Overconfidently underthinking: narcissism negatively predicts cognitive reflection

Abstract

There exists a large body of work examining individual differences in the propensity to engage in reflective thinking processes. However, there is a distinct lack of empirical research examining the role of dispositional factors in these differences and understanding these associations could provide valuable insight into decision-making. Here, we examine whether individual differences in cognitive reflection are related to narcissism (excessive self-focused attention) and impulsiveness (trait-based lack of inhibitory control). Participants across three studies completed measures of narcissism, impulsiveness and cognitive reflection. Results indicate that grandiose and vulnerable narcissists differ in their performance on problem-solving tasks (i.e., Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]) and preferences for intuitive thinking, as well as the degree to which they reflect on and understand their own thoughts and enjoy cognitively effortful activities. Additionally, though impulsiveness was significantly related to self-report measures of cognitive reflection (i.e., metacognitive reflection, metacognitive insight, and need for cognition), it showed no association with a behavioural measure of cognitive reflection (i.e., CRT scores). Our results suggest that certain individual differences in dispositional and personality characteristics may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in certain forms of reflective thinking.     

Increased Attentional Control for Emotional Distractors Moderates the Use of Reflective Pondering in Times of Life Stress: A Prospective Study

According to the response styles theory, rumination is a cognitive response to a stressor with repetitive and self‐focused attention on a negative mood state. The attentional disengagement theory highlights that attentional processes are critical, underlying individual differences in ruminative thinking, such as reflective pondering and depressive brooding. Using a prospective design, the current study sought to determine whether attentional control for negative material was differently associated with brooding and reflection upon life stress. Spanning a period of three months, 76 never depressed undergraduate students completed a baseline measurement of attentional bias by using an emotional modification of the exogenous cueing task (T1) and subsequently, six weeks after T1, completed Internet questionnaires during their final examinations at four weekly fixed moments (T2–T5). Data were analysed with a series of multilevel regression analyses. Results revealed that the relation between stress and the use of reflective pondering is stronger when participants allocate less attention to emotional information (negative and positive stimuli). On the other hand, attentional control did not moderate the relation between stress and depressive brooding. On the basis of the current research findings, it might be important to train attentional control to disengage from emotional distractors, which in turn may increase the use of more self‐controlling thinking in response to stress. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conscious knowledge influences decision‐making differently in substance abusers with and without co‐morbid antisocial personality disorder

Decision‐making impairment, as measured by the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), is a consistent finding among individuals with substance use disorder (SUD). We studied how this impairment is influenced by co‐morbid antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and conscious knowledge of the task. Three groups were investigated: SUD individuals without co‐morbid ASPD (n = 30), SUD individuals with co‐morbid ASPD (n = 16), and healthy controls (n = 17). Both SUD and SUD+ASPD participants had poor overall IGT performance. A block‐by‐block analysis revealed that SUD participants exhibited slow but steady improvement across the IGT, whereas SUD+ASPD participants exhibited initial normal improvement, but dropped off during the last 40 trials. Conscious knowledge of the task was significantly correlated to performance for controls and SUD participants, but not for SUD+ASPD participants. Our findings suggest that decision‐making proceeds differently in SUD and SUD+ASPD individuals due to differences in acquisition and application of conscious knowledge.     

Self‐Control Success Revealed: Greater Approach Motivation Towards Healthy versus Unhealthy Food

Deviating from existing literature on self‐control failure the current research examines self‐control success and the role of motivation. Functional research suggests people visually perceive objects to be bigger when they are motivated to approach them. Using the size perception task, participants estimated the size of a healthy and an unhealthy food object that were identical in size. In the current research we simulated a reflective state vs. impulsive state using an ego‐depletion manipulation in Study 1 and a cognitive load manipulation in Study 2. Results from both studies revealed that participants in a reflective state (vs. impulsive state) assigned increased size estimations to the healthy food item compared to the unhealthy food item. Current findings demonstrate greater approach motivation towards a ‘virtue’ (i.e., healthy food) as a mechanism that underlies self‐control success, suggesting that successful self‐control involves initiating approach towards a virtue rather than inhibiting a vice. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Working memory involvement in emotion-based processes underlying choosing advantageously

