The role of moral commitments in moral judgment

Traditional approaches to moral psychology assumed that moral judgments resulted from the application of explicit commitments, such as those embodied in consequentialist or deontological philosophies. In contrast, recent work suggests that moral judgments often result from unconscious or emotional processes, with explicit commitments generated post hoc. This paper explores the intermediate position that moral commitments mediate moral judgments, but not through their explicit and consistent application in the course of judgment. An experiment with 336 participants finds that individuals vary in the extent to which their moral commitments are consequentialist or deontological, and that this variation is systematically but imperfectly related to the moral judgments elicited by trolley car problems. Consequentialist participants find action in trolley car scenarios more permissible than do deontologists, and only consequentialists moderate their judgments when scenarios that typically elicit different intuitions are presented side by side. The findings emphasize the need for a theory of moral reasoning that can accommodate both the associations and dissociations between moral commitments and moral judgments.     

The inclusion of antisocial behavior in the construct of psychopathy: A review of the research

The psychopathic personality, or the construct of this disorder, has a long and contentious history. Psychopathy has been identified anecdotally for centuries; however, the ability to accurately define this construct continues to challenge researchers and clinicians. Of preliminary concern is the relevance of antisocial behavior to this disorder. Theoretical conceptualizations of psychopathy have changed over the past 65 years. Some have stressed the interpersonal and affective deficits of psychopathy [Cleckley, H. (1941). The mask of sanity (1st ed.). St. Louis, MO:C.V. Mosby.], while later conceptualizations have included both personality traits as well as antisocial behavior as criteria of psychopathy [Hare, R. D. (1991/2003). The Hare Psychopathy Checklist—Revised. Toronto, Canada: Multi-Health Systems]. This article will review the literature, particularly the relevance of antisocial behavior to the core personality structure of the psychopath. In doing so, historical theories will be reviewed, followed by later theoretical and empirical research. A great deal of this research has been conducted over the past 15 years, since the publication of the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) and the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; [Hare, R. D. (1991/2003). The Hare Psychopathy Checklist—Revised. Toronto, Canada: Multi-Health Systems]). The PCL-R has provided the field of psychopathy research with a consistent measurement device, and, therefore will be discussed at length. The limitations of the psychopathy construct will be discussed as well as needed future research and the policy implications of such research.     

Empathy,morality and psychopathic traits in women

Empathic and moral processing correlates of psychopathic personality have seldom been studied in women. In this study, we experimentally tested associations between psychopathic personality traits and empathic and moral processing in a female sample, and further directly compared them to results from a male sample. We found that high levels of affective-interpersonal traits were associated with diminished affective response to sad and fearful emotions in others; lower propensity to feel moral emotions; higher endorsement of utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas involving direct harm; and less self-reported difficulty when performing moral decision making. Overall, our findings strengthen the view that the two dimensions of psychopathy make distinct contributions to emotional and moral processing; and demonstrate that, in women, psychopathic personality traits are associated with a similar pattern of empathic and moral processing biases as the one that has been previously reported in men.     

Moral judgments and the role of social harm: Differences in automatic versus controlled processing

The social intuitionist model has served as an important corrective to the earlier dominance of rational deliberation in moral psychology. Yet the relationship between intuition and deliberation in moral judgments remains largely unexplored. Three studies were conducted to explore the role of automatic and controlled processes in moral judgments. Results suggest that controlled processing is attuned to instances of social harm. Immoral acts (i.e., cases of serious academic dishonesty) that involved diffuse harm in the form of flouting societal rules did not result in increased moral censure under deliberation. In contrast, similar dishonest acts that involved direct social harm to others resulted in harsher, more punitive moral judgments under deliberation, providing evidence of augmentation of automatic responses under controlled processing. The results suggest that the intuitionist sensitivity to direct physical harm has parallels in the controlled processing system, which seems sensitive to non-physical instances of social harm, such as over-benefiting the self at the expense of deserving others.     

Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment

While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings, a scenario known for eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion. Here, we manipulated two factors related to moral reasoning: argument strength and deliberation time. These factors interacted in a manner consistent with moral reasoning: A strong argument defending the incestuous behavior was more persuasive than a weak argument, but only when increased deliberation time encouraged subjects to reflect.     

The relationship between psychopathy and impulsivity: A multi-impulsivity measurement approach

Psychopathy is a serious personality disorder of which impulsivity is a key component. However, impulsivity is a multidimensional construct, with multiple approaches to measurement, and different measures may be differentially implicated in psychopathy. This study investigated the relationship between psychopathy as assessed by the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised (PPI-R; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005), a personality measure of impulsivity (Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11), and four behavioural measures of impulsivity (GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm, Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm, Delay Discounting Task, Iowa Gambling Task). A nonclinical sample (N = 80) was recruited from the local community to advance understanding of psychopathy in non-incarcerated samples. The results indicated that the personality measure of impulsivity was strongly correlated with the PPI-R, while the behavioural measures were either not correlated or only weakly correlated with the PPI-R. The results are discussed in terms of the multifaceted nature of impulsivity and the need for the further development of behavioural measures of impulsivity, given their importance in clinical assessment and intervention.     

Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment

In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or “personal”. Here we integrate these two classes of findings. Two experiments examine a novel personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent’s muscles (e.g., in pushing). Experiments 1a and b demonstrate the influence of personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact and spatial proximity. Experiments 2a and b demonstrate an interaction between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force depends entirely on intention. These studies also introduce a method for controlling for people’s real-world expectations in decisions involving potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas.     

The mismeasure of morals: antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas

Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments and a set of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. Participants who indicated greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on measures of Psychopathy, machiavellianism, and life meaninglessness. These results question the widely-used methods by which lay moral judgments are evaluated, as these approaches lead to the counterintuitive conclusion that those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also possess a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider prototypically immoral.     

Valuing myself over others: The Dark Triad traits and moral and social values

In samples from America and Germany (N = 1353), we examined how the Dark Triad traits related to different value systems as measured by Moral Foundations and Social Values. Psychopathy was linked to diminished concerns for all Moral Foundations, Machiavellianism was linked to a moral flexibility, and narcissism was linked to a socially desirable form of morality. Machiavellianism and psychopathy scores were associated with a devaluing of collective interests, whereas narcissism was associated with a valuing of individual interests through the value of Self-Enhancement. Individual differences in a variety of values mediated part of the sex differences in the Dark Triad traits. We contend that what makes the Dark Triad traits unique and interesting is that they share a unique complex of values that might run counter to societal expectations for selflessness.     

Psychopathy and aggression: Examining the role of psychopathy factors in predicting laboratory aggression under hostile and instrumental conditions

Psychopathy is a problematic configuration of traits and behaviors that is consistently correlated with aggressive, criminal behavior. Studies have suggested that psychopathy is composed of related but distinct factors that manifest divergent relations with a host of constructs including aggression. In the current study, we used a sample of 126 men to examine whether these psychopathy factors are differentially related to aggression manifested in two conditions (instrumental and hostile/reactive aggression) of a laboratory aggression paradigm. Traits related to an antagonistic interpersonal style and emotional detachment (i.e., Factor 1) were related to aggression in both conditions whereas traits related to negative emotionality, impulsivity, and an antagonistic style (i.e., Factor 2) were related to aggression only in the hostile/reactive condition. Potential explanations for these findings are put forth.     

The criminal and personality profile of patients with schizophrenia and comorbid psychopathic traits

Sixty-one male forensic patients who met the DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia were categorised into high and low psychopathic trait groups using the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version. The groups were compared on their criminal history, symptom profile, personality style, risk scores and subsequent institutional violence. Patients with high scores on the PCL:SV had a greater number of previous convictions and were more likely to have a family history of criminality. The high psychopathy-scoring group had higher levels of Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale grandiose and hostile symptomatology, and higher scores on trait impulsivity and aggression. They also had a more coercive, less compliant interpersonal style than the low-psychopathy scoring group. The high-psychopathy scoring group were more likely to be involved in institutional aggression and had higher levels of risk for violence. Patients with schizophrenia and high levels of comorbid psychopathy have a distinctive interpersonal style that may contribute to their greater risk of disruptive institutional behaviour.     

The role of moral identity in the aftermath of dishonesty

People lie on a regular basis. However, lying can pose a threat to the self-view of being an honest and moral person. How do people respond to their previous dishonest acts? A way to deal with psychological discomfort arisen for previous lying is reconfirming oneself to be an honest and moral person, for example, by showing subsequent moral behavior. We hypothesize that people engage in this reconfirmation depending on whether their moral identity is central to their self-concept. This was supported in three studies in which, compared to low moral identifiers, high moral identifiers engaged in more efforts to uphold a moral self-image and were more likely to show a compensatory reaction rather than a consistency reaction to their previous dishonesty. Implications for the topics of moral self-regulation and compensatory ethics and for the concept of moral identity are discussed.     

Investigating associations between empathy, morality and psychopathic personality traits in the general population

Although atypical moral and empathy processing are considered core features of psychopathic personality, little is known about how these constructs are associated with psychopathic traits in the general population. One-hundred and twenty-four adult males from the community were administered the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 4 Short Form, as well as a wide battery of affect, empathy and morality tasks and questionnaires. Our findings indicate that both core affective-interpersonal, as well as lifestyle-antisocial features of psychopathy are associated with weaker empathic responses to fearful faces. However, only the unique variance of the affective-interpersonal features is associated with weaker empathic response to happy stories, lower propensity to feel empathic concern and less difficulty in making decisions on moral dilemmas. In contrast, the unique variance of the lifestyle-antisocial features is associated with greater propensity to feel empathic concern. These preliminary findings extend previous research and suggest that, while the joint variance between affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial features might drive some ‘deficits’ associated with psychopathy, there also appears also to be unique ‘deficits’ associated with the core affective-interpersonal features, particularly in relation to affective aspects of moral processing.     

Norms with feeling: towards a psychological account of moral judgment

There is a large tradition of work in moral psychology that explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g. hitting another person) from conventional violations (e.g. playing with your food). However, only recently have there been attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying moral judgment (e.g. Cognition 57 (1995) 1; Ethics 103 (1993) 337). Recent evidence indicates that affect plays a crucial role in mediating the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction. However, the prevailing account of the role of affect in moral judgment is problematic. This paper argues that the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction depends on both a body of information about which actions are prohibited (a Normative Theory) and an affective mechanism. This account leads to the prediction that other normative prohibitions that are connected to an affective mechanism might be treated as non-conventional. An experiment is presented that indicates that "disgust" violations (e.g. spitting at the table), are distinguished from conventional violations along the same dimensions as moral violations.     

The role of emotion expectancies in adolescents' moral decision making

This study investigated the impact of emotion expectancies on adolescents’ moral decision making in hypothetical situations. The sample consisted of 160 participants from three different grade levels (mean age = 15.79 years, SD = 2.96). Participants were confronted with a set of scenarios that described various emotional outcomes of (im)moral actions and needed to decide what they would do if they were in the protagonist’s shoes. Findings demonstrate that emotion expectancies differentially influenced adolescents’ hypothetical decision making in antisocial versus prosocial behavioral contexts. Whereas negatively charged self-evaluative emotions over failing to act morally (e.g., guilt) were the strongest predictor for moral choice in antisocial behavioral contexts, positively charged self-evaluative emotions over acting morally (e.g., pride) most strongly predicted moral choice in prosocial contexts. Older adolescents paid greater attention to outcome-oriented emotions that make the decision to act morally less attractive (e.g., regret). Overall, the study suggests that emotion expectancies influence moral decision making in unique and meaningful ways.     

Sources of variation in moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality

To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.     

Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making

Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm -- but not the do/allow distinction -- influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.     

Priming family values: How being a parent affects moral evaluations of harmless but offensive acts

In modern liberal societies people are generally reluctant to morally condemn acts that they find personally distasteful so long as those acts are not harmful or unfair to others. However, in providing character education for their children, parents often have to censure harmless but offensive acts. Thus, we hypothesize that the parental role broadens the scope of morality beyond narrow considerations of harm and fairness. To test this idea we asked parents and nonparents to morally evaluate harmless/offensive acts and a control harmful act. We manipulated whether the parental role was primed before they evaluated these acts. Parents and nonparents did not differ in their moral objections to the control act regardless of parental role priming. However, when the parental role was primed parents were more morally opposed to harmless but offensive acts than were nonparents. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding the dynamics of moral judgment and the recruitment of parents into moral reform movements.     

The influence of negligence, intention, and outcome on children’s moral judgments

Piaget (1932) and subsequent researchers have reported that young children’s moral judgments are based more on the outcomes of actions than on the agents’ intentions. The current study investigated whether negligence might also influence these judgments and explain children’s apparent focus on outcome. Children (3–8 years of age) and adults (N = 139) rated accidental actions in which the valences of intention, negligence, and outcome were varied systematically. Participants of all ages were influenced primarily by intention, and well-intentioned actions were also evaluated according to negligence and outcome. Only two young children based their judgments solely on outcome. It is suggested that previous studies have underestimated children’s use of intention because outcome and negligence have been confounded. Negative consequences are considered to be important because children assume that they are caused by negligence. The findings indicate that young children can show sophisticated understanding of the roles of intention and negligence in moral judgments.     

The emergence of psychopathy: implications for the neuropsychological approach to developmental disorders

In this paper, I am going to examine the disorder of psychopathy and consider how genetic anomalies could give rise to the relatively specific neuro-cognitive impairments seen in individuals with this disorder. I will argue that genetic anomalies in psychopathy reduce the salience of punishment information (perhaps as a function of noradrenergic disturbance). I will argue that the ability of the amygdala to form the stimulus-punishment associations necessary for successful socialization is disrupted and that because of this, individuals with psychopathy do not learn to avoid actions that will harm others. It is noted that this model follows the neuropsychological approach to the study of developmental disorders, an approach that has been recently criticized. I will argue that these criticisms are less applicable to psychopathy. Indeed, animal work on the development of the neural systems necessary for emotion, does not support a constructivist approach with respect to affect. Importantly, such work indicates that while environmental effects can alter the responsiveness of the basic neural architecture mediating emotion, environmental effects do not construct this architecture. However, caveats to the neuropsychological approach with reference to this disorder are noted.