Self‐specific Optimism Bias in Belief Updating Is Associated with High Trait Optimism

People learn more from new information when it leads to favorable future outlooks and thus can maintain optimism despite conflicting evidence. In two studies (N = 20 and 26), we investigated whether this optimism bias in belief updating is self‐specific by modifying a recently introduced learning paradigm. In each trial, participants had to estimate the probability of experiencing a negative future event, were then presented with the population base rate of that event, and were subsequently asked for a second, updated estimation. In half of the 88 trials with varying events, estimations were made for oneself, in the other half for a similar other. We tested whether the updates (differences between the first and second estimates) following undesirable base rate were lower than those following desirable base rates, and whether this difference was greater for self relative to other. In both studies, the overall results support the presence of a self‐specific optimism bias in belief updating. However, taking into account trait optimism (TO) as a moderator variable revealed that this was the case only in participants with high TO, whereas those with low TO showed optimistic belief updating for both self and other. In Study 2, we additionally controlled for possible misclassifications of base rate desirability. Taken together, the optimism bias in belief updating was demonstrated by a selective neglect of unfavorable information. A self‐specific influence of this bias in individuals with high TO may ultimately cause the impression of a more positive future outlook relative to others. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why so confident? The influence of outcome desirability on selective exposure and likelihood judgment

Previous studies that have directly manipulated outcome desirability have often found little effect on likelihood judgments (i.e., no desirability bias or wishful thinking). The present studies tested whether selections of new information about outcomes would be impacted by outcome desirability, thereby biasing likelihood judgments. In Study 1, participants made predictions about novel outcomes and then selected additional information to read from a buffet. They favored information supporting their prediction, and this fueled an increase in confidence. Studies 2 and 3 directly manipulated outcome desirability through monetary means. If a target outcome (randomly preselected) was made especially desirable, then participants tended to select information that supported the outcome. If made undesirable, less supporting information was selected. Selection bias was again linked to subsequent likelihood judgments. These results constitute novel evidence for the role of selective exposure in cases of overconfidence and desirability bias in likelihood judgments.     

Perception of line‐up suggestiveness: effects of identification outcome knowledge

Research on the hindsight bias has shown that knowledge of an event outcome makes the observed outcome appear more predictable than it does in the absence of outcome knowledge. It was hypothesised that perceptions of the suggestiveness of a line‐up would be similarly influenced by knowledge of a witness' identification decision, with a positive identification of the suspect increasing, and a negative non‐identification decreasing, perceived suggestiveness. The ratings of undergraduate students (N = 50) in Experiment 1 showed the predicted influence of positive outcome, whereas negative outcome had no demonstrable influence. In contrast, Experiment 2, conducted with police trainees (N = 126) and with the line‐up presented in the context of a criminal investigation, partially supported the predicted influence of negative, but not positive, outcome. The discrepant findings are discussed in terms of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the hindsight bias and the implications for real‐life judgements of line‐up suggestiveness. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisiting desirable response bias in well-being reports

Growing popular interest in positive psychology may have important implications for the measurement of well-being. Five studies tested the prediction that well-being ratings are influenced by desirability bias. In Study 1, participants (N?=?176) instructed to fake good endorsed higher well-being; those instructed to fake bad endorsed lower well-being, compared to controls. In Studies 2 and 3 (N’s?=?111, 121), control participants endorsed higher levels of well-being compared to those attached to a bogus pipeline. These differences were mediated by desirability bias. In Study 4 (N?=?417), instruction manipulations did not affect well-being levels, but presenting a desirability measure prior to well-being measures attenuated the correlations between them. In Study 5 (N?=?391), however, this order effect did not replicate. We discuss the importance of continued vigilance for desirability bias in well-being research as a ready solution to this clear problem remains elusive.     