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is widely used to assess decision making under conditions of uncertainty in clinical as well as in nonclinical populations. However, there is still debate as to whether normal performance at this task relies on implicit, emotion-based processes that are independent of working memory. To clarify the role of working memory on normal performance on the IGT, participants performed the task under low or high working memory load. We used a modified version of the original task, in which the position of the four decks was randomized between trials. Results showed that only participants performing under low memory load significantly chose more advantageously halfway through the task. In addition, when comparing the number of cards chosen from the two decks with frequent losses, one advantageous and one disadvantageous, only participants performing under low memory load chose more cards from the advantageous deck. The present findings indicate that the processes underlying optimal advantageous performance on the IGT rely on working memory functions.     

Are Thoughtful People More Utilitarian? CRT as a Unique Predictor of Moral Minimalism in the Dilemmatic Context

Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow, deliberative thinking with the utilitarian disposition and fast, automatic thinking with the deontological disposition. However, evidence for the reflective utilitarian hypothesis—the hypothesized link between utilitarian judgment and individual differences in the capacity for rational reflection (gauged here by the Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT; Frederick, 2005]) has been inconsistent and difficult to interpret in light of several design flaws. In two studies aimed at addressing some of the flaws, we found robust evidence for a reflective minimalist hypothesis—high CRT performers’ tendency to regard utility‐optimizing acts as largely a matter of personal prerogative, permissible both to perform and to leave undone. This relationship between CRT and the “minimalist” orientation remained intact after controlling for age, sex, trait affect, social desirability, and educational attainment. No significant association was found between CRT and the strict utilitarian response pattern or CRT and the strict deontological response pattern, nor did we find any significant association between CRT and willingness to act in the utility‐optimizing manner. However, we found an inverse association between empathic concern and a willingness to act in the utility‐optimizing manner, but there was no comparable association between empathic concern and the deontological judgment pattern. Theoretical, methodological, and normative implications of the findings are discussed.     

Emotion-based learning and central executive resources: an investigation of intuition and the Iowa Gambling Task

The role of emotion in complex decision-making can be assessed on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a widely used neuropsychological measure that may tap a different aspect of executive function than that assessed by conventional measures. Most notably, the 'feeling' about which decks are good or bad, often described in relation to IGT performance, seems reminiscent of decision-making based on intuition-linked to a long history of research in decision-making contrasting the 'intuition' versus 'reasoning' styles of problem solving. To test the claim that the performance on the IGT relies more on emotion-based learning than conventional executive resources for normal performance, a group of participants completed the IGT simultaneously with one of two secondary-tasks, one of which (random number generation) is known to load executive resources. A third group performed the IGT with no secondary-task. If performance on the IGT requires the properties associated with intuitive operations, then participants should either show no disruption when completing a secondary-task, or at least show no selective disruption on a secondary-task that loads for executive function. The rate of learning in the three groups was not significantly different. This suggests that the sorts of cognitive resources loaded by traditional executive tasks such as random number generation do not overlap, in the cognitive architecture, with the emotion-based learning skills that are required for Iowa Gambling Task performance. The findings of the present study are also consistent with a previous claim of the Iowa group that emotion-based learning and working memory resources are doubly dissociable.     

