfer of morality and eminence seems to be governed by role-modeling processes. The remaining variables were either transferred by more complex mechanisms (viz. leadership) or not transferred at all from one generation to the next (viz. reign span). The results contradict both Woods's (1906) belief that morality is genetically inherited and Galton's (1869) argument that eminence can served as a nearly equivalent proxy variable for intellectual genius.     

前额叶损害对个体一般智力、认知策略与自我监控能力影响的研究

本研究随机挑选了15名因外伤而造成的前额叶损害者和15名正常成人,采用韦氏成人智力量表和自编的图片分类作业,考查了他们在一般智力、认知策略与自我监控能力方面的差异,研究结果表明:(1)前额叶损害对个体的一般智力产生显著的影响,但是其智力仍然处于正常范围,可见智力的脑结构范围极为广泛,智力是一个具有多重性的系统。(2)前额叶损害者对无关刺激的抑制,对有效信息的提取与加工放大的心理活动受到极大影响,认知策略转换能力明显低于正常人,表现出了明显的认知不随意性,额叶可能更多的与个体的计划、认知策略选择、自我监控密切相关;(3)前额叶损害者对具体概念与抽象概念的自我监控能力表现出了不同的影响,对前者的损害显著大于后者,这表明个体依据具体概念进行的形象思维与凭借抽象概念进行的逻辑思维有不同的脑机制。     

Placing inspection time, reaction time, and perceptual speed in the broader context of cognitive ability: The VPR model in the Lothian Birth Cohort 1936

The idea that information processing speed is related to cognitive ability has a long history. Much evidence has been amassed in its support, with respect to both individual differences in general intelligence and developmental trajectories. Two so-called elementary cognitive tasks, reaction time and inspection time, have been used to compile this evidence, but most studies have used either one or the other. Relations between speed and fluid intelligence have tended to be stronger than those between speed and crystallized intelligence, but studies testing this have confounded verbal abilities with crystallized intelligence and spatial/perceptual abilities with fluid intelligence. Questions have also been raised regarding whether speed contributes directly to general intelligence or to more specific cognitive abilities to which general intelligence also contributes. We used 18 ability and speed measures in the Lothian Birth Cohort 1936, assessed at approximately age 70, to construct alternative versions of the Verbal-Perceptual-Image Rotation (Johnson & Bouchard, 2005a) model of cognitive ability to test different hypotheses regarding these issues. Though differences in the extents to which our models fit the data were relatively small, they suggested that reaction and inspection time tasks were comparable indicators of information processing speed with respect to general intelligence, that verbal and spatial abilities were similarly related to information processing speed, and that spatial, verbal, and perceptual speed abilities were more directly related to information processing speed than was general intelligence. We discuss the theoretical implications of these results.     

实践智力、社会智力、情绪智力的概念及其教育价值

传统智力测验的单一性和其预测的有限性为其它类型智力概念的提出留下了空间。实践智力、社会智力和情绪智力分别从实际解决问题,与人相处及情绪知觉、调节和情绪对思维的促进等不同角度对智力概念进行了强调和扩展。它们与传统的智力理论并不矛盾,只是各有侧重。此外,不同智力概念的提出对教育观念和教育模式的改变亦会有所启发。     

Conceptualizing institutions

Being part of the life of institutions requires a considerable amount of conceptual knowledge. In institutional settings, we must learn the relevant concepts to act meaningfully, and these concepts are internal in a peculiar way, namely, they are strictly relative to the rules of a given institution because they are constituted by those rules. However, institutions do not come out of nothing: They are inscribed in a social setting and this setting determines, at least in a broad sense, what is the nature of the institution. Our social life therefore creates more or less defined contexts for meaningful institutional activities, and these contexts in their own turn involve concepts. In this paper, I address this question by distinguishing between three kinds of concepts relevant for an institution and trying to identify the different relations that these concepts have with constitutive rules. I then proceed to explain how this distinction can improve our understanding of practical reasoning in institutional context.     