Proximity bias: Interactive effect of spatial distance and outcome valence on probability judgments

Across a range of decision contexts, we provide evidence of a novel proximity bias in probability judgments, whereby spatial distance and outcome valence systematically interact in determining probability judgments. Six hypothetical and incentive-compatible experiments (combined N = 4007) show that a positive outcome is estimated as more likely to occur when near than distant, whereas a negative outcome is estimated as less likely to occur when near than distant (studies 1–6). The proximity bias is explained by wishful thinking and thus perceptions of outcome desirability (study 3), and it does not manifest when an outcome is less relevant for the self, such as the case of outcomes with little consequence for the self (studies 4 and 5) or when estimating outcomes for others who are irrelevant to the self (study 6). Overall, the proximity bias we document deepens our understanding of the antecedents of probability judgments.     

Female first,leader second? Gender bias in the encoding of leadership behavior

In the current paper we investigate whether gender affects the encoding of leadership behavior. In three studies we found evidence that perceivers had difficulty encoding leadership behaviors into their underlying prototypical leadership traits when the behavior implied an agentic trait and the behavior was enacted by a female. Using a lexical decision making task, in Study 1 we demonstrated that agentic leadership traits were less accessible than communal leadership traits when the leader was female. Additionally, Study 1 also demonstrated that agentic traits were less accessible when the leader was female versus male. In Studies 2a and 2b, we replicated the differences we found for agentic leadership behaviors using perceiver’s self-ratings as the dependent variable. Results are discussed both in terms of their implications for future research on gender bias in leadership and their practical implications for eliminating gender bias against females who aspire to leadership positions.     

The desirability bias in predictions: Going optimistic without leaving realism

Does desire for an outcome inflate optimism? Previous experiments have produced mixed results regarding the desirability bias, with the bulk of supportive findings coming from one paradigm—the classic marked-card paradigm in which people make discrete predictions about desirable or undesirable cards being drawn from decks. We introduce a biased-guessing account for the effects from this paradigm, which posits that people are often realistic in their likelihood assessments, but when making a subjectively arbitrary prediction (a guess), they will tend to guess in a desired direction. In order to establish the validity of the biased-guessing account and to distinguish it from other accounts, we conducted five experiments that tested the desirability bias within the paradigm and novel extensions of it. In addition to supporting the biased-guessing account, the findings illustrate the critical role of moderators (e.g., type of outcome, type of forecast) for fully understanding and predicting desirability biases.     

Monkey see,monkey do: The effect of social influence on selective‐exposure bias

Selective‐exposure bias refers to the tendency to predominantly seek out attitude‐consistent information and avoid attitude‐inconsistent information. Although researchers have proposed and tested several underlying psychological factors that might contribute to this tendency, the potential role of social influence has not been addressed. In the present research, we address this issue. In four experiments (total N = 645), participants’ selective‐exposure bias was significantly reduced when the bias was portrayed as non‐normative (vs. normative). In Experiment 4, we obtained evidence for the possibility that this social‐norm manipulation could result in effects on attitudes through information selection. Overall, this research contributes novel evidence for the effect of social influence on selective‐exposure bias.     

Monolingual but not bilingual infants demonstrate racial bias in social cue use

Bilingualism exerts early and pervasive effects on cognition, observable in infancy. Thus far, investigations of infant bilingual cognition have focused on sensitivity to visual memory, executive function, and linguistic sensitivity. Much less research has focused on how bilingualism impacts processing of social cues. The present study sought to investigate whether bilingualism modulates the expression of one aspect of social processing: early racial bias. Using a gaze‐following paradigm, we investigated whether 18‐ to 20‐month‐old monolingual and bilingual infants favored their own race. Results demonstrated that monolingual infants favored their own race in following a model whose direction of gaze signaled an event. In contrast, bilingual infants demonstrated race‐neutral gaze‐following patterns, relying more heavily on the reliability of the behavior of the model over race. Findings suggest that bilingualism may have protective effects against the early emergence of racial bias.     

