《巴门尼德》与柏拉图式辩证术

《巴门尼德》的主题是形相论(理念论)与辩证术,柏拉图式辩证术问题与他应对智术师运动及其背后的前苏格拉底“存在之战”直接相关。本文考察柏拉图改造修辞术为辩证术的过程和哲学意义,以此定位形相与辩证术的位置。《巴门尼德》的形相论批判和辩证术展示指向共同的目的,即呈现逻辑推理与范畴描述对于人类认识存在的作用及限度,并由此凸显辩证术对于哲学探究新路彳圣的意义,这篇对话传达了柏拉图对人类认识与存在之问的深刻反思。     

实在论、观念论与语义学:现代英美巴门尼德解释的三条进路

现代英美关于巴门尼德哲学的解释可谓五花八门,如何梳理和鉴别这些解释是进一步研究的前提条件.关键是,我们该如何确定我们自己借以鉴别这诸多解释所依据的视向呢?因此,我们有理由将推演性重构的"进路"或"出发点",而非"结论"作为我们梳理现代英美巴门尼德解释谱系的主导视向.     

Two recent interpretations of Plato's Parmenides

William F. Lynch, S. J. An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the Parmenides, Georgetown University Press, 1959, 255 pp. $ 6.00

Robert S. Brumbaugh, Plato on the One. The Hypotheses in the Parmenides, Yale University Press, New Haven 1961, 365 pp. $ 6.50.     

Li in East Asian Buddhism: One Approach from Plato's Parmenides

In Plato's Parmenides, Socrates proposes a ‘Day’ analogy to express one possible model of part/whole relations. His analogy is swiftly rejected and replaced with another analogy, that of the ‘Sail’. In this paper, it is argued that there is a profound difference between these two analogies and that the ‘Day’ represents a distinct way to think about part/whole relations. This way of thinking, I argue, is the standard way of thinking in East Asian Buddhism. Plato's ‘Day’ analogy can then be used to illuminate the meaning of an opaque but very important concept in East Asian Buddhism: li, which in this paper is developed as a modal concept of ‘Wholeness’.     

Platonic Number in the Parmenides and Metaphysics XIII

I argue here that a properly Platonic theory of the nature of number is still viable today. By properly Platonic, I mean one consistent with Plato's own theory, with appropriate extensions to take into account subsequent developments in mathematics. At Parmenides 143a-4a the existence of numbers is proven from our capacity to count, whereby I establish as Plato's the theory that numbers are originally ordinal, a sequence of forms differentiated by position. I defend and interpret Aristotle's report of a Platonic distinction between form and mathematical numbers, arguing that mathematical numbers alone are cardinals, by reference to certain non-technical features of a set-theoretical approach and other considerations in philosophy of mathematics. Finally I respond to the objections that such a conception of number was unavailable in antiquity and that this theory is contradicted by Aristotle's report in Metaph . XIII that Platonic numbers are collections of units. I argue that Aristotle reveals his own misinterpretation of the terms in which Plato's theory was expressed.