Knowledge, expectations, and inductive reasoning within conceptual hierarchies

Previous research (e.g. Cognition 64 (1997) 73) suggests that the privileged level for inductive inference in a folk biological conceptual hierarchy does not correspond to the “basic” level (i.e. the level at which concepts are both informative and distinct). To further explore inductive inference within conceptual hierarchies, we examine relations between knowledge of concepts at different hierarchical levels, expectations about conceptual coherence, and inductive inference. In Experiments 1 and 2, 5- and 8-year-olds and adults listed features of living kind (Experiments 1 and 2) and artifact (Experiment 2) concepts at different hierarchical levels (e.g. plant, tree, oak, desert oak), and also rated the strength of generalizations to the same concepts. For living kinds, the level that showed a relative advantage on these two tasks differed; the greatest increase in features listed tended to occur at the life-form level (e.g. tree), whereas the greatest increase in inductive strength tended to occur at the folk-generic level (e.g. oak). Knowledge and induction also showed different developmental trajectories. For artifact concepts, the levels at which the greatest gains in knowledge and induction occurred were more varied, and corresponded more closely across tasks. In Experiment 3, adults reported beliefs about within-category similarity for concepts at different levels of animal, plant and artifact hierarchies, and rated inductive strength as before. For living kind concepts, expectations about category coherence predicted patterns of inductions; knowledge did not. For artifact concepts, both knowledge and expectations predicted patterns of induction. Results suggest that beliefs about conceptual coherence play an important role in guiding inductive inference, that this role may be largely independent of specific knowledge of concepts, and that such beliefs are especially important in reasoning about living kinds.     

A review of object individuation in infancy

The present review of object individuation in infancy is divided into five sections. The first section is a brief history of the field and an outline of the development of efficient methods for studying object individuation among infants. Sections 2 and 3 are structured around the empirical evidence obtained by using two different kinds of basic and widely used experiments: infants' responses to (apparently) disappearing objects (Section 2), and infants' responses to objects that (apparently) change into other objects (Section 3). In the fourth section, theories of object individuation are presented and discussed. The final section takes a look ahead to the future and proposes a few experiments that may help in resolving some of the most important disputes regarding object individuation in infancy.     

Task rules, working memory, and fluid intelligence

Many varieties of working memory have been linked to fluid intelligence. In Duncan et al. (Journal of Experimental Psychology:General 137:131-148, 2008), we described limited working memory for new task rules: When rules are complex, some may fail in their control of behavior, though they are often still available for explicit recall. Unlike other kinds of working memory, load is determined in this case not by real-time performance demands, but by the total complexity of the task instructions. Here, we show that the correlation with fluid intelligence is stronger for this aspect of working memory than for several other, more traditional varieties-including simple and complex spans and a test of visual short-term memory. Any task, we propose, requires construction of a mental control program that aids in segregating and assembling multiple task parts and their controlling rules. Fluid intelligence is linked closely to the efficiency of constructing such programs, especially when behavior is complex and novel.     

Qualities of color vision in infancy.

Four-month-old infants attended differentially to eight equally bright, monochromatic spectral lights; that is, they discriminated colors. Moreover, infants showed the same pattern of differential attention regardless of experimental group (different groups of infants saw different subsets of all possible pairings of colors) or experimental method (paired comparisons or single stimulus). In general, the differential attention of infants to colors parallels the ratings of the pleasantness of those same colors by adults. Finally, infants looked significantly longer at color category centers than at color category boundaries. These results suggest that looking at this early stage of infancy can better be understood in terms of preference rather than in terms of stimulus categorization. The results also provide further evidence for a neural excitation model of early visual attention.     

New evidence for the prediction of intelligence from infancy

An assumption is made that tests of the infant's ability to recognize a previously seen target tap early cognitive processes similar to those processes employed to solve later tests of intelligence. The recognition memory abilities of normal infants have been found to be superior to those of infants considered to be at risk for later intellectual deficit. Evidence for the predictive validity of infant recognition memory tests emerges from longitudinal studies in which the relationship between the extent of infants' visual preferences for novel targets and later performance on standard tests of intelligence has been examined. Various theoretical and practical consequences flow from these initial discoveries of continuity in intelligent functioning from infancy to childhood.