社会比较中的认知偏差探析：“优于常人”效应和“差于常人”效应

近几年来,在社会心理学的研究中社会比较中的认知偏差现象越来越多的受到研究者的关注。该文主要介绍了社会比较中的认知偏差现象：“优于常人”效应和“差于常人”效应。并对其理论依据、测量方法以及研究的理论意义分别进行了介绍。最后,在对以往研究回顾的基础上,提出了对今后研究的展望。     

Certainty and Uncertainty: The Two Faces of the Hindsight Bias

“Hindsight Bias” is a person's tendency, after learning about the actual outcome of a situation or the correct answer to a question, to distort a previous judgment in the direction of this new information. In the literature, hindsight bias has been mostly discussed as an inevitable result of a “judgment under uncertainty.” We think that the hindsight bias is due to memorial as well as inferential processes: Whereas certainty about the recollection is memorial and concerns the recollective experience, certainty at the time of the judgment is inferential and concerns the individual's metaknowledge (“I know that I knew that”). In two experiments participants' feelings of certainty were measured indirectly (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) by giving participants the option of leaving those questions unanswered about which they felt uncertain. This free-report option was offered to half of the participants in the first estimate phase (concerning time of judgment) and to the second half in the memory phase (concerning the recollective experience). At the end of the session, participants were presented again with the questions they had skipped and were now required to answer them. This procedure allowed us to compare the amount of hindsight bias for the skipped, uncertain items to the spontaneously answered, certain ones. Both experiments demonstrated that the hindsight bias is a result of the interaction of both uncertainty and certainty.     

内在锚与外在锚对锚定效应及其双加工机制的影响

通过2（外在锚类型：高锚VS低锚）×2（内在锚类型：有VS无）被试间设计,考察不同锚定信息来源：由外部世界提供的外在锚与个体自身内部产生的内在锚信息对锚定效应及其加工机制的影响。结果发现：（1）当内在锚不存在时,外在高低锚组的估计值有显著差异,当内在锚存在时此种差异变得不显著;（2）当内在锚存在时,外在高低锚组被试的答题反应时有显著差异,内在锚与外在锚一致时反应时比不一致时更快,当内在锚不存在时,此种差异变得不显著。实验结果表明,当锚定调整机制与选择通达机制同时存在时,前者更占优势;锚定信息一致性会影响不同加工机制的启动,一致的信息会激活选择通达机制,不一致的信息则会激活锚定调整机制。     

Partisan Bias and Information Discounting in Economic Judgments

Research shows that partisanship biases people's views about the economy. Yet, there is little understanding of the factors, if any, that might mitigate the influence of partisanship on these judgments or the effect of partisanship on metacognitive judgments. This study uses an experimental design to show that partisanship continues to bias economic judgments even when subjects receive direct and neutral information about specific aspects of the economy. Moreover, it extends our understanding of partisan bias by showing it has a direct effect on people's metacognitive assessments of their own attitudes—particularly the degree of uncertainty people have in their own economic judgments. However, it appears that people are aware of the conflict between their partisan‐based judgment and economic information since we observe increases in economic uncertainty when information is counter to a subject's partisan predisposition. The results provide new insight into the extent of partisan bias and the difficulty of countering partisan‐based judgments.     

决策信心的认知机制与神经基础

决策信心是指在进行判断或决策时, 个体对其决策最优性或正确性的信心程度。决策信心的单过程理论认为决策与信心评估是并行的同一加工过程; 而决策后理论认为决策和信心评估是串行的两个加工过程。决策信心存在两种典型的偏差效应：过分自信和信心不足。决策信心的神经机制研究指出, 信心评估可能是决策过程中最基本并且普遍存在的一个成分; 对决策信心评估敏感的脑区包括扣带回、背外侧前额叶和顶上小叶等。未来研究应该在决策信心产生的机制、信心与决策如何交互的心理及神经机制等领域展开大量研究。     

