Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reversal of the preference reversal phenomenon

The widely replicated preference reversal phenomenon (PRP) violates most theories of decision under risk. People exhibiting PRP choose a safe bet (with a large chance of a small gain) over a long shot (with a small chance of a larger gain). But, when bidding to buy or sell each bet, they bid more for the long shot. Surprisingly, in Experiment 1, a new opposite reversal pattern (NPRP) was found: Safe bets typically received larger bids than long shots and reversals were far more frequent when the long shot was chosen. In Experiment 2, NPRP was found for $100 expected value bets, but PRP occurred for bets with $3 expected values. The task characteristics apparently necessary to produce NPRP are (1) bids in the form of maximum buying prices, (2) possibility of loss in bidding, but not in choice, and (3) large payoffs. It is argued that wealth effects predicted by expected utility theory are too small to explain NPRP. Instead, it is hypothesized that a contingent decision process underlies the shift in reveral patterns and that aspiration levels exert increased influence in bidding to buy when payoffs are large.     

A re‐examination of melioration and rational choice

We examined how people allocate choices between two alternatives when the payoff from each alternative varied as a function of the allocation of recent choices. On any one trial alternative A had a higher immediate payoff than alternative B, but across all trials B had a higher overall payoff than A. Rational choice theory requires that participants allocate all their responses to the alternative with the greatest overall payoff irrespective of which has the higher immediate payoff. Melioration, in contrast, proposes that participants are motivated to choose the alternative with the higher immediate payoff, irrespective of the consequences for future returns. We report four experiments in which we varied the nature of the payoffs. Participants exhibited self‐control consistent with rational choice theory when payoffs varied in magnitude, but exhibited impulsiveness consistent with melioration when the payoffs varied in probability. Finally, we show that impulsivity when payoffs varied in probability can be overcome following un‐reinforced practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eye Movements in Strategic Choice

In risky and other multiattribute choices, the process of choosing is well described by random walk or drift diffusion models in which evidence is accumulated over time to threshold. In strategic choices, level‐k and cognitive hierarchy models have been offered as accounts of the choice process, in which people simulate the choice processes of their opponents or partners. We recorded the eye movements in 2 × 2 symmetric games including dominance‐solvable games like prisoner's dilemma and asymmetric coordination games like stag hunt and hawk–dove. The evidence was most consistent with the accumulation of payoff differences over time: we found longer duration choices with more fixations when payoffs differences were more finely balanced, an emerging bias to gaze more at the payoffs for the action ultimately chosen, and that a simple count of transitions between payoffs—whether or not the comparison is strategically informative—was strongly associated with the final choice. The accumulator models do account for these strategic choice process measures, but the level‐k and cognitive hierarchy models do not. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Bayesian parameter estimation in the Expectancy Valence model of the Iowa gambling task

The purpose of the popular Iowa gambling task is to study decision making deficits in clinical populations by mimicking real-life decision making in an experimental context. Busemeyer and Stout [Busemeyer, J. R., & Stout, J. C. (2002). A contribution of cognitive decision models to clinical assessment: Decomposing performance on the Bechara gambling task. Psychological Assessment, 14, 253-262] proposed an “Expectancy Valence” reinforcement learning model that estimates three latent components which are assumed to jointly determine choice behavior in the Iowa gambling task: weighing of wins versus losses, memory for past payoffs, and response consistency. In this article we explore the statistical properties of the Expectancy Valence model. We first demonstrate the difficulty of applying the model on the level of a single participant, we then propose and implement a Bayesian hierarchical estimation procedure to coherently combine information from different participants, and we finally apply the Bayesian estimation procedure to data from an experiment designed to provide a test of specific influence.     

