The Role of Inference in Attribute Framing Effects

Previous research has shown that a speaker's choice between logically equivalent frames is influenced by reference point information, and that listeners draw accurate inferences based on the frame. Less clear, however, is whether these inferences play a causal role in generating attribute framing effects. Two experiments are reported, which suggest that frame‐dependent inferences are sufficient to generate attribute framing effects, and that blocking such inferences may block framing effects. Experiment 1 decomposed the typical framing design into two parts: One group of participants saw a target described in one of two attribute frames and reported their estimates (inferences) of the typical attribute value. These estimates were then given to a second group of yoked participants, who evaluated the target. Although this latter group was not exposed to different attribute frames, they nevertheless exhibited a “framing effect” as a result of receiving systematically different inferences. In contrast, Experiment 2 shows that experts—who are familiar with an attribute's distribution and are therefore less likely to draw strong frame‐based inferences—exhibit a diminished framing effect. Together, these findings underscore the role of inferences in the generation and attenuation of attribute framing effects. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Framing Effects and Arenas of Choice: Your Money or Your Life?

This paper investigates the consistency of outcome framing effects on choice across two arenas of outcome: human life and money. Past research has yielded notable variability in the magnitude of framing effects. One possible contributor to the variation in magnitude is outcome arena. Past research has varied along this dimension without systematically assessing its effects. Undergraduates (N= 297) responded to three decision scenarios involving either human lives or money in which outcomes were framed either positively or negatively. Based on prospect theory, an interaction between framing and arena was predicted, such that a greater framing effect was expected in the human life arena (i.e., more risky choices were expected when outcomes involved human life than money in the negative frame and the reverse in the positive frame). Results were only partly consistent with this prediction. Regardless of frame, subjects made riskier choices when outcomes involved human lives rather than money. This was not expected for the positive frame. Even though human lives presumably have greater utility than dollars, subjects in the positive framing condition made riskier choices regarding human life than money. Additionally, no overall framing effect was observed. There was a significant sex by frame interaction such that only women exhibited framing effects on choice. This extends the finding of sex differences in framing to the monetary arena. This has important implications for the conduct of future studies on framing as well as for the interpretation of past and future framing research.     

Multiple Framing: Verbal,Facial, and Vocal Cues in Risky Choice

Verbal framing effects have been widely studied, but little is known about how people react to multiple framing cues in risk communication, where verbal messages are often accompanied by facial and vocal cues. We examined joint and differential effects of verbal, facial, and vocal framing on risk preference in hypothetical monetary and life–death situations. In the multiple framing condition with the factorial design (2 verbal frames × 2 vocal tones × 4 basic facial expressions × 2 task domains), each scenario was presented auditorily with a written message on a photo of the messenger's face. Compared with verbal framing effects resulting in preference reversal, multiple frames made risky choice more consistent and shifted risk preference without reversal. Moreover, a positive tone of voice increased risk‐seeking preference in women. When the valence of facial and vocal cues was incongruent with verbal frame, verbal framing effects were significant. In contrast, when the affect cues were congruent with verbal frame, framing effects disappeared. These results suggest that verbal framing is given higher priority when other affect cues are incongruent. Further analysis revealed that participants were more risk‐averse when positive affect cues (positive tone or facial expressions) were congruently paired with a positive verbal frame whereas participants were more risk‐seeking when positive affect cues were incongruent with the verbal frame. In contrast, for negative affect cues, congruency promoted risk‐seeking tendency whereas incongruency increased risk‐aversion. Overall, the results show that facial and vocal cues interact with verbal framing and significantly affect risk communication. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Much ado about nothing: The zero effect in life‐saving decisions

Zero is a special value in our daily lives, and previous research on how zero values affect decision making leaves many questions to be explored. The present research examined the zero effect in life‐saving decisions and found that people expressed strong preferences for options offering a possibility that no one will die, even when the expected loss was relatively high. The prominence effect (the notion that the option with possibly zero deaths is easy to defend and justify) was proposed as one possible explanation. Furthermore, we also found that the zero effect in these life‐saving decisions occurs only in loss framing rather than gain framing. We discuss the relationships between the zero effect, framing, and evaluation mode in life saving and other domains.     

Social cues and verbal framing in risky choice

We examined how people use social and verbal cues of differing priorities in making social decisions. In Experiment 1, formally identical life – death choice problems were presented in different hypothetical group contexts and were phrased in either a positive or negative frame. The risk‐seeking choice became more dominant as the number of kin in an endangered group increased. Framing effects occurred only in a heterogeneous group context where the lives at risk were a mixture of kin and strangers. No framing effect was found when the same problem was presented in the context of a homogeneous group consisting of either all kin or all strangers. We viewed the framing effects to be a sign of indecisive risk preference due to the differential effects of a kinship cue and a stranger cue on choice. In Experiment 2, we presented the life – death problem in two artificial group contexts involving either 6 billion human lives or 6 billion extraterrestrial lives. A framing effect was found only in the human context. Two pre‐conditions of framing effects appear to be social unfamiliarity of a decision problem and aspiration level of a decision maker. In Experiment 3, we analyzed the direction of the framing effect by balancing the framing. The direction of the framing effect depended on the baseline level of risk preference determined by a specific decision context. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Happiness and Sex Difference in Life Expectancy

The aim of this study is to test the explanatory power of happiness on survival at the aggregate level. Based on previous findings that psychological stress adversely affects survival and that its effect on survival is more severe for men, this study uses the sex difference in, rather than the level of, life expectancy as the dependent variable. As long as psychological stress and happiness are negatively correlated, happiness is expected to have a greater impact on men’s life expectancy and negatively influence the life expectancy gap between women and men. However, at the same time, the causality is expected to run in both directions. In the reverse direction from the life expectancy gap to national happiness, the intermediary is the women’s widowhood ratio. Since the widowed are, on average, less happy, an increase in the life expectancy gap, which raises the women’s widowhood ratio, is expected to lower women’s average happiness. For this reason, this study first investigates the reverse causality and demonstrates that the life expectancy gap negatively affects national happiness. Then, taking this reverse causality into account, it shows that happiness is significant in explaining the cross-country differences in the life expectancy gap. As national average happiness decreases, the sex difference in life expectancy increases. This result suggests that happiness has a significant impact on survival even at the aggregate level.     

The placebo effect: dissolving the expectancy versus conditioning debate

The authors review the literature on the 2 main models of the placebo effect: expectancy theory and classical conditioning. A path is suggested to dissolving the theoretical impasse that has long plagued this issue. The key is to make a clear distinction between 2 questions: What factors shape placebo effects? and What learning mediates the placebo effect? The reviewed literature suggests that classical conditioning procedures are one shaping factor but that verbal information can also shape placebo effects. The literature also suggests that conditioning procedures and other sources of information sometimes shape conscious expectancies and that these expectancies mediate some placebo effects; however, in other cases conditioning procedures appear to shape placebo effects that are not mediated by conscious cognition.     

How Dispositional Optimists and Pessimists Evaluate their Past,Present and Anticipated Future Life Satisfaction: A Lifespan Approach

Dispositional optimism is typically conceptualized with respect to generalized positive expectancies for personal future outcomes. The present work draws on lifespan development theory to evaluate how dispositional optimists and pessimists from across the lifespan evaluate their past, present and anticipated future life satisfaction (LS). Using data from an American probability sample (n = 3871, ages = 30–84 years, 55% female), I compared dispositional optimists and pessimists across six age decades. Subjective LS trajectories reflected in mean trends in ratings of past, present and future LS were contoured by lifestage, revealing inclining trajectories among young dispositional optimists and pessimists and declining trajectories among older optimists and pessimists. After adjusting for age‐specific normative trends, however, differences between dispositional optimists and pessimists in subjective LS trajectories were consistent across lifestage, revealing a single dissociative pattern wherein optimists rated their past, present and anticipated future LS more positively than did pessimists. Of the three temporal perspectives, evaluations of present (rather than past or future) LS were most consistently related to dispositional optimism. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

阈下特征框架效应心理机制初探

特征框架效应是指当分别以积极框架和消极框架来描述给定情景中的某一事物或事件的关键特征时,一般情况下人们更偏好以积极框架来描述其关键特征的事物或事件的现象.本研究通过2个实验验证了阈下特征框架效应的存在及其产生机制.实验一发现,阈下特征框架效应只在有时间压力下才会产生.实验二发现,被试对与框架类型一致的词汇判断的反应时比对与框架类型不一致的词汇判断的反应时更快,这在一定程度上说明特征框架效应的产生是因为框架激活了与框架一致性的信息,起到了语义启动的作用,从而导致被试判断任务的评定值偏向该框架类型.     

Decision-making and the framing effect in a foreign and native language

Recent research using scenarios such as the Asian disease problem has demonstrated a “foreign-language effect”, whereby the framing effect (tendency to be risk-averse in a gain frame and risk seeking in a loss frame) is not (or not as) apparent in the foreign language as the native language. The aim of the current study was to further investigate decision-making and the framing effect in a native language, Thai and a foreign language, English, using the Asian disease/Financial crisis problem (Study 1) and a novel financial decision-making task (Study 2). Results from Study 1 confirmed previous findings as a foreign-language effect emerged. In contrast, in Study 2, a framing effect emerged in both the native and foreign languages of the Thai participants. These contradictory results point to language factors as well as emotional and cognitive demands of the task contributing to the occurrence of the foreign-language effect.     

Self‐framing of risky choice

Previous research on framing effects has largely focused on how choice information framed by external sources influences the response of a decision maker. This research examined how decision makers framed choice options and how the hedonic tone of self‐framing influenced their risk preference. By using pie charts and a complementary sentence‐completion task in Experiment 1, participants were able to interpret and frame the expected choice outcomes themselves before making a choice between a sure option and a gamble in either a life–death or a monetary problem. Each of these self‐frames (phrases) was then rated by a group of independent judges in terms of its hedonic tone. The hedonic tone of self‐frames was mostly positive and was more positive in the life–death than the monetary context, suggesting a motivational function of self‐framing. However, positive outcomes were still more likely to be framed positively than negative outcomes. In Experiment 2, choice outcomes were depicted with a whole‐pie chart instead of a pie slice in order to emphasize positive and negative outcomes equally. The results showed that the hedonic tone of self‐framing was still largely positive and more positive in the life domain than the monetary domain. However, compared to Experiment 1, the risk preference in the life–death domain was reversed, showing an outcome salience effect: when the pie‐slice chart emphasized only survival outcomes, participants were more risk taking under positive hedonic frames whereas when the whole‐pie chart depicted both survival and mortality outcomes, they became risk averse under positive frames. In sum, self‐framing reflected a positive bias in encoding risk information and affected the risk preference of the decision maker. Like the tone of voice used in communication, the hedonic tone of self‐framing, either positive or negative, can affect risk perception of a choice problem. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of Contract Framing,Motivation to Quit,and Self-Efficacy on Smoking Reduction1

Social learning theorists (SLT) have advocated that individual's cognitive beliefs about perceived behavioral ability and outcome expectancies are predictive of behavior change. SLT's also propose that the threat of losing positive rewards may result in greater behavior change than gaining rewards for altering behaviors such as smoking. Specifically, presenting behavioral outcomes in a loss frame context has proven more influential under certain conditions than presenting outcomes in a gain frame context. The present study evaluated the relationship between smoking cessation self-efficacy motivation to quit, and contract framing on smoking reduction. The majority of cognitive and behavioral changes occurred between baseline and 3 months into a 12-month treatment program. An interaction between contract framing and motivation to quit suggested that, for subjects with low motivation, receiving combined (gain plus loss) frame contracts resulted in smoking fewer cigarettes posttreatment than receiving gain frame only contracts. An interaction between framing and self-efficacy also indicated that subjects who received combined frame contracts smoked fewer cigarettes if they had high rather than low self-efficacy beliefs.     

Constructing other persons: A limit on the effect

Numerous studies have documented the effect that expectancies have on perceivers' perceptions of targets, but in few of these studies have the targets been aware of the perceivers' expectancies. In the present study, some perceivers were led to believe that their future interaction partners had a cold personality while others held no such expectancy. Orthogonal to this manipulation, some targets were told that their partners expected them to be cold while others received no such information. Results indicate that expectancy confirmation occurs only when perceivers with expectancies interact with naive targets. Targets who were told that the perceiver held an expectancy about them were able to overcome this expectancy. The relevance of these findings to the process of expectancy confirmation is discussed, and some predictions are made about the conditions under which expectancy confirmation will and will not occur.     

