Judging Yourself as You Judge Others: Moral Development and Exculpation

This study investigated two main issues: Whether people's judgments about real-life moral transgressions are affected by the role they play in them and whether self-serving biases in such judgments vary with level of moral development. One-hundred twenty university students took Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) test of moral judgment and made open-ended and rating-scale judgments about three real-life transgressions they considered moral in nature. As expected, participants made more exculpatory judgments about transgressions they committed than they did about transgressions others committed, but participants did not judge transgressions committed against them more harshly than they judged transgressions committed against others. The higher participants scored on Kohlberg's test the less they externalized and excused their moral transgressions. Contrary to expectation, this relation also applied to moral judgments about transgressions committed by others against others. These findings have important implications for models of moral development and social cognition.     

Kierkegaard's Mirrors: The Immediacy of Moral Vision

This paper explores Kierkegaard's recurrent use of mirrors as a metaphor for various aspects of moral imagination and vision. While a writer centrally concerned with issues of self‐examination, selfhood and passionate subjectivity might well be expected to be attracted to such metaphors, there are deeper reasons why Kierkegaard is drawn to this analogy. The specifically visual aspects of the mirror metaphor reveal certain crucial features of Kierkegaard's model of moral cognition. In particular, the felicity of the metaphors of the “mirror of possibility” in Sickness Unto Death and the “mirror of the Word” in For Self‐Examination depend upon a normative phenomenology of moral vision, one in which the success of moral agency depends upon an immediate, non‐reflective self‐referentiality built into vision itself. To “see oneself in the mirror” rather than simply seeing the mirror itself is to see the moral content of the world as immediately “about” oneself in a sense that goes beyond the conceptual content of what is perceived. These metaphors gesture towards a model of perfected moral agency where vision becomes co‐extensive with volition. I conclude by suggesting directions in which explication of this model may contribute to discussions in contemporary moral psychology.     

Kierkegaard's Mirrors: Interest,Self, and Moral Vision

This paper advances the view that the history of philosophy is both a kind of history and a kind of philosophy. Through a discussion of some examples from epistemology, metaphysics, and the historiography of philosophy, it explores the benefit to philosophy of a deep and broad engagement with its history. It comes to the conclusion that doing history of philosophy is a way to think outside the box of the current philosophical orthodoxies. Somewhat paradoxically, far from imprisoning its students in outdated and crystallized views, the history of philosophy trains the mind to think differently and alternatively about the fundamental problems of philosophy. It keeps us alert to the fact that latest is not always best, and that a genuinely new perspective often means embracing and developing an old insight. The upshot is that the study of the history of philosophy has an innovative and subversive potential, and that philosophy has a great deal to gain from a long, broad, and deep conversation with its history.     

Avoiding Cheap Grace: Luther and the Need for Moral Despair

Abstract : This article addresses two problems in the development of an adequate Lutheran ethics in our time: moral quietism in the public square and an overly narrow and individualistic moral vision. I argue that the construction of grace as “freedom” tends toward “cheap grace” and that grace needs, then, to be thought of as a compelling of moral striving. Second, I argue that our sense of moral despair today should be broadened to focus on our participation in social structures that damage humans and the nonhuman world as much as on our personal and individual failings.     

Kierkegaard's Philosophy: Implications for Counseling

This article discusses how the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard can provide useful guidelines for the study of the counseling process. Kierkegaard's philosophy is also compared with selected contributions of Freud, Skinner, Rogers, and May and with four common themes of counseling and psychotherapy.     

But for the Grace of God: Abortion and Cognitive Disability,Luck and Moral Status

Many theories of moral status that are intended to ground pro-choice views on abortion tie full moral status to advanced cognitive capabilities. Extant accounts of this kind are inconsistent with the intuition that the profoundly cognitively disabled have full moral status. This paper improves upon these extant accounts by combining an anti-luck condition with Steinbock’s stratification of moral status into two levels. On the resulting view, a being has full moral status if and only if (1) she has moral status and (2) (a) has had advanced cognitive capacities, (b) has the potential to develop such capacities, or (c) would have had such capacities were it not for luck. I argue that modal accounts of luck provide a non-speciesist basis for attributing the lack of advanced cognitive capacities in humans to luck without doing the same for non-human animals.     

信任与服从:公共道德的结构性要求

信任和服从作为公共道德的结构性要求,要求我们在相互“信服”中共同生存。通过我们日常生活中的信任与服从两个规范性道德的结构性要求而达致的对公共道德的理解,是我们寻求重叠共识与共同生存的起点。     

Passion and Reason: Aristotelian Strategies in Kierkegaard's Ethics

Both Aristotle and Kierkegaard show that virtues result, in part, from training which produces distinctive patterns of salience. The "frame problem" in AI shows that rationality requires salience. Salience is a function of cares and desires (passions) and thus governs choice in much the way Aristotle supposes when he describes choice as deliberative desire. Since rationality requires salience it follows that rationality requires passion. Thus Kierkegaard is no more an irrationalist in ethics than is Aristotle, though he continues to be charged with irrationalism. The compatibility of an Aristotelian reading of Kierkegaard with the "suspension of the ethical" and general problems with aretaic ethical theories are treated briefly. The author argues that it is possible to preserve a realist ethics in the face of the "tradition relativism" which threatens the version of virtue ethics here attributed to Kierkegaard.     

Sexuality and spirit in Kierkegaard's thought

The following article shows a sensible and responsible interpretation of Kierkegaard's theory of sexuality in relation to the longest-range development of self, where self from this perspective will be called spirit. Since, for Kierkegaard, this longest-range development involved immortality and was construed by him from a religious perspective, the topics under consideration will necessarily have some relevance to the philosophy of religion. Mental health issues will figure prominently, too. In the process of working this out, I have found some startling and significant adumbrations of some of Freud's work.     

Accept Yourself! A Pilot Randomized Controlled Trial of a Self-Acceptance-Based Treatment for Large-Bodied Women With Depression

A pilot parallel randomized controlled trial compared a self-acceptance, non-weight-loss intervention, Accept Yourself! (AY), to a weight loss program, Weight Watchers (WW), in order to provide preliminary safety, feasibility, and efficacy data in preparation for a definitive RCT of AY as an intervention to enhance the mental and physical health of larger-bodied women with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). Adult women with MDD and a Body Mass Index ≥30 were eligible. Nineteen women were randomized by random number table into AY (n = 9) or WW (n = 10). Intake, pretreatment, posttreatment, 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month follow-up assessments occurred at a rural academic medical center. Primary outcomes included depression severity and cardiovascular fitness. Chi-square and t-tests assessed attrition and participant preferences for treatment; other analyses used intention-to-treat, linear mixed-effects models for repeated measures, including all participants’ available data. Both groups improved in self-reported, F(5, 43.81) = 7.45, p < .001, partial η² = .38, and blinded-clinician-rated depression, F(6, 62.03) = 10.41, p < .001, partial η² = .5. AY was superior to WW in self-reported depression, F(5, 43.81) = 2.72, p = .03, partial η² = .11. Neither group improved in fitness. Eating disorder symptoms and weight gain worsened in WW. AY appeared safe, feasible, and offered initial evidence of efficacy for depression; it should be investigated in a definitive RCT, with modifications to increase potency. WW may not be suitable as a comparator intervention for AY because of risk to participants.