The differential processing of price in gains and losses: the effects of frame and need for cognition

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of decision theory is that more money is preferred to less: the principle of desired wealth. Based on this and other principles such as reference dependence and loss aversion, researchers have derived and demonstrated mental accounting (MA) rules for multiple outcome situations. Experiment 1 tested the invariance of the desired wealth principle and two mental accounting rules (mixed gain, e.g. $100 gain and a $50 loss; mixed loss, e.g. $100 loss and a $50 gain) across types of decision maker and frame. The desired wealth principle and the MA rule for mixed gains were found to vary depending upon (1) the thoughtfulness of the decision maker (need for cognition, NC), and (2) the frame used to describe gains and losses (e.g. a gain of $x versus a gain of y%). The MA rule for mixed losses, however, was found to be immune to framing effects, even among people who are generally less thoughtful. The differential processing of gains and losses across frames (dollar versus percentage) and individuals (less versus more thoughtful) was tested further in Experiment 2 where evaluations of mixed losses were made at the level of the gestalt as well as the constituent (the gain and the loss being evaluated separately). Framing effects were evidenced only among subjects lower in NC and only when the constituent gain was evaluated. Evaluations of the overall mixed loss and the constituent loss were comparable across situation and individual, suggesting that losses motivate greater processing among people otherwise inclined toward cognitive miserliness. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

RISKY CHOICE IN PIGEONS AND HUMANS: A CROSS‐SPECIES COMPARISON

Pigeon and human subjects were given repeated choices between variable and adjusting delays to token reinforcement that titrated in relation to a subject's recent choice patterns. Indifference curves were generated under two different procedures: immediate exchange, in which a token earned during each trial was exchanged immediately for access to the terminal reinforcer (food for pigeons, video clips for humans), and delayed exchange, in which tokens accumulated and were exchanged after 11 trials. The former was designed as an analogue of procedures typically used with nonhuman subjects, the latter as an analogue to procedures typically used with human participants. Under both procedure types, different variable‐delay schedules were manipulated systematically across conditions in ways that altered the reinforcer immediacy of the risky option. Under immediate‐exchange conditions, both humans and pigeons consistently preferred the variable delay, and indifference points were generally ordered in relation to relative reinforcer immediacies. Such risk sensitivity was greatly reduced under delayed‐exchange conditions. Choice and trial‐initiation response latencies varied directly with indifference points, suggesting that local analyses may provide useful ancillary measures of reinforcer value. On the whole, the results indicate that modifying procedural features brings choices of pigeons and humans into better accord, and that human—nonhuman differences on risky choice procedures reported in the literature may be at least partly a product of procedural differences.     

Loss aversion,diminishing sensitivity,and the effect of experience on repeated decisions

Three experiments are presented that explore the assertion that loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity drive the effect of experience on choice behavior. The experiments are focused on repeated choice tasks where decision makers choose repeatedly between alternatives and get feedback after each choice. Experiments 1a and 1b show that behavioral tendencies that were previously interpreted as indications of loss aversion in decisions from experience are better described as products of diminishing sensitivity to absolute payoffs. Experiment 2 highlights a nominal magnitude effect: A decrease in the magnitude of the nominal payoffs eliminates the evidence for diminishing sensitivity. These and related previous results can be captured with a model that assumes reliance on small samples of subjective experiences, and an increase in diminishing sensitivity with payoff variability. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual Differences in Decision Making Depend on Cognitive Abilities,Monitoring and Control

Decision making is the process by which actions are constructed and initiated. Across many research streams, this can be explained in terms of three broad cognitive processes: cognitive abilities that construct judgements and potential courses of action, and interacting monitoring and control processes that determine when to initiate them as behaviour. The aim of this research was to investigate the generality of individual differences in these processes, and their power to predict patterns of decision behaviour identified in our previous research. Undergraduate participants (N = 364) completed nine tests assessing cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, control thresholds and various patterns of decision behaviour. The tests differed in their cognitive ability requirements and the nature of the payoffs associated with decisions. Cognitive abilities were a strong predictor of individuals' decision competence and optimality, while monitoring confidence and control thresholds were strong and unique predictors of their overall decisiveness, and reckless and hesitant errors. These results were strongest when the measures of cognitive abilities and monitoring confidence were derived from tests with the same cognitive requirements as the tests used to derive the decision behaviours and when the control threshold measure was derived from tests with the same decision payoffs as the test used to derive the decision behaviours. This effect was particularly pronounced for control thresholds, highlighting the domain‐specific nature of cognitive control processes. These findings demonstrate how cognitive abilities, monitoring output and control thresholds interact with cognitive requirements and context‐specific payoffs to drive individual differences in decision‐making behaviour. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revealed Indifference and Models of Choice Behavior