Evaluating scientific research: Belief,hindsight bias,ethics, and research evaluation

Students may exhibit two forms of cognitive biases, belief and hindsight bias, in evaluating a scientific experiment. Counter to disagreement, they may only believe an outcome that agrees with their belief to be more predictable in hindsight than foresight. The focus of this research is on the relationship between these biases. Students were queried about their dichotomous beliefs (learned vs. genetic) about behavior for an animal experiment and then assigned randomly to a no‐outcome or genetic outcome condition. With agreement between students' belief and outcome, the findings revealed hindsight bias (foreseeability) supported by the outcomes for surprise, disappointment, ethics, and research evaluation. With disagreement, hindsight bias was trumped along with perceiving the experiment as being less ethical and scientifically sound. Regardless of the outcome, students seem to adhere to their beliefs. Hence, students may believe that the outcome is inconsequential because it is obvious or contrary to their beliefs.     

The effect of constant outcome value on judgments and decision making given linguistic probabilities

Two experiments were performed to determine whether judgments of the relative chances of two independent events occurring are biased by constant outcome values contingent on the events when the uncertainties are specified by linguistic expressions (e.g. doubtful). In Experiment 1, subjects directly judged the relative chances of the two events, of which one was represented by a spinner and the other by a linguistic probability expression. In Experiment 2, only linguistic probability expressions were used to describe the two events and a betting procedure was used. A bias was evident in both studies, such that the relative judgments tended to favour the event with the positive rather than the negative contingent outcome. The bias was smaller for the low- than for the high-probability phrases. Individual differences were great, with the bias appearing strongly in only about one-third of the population. Theoretical implications of the present and related results are discussed.     

Wishful Thinking about the Future: Does Desire Impact Optimism?

The notion that desire for an outcome inflates optimism about that outcome has been dubbed the desirability bias or wishful thinking. In this paper, we discuss the importance of distinguishing wishful thinking from the more general concept of motivated reasoning, and we explain why documenting overoptimism or correlations between preferences and optimism is not sufficient to infer a desirability bias. Then, we discuss results from a review and meta-analysis of the experimental literature on wishful thinking. These findings, in conjunction with more recent work, not only highlight important moderators and mediators of the desirability bias but also point out limitations of the empirical research on the bias. These results also reveal an important difference between how likelihood judgments and discrete outcome predictions respond to desirability of outcomes. We conclude by presenting avenues for future research useful for understanding wishful thinking's manifestation in everyday environments and its integration with related phenomena.     

Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive and negative events

People generally judge that positive events will occur in their lives and negative events will not, even when both events have the same objective likelihood to occur. In four studies, we examined the possibility that this optimistic bias is the result of people’s automatic affective reactions to future events. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate, in two different contexts, that people are consistently optimistic in their predictions, despite identical base rates for positive and negative events. In Study 2, optimistic bias was not influenced by incentives for motivated reasoning or rewards for accuracy, suggesting that bias was the result of automatic processes. Studies 3 and 4 showed that optimistic bias was more pronounced when predictions were speeded and when participants made predictions after exposure to affectively valenced words. Together, these findings suggest that people optimistically interpret base rates and that this optimism is due to an effortless affective process.     

Weighting information from outside sources: a biased process

How do people utilize information from outside sources in their decisions? Participants observed a signal‐plus‐noise or noise‐alone event and then made a yes–no decision about whether a signal had occurred. Participants were provided with two information sources to aid decision making. Each source consisted of four components that provided estimates of signal likelihood. In Experiment 1, the two sources had equal overall accuracy but differed in the expertise and internal correlation of their components. A regression analysis indicated that participants overweighed the high‐expertise‐high‐correlation source. This bias occurred on trials when the aggregate opinions of the sources disagreed. In Experiment 2, both the overall accuracy of the source and its components were manipulated. Participants overweighed information from the higher accuracy source. These biases reflect people's sensitivity to across‐trial and within‐trial differences in the accuracy and internal consistency of information sources. Experiment 3 provided additional evidence supporting these conclusions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Increased Group Identification Leads to Outgroup Liking and Cooperation: The Role of Trust