Probability estimation in poker: A qualified success for unaided judgment

Poker players make strategic decisions on the basis of imperfect information, which are informed by their assessment of the probability they will hold the best set of cards among all players at the conclusion of the hand. Exact mental calculations of this probability are impossible—therefore, players must use judgment to estimate their chances. In three studies, 69 moderately experienced poker players estimated the probability of obtaining the best cards among all players, based on the limited information that is known in the early stages of a hand. Although several of the conditions typically associated with well‐calibrated judgment did not apply, players' judgments were generally accurate. The correlation between judged and true probabilities was r > .8 for over five‐sixths of the participants, and when judgments were averaged across players and within hands this correlation was .96. Players slightly overestimated their chance of obtaining the best cards, mainly where this probability was low to moderate (<.7). Probability estimates were slightly too strongly related to the strength of the two cards that a player holds (known only to themselves), and insufficiently influenced by the number of opponents. Seemingly, players show somewhat insufficient regard for the cards that other players could be holding and the potential for opponents to acquire a strong hand. The results show that even when judgment heuristics are used to good effect in a complex probability estimation task, predictable errors can still be observed at the margins of performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

无法忍受不确定性与担忧：对记忆偏差与解释偏差的检验

本研究旨在探索记忆偏差与解释偏差在无法忍受不确定性(IU)与个体担忧之间的中介作用。实验1采用伴随学习任务范式,计算被试对中性词语和不确定词的回忆量。结果发现,IU对记忆偏差的预测不显著,记忆偏差在IU与担忧倾向之间的中介作用不显著。实验2采用情境评估任务范式收集被试在不确定情境下的担忧评分和解释倾向。结果发现,IU可以正向预测被试在不确定情境下的担忧评分,被试对情境的解释倾向在IU与担忧评分的关系中起到中介作用。概言之,高IU个体存在一定的信息加工偏差。     

The Bias of Crowds: How Implicit Bias Bridges Personal and Systemic Prejudice

As public awareness of implicit bias has grown in recent years, studies have raised important new questions about the nature of implicit bias effects. First, implicit biases are widespread and robust on average, yet are unstable across a few weeks. Second, young children display implicit biases indistinguishable from those of adults, which suggests to many that implicit biases are learned early. Yet, if implicit biases are unstable over weeks, how can they be stable for decades? Third, meta-analyses suggest that individual differences in implicit bias are associated weakly, although significantly, with individual differences in behavioral outcomes. Yet, studies of aggregate levels of implicit bias (i.e., countries, states, counties) are strongly associated with aggregate levels of disparities and discrimination. These puzzles are difficult to reconcile with traditional views, which treat implicit bias as an early-learned attitude that drives discrimination among individuals who are high in bias. We propose an alternative view of implicit bias, rooted in concept accessibility. Concept accessibility can, in principle, vary both chronically and situationally. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that most of the systematic variance in implicit bias is situational. Akin to the “wisdom of crowds” effect, implicit bias may emerge as the aggregate effect of individual fluctuations in concept accessibility that are ephemeral and context-dependent. This bias of crowds theory treats implicit bias tests as measures of situations more than persons. We show how the theory can resolve the puzzles posed and generate new insights into how and why implicit bias propagates inequalities.     

What you are confident of determines your choices in context: Confidence in yourself versus in your ability

The notion that consumers' preference is constructed by decision context is well established. Two of such salient manifestations are compromise effect and attraction effect. Although literature has explored the moderators of these effects from the perspective of a decision maker, little is known about whether a significant difference exists between the effects of individual differences as a situational state and as a stable personality. This article approaches this question by examining how specific self‐confidence and general self‐confidence shape consumer's preference for context options. Four studies find that compromise effect is greater for consumer with high specific self‐confidence, whereas attraction effect is greater for consumer with low specific self‐confidence. The two context effects are greater for consumers with low general self‐confidence only in the presence of social influence. In addition, low (vs. high) general self‐confidence strengthens (vs. weakens) the impact of specific self‐confidence on context effects under this condition. This article concludes by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of the findings.     