This paper introduces an approach to the study of rational choice behavior which is based on the concept of subjective indifference, as well as its relationships with both the classical preference-based approach and the choice behavior approach. With regard to the first relationship (which has already been studied in Alcantud, 2001, as a purely topological and order-theoretical problem) new considerations are now put forward in the decision theory context. In short, if a decisionmaker has some indifference classes defined on a choice set, then we know the conditions under which his/her tastes can be modeled by a continuous preference yielding these indifference classes. The second problem is posed and tackled here and gives place to a theory of revealed indifference, where both the decisive, and indecisive cases will be considered.     

风险决策中的双参照点效应

以预期理论为代表的决策理论认为, 决策者自身的损益状态对风险决策有重要作用, 因此, 将决策者的现状定义为个人参照点。它决定了决策情境是个人获益还是个人损失。个人参照点直接关乎决策者实际的得失, 具有直接性、真实性和绝对性的特征。然而, 社会比较理论认为, 与他人的比较结果同样对风险决策具有不可忽视的意义。因此, 将他人的状态定义为社会参照点。自身的现状与他人状态相比较的结果决定了决策情境是社会获益还是社会损失。社会参照点无关决策者的实际得失, 具有间接性、假设性和相对性的特征。社会参照点通过自我概念、情绪、认知等路径作用于风险决策。更为重要的是, 社会参照点和个人参照点同时存在于风险决策过程中, 决策者对两者的心理感受和行为倾向具有相似性, 因此两者将共同影响决策者的风险选择。基于此, 本文提出风险决策中的双参照点效应。有关双参照点对风险决策过程的影响机制还需进一步的探讨。     

The relationship between indecisiveness and eye movement patterns in a decision making informational search task

Indecisiveness is a trait‐related general tendency to experience decision difficulties across a variety of situations, leading to decision delay, worry, and regret. Indecisiveness is proposed (Rassin, 2007) to be associated with an increase in desire for information acquisition and reliance on compensatory strategies—as evidenced by alternative‐based information search—during decision making. However existing studies provide conflicting findings. We conducted an information board study of indecisiveness, using eye tracking methodology, to test the hypotheses that the relationship between indecisiveness and choice strategy depends on being in the early stage of the decision making process, and that it depends on being in the presence of an opportunity to delay choice. We found strong evidence for the first hypothesis in that indecisive individuals changed shift behavior from the first to the second half of the task, consistent with a move from greater to lesser compensatory processing, while the shift behavior of decisive individuals suggested lesser compensatory processing over the whole task. Indecisiveness was also related to time spent viewing attributes of the selected course, and to time spent looking away from decision information. These findings resolve past discrepancies, suggest an interesting account of how the decision process unfolds for indecisive versus decisive individuals, and contribute to a better understanding of this tendency. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

DELAY‐AMOUNT TRADEOFFS IN CHOICES BY PIGEONS AND RATS: HYPERBOLIC VERSUS EXPONENTIAL DISCOUNTING

An adjusting‐delay procedure was used to study the choices of pigeons and rats when both delay and amount of reinforcement were varied. In different conditions, the choice alternatives included one versus two reinforcers, one versus three reinforcers, and three versus two reinforcers. The delay to one alternative (the standard alternative) was kept constant in a condition, and the delay to the other (the adjusting alternative) was increased or decreased many times a session so as to estimate an indifference point—a delay at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Indifference functions were constructed by plotting the adjusting delay as a function of the standard delay for each pair of reinforcer amounts. The experiments were designed to test the prediction of a hyperbolic decay equation that the slopes of the indifference functions should increase as the ratio of the two reinforcer amounts increased. Consistent with the hyperbolic equation, the slopes of the indifference functions depended on the ratios of the two reinforcer amounts for both pigeons and rats. These results were not compatible with an exponential decay equation, which predicts slopes of 1 regardless of the reinforcer amounts. Combined with other data, these findings provide further evidence that delay discounting is well described by a hyperbolic equation for both species, but not by an exponential equation. Quantitative differences in the y‐intercepts of the indifference functions from the two species suggested that the rate at which reinforcer strength decreases with increasing delay may be four or five times slower for rats than for pigeons.     

