Taking the High (or Low) Road: A Quantifier Priming Perspective on Basic Anchoring Effects

ABSTRACT

Current explanations of basic anchoring effects, defined as the influence of an arbitrary number standard on an uncertain judgment, confound numerical values with vague quantifiers. I show that the consideration of numerical anchors may bias subsequent judgments primarily through the priming of quantifiers, rather than the numbers themselves. Study 1 varied the target of a numerical comparison judgment in a between-participants design, while holding the numerical anchor value constant. This design yielded an anchoring effect consistent with a quantifier priming hypothesis. Study 2 included a direct manipulation of vague quantifiers in the traditional anchoring paradigm. Finally, Study 3 examined the notion that specific associations between quantifiers, reflecting values on separate judgmental dimensions (i.e., the price and height of a target) can affect the direction of anchoring effects. Discussion focuses on the nature of vague quantifier priming in numerically anchored judgments.     

锚定效应的种类、影响因素及干预措施

锚定效应是指个体在不确定情境下的决策会受到初始无关锚影响致使其随后的数值估计偏向该锚的一种判断偏差现象。不同种类的锚定效应其影响因素和干预措施不同, 如影响传统锚定效应的有锚定信息特征、能力变量、情绪因素及个体差异性等, 基本锚定效应的主要影响因素有知识技能与时间压力, 自发锚定效应则受动机变量、认知因素及内部信念等影响。未来研究可深入挖掘认知加工机制、类比推理过程和开发DDS系统等来帮助减少各种锚定偏差。     

Does anchoring vary across cultures? Expanding the Many Labs analysis

Numerous investigations have examined anchoring effects, but most of them studied individuals from similar cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds. Replication studies have shown that anchoring heuristics have heterogeneous effects across different cultural groups. In the present investigation, we examined this heterogeneity by looking for associations between effect size and cultural values orientation. We conducted pre-registered meta-analyses of four anchoring tasks, using open data provided by previous works and collected from 6,344 participants in 10 countries. The analyses confirmed that anchoring effects display strong heterogeneity between cultures. Moreover, specific cultural values orientations explained substantial amounts of variability in anchoring effect sizes between cultures: Intellectual Autonomy and Egalitarianism were negatively correlated with anchoring effect size, as we had expected. Surprisingly, Harmony was also negatively correlated with anchoring effect size, whereas Mastery had a positive association. These results suggest that cultural differences can play an important role in observed anchoring effect size.     

Certainty and Uncertainty: The Two Faces of the Hindsight Bias

“Hindsight Bias” is a person's tendency, after learning about the actual outcome of a situation or the correct answer to a question, to distort a previous judgment in the direction of this new information. In the literature, hindsight bias has been mostly discussed as an inevitable result of a “judgment under uncertainty.” We think that the hindsight bias is due to memorial as well as inferential processes: Whereas certainty about the recollection is memorial and concerns the recollective experience, certainty at the time of the judgment is inferential and concerns the individual's metaknowledge (“I know that I knew that”). In two experiments participants' feelings of certainty were measured indirectly (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) by giving participants the option of leaving those questions unanswered about which they felt uncertain. This free-report option was offered to half of the participants in the first estimate phase (concerning time of judgment) and to the second half in the memory phase (concerning the recollective experience). At the end of the session, participants were presented again with the questions they had skipped and were now required to answer them. This procedure allowed us to compare the amount of hindsight bias for the skipped, uncertain items to the spontaneously answered, certain ones. Both experiments demonstrated that the hindsight bias is a result of the interaction of both uncertainty and certainty.     

Partisan Bias and Information Discounting in Economic Judgments

Research shows that partisanship biases people's views about the economy. Yet, there is little understanding of the factors, if any, that might mitigate the influence of partisanship on these judgments or the effect of partisanship on metacognitive judgments. This study uses an experimental design to show that partisanship continues to bias economic judgments even when subjects receive direct and neutral information about specific aspects of the economy. Moreover, it extends our understanding of partisan bias by showing it has a direct effect on people's metacognitive assessments of their own attitudes—particularly the degree of uncertainty people have in their own economic judgments. However, it appears that people are aware of the conflict between their partisan‐based judgment and economic information since we observe increases in economic uncertainty when information is counter to a subject's partisan predisposition. The results provide new insight into the extent of partisan bias and the difficulty of countering partisan‐based judgments.     

All's well that ends well? Outcome bias in pilots during instrument flight rules

The objective of the present study was to examine if the Outcome Bias also occurs in pilots flying under instrument flight rules (IFR). In a scenario-based survey, 60 pilots evaluated weather-related decisions made by hypothetical pilots. Participants rated the decisions as better, less risky, and regarded the probability that they would have made the same decision as higher when they were followed by a positive outcome, than when they were followed by a negative outcome. This effect showed likewise for novice pilots and for experienced pilots. These findings could be relevant for the flight-related decision-making of pilots, which sometimes is affected by the decisions made by third-party pilots. In particular, decisions made by other pilots that have led to positive outcomes might be hastily followed, whereas those that have led to negative outcomes might be hastily rejected.     

锚定效应的研究范式、理论模型及应用启示

锚定效应是普遍存在的一种现象,它是指在不确定状态判断过程中,人们会以最初的信息作为参照点来调整对事件的估计,这往往会导致得出错误的判断。本文首先阐述了锚定效应的相关概念及经典研究范式,后者包括语意启动范式、数值启动范式、自发锚与外部锚启动范式等。然后对锚定效应的不充分调整启发模型、锚定调整模型、选择通达模型、双加工模型以及神经心理模型等进行了深入的探讨,并总结了锚定效应在经济管理等领域中的应用。最后指出了锚定效应的研究局限及未来的研究发展方向。     

On the evaluation of one-sided evidence

We examine predictions and judgments of confidence based on one-sided evidence. Some subjects saw arguments for only one side of a legal dispute while other subjects (called ‘jurors’) saw arguments for both sides. Subjects predicted the number of jurors who favored the plaintiff in each case. Subjects who saw only one side made predictions that were biased in favor of that side. Furthermore, they were more confident but generally less accurate than subjects who saw both sides. The results indicate that people do not compensate sufficiently for missing information even when it is painfully obvious that the information available to them is incomplete. A simple manipulation that required subjects to evaluate the relative strength of the opponent's side greatly reduced the tendency to underweigh missing evidence.     

True Context‐dependent Preferences? The Causes of Market‐dependent Valuations

A central assumption of neoclassical economics is that reservation prices for familiar products express people's true preferences for these products; that is, they represent the total benefit that a good confers to the consumers and are, thus, independent of actual prices in the market. Nevertheless, a vast amount of research has shown that valuations can be sensitive to other salient prices, particularly when individuals are explicitly anchored on them. In this paper, the authors extend previous research on single‐price anchoring and study the sensitivity of valuations to the distribution of prices found for a product in the market. In addition, they examine its possible causes. They find that market‐dependent valuations cannot be fully explained by rational inferences consumers draw about a product's value and are unlikely to be fully explained by true market‐dependent preferences. Rather, the market dependence of valuations likely reflects consumers' focus on something other than the total benefit that the product confers to them. Furthermore, this paper shows that market‐dependent valuations persist when – as in many real‐life settings – individuals make repeated purchase decisions over time and infer the distribution of the product's prices from their market experience. Finally, the authors consider the implications of their findings for marketers and consumers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

人际互动中的被洞悉错觉

被洞悉错觉是人际互动中的一种认知偏差。文章回顾了被洞悉错觉在不同领域存在的证据;介绍了被洞悉错觉在旁观者冷漠、刑事审讯、社交障碍、自我泄露感和亲密关系中的相关应用;分析了锚定及其调节效应、知识之祸、自我关注和朴素实在论对被洞悉错觉的理论解释;讨论了以往研究在对象、方法及跨文化比较方面的不足。     

The Importance of Item Selection in "Knew-It-All-Along" Studies of General Knowledge

This study was designed to investigate the effects of item sampling on hindsight bias in experiments using general knowledge material. The results show that the use of random versus traditional experimenter-selected item samples can have different effects on hindsight bias. In a within-subjects study almost twice as many items in a random sample were connected with a reversed effect rather than with a traditional hindsight bias. The same items that resulted in overconfidence in foresight lead to a higher degree of hindsight bias than others. The results suggest that earlier findings of unusually large hindsight effects with general knowledge tasks may be explained by the selection of items used. No hindsight effect was found on confidence scores in a within-subjects design, but was obtained in a between-subjects design. Results suggest that the use of a within-subjects design itself can moderate hindsight bias by familiarizing subjects with the task. The study shows the importance of two conditions for decreasing the hindsight bias: (1) The use of randomly sampled items, and (2) The use of a within-subjects procedure. When these conditions were met, the "knew-it-all-along effect" was completely eliminated.