锚定效应的种类、影响因素及干预措施

锚定效应是指个体在不确定情境下的决策会受到初始无关锚影响致使其随后的数值估计偏向该锚的一种判断偏差现象。不同种类的锚定效应其影响因素和干预措施不同, 如影响传统锚定效应的有锚定信息特征、能力变量、情绪因素及个体差异性等, 基本锚定效应的主要影响因素有知识技能与时间压力, 自发锚定效应则受动机变量、认知因素及内部信念等影响。未来研究可深入挖掘认知加工机制、类比推理过程和开发DDS系统等来帮助减少各种锚定偏差。     

焦虑障碍的认知偏向矫正：应用与争议

认知偏向是焦虑障碍患者的重要认知特征, 是指患者或高焦虑个体对负性或威胁性信息存在认知加工方面的偏向。目前该领域的研究聚焦于注意偏向和解释偏向。近年来, 研究者致力于将认知偏向的矫正应用于焦虑障碍患者的临床治疗, 得到了不一致的结果。本文总结了将认知偏向矫正应用于临床实践的不同方式, 并从主观报告的疗效证据、行为及生理指标的疗效证据, 以及未发现疗效证据的研究三方面回顾了近年来的研究成果。对于结果的高度不一致, 本文从期望效应、干预对象、因变量和其它参数等方面探讨了可能的原因, 并讨论了未来可能的研究方向。     

Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Misinformation Effects and Hindsight Bias

The present study examined individual differences in susceptibility to two similar forms of memory distortion: the misinformation effect and hindsight bias. The misinformation effect occurs when individuals witness an event, are provided with misinformation, and recall the original event as containing elements of the misinformation. Hindsight bias occurs when individuals make judgments, are provided with feedback, and recall their original judgments as being more similar to the feedback than they actually were. Seventy-five participants completed a misinformation task, a hindsight bias task, and several individual difference measures related to memory distortions. Working memory capacity was negatively correlated with the misinformation effect and hindsight bias, and the misinformation effect and hindsight bias were negatively correlated with one another. Although the misinformation effect and hindsight bias are measured with similar designs, and both are predicted by working memory capacity, the negative correlation between them suggests these phenomena result from somewhat different processes.     

Dangerous Enough: Moderating Racial Bias with Contextual Threat Cues

Research shows that participants shoot armed Blacks more frequently and quickly than armed Whites, but make don't-shoot responses more frequently and quickly for unarmed Whites than unarmed Blacks. We argue that this bias reflects the perception of threat — specifically, threat associated with Black males. Other danger cues (not just race) may create a similar predisposition to shoot, and if these cues promote shooting when the target is White, they should attenuate racial bias. We embedded targets in threatening and safe backgrounds. Racial bias was evident in safe contexts but disappeared when context signaled danger, and this reduction was largely due to an increased tendency to shoot White targets.     

Bias and Bias Remediation in Creative Problem-Solving: Managing Biases through Forecasting

Although scholars have identified many variables that contribute to creative problem-solving, less attention has been given to variables that might lead to failure in creative problem-solving. One set of variables that might lead to poor performance in creative problem-solving efforts may be found in various decision biases. In this study, the impact of simple and complex decision biases on the production of original, high-quality, and elegant solutions to a creative problem-solving task was examined in a sample of 227 undergraduates attending a large southwestern university. In addition, the value of forecasting instruction as a technique for reducing these decision biases was examined. It was found that both simple and complex decisions biases resulted in problem solutions of lower originality, quality, and elegance. Training in viable forecasting strategies resulted in the production of higher quality problem solutions. The implications of these findings for improving creative problem-solving performance are discussed.     