A New Look at Framing Effects: Distribution of Effect Sizes,Individual Differences,and Independence of Types of Effects

Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) identified three distinct types of framing effects in the literature: attribute framing effects, goal framing effects, risky choice framing effects. While most previous framing studies used between-subjects manipulations of frame, the present study used two sessions, spaced one week apart, to give each of 102 participants both framing conditions and all three types of framing. Using the difference between the score for the positive framing condition and the negative framing condition as the unit of analysis for each type of framing effect, the following were found: (1) reliable framing effects for attribute framing and risky choice framing, but not for goal framing; (2) distributions of individual framing effects showing that the aggregate-level effects were representative of individuals even though some individuals showed no framing effects; (3) no significant interdependencies between the three categories of framing effects; (4) individual differences in reaction to the task scenarios related to various of the “Big Five” personality traits as well as the Faith in Intuition scale. The use of within-subject designs to assess individual differences in decision-making phenomena such as framing effects and other biases and heuristics is recommended for future research.     

Discrimination between hopes and expectancies for nonvolitional outcomes: psychological phenomenon or artifact?

Despite the large literature concerning the impact of hope and expectancy on various outcomes (e.g., nonvolitional), less is known about the constructs of hope and expectancy themselves. In a recent study, Montgomery et al. (2003) demonstrated that hopes and expectancies are separate but related constructs; however, because both hopes and expectancies were measured within the same context, it is possible that these findings were simply a methodological artifact. Furthermore, it is unknown whether these data would generalize to other populations. Taking into account the importance of this distinction for both the expectancy and hope literatures, the present study sought to: (1) Determine if the distinction between hope and expectancy is a general and reliable phenomenon by using a culturally different sample (i.e., Romanian sample); and (2) Examine the robustness of this distinction by controlling for the context effect. One hundred-twenty five volunteers completed items in regard to 10 nonvolitional outcome scenarios in one of five measurement contexts. The results revealed that hope and expectancy were distinct constructs (p<0.0001), and that this distinction is both general and robust across contexts. Implications for theory and research are discussed.     

Prejudiced learning: A connectionist account

Connectionist simulation was employed to investigate processes that may underlie the relationships between prior expectancies or prejudices and the acquisition of attitudes, under conditions where learners can only discover the valence of attitude objects through directly experiencing them. We compared contexts analogous to learners holding either false negative expectancies (‘prejudices’) about a subclass of objects that were actually good or false positive expectancies about objects that were actually bad. We introduced expectancy‐related bias either by altering the probability of approach, or by varying the rate of learning following experience with good or bad objects. Where feedback was contingent on approach, the false positive expectancies were corrected by experience, but negative prejudices resisted change, since the network avoided objects deemed to be bad, and so received less corrective feedback. These findings are discussed in relation to the effects of intergroup contact and expectancy‐confirmation processes in reducing or sustaining prejudice.     

Episode Type,Attachment Orientation,and Frame Salience: Evidence for a Theory of Relational Framing

Relational framing theory asserts that dominance‐submission and affiliation‐disaffiliation tend to displace each other as frames for processing social interaction; involvement is argued to be a content‐free intensifier variable that contributes to judgments of dominance or affiliation as a function of the salient relational frame. The present study seeks to replicate and extend previous tests of these claims by evaluating three hypotheses: (a) The differential salience of dominance‐submission and affiliation‐disaffiliation frames as a function of the type of social episode is robust across same‐sex and cross‐sex friendship dyads; (b) the magnitude of the association between involvement and dominance and affiliation varies as a function of frame salience instantiated by the type of episode; and (c) attachment anxiety is positively correlated with the perceived relevance of both dominance‐submission and affiliation‐disaffiliation to social episodes. Results are consistent with all three of the hypotheses, but relational framing is unrelated to subscales operationalizing the comfort with closeness dimension of attachment orientation.     

The effects of instructional set on physiological response to stressful imagery

Centrally mediated or cognitive variables have received considerable attention in clinical research. With the establishment of the effectiveness of such specific treatment techniques as systematic desensitization (Paul. 1969a. 1969b). a question arises as to the influence of cognitions on process and outcome variables in such learning based treatments (Lang. 1971). Research investigating the influence of demand characteristics and subject expectancies has demonstrated such centrally mediated variables can significantly influence overt, behavioral and self-report measures of fear, stress, or anxiety (cf. Borkovec. 1972: Marcia. Rubin and Efran. 1969; McGlynn. Maelia and Nawas. 1969: McGlynn. Reynolds and Linder. 1971: Oliveau. Agras. Leitenberg and Wright. 1969; Rappaport. 1972: Rosen. 1974).However. Borkovec (1972) and Rappaport (1972) failed to obtain expectancy effects on physiological measures of anxiety. Neither investigation provided for an independent assessment of subjects' actual expectancies, or belief in the instructions, as recommended by Davison and Wilson (1973). Borkovec administered clinical procedures over four sessions and varied the information communicated about the ‘purpose’ of the treatments (physiological versus therapeutic instructions). Differential rationales for differential expectancies of physiological reactivity were not provided. After each session, subjects reviewed the same false physiological records depicting reductions in fear responses. Although these changes were explained either physiologically or therapeutically. the fact that such reductions were emphasized should have attenuated differences between groups. Rappaport (1972) exposed subjects to a fearful stimulus and varied the suggestion and rationale for the pseudotreatment: no expectancy (stress research): therapeutic expectancy (fear reduction); and negative expectancy (fear increase). The lack of an independent assessment of the expectancy manipulation, as well as the exclusion of a specific therapeutic procedure, make it impossible to interpret the results in relation to expectancy effects on physiological fear responses during the administration of therapeutic procedures. There is other evidence, however, that suggestion and instructional set can significantly influence somatic and autonomic response systems (Barber. 1961. 1965; Sternbach. 1964. 1965).The primary purpose of this study was to evaluate the effects of instructional set on physiological responses to stressful imagery. This was an early step in a research program investigating the effects of instructional and informational variables on physiological responses of clinical interest. One half of the subjects received abbreviated live relaxation training (R) as described m a manual by Bernstein and Borkovec (1972) and based upon the original work of Jacobson (1938). The other half received an inert placebo pill and undertook a target detection task (P). The latter procedure was similar to that used by Paul (1966). Although both procedures had previously been shown to have relaxing effects, the P task was included as an additional control for any potential effects specific to the tension-release procedure of R. In order to evaluate the effects of instructional set, one half of each of the above two groups received instructions designed to lead to an expectancy of response inhibition to stressful imagery by the respective procedure (Decrease Stress Response. DSR). while the other half received instructions designed to lead to an expectancy of an increased response to stressful imagery by the respective procedure (Increase Stress Response. ISR). Each subject visualized three individually specified items that were the most frightening scenes imaginable prior to training and four times after training visualized the scene producing the largest response. Considerable effort was devoted to eliciting from each subject the most frightening items possible for her. and it was clear from subject comments that the items did elicit negative emotional responses.Since previous research (Barber. 1961. 1965; Sternbach. 1964. 1965) indicated that instructional set can influence physiological reactivity, it was hypothesized the DSR) subjects should exhibit a greater reduction in emotional response from pre- to posttraining than ISR subjects.     

Lasting effects of alcohol: Subliminal alcohol cues,impairment expectancies,and math performance

Many people believe that drinking alcohol reduces cognitive performance, and prior research has shown such expectancy‐related impairment even when people merely thought that the (non‐alcoholic) drink they consumed contained alcohol. This study tested whether subliminal priming with alcohol‐related cues would similarly result in expectancy‐consistent cognitive performance decrements. Additionally, the moderating role of alcohol use was examined. After assessing participants' baseline math performance, participants were primed with alcohol‐related or neutral words and then completed a post‐treatment math task. Whereas impairment expectancies had no influence on math performance in control participants, expectancies predicted math performance for participants primed with alcohol‐related words. As hypothesized, expectancy‐consistent impairment in performance was only observed among high alcohol users. The current findings suggest that, in the presence of alcohol‐related cues in the environment, some people may perform less on cognitive tasks even in the absence of actual or assumed alcohol consumption and without being aware of it. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.