Narcissism and Performance on Behavioral Decision‐making Tasks

Three studies examined narcissism and behavioral decision making. Decision‐making tasks included the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Studies 1–3), Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Studies 1–3), Columbia Card Task (CCT; Studies 2 and 3), and Game of Dice Task (Study 3). To tease apart the contributions of grandiose narcissism (i.e., narcissism found in the general population), pathological narcissism, and narcissistic traits (i.e., grandiosity, entitlement, and exploitativeness) in decision making, we assessed grandiose narcissism in Studies 1 (n = 380) and 2 (n = 244), pathological narcissism in Study 2, and the narcissistic traits in Study 3 (n = 312). Grandiose and pathological narcissism failed to predict decision making regardless of whether or not decision making included immediate feedback. In Study 3, the narcissistic trait of grandiosity (i.e., having an inflated sense of self‐importance) was associated with greater risk taking on the CCT‐hot (i.e., provided immediate feedback), and entitlement was associated with greater risk taking on the IGT. Measurement and applied implications are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Identifying and Addressing Barriers to Treatment Decision‐making in Bipolar II Disorder: Clinicians’ Perspective

Objective

Treatment decision‐making in bipolar II disorder is complex due to limited evidence on treatment efficacy and potentially burdensome side‐effects of options. Thus, involving patients and negotiating treatment options with them is necessary to ensure that final treatment decisions balance both clinician and patient preferences. This study qualitatively explored clinician views on (a) effective treatment decision‐making, unmet patient needs for (b) decision‐support and (c) information.

Method

Qualitative semi‐structured interviews with 20 practising clinicians (n = 10 clinical psychologists, n = 6 general practitioners, n = 4 psychiatrists) with experience treating adult outpatients with bipolar II disorder were conducted. Interviews were audiotaped, transcribed verbatim and analysed thematically using framework methods. Self‐report professional experience, and clinician preferences for patient decision‐making involvement were also assessed.

Results

Qualitative analyses yielded two inter‐related themes: (a) challenges and barriers to decision‐making and (b) facilitators of clinician decision‐making. Symptom severity, negative family attitudes, system‐based factors, and information gaps were thought to pose challenges to decision‐making. By contrast, decision‐making was supported by patient information, family involvement and patient‐centredness, and a strong therapeutic relationship. Clinician views varied depending on their professional background (medical vs clinical psychologist), patient involvement preferences, and whether the clinician was a bipolar specialist.

Conclusions

Whilst clinicians uniformly recognise the importance of involving patients in informed treatment decision‐making, active patient participation is hampered by unmet informational and decision‐support needs. Current findings inform a number of bipolar II disorder‐specific, clinician‐endorsed strategies for facilitating patient decision‐making, which can inform the development of targeted patient decision‐support resources for use in this setting.     

The effect of self‐regulated decision making on career path and major‐related career choice satisfaction

The present research examined the influence of self‐regulated decision making on satisfaction in career path (college major for Study 1, job for Study 2) and major‐related career choice. Results indicate a full mediating effect of fit in the relationship between self‐regulated decision making and satisfaction in career path. Self‐regulated decision making also influenced major–job congruence via satisfaction with a participant's college major. Findings suggest that individuals who possess self‐regulatory ability in decision‐making contexts were more likely to choose majors and jobs of good fit, experience satisfaction from their career decisions, and choose careers relevant to their college majors.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Developmental patterns of change in the influence of safe and risky peer choices on risky decision‐making

Adolescents take more risks when peers monitor their behavior. However, it is largely unknown how different types of peer influence affect adolescent decision‐making. In this study, we investigate how information about previous choices of peers differentially influences decision‐making in adolescence and young adulthood. Participants (N = 99, age range 12–22) completed an economic choice task in which choice options were systematically varied on levels of risk and ambiguity. On each trial, participants selected between a safer choice (low variability in outcome) and a riskier choice (high variability in outcome). Participants made choices in three conditions: a solo condition in which they made choices with no additional information, a social condition in which they saw choices of supposed peers, and a computer condition in which they saw choices of a computer. Results showed that participants’ choices conform to the choices made by the peers, but not a computer. Furthermore, when peers chose the safe option, late adolescents were especially likely to make a safe choice. Conversely, when the peer made a risky choice, late adolescents were least likely to follow choices made by the peer. We did not find evidence for differential influence of social information on decisions depending on their level of risk and ambiguity. These results show that information about previous decisions of peers are a powerful modifier for behavior and that the effect of peers on adolescents’ decisions is less ubiquitous and more specific than previously assumed.     

What a Feeling: The Role of Immediate and Anticipated Emotions in Risky Decisions

The risk‐as‐feelings hypothesis argues that many risky decisions are not only predicted by anticipated emotions, as most consequentialistic decision making theories would presume, but also by immediate emotions. Immediate emotions refer to the “hot” visceral feelings people feel as they contemplate a specific decision option at the cusp of making a decision, whereas anticipated emotions are those emotions that people forecast that they will feel once they experience possible consequences of that decision. Four studies focused on the role of both types of emotions in decisions under risk and uncertainty. Decisions were substantively predicted by immediate emotional states beyond anticipated emotions or the subjective probability attached to outcomes. Thus, risky choices may be prompted, in part, by how people feel about the “riskless” portion of the decision—specifically, the various decision options they are contemplating—rather than the potential outcomes those options may produce. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Group‐analytic network process for balancing stakeholder views on fire protection of steel‐framed buildings

To select appropriate fire protection options for buildings during their design stage, economic, safety, environmental, and societal criteria need to be accounted for. The divergent and sometimes conflictual desires from different fire design stakeholders involved in the process present a multicriteria decision problem. Design decision criteria and fire protection options can be interdependent, and so there is a need to manage these desires with an advanced decision analysis technique, thereby reducing uncertainties in the complex decision‐making process. The aim of this paper is to use the weighted/geometric mean method‐analytic network process (W/GMM‐ANP) to balance the opinions of fire design stakeholders extracted from 42 structured stakeholder interviews on selecting the most suitable fire protection option for buildings constructed of steel frames. Different categories of interdependent decision elements were developed from 22 design decision criteria and 5 proposed fire protection options to produce a network of decision clusters for multicriteria decision analysis. In the synthesis and ranking of fire protection options, the W/GMM‐ANP accounted for the multiple interdependencies of weighted and unweighted stakeholder desires and managed the complexity of the decision‐making problem. The technique is proposed for approaching suitable group decisions in structural fire design of steel‐framed buildings as well as other performance‐based engineering decision making that may involve multidisciplinary stakeholders.     

Parental rearing behavior prospectively predicts adolescents’ risky decision‐making and feedback‐related electrical brain activity

The present study examined the role of parental rearing behavior in adolescents’ risky decision‐making and the brain's feedback processing mechanisms. Healthy adolescent participants (n = 110) completed the EMBU‐C, a self‐report questionnaire on perceived parental rearing behaviors between 2006 and 2008 (T1). Subsequently, after an average of 3.5 years, we assessed (a) risky decision‐making during performance of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART); (b) event‐related brain potentials (ERPs) elicited by positive (gain) and negative feedback (loss) during the BART; and (c) self‐reported substance use behavior (T2). Age‐corrected regression analyses showed that parental rejection at T1 accounted for a unique and significant proportion of the variance in risk‐taking during the BART; the more adolescents perceived their parents as rejecting, the more risky decisions were made. Higher levels of perceived emotional warmth predicted increased P300 amplitudes in response to positive feedback at T2. Moreover, these larger P300 amplitudes (gain) significantly predicted risky decision‐making during the BART. Parental rearing behaviors during childhood thus seem to be significant predictors of both behavioral and electrophysiological indices of risky decision‐making in adolescence several years later. This is in keeping with the notion that environmental factors such as parental rearing are important in explaining adolescents’ risk‐taking propensities.     

Self–other differences in multiattribute decision making: Compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies

When making decisions where options involve multiple attributes, a person can choose to use a compensatory, utility maximizing strategy, which involves consideration and integration of all available attributes. Alternatively, a person can choose a noncompensatory strategy that extracts only the most important and reliable attributes. The present research examined whether other‐oriented decisions would involve greater reliance on a noncompensatory, lexicographic decision strategy than self‐oriented decisions. In three studies (Mturk workers and college students), the difference in other‐oriented versus self‐oriented decisions in a medical decision context was explained by a subsample of participants that chose the death minimizing operation on all 10 decisions (Study 1) and a subsample of participants who self‐reported that they used a strategy that minimized the chance of death on every decision (i.e., a lexicographic mortality heuristic; Study 2). In Study 2, tests of mediation found that self‐reported use of the mortality heuristic completely accounted for the self–other effect on decisions. In Study 3, participants were more likely to report prospectively that they would adopt the mortality heuristic when making decisions for others than for themselves, suggesting that participants were not mistakenly inferring a lexicographic decision strategy from their past behavior. The results suggest that self–other effects in multiattribute choice involve differential use of compensatory versus noncompensatory decision strategies and that beyond this group difference, individual differences in the use of these strategies also exist within self‐oriented and other‐oriented decisions.     

Dispositional optimism,self‐framing and medical decision‐making

Self‐framing is an important but underinvestigated area in risk communication and behavioural decision‐making, especially in medical settings. The present study aimed to investigate the relationship among dispositional optimism, self‐frame and decision‐making. Participants (N = 500) responded to the Life Orientation Test‐Revised and self‐framing test of medical decision‐making problem. The participants whose scores were higher than the middle value were regarded as highly optimistic individuals. The rest were regarded as low optimistic individuals. The results showed that compared to the high dispositional optimism group, participants from the low dispositional optimism group showed a greater tendency to use negative vocabulary to construct their self‐frame, and tended to choose the radiation therapy with high treatment survival rate, but low 5‐year survival rate. Based on the current findings, it can be concluded that self‐framing effect still exists in medical situation and individual differences in dispositional optimism can influence the processing of information in a framed decision task, as well as risky decision‐making.     

Emotional Intelligence and Career Decision‐Making Self‐Efficacy: National and Gender Differences

This study examined the effect of emotional intelligence (EI) on career decision‐making self‐efficacy (CDMSE) in an East Asian context, as well as the moderating roles of gender and country. Data were collected from undergraduate students from China (N = 149) and South Korea (N = 218). The results showed that all 4 factors of EI were positively related to CDMSE. Moreover, while the effects of 3 EI factors on CDMSE were found to be greater among the Chinese students than the South Korean students, no gender differences were detected. By introducing cultural influences, the findings provide important implications for career counseling.     

When do peers influence adolescent males' risk taking? Examining decision making under conditions of risk and ambiguity

Risk taking is highly prevalent among adolescent males, and a range of studies have shown that decisions become riskier if a peer is present. However, previous studies have typically provided participants with explicit probabilities of risk in each situation. This does not accurately reflect adolescents' real‐world risk taking, where decisions are made in ambiguous situations alongside their peers. Aiming for a more ecologically valid design, the present experiment manipulated situational ambiguity and examined its interplay with group decision making and developmental factors. Adolescent males (N = 202) aged 12–15 completed a “Wheel of Fortune” task and then self‐reported their score, presenting an opportunity to cheat as a measure of antisocial risk taking. As predicted, adolescents were more likely to take risks when probabilities were ambiguous rather than explicit. Further, higher levels of gambling choices were made by groups in ambiguous, but not risk situations. Age significantly predicted gambling in ambiguous conditions, whereas developmental dispositions (risk perception, reward sensitivity, and inhibitory control) did not play a role. Findings provide an insight into the social and situational conditions under which adolescent males engage in reckless behavior.     

The affect heuristic,mortality salience,and risk: Domain‐specific effects of a natural disaster on risk‐benefit perception

We examine how affect and accessible thoughts following a major natural disaster influence everyday risk perception. A survey was conducted in the months following the 2004 south Asian Tsunami in a representative sample of the Swedish population (N = 733). Respondents rated their experienced affect as well as the perceived risk and benefits of various everyday decision domains. Affect influenced risk and benefit perception in a way that could be predicted from both the affect‐congruency and affect heuristic literatures (increased risk perception and stronger risk‐benefit correlations). However, in some decision domains, self‐regulation goals primed by the natural disaster predicted risk and benefit ratings. Together, these results show that affect, accessible thoughts and motivational states influence perceptions of risks and benefits.     

A Self‐Categorization Explanation for the Third‐Person Effect

Three studies tested a self‐categorization theory explanation for the third‐person effect. In Study 1 (N= 49) undergraduate students judged the influence of the National Enquirer, Wall Street Journal, and TV show Friends on themselves, relative to low‐ and high‐status outgroup members, and other undergraduate students. The profile of first‐ and third‐person perceptions was largely consistent with predictions, and the size of the third‐person effect decreased as perceived similarity to target others increased—but only for media that were normative for comparison others. Study 2 (N= 49) provided evidence for this process with different media and showed that the profile of first‐ and third‐person perceptions matched closely with perceived norms of media consumption—but not the social desirability of those media. Study 3 (N= 64) showed that the third‐person effect for the same media and target other shifts with the frame of reference in which the judgment is made. Taken together, the findings are consistent with self‐categorization theory and difficult to reconcile with other explanations.     