ABSTRACT

Two studies explored the influence of group identification and the functional relations between groups on outgroup liking. In a laboratory study, Study 1 (N = 112) found that outgroup liking was highest when group identification was high and relations between groups were cooperative, but outgroup liking was lowest when group identification was high and relations were competitive. In a field replication of Study 1, Study 2 (N = 181) similarly found more liking with high group identification and cooperative relations between groups. Additional analyses revealed that the Identification × Relations interactions found in Studies 1 and 2 were mediated by outgroup trust. We discuss how trust is an important factor for predicting outgroup bias for both high and low group identification.     

Exposure to sexism can decrease implicit gender stereotype bias

Two studies examined the effect of exposure to sexism on implicit gender bias, focusing specifically on stereotypes of men as competent and women as warm. Male and female participants were exposed to sexism or no sexism. In both Experiment 1 (Implicit Association Task; N = 115) and Experiment 2 (Go/No‐go Association Task; N = 167), women who had been exposed to sexist beliefs demonstrated less implicit gender stereotype bias relative to women who were not exposed to sexism. In contrast, exposure to sexism did not influence men's implicit gender stereotype bias. In Experiment 2, process modelling revealed that women's reduction in bias in response to sexism was related to increased accuracy orientation and a tendency to make warmth versus competence judgments. The implications of these findings for current understandings of sexism and its effects on gender stereotypes are discussed.     

They should have known: Hindsight and outcome biases in child abduction cases

Two cognitive biases might partially account for public support of the ineffective AMBER Alert system. Hindsight bias is a cognitive error in which people with outcome knowledge overestimate the likelihood that this particular outcome would occur; outcome bias is an error made in evaluating the quality of a decision once the outcome is known. Two experiments assessed whether hindsight and outcome bias occur in child abduction scenarios. Study 1 was a pre/posttest experiment that examined whether hindsight bias occurs in situations in which the identity of the abductor (stranger or parent) is manipulated between groups, and all participants are told the child was killed. Study 2, a between-subjects experiment, examined whether hindsight and outcome biases occur in situations in which no AMBER Alert was issued (because the situation did not meet the legal requirements to issue an Alert), and manipulated the identity of the abductor and the outcome (child safely returned, killed, or not outcome provided). Hindsight and outcome biases occurred in both studies, given the correct set of circumstances. Abductor identity also impacted outcome estimates. Results from the two studies indicate that hindsight and outcome bias occur, but this is dependent on the outcome (child killed, child returned safely, no outcome provided) and the identity of the abductor (stranger, dangerous parent, non-dangerous parent). Limitations and future directions are discussed.     

The input bias: The misuse of input information in judgments of outcomes

In this paper we identify an input bias, the systematic misuse of input information in judgments of outcome quality. In many settings irrelevant input measures, such as the amount of time an employee spends in the office, influence outcome assessments, such as performance reviews. Across four studies we find that input values subtly, but significantly distort judgments of outcome quality. Irrelevant input information predictably influences outcome assessments even when people recognize that input measures should not matter and believe that input information did not matter. We examine the mechanics of the input bias, and suggest that because input measures are often easy to manipulate or misrepresent, the input bias is likely to have broad implications for managerial judgment and decision making.     

无法忍受不确定性与担忧：对记忆偏差与解释偏差的检验

本研究旨在探索记忆偏差与解释偏差在无法忍受不确定性(IU)与个体担忧之间的中介作用。实验1采用伴随学习任务范式,计算被试对中性词语和不确定词的回忆量。结果发现,IU对记忆偏差的预测不显著,记忆偏差在IU与担忧倾向之间的中介作用不显著。实验2采用情境评估任务范式收集被试在不确定情境下的担忧评分和解释倾向。结果发现,IU可以正向预测被试在不确定情境下的担忧评分,被试对情境的解释倾向在IU与担忧评分的关系中起到中介作用。概言之,高IU个体存在一定的信息加工偏差。