Choice patterns reveal qualitative individual differences among discounting of delayed gains,delayed losses,and probabilistic losses

A new probabilistic losses questionnaire as well as Kirby's delayed gains questionnaire and a previously developed delayed losses questionnaire were administered to a large online sample. Almost all participants showed the positive discounting choice pattern expected on the Kirby questionnaire, decreasing their choice of a delayed gain as time to its receipt increased. In contrast, approximately 15% of the participants showed negative discounting on the delayed losses questionnaire and/or the probabilistic losses questionnaire, decreasing their choice of an immediate loss as time to a delayed loss decreased and/or decreasing their choice of a certain loss as likelihood of the probabilistic loss increased. Mixture model analysis confirmed the existence of these negative discounting subgroups. The inconsistent findings observed in previous research involving delayed/probabilistic losses may be due to differences in the proportion of negative discounters who participated in previous studies. Further research is needed to determine how negative discounting of delayed and probabilistic losses manifests itself in everyday decisions. It should be noted that the presence of individuals who show atypical choice patterns when losses are involved may pose challenges for efforts to modify discounting in order to ameliorate behavioral problems, especially because many such problems concern choices that have negative consequences, often delayed and/or probabilistic.     

Influence of Self‐Affirmation on Responses to Gain‐ Versus Loss‐Framed Antismoking Messages

Self‐affirmation has been shown to reduce biased processing of threatening health messages. In this study, the impact of self‐affirmation on college smokers' reactions to gain‐ versus loss‐framed antismoking public service announcements (PSAs) was examined. A consistent pattern of interaction was observed wherein self‐affirmation produced more favorable responses to loss‐framed PSAs and more unfavorable responses to gain‐framed PSAs. Self‐affirmation also reduced smoking intention in the loss frame condition and increased antismoking self‐efficacy across framing conditions. These findings are discussed in light of previous research linking self‐affirmation to increased message scrutiny.     

Using logistic regression to estimate delay-discounting functions

The monetary choice questionnaire (MCQ) and similar computer tasks ask preference questions in order to ascertain indifference, the perceived equivalence of immediate versus larger delayed rewards. Indifference data are then fitted with a hyperbolic function, summarizing the decline in perceived value with delay time. We present a fitting method that estimates the hyperbolic parameterk directly from survey responses. Binary preferences are modeled as a function of time (X₂) and a transformed reward ratio (X ₁), yielding logistic regression coefficients β₂ and β₁. The hyperbolic parameter emerges ask = β₂/β₁, where the logistic predictedp = .5 (the definition of indifference). The MCQ was administered to 1,073 adolescents and was scored using both standard and logistic methods. The means for ln(k) were similar (standard, −4.53; logistic, −4.51), and the results were highly correlated (ρ = .973). Simulated MCQ data showed thatk was unbiased, except where β₁ ≥ −1, indicating a vague survey response. Jackknife standard errors provided excellent coverage.     

Delay discounting of monetary gains and losses in adolescents with ADHD: Contribution of delay aversion to choice

Adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are known to have stronger preferences for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards in delay discounting tasks than their peers, which has been argued to reflect delay aversion. Here, participants performed a delay discounting task with gains and losses. In this latter condition, participants were asked whether they were willing to wait in order to lose less money. Following the core assumption of the delay aversion model that individuals with ADHD have a general aversion to delay, one would predict adolescents with ADHD to avoid waiting in both conditions. Adolescents (12–17 years) with ADHD (n = 29) and controls (n = 28) made choices between smaller immediate and larger delayed gains, and between larger immediate and smaller delayed losses. All delays (5–25 s) and gains/losses (2–10 cents) were experienced. In addition to an area under the curve approach, a mixed-model analysis was conducted to disentangle the contributions of delay duration and immediate gain/delayed loss amount to choice. The ADHD group chose the immediate option more often than controls in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. The contribution of delay duration to immediate choices was stronger for the ADHD group than the control group in the gain condition only. In addition, the ADHD group scored higher on self-reported delay aversion, and delay aversion was associated with delay sensitivity in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. In sum, we found no clear evidence for a general aversion to delay in adolescents with ADHD.     

