Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science

Several recently developed philosophical approaches to the self promise to enhance the exchange of ideas between the philosophy of the mind and the other cognitive sciences. This review examines two important concepts of self: the 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, and the 'narrative self', which involves personal identity and continuity across time. The notion of a minimal self is first clarified by drawing a distinction between the sense of self-agency and the sense of self-ownership for actions. This distinction is then explored within the neurological domain with specific reference to schizophrenia, in which the sense of self-agency may be disrupted. The convergence between the philosophical debate and empirical study is extended in a discussion of more primitive aspects of self and how these relate to neonatal experience and robotics. The second concept of self, the narrative self, is discussed in the light of Gazzaniga's left-hemisphere 'interpreter' and episodic memory. Extensions of the idea of a narrative self that are consistent with neurological models are then considered. The review illustrates how the philosophical approach can inform cognitive science and suggests that a two-way collaboration may lead to a more fully developed account of the self.     

Self and identity in social anxiety disorder

Models of social anxiety (SA) place the self as an organizing and causal center involved in the maintenance of this condition. An integrative conceptual framework for the understanding of the self is used to review the literature on the self in SA. Two main distinctions are emphasized: the self-as-a-subject (I-self) versus self-as-an-object (Me-self), and the evolutionary-based distinction of social rank versus affiliation. We argue that (a) although much progress has been made in understanding the association between SA and Me-self, the association between SA and I-self remains largely unexplored (with the important exception of anxiety-related processes in social situations); and (b) experiences and representations of the self in SA center on social rank. We suggest that in SA, social rank themes constitute the linchpins of identity, defined as the content and structure of the Me-self. We speculate that processes related to low social rank contribute to the focus on representational (Me), rather than experiential (I), self-aspects. Finally, we delineate the ways in which such an understanding may direct and refine the construction of novel, individually tailored, therapeutic approaches.     

Naked Subjectivity: Minimal vs. Narrative Selves in Kierkegaard

In recent years a significant debate has arisen as to whether Kierkegaard offers a version of the “narrative approach” to issues of personal identity and self-constitution. In this paper I do not directly take sides in this debate, but consider instead the applicability of a recent development in the broader literature on narrative identity—the distinction between the temporally-extended “narrative self” and the non-extended “minimal self—to Kierkegaard's work. I argue that such a distinction is both necessary for making sense of Kierkegaard's claim that we are ethically enjoined to become selves, and can indeed be found in Either/Or and the later The Sickness Unto Death . Despite Kierkegaard's Non-Substantialism, each of these texts speaks (somewhat obliquely) of a “naked self” that is separable from the concrete facticity of human being. In both cases, this minimal self is linked to issues of eschatological responsibility; yet the two works develop very different understandings of “eternity” and correspondingly divergent accounts of the temporality of selfhood. This complicates the picture of Kierkegaardian selfhood in interesting ways, taking it beyond both narrativist and more standard neo-Lockean models of what it is to be a self.     

Between Minimal Self and Narrative Self: A Husserlian Analysis of Person

The distinction between minimal self and narrative self has gained ground in recent discussions of selfhood. In this article, this distinction is reassessed by analysing Zahavi and Gallagher’s account of selfhood and supplementing it with Husserl’s concept of person. I argue that Zahavi and Gallagher offer two compatible and complementary notions of self. Nevertheless, the relationship between minimal self and narrative self requires further clarification. Especially the embeddedness of self, the interplay between passivity and activity, and the problems of uniqueness and persistence are better understood with Husