Numerical vs Cardinal Measurements in Multiattribute Decision Making: How Exact Is Enough?

Multiattribute decision making can involve consideration of both quantitative and qualitative measures of criteria attaintment. Some decision support systems (decision aids) to help multiattribute decision making quantify value functions. One of the most popular of these systems, multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), requires two types of input. Decision makers need to express the relative value of different attainment levels on each criterion, as well as express the relative importance of these criteria. Some systems (such as DECAID) require simple direct graphical input of value and criterion importance. Other systems (such as LOGICAL DECISION) use more complex means of expressing relative value. Either way, MAUT converts expressions of criterion importance into quantitative form. This study compares the relative stability of numerical results obtained through two decision support systems, DECAID and LOGICAL DECISION (LD), used in the task of evaluation of multiattribute alternatives. Additionally the relative stability of results was measured by comparison with results obtained using an ordinal method, ZAPROS. ZAPROS is a decision support system for construction of a partial order over the set of alternatives. It does not require conversion of qualitative measures into quantitative form. The relations among alternatives are close to those based on ordinal dominance. The results of experiments show that ordinal relationships between task parameters are much more stable than those obtained from quantitative measures. Results from DECAID and LD are much less coincident with each other than with results obtained through ZAPROS. Many inconsistencies were found in subject responses. It is concluded that more attention should be given to the means of testing judgment consistency, and that in some cases, attempts to solve decision tasks through more "exact" judgments of value function parameters may lead to erroneous results.     

How Can Decision Making Be Improved?

ABSTRACT— The optimal moment to address the question of how to improve human decision making has arrived. Thanks to 50 years of research by judgment and decision-making scholars, psychologists have developed a detailed picture of the ways in which human judgment is bounded. This article argues that the time has come to focus attention on the search for strategies that will improve bounded judgment because decision-making errors are costly and are growing more costly, decision makers are receptive, and academic insights are sure to follow from research on improvement. In addition to calling for research on improvement strategies, this article organizes the existing literature pertaining to improvement strategies and highlights promising directions for future research.     

Forecasting and Ethical Decision Making: What Matters?

This study examined how the number and types of consequences considered are related to forecasting and ethical decision making. Undergraduate participants took on the role of the key actor in several ethical problems and were asked to forecast potential outcomes and make a decision about each problem. Performance pressure was manipulated by ostensibly making rewards contingent on good problem-solving performance. The results indicated that forecast quality was associated with decision ethicality, and the identification of the critical consequences of the problem and consequences for others were associated with both higher quality forecasts and more ethical decisions. In addition, the identification of a larger number of consequences was negatively associated with ethical decision making. Performance pressure did not impact forecast quality or ethicality of decisions. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments,Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality

Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long‐term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – or at least for retaining one's intention until the time to act has come? Or is the rationality of ‘doing as you decide’ governed by diachronic wide‐scope norms, as Michael Bratman and John Broome suggest? All of these approaches are shown to raise severe problems, which suggests a more modest view: diachronic pressures on intending are at each point in time confined to the very next instant.     

Predicting and Explaining Intentions and Behavior: How Well Are We Doing?

Meta-analyses of research using the theory of reasoned action (TRA) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB) show that these models explain on average between 40% and 50% of the variance in intention, and between 19% and 38% of the variance in behavior. This paper evaluates the performance of these models in predicting and explaining intentions and behavior. It discusses the distinction between prediction and explanation, the different standards of comparison against which predictive performance can be judged, the use of percentage of variance explained as a measure of effect size, and presents 9 reasons why the models do not always predict as well as we would like them to do.     

Referees' Decision Making in Handball and Transgressive Behaviors: Influence of Stereotypes About Gender of Players?

We offer norm theory as a framework for developing some common ground within both feminist psychology and lesbian and gay psychology about the meaning of empirical differences between social groups. Norm theory is a social cognitive theory that predicts that empirical differences will be consistently explained by taking more typical groups (e.g., men, straight people) as implicit norms for comparison and by attributing differences to less typical groups (e.g., women, lesbians, and gay men). Results of an experiment (N = 114) are presented to show that norms shape interpretations of empirical differences between lesbian/gay and straight persons by (1) leading explanations to focus on attributes of lesbian/gay persons, and (2) leading to judgments that straight persons have less mutable attributes. Stereotypes also affected interpretations; stereotype-consistent results led to more essentialistic explanations and, when targets were female, to higher ratings of the results' importance and fundamentality. We highlight how experiments can be used to understand the process of constructing the meaning of scientific data, and make recommendations for empiricists' interpretive practices and constructionist theories in feminist psychology and lesbian and gay psychology.     

Education and the Importance of Religion in Decision Making: Do Other Dimensions of Religiousness Matter?

The relationship between education and the importance of religion in everyday decision making is examined using data from two national surveys of American adults. People who have higher levels of education are less likely to rely on the Bible and the teachings of their place of worship for guidance in their decision making. However, previously undocumented contingencies attenuate the effect of education: (1) attending religious services regularly; (2) involvement in religious activities; (3) praying more frequently; (4) believing in the literal interpretation of the Bible; and (5) greater certainty in one's personal faith. These patterns hold net of income, which is also negatively associated with religious‐based decision making—and only the socially integrative aspects of religiousness attenuate that association.     

Diagnostic Decision Making: Do Counselors Delay Final Judgments?

Although there is a theoretical, empirical rationale warranting the delay of diagnostic decision making, it is unknown whether this debiasing strategy is actually implemented in counseling practice. This study investigated whether counselors delayed their diagnostic decisions in a setting that allowed them the option of doing so. Clinical records were selected from a counselor training center at a large midwestern university and coded for delayed diagnostic decision making. Three pairs of chi‐square analyses were performed. Results indicated that delayed diagnostic decision making occurred to a greater extent than immediate diagnostic decision making across counselor‐client dyads, counselors, and clients.     

The Automatic and Controlled Information-Processing Dissociation: Is It Still Relevant?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the dual-process information-processing model of Schneider and Shiffrin (Schneider, W., and Shiffrin, R. M., Psychol. Rev. 84: 1–66, 1977; see also Shiffrin, R. M., and Schneider, W. Psychol. Rev. 84: 127–190, 1977) in light of the research data that have accumulated since the model was introduced more than 20 years ago. First, a brief introduction of the basic model of automatic and controlled information processing will be given. Second, some alternatives to the basic model that were developed over the last two decades will be reviewed. Third, data from neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience that have a bearing upon this framework will be considered. Finally, some comments on the current usefulness of the dual-process framework for neuropsychological research will be offered.     

How Do Chemistry Faculty and Graduate Students Engage in Decision Making on Issues Related to Ethical and Responsible Conduct of Research Including Authorship?

Science and Engineering Ethics - This article explores the impact of an Increase in the average Number of Authors per Publication (INAP) on known ethical issues of authorship. For this purpose, the...     

Intending or Pretending? Automatic Evaluations of Goal Cues Discriminate True and False Intentions

This research presents a novel approach to discriminating between true and deceptive statements about intended future behavior. Arguing that true intentions are goal‐directed, we predict that people who genuinely intend to pursue a reported goal will implicitly evaluate goal‐relevant cues positively, whereas people who do not intend to pursue the goal will not. Participants in an experiment were instructed to tell the truth about a planned future behavior (true intention) or to falsely report that same behavior to mask their actual mock‐criminal intention (false intention). As predicted, an evaluative priming task showed that participants with true intention exhibited implicit positive evaluations of cues relevant to the reported goal, whereas participants with false intention did not. Subsequent analyses showed that implicit positivity significantly discriminated between true and false intentions. The findings are discussed in terms of theoretical contributions and implications for the development of future detection tools. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Of Kids and Unicorns: How Rational Is Children's Trust in Testimonial Knowledge?

When young children confront a vast array of adults' testimonial claims, they should decide which testimony to endorse. If they are unable to immediately verify the content of testimonial assertions, children adopt or reject their informants' statements on the basis of forming trust in the sources of testimony. This kind of trust needs to be based on some underlying reasons. The rational choice theory, which currently dominates the social, cognitive, and psychological sciences, posits that trust should be formed on a rational basis, as a result of probabilistic assessments and utility-maximizing calculations. In this paper, the predictions stemming from the rational choice approach to trust are systematically compared with the empirical evidence from the field of developmental psychology on how children establish their trust in testimonial statements. The results of this comparison demonstrate an obvious inadequacy of the rational choice explanation of the emergence and development of children's testimonial trust, regardless of which form of trust rationality—weighting, threshold, or ordering—is examined. As none of the three forms of rationality of children's trust in testimony squares with the empirical data, this paper introduces a new version of trust rationality, adaptively rational trust. It explores the compatibility of the concept of adaptively rational trust with the recent empirical findings in the area of developmental psychology and addresses some avenues for future research on the rationality of testimonial trust.     

Parental Modeling,Reinforcement, and Information Transfer: Risk Factors in the Development of Child Anxiety?

The purpose of this article is to provide a comprehensive review and a conceptual integration of research examining the potential role of learning from parents in the development of child anxiety. Specifically, research in this area is discussed within the framework of three specific mechanisms: parental modeling, information transfer, and parental reinforcement of anxious/avoidant behavior. Implications of the research in this area are discussed, as well as limitations and directions for future research.