Maximization and Search for Alternatives in Decision Situations With and Without Loss of Options

Maximizing tendency has been associated with greater accumulation of choice alternatives prior to selection of a preference. It is not known whether this search behavior extends to situations in which accumulation of new choice alternatives comes with the potential loss of existing ones. In Study 1, we replicate the original finding of greater accumulation of choice alternatives, using a computer‐based laboratory task. We then provide evidence, in Studies 2 and 3, that when potential loss of existing options is incorporated into the task, maximization is associated with less rather than more search for additional options. Maximization components of decision difficulty and alternative search, but not high standards or satisficing, explain this behavior. Other task measures are also collected, but few maximization‐related differences are observed. The findings support an interpretation of maximizers as decision makers who are as concerned with the potential loss of existing options as with the loss of undiscovered future ones. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is!’: Effects of Streaks on Confidence and Betting in a Binary Choice Task

Human choice under uncertainty is influenced by erroneous beliefs about randomness. In simple binary choice tasks, such as red/black predictions in roulette, long outcome runs (e.g. red, red, red) typically increase the tendency to predict the other outcome (i.e. black), an effect labeled the “gambler's fallacy.” In these settings, participants may also attend to streaks in their predictive performance. Winning and losing streaks are thought to affect decision confidence, although prior work indicates conflicting directions. Over three laboratory experiments involving red/black predictions in a sequential roulette task, we sought to identify the effects of outcome runs and winning/losing streaks upon color predictions, decision confidence and betting behavior. Experiments 1 (n = 40) and 3 (n = 40) obtained trial‐by‐trial confidence ratings, with a win/no win payoff and a no loss/loss payoff, respectively. Experiment 2 (n = 39) obtained a trial‐by‐trial bet amount on an equivalent scale. In each experiment, the gambler's fallacy was observed on choice behavior after color runs and, in experiment 2, on betting behavior after color runs. Feedback streaks exerted no reliable influence on confidence ratings, in either payoff condition. Betting behavior, on the other hand, increased as a function of losing streaks. The increase in betting on losing streaks is interpreted as a manifestation of loss chasing; these data help clarify the psychological mechanisms underlying loss chasing and caution against the use of betting measures (“post‐decision wagering”) as a straightforward index of decision confidence. © 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Syntax for calculation of discounting indices from the monetary choice questionnaire and probability discounting questionnaire

The 27‐item Monetary Choice Questionnaire (MCQ; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999) and 30‐item Probability Discounting Questionnaire (PDQ; Madden, Petry, & Johnson, 2009) are widely used, validated measures of preferences for immediate versus delayed rewards and guaranteed versus risky rewards, respectively. The MCQ measures delayed discounting by asking individuals to choose between rewards available immediately and larger rewards available after a delay. The PDQ measures probability discounting by asking individuals to choose between guaranteed rewards and a chance at winning larger rewards. Numerous studies have implicated these measures in addiction and other health behaviors. Unlike typical self‐report measures, the MCQ and PDQ generate inferred hyperbolic temporal and probability discounting functions by comparing choice preferences to arrays of functions to which the individual items are preconfigured. This article provides R and SPSS syntax for processing the MCQ and PDQ. Specifically, for the MCQ, the syntax generates k values, consistency of the inferred k, and immediate choice ratios; for the PDQ, the syntax generates h indices, consistency of the inferred h, and risky choice ratios. The syntax is intended to increase the accessibility of these measures, expedite the data processing, and reduce risk for error.