Functional connectivity of reflective and brooding rumination in depressed and healthy women

Ruminative thinking is related to an increased risk for major depressive disorder (MDD) and perpetuates negative mood states. Rumination, uncontrollable negative thoughts about the self, may comprise both reflective and brooding components. However, only brooding rumination is consistently associated with increased negativity bias and negative coping styles, while reflective rumination has a less clear relationship with negative outcomes in healthy and depressed participants. The current study examined seed-to-voxel (S2.V) resting-state functional connectivity (FC) in a sample of healthy (HC) and depressed (MDD) adult women (HC: n=50, MDD: n=33). The S2V FC of six key brain regions, including the left and right amygdala, anterior and posterior cingulate cortex (ACC, PCC), and medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (mPFC, dlPFC), was correlated with self-reported reflective and brooding rumination. Results indicate that HC and MDD participants had increased brooding rumination associated with decreased FC between the left amygdala and the right temporal pole. Moreover, reflective rumination was associated with distinct FC of the mPFC, PCC, and ACC with parietal, occipital, and cingulate regions. Depressed participants, compared with HC, exhibited decreased FC between the PCC and a region in the right middle frontal gyrus. The results of the current study add to the understanding of the neural underpinnings of different forms of self-related cognition—brooding and reflective rumination—in healthy and depressed women.     

Adaptive and maladaptive components of rumination? Diagnostic specificity and relation to depressive biases

The present study investigated the validity of the two-factor solution of items selected from the Rumination Scale of the Response Style Questionnaire proposed by Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003). In the first part of this study we used samples of currently depressed (MDD), formerly depressed (FD), socially anxious (SP), and healthy control participants to examine whether the brooding and reflective pondering components differentiate participants with an anxiety disorder from participants with depression. In the second part of this study we examined whether these components of rumination were differentially related to cognitive biases in depression. Overall, the MDD group exhibited higher brooding scores than did all other groups; SP and FD groups did not differ from each other but obtained higher brooding scores than did the control participants. Only the MDD and the control groups differed on the reflective pondering factor. Importantly, brooding and reflective pondering were differentially related to cognitive biases. Specifically, the correlation between brooding/reflective pondering and memory bias was not significant when depressive symptoms were partialed out. The correlation between brooding and attentional bias for sad faces, however, remained significant even when current depressive symptoms were taken into account. In sum, our results support the formulation that rumination is composed of an adaptive reflective pondering factor and a maladaptive brooding factor.     

Affective guidance in the Iowa gambling task

It has been suggested that affective states can guide higher level cognitive processes and that such affective guidance may be particularly important when real-life decisions are made under uncertainty. We ask whether affect guides decisions in a laboratory task that models real-life decisions under uncertainty. In the Iowa gambling task (IGT), participants search for monetary payoffs in an uncertain environment. Recent evidence against an affective guidance interpretation of the IGT indicates a need to set a standard for what counts as evidence of affective guidance. We present a novel analysis of IGT, and our results show that participants’ galvanic skin response (GSR) reflects an affective process that precedes and guides cognition. Specifically, prior to participants’ knowledge of the optimal strategy, their GSRs are significantly higher when they are about to select from a bad deck, relative to a good deck, and this difference in GSR is correlated with a behavioral preference for the good deck.     

Relationships between executive function,working memory,and decision-making on the Iowa Gambling Task: Evidence from ventromedial patients,dorsolateral patients,and normal subjects

The results of previous studies are inconsistent in regard to the relationship between the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), working-memory (WM), and executive tasks, and whether these cognitive processes could be considered as mechanisms underlying a decision-making deficit. Moreover, the relationship between the IGT and executive measures is examined based on a limited number of executive tasks, within different populations showing diffuse damage. In addition, there are fewer studies carried out within control participants, with those studies also being inconclusive. It is also suggested that the association of the IGT performance with executive tasks depends on whether the IGT was running under ambiguity or under risk. In this work, all of these issues are studied. Results showed that both patients with ventromedial (VMPFC, N = 10) and dorsolateral (DLPFC, N = 10) prefrontal cortex lesions are significantly impaired on almost all executive tasks, WM tasks, and the IGT. Furthermore, when the IGT is run under risk, there are significant correlations between executive measures and the IGT for the DLPFC patients and the control participants (N = 34) but not the VMPFC patients. No correlation was found between WM tasks and the IGT for both frontal subgroups and control participants. These findings suggested that the mechanisms underlying the IGT deficit differ according to the lesion locations.     

Some decks are better than others: the effect of reinforcer type and task instructions on learning in the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) has become widely used as a laboratory test of "real-life" decision-making. However, aspects of its administration that have been varied by researchers may differentially affect performance and the conclusions researchers can draw. Some researchers have used facsimile money reinforcers while others have used real money reinforcers. More importantly, the instructions participants receive have also been varied. While no differences have been reported in performance dependent on reinforcer type, no previous comparison of participants' instructions has been conducted. This is despite one set of instructions giving participants a clear hint about the nature of the task. Additionally, in previous research one set of instructions have not been used exclusively with one reinforcer type making any differential or cumulative effects of these factors difficult to interpret. The present study compared the effects of instruction and reinforcer type on IGT performance. When participants received instructions without a hint performance was affected by reinforcer type. This was not the case when the instructions included a hint. In a second IGT session performance was improved in participants who had received the hint instructions compared with those who had not.     

Modal preferences in creative problem solving

Embodied cognitive science appeals to the idea that cognition depends on the body as well as on the brain. This study looks at whether we are more likely to engage just the brain or enlist the body for complex cognitive functioning such as creative problem solving. Participants were presented with a puzzle based on De Bono’s lateral thinking puzzles. The puzzle consisted of rotating and joining two-dimensional shapes to make a three-dimensional one. In one condition, participants were given the choice of either solving the puzzle mentally or through manipulation of the images on a computer screen. In another condition, the subjects had to solve the puzzle first mentally and then report which mode they would have preferred to solve the puzzle. Two more conditions were applied with slight variations. In all conditions, an overwhelming majority of participants chose to solve the puzzle by manipulation, even though there was not a significant increase on performance. It appeared that participants were making a conscious choice for the body to play a feedback-driven role in creative cognitive processing. This strong preference for manual manipulation over just mental representation, regardless of the impact on performance, would seem to suggest that it is our natural tendency to involve the body in complex cognitive functioning. This would support the theory that cognition may be more than just a neural process, and that it is a dynamic interplay between body, brain and world. The experiential feedback of the body moving through space and time may be an inherently important factor in creative cognition.     

Anxiety-induced miscalculations,more than differential inhibition of intuition,explain the gender gap in cognitive reflection

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is among the most common and well-known instruments for measuring the propensity to engage reflective processing, in the context of the dual-process theory of high-level cognition. There is robust evidence that men perform better than women on this test—but we should be wary to conclude that men are more likely to engage in reflective processing than women. We consider several possible loci for the gender difference in CRT performance, and use mathematical modeling to show, across two studies, that the gender difference in CRT performance is more likely due to women making more mathematical mistakes (partially explained by their greater mathematics anxiety) than due to women being less likely to engage reflective processing. As a result, we argue that we need to use gender-equivalent variants of the CRT, both to improve the quality of our instruments and to fulfill our social responsibility as scientists.     

Instructional cues modify performance on the Iowa Gambling Task

The current study investigated whether acute alcohol intoxication produces impaired decision-making on tasks assessing ventromedial prefrontal (VMF) cortex functioning and impulsive responding. Participants completed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a decision-making test targeting the VMF, and the Newman Perseveration Task (NT), a measure of impulsivity. Personality measures of impulsivity were assessed using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS). To encourage natural responding on both tasks, participants were falsely informed that the study was examining the effects of alcohol on memory; the impulsivity tasks were presented as 'distractor' tasks. Advantageous performance on the IGT was related to specific instructional cues as well as to knowledge about the experimental purpose. Performance of intoxicated and sober participants did not differ. A subsequent study in which the true purpose of the experiment was revealed confirmed that alcohol does not affect IGT performance. Most importantly, the instruction-sensitivity of the IGT emphasizes the importance of salient cues for decision-making.     