Financial prospect relativity: context effects in financial decision‐making under risk

We report three studies in which methodologies from psychophysics are adapted to investigate context effects on individual financial decision‐making under risk. The aim was to determine how the range and the rank of the options offered as saving amounts and levels of investment risk influence people's decisions about these variables. In the range manipulation, participants were presented with either a full range of choice options or a limited subset, while in the rank manipulation they were presented with a skewed set of feasible options. The results showed that choices are affected by the position of each option in the range and the rank of presented options, which suggests that judgments and choices are relative. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effect of Internal Locus of Control on Career Adaptability: The Mediating Role of Career Decision‐Making Self‐Efficacy and Occupational Engagement

This study examined the mediating roles of career decision‐making self‐efficacy (a domain‐specific motivational variable) and occupational engagement (a behavioral variable) on the relationship between internal locus of control (a general motivational variable) and career adaptability among college students in South Korea (N = 310). The findings extend past research on career adaptability by identifying a relationship among the variables.     

To trust or not to trust: social decision‐making in post‐institutionalized,internationally adopted youth

Chronic parental maltreatment has been associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust, and depriving environments have been shown to predict short‐sighted, risk‐averse decision‐making. The present study examined whether a circumscribed period of adverse care occurring only early in life was associated with biases in trust behavior. Fifty‐three post‐institutionalized (PI) youth, adopted internationally on average by 1 year of age, and 33 never‐institutionalized, non‐adopted youth (M_age = 12.9 years) played a trust game. Participants decided whether or not to share coins with a different anonymous peer in each trial with the potential to receive a larger number of coins in return. Trials were presented in blocks that varied in the degree to which the peers behaved in a trustworthy (reciprocal) or untrustworthy (non‐reciprocal) manner. A comparison condition consisted of a computerized lottery with the same choices and probabilistic risk as the peer trials. Non‐adopted comparison youth showed a tendency to share more with peers than to invest in the lottery and tended to maintain their level of sharing across trials despite experiencing trials in which peers failed to reciprocate. In contrast, PI children, particularly those who were adopted over 1 year of age, shared less with peers than they invested in the lottery and quickly adapted their sharing behavior to peers’ responses. These results suggest that PI youth were more mistrusting, more sensitive to both defection and reciprocation, and potentially more accurate in their trusting decisions than comparison youth. Results support the presence of a sensitive period for the development of trust in others, whereby conditions early in life may set long‐term biases in decision‐making.     

No Time to Waste: Restricting Life‐Span Temporal Horizons Decreases the Sunk‐Cost Fallacy

In three studies, we examined the influence of restricted and expansive temporal horizons on the sunk‐cost fallacy. The sunk‐cost fallacy occurs when prior investments instead of future returns influence decisions about future investments. When making decisions about future investments, rational decision makers base decisions on future consequences, not already‐invested costs that are “sunk” and cannot be recovered. In Study 1, we restricted young adult college students' temporal horizons by instructing them to imagine that they did not have much longer to live; this manipulation decreased the sunk‐cost fallacy. In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 and also found that the consequences of manipulating temporal horizons were most pronounced for prior investments of time and that prior investments of time and money had different implications for the sunk‐cost fallacy, depending on the social or nonsocial decision domain. In Study 3, we manipulated temporal horizons by instructing students to imagine their time as a college student was coming to an end. Results were mostly similar to Study 2 but also suggested that focusing on one's mortality may have unique consequences. Implications of the three studies for understanding age differences in sunk‐cost decisions, interventions to improve sunk‐cost decisions, and the situations in which interventions might be most needed are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Weight beliefs and messages: Mindsets predict body‐shame and anti‐fat attitudes via attributions

In two samples (N = 247, N = 291), we examined the link between beliefs and messages about the changeable (incremental theory) vs. fixed (entity theory) nature of weight, attributions for weight, and body shame. We recruited participants using online sampling, employing a correlational design in Study 1 and an experimental design in Study 2. Across both studies, we found evidence for the stigma‐asymmetry effect—incremental, relative to entity beliefs/messages of weight predicted both (a) stronger onset responsibility attributions, indirectly increasing body shame and (b) stronger offset efficacy attributions, indirectly decreasing body shame. Study 2 replicated the stigma‐asymmetry effect with anti‐fat attitudes. We discuss implications for public health obesity messages with the goal of reducing stigma.