When effortful thinking influences judgmental anchoring: differential effects of forewarning and incentives on self‐generated and externally provided anchors

Two experiments examined the impact of financial incentives and forewarnings on judgmental anchoring effects, or the tendency for judgments of uncertain qualities to be biased in the direction of salient anchor values. Previous research has found no effect of either manipulation on the magnitude of anchoring effects. We argue, however, that anchoring effects are produced by multiple mechanisms—one involving an effortful process of adjustment from “self‐generated” anchors, and another involving the biased recruitment of anchor‐consistent information from “externally provided” anchors—and that only the former should be influenced by incentives and forewarning. Two studies confirmed these predictions, showing that responses to “self‐generated” anchors are influenced by both incentives and forewarnings whereas responses to “externally provided” anchors are not. Discussion focuses on the implications of these effects for debiasing efforts. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Confidence and Uncertainty in Judgmental Forecasting: Differential Effects of Scenario Presentation

Multiple scenario analysis is used by many organizations for long-term planning, in part because the development of more than one scenario of the future is thought to prevent overconfidence in any one specific forecast. The present study attempts to clarify some of the questions concerning the cognitive effects of scenario presentation by distinguishing between confidence and subjective uncertainty. It examined the impact of different types of scenario information on confidence ratings, credible intervals, and features of forecast series. Subjects (N=186) read either one, two, or no scenario(s) describing potential changes in the level of a stimulus variable, then made forecasts of that variable over the next fifty years. Reading any type of scenario information increased confidence in forecasts; there was no reduction in confidence due to presentation of multiple conflicting scenarios, compared to presentation of only one scenario. Differences in number and in type of scenarios presented did, however, affect subjective uncertainty.     

Bias in self-evaluation: Signal probability effects

Two experiments examined apparent signal probability effects in simple verbal self-reports. After each trial of a delayed matching-to-sample task, young adults pressed either a “yes” or a “no” button to answer a computer-presented query about whether the most recent choice met a point contingency requiring both speed and accuracy. A successful matching-to-sample choice served as the “signal” in a signal-detection analysis of self-reports. Difficulty of matching to sample, and thus signal probability, was manipulated via the number of nonmatching sample and comparison stimuli. In Experiment 1, subjects exhibited a bias (log b) for reporting matching-to-sample success when success was frequent, and no bias or a bias for reporting failure when success was infrequent. Contingencies involving equal conditional probabilities of point consequences for “I succeeded” and “I failed” reports had no systematic effect on this pattern. Experiment 2 found signal probability effects to be evident regardless of whether referent-response difficulty was manipulated in different conditions or within sessions. These findings indicate that apparent signal probability effects in self-report bias that were observed in previous studies probably were not an artifact of contingencies intended to improve self-report accuracy or of the means of manipulating signal probability. The findings support an analogy between simple self-reports and psychophysical judgments and bolster the conclusion of Critchfield (1993) that signal probability effects can influence simple self-reports much as they do reports about external stimuli in psychophysical experiments.     

Unanswered Prayers: Religiosity and the God-Serving Bias

Two self-report experiments examined how religiosity affects attributions made for a target person’s death. Online adults (Study 1, N = 427) and undergraduate students (Study 2, N = 326) read about Chris who had a heart attack, used religious or health behaviors, and lived or died. Participants made attributions to Chris and God (both studies), and reported their emotions (Study 2). Participants made more attributions to Chris when he lived than when he died, but only when he used health behaviors. The highly religious made more attributions to God, but not when Chris used religious behaviors and died (the God-serving bias); they reported the most positive emotions when Chris lived after using religious behaviors (the Hallelujah effect). Directions for future research in terms of implicit religious beliefs and normative evaluations of religion are discussed.     

Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive and negative events

People generally judge that positive events will occur in their lives and negative events will not, even when both events have the same objective likelihood to occur. In four studies, we examined the possibility that this optimistic bias is the result of people’s automatic affective reactions to future events. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate, in two different contexts, that people are consistently optimistic in their predictions, despite identical base rates for positive and negative events. In Study 2, optimistic bias was not influenced by incentives for motivated reasoning or rewards for accuracy, suggesting that bias was the result of automatic processes. Studies 3 and 4 showed that optimistic bias was more pronounced when predictions were speeded and when participants made predictions after exposure to affectively valenced words. Together, these findings suggest that people optimistically interpret base rates and that this optimism is due to an effortless affective process.