How to explain receptivity to conjunction-fallacy inhibition training: Evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

Intuitive predictions and judgments under conditions of uncertainty are often mediated by judgment heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Using the classical conjunction bias example, the present study examines the relationship between receptivity to metacognitive executive training and emotion-based learning ability indexed by Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance. After completing a computerised version of the IGT, participants were trained to avoid conjunction bias on a frequency judgment task derived from the works of Tversky and Kahneman. Pre- and post-test performances were assessed via another probability judgment task. Results clearly showed that participants who produced a biased answer despite the experimental training (individual patterns of the biased → biased type) mainly had less emotion-based learning ability in IGT. Better emotion-based learning ability was observed in participants whose response pattern was biased → logical. These findings argue in favour of the capacity of the human mind/brain to overcome reasoning bias when trained under executive programming conditions and as a function of emotional warning sensitivity.     

领导非工作时间电子通信预期影响下属工作绩效的多路径模型

领导预期下属非工作时间随时保持联系、并且及时回复工作信息已成为当下数字经济时代中的职场新常态。文章基于资源保存理论, 构建领导非工作时间电子通信预期(After-hours electronic communication expectations, AECE)影响下属工作绩效的多路径模型。通过实验研究, 以及多时点、多来源的问卷调查研究, 结果发现：(1)在资源获益路径, 领导AECE会通过增强下属组织自尊, 提升工作绩效; (2)在资源损耗路径, 领导AECE会增加下属的压力感知; (3)在资源威胁路径, 领导AECE会引发下属的名声担忧, 进而降低工作绩效; (4)自我领导调节资源威胁路径, 即当下属自我领导水平较高时, 领导AECE通过名声担忧降低工作绩效的间接效应被削弱。整合的理论框架为解释领导AECE对下属工作绩效的复杂影响提供更全面的解释, 这不仅丰富了AECE相关文献, 拓展了资源保存理论在数字经济管理背景下的应用, 同时也为“随时待命”这一职场新常态提供管理实践启示。     

Dunning–Kruger effects in reasoning: Theoretical implications of the failure to recognize incompetence

The Dunning–Kruger effect refers to the observation that the incompetent are often ill-suited to recognize their incompetence. Here we investigated potential Dunning–Kruger effects in high-level reasoning and, in particular, focused on the relative effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring among particularly biased reasoners. Participants who made the greatest numbers of errors on the cognitive reflection test (CRT) overestimated their performance on this test by a factor of more than 3. Overestimation decreased as CRT performance increased, and those who scored particularly high underestimated their performance. Evidence for this type of systematic miscalibration was also found on a self-report measure of analytic-thinking disposition. Namely, genuinely nonanalytic participants (on the basis of CRT performance) overreported their “need for cognition” (NC), indicating that they were dispositionally analytic when their objective performance indicated otherwise. Furthermore, estimated CRT performance was just as strong a predictor of NC as was actual CRT performance. Our results provide evidence for Dunning–Kruger effects both in estimated performance on the CRT and in self-reported analytic-thinking disposition. These findings indicate that part of the reason why people are biased is that they are either unaware of or indifferent to their own bias.     

Assessing the validity of inferences from scores on the cognitive reflection test

Decision‐making researchers purport that a novel cognitive ability construct, cognitive reflection, explains variance in intuitive thinking processes that traditional mental ability constructs do not. However, researchers have questioned the validity of the primary measure because of poor construct conceptualization and lack of validity studies. Prior studies have not adequately aligned the analytical techniques with the theoretical basis of the construct, dual‐processing theory of reasoning. The present study assessed the validity of inferences drawn from the cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores. We analyzed response processes with an item response tree model, a method that aligns with the dual‐processing theory in order to interpret CRT scores. Findings indicate that the intuitive and reflective factors that the test purportedly measures were indistinguishable. Exploratory, post hoc analyses demonstrate that CRT scores are most likely capturing mental abilities. We suggest that future researchers recognize and distinguish between individual differences in cognitive abilities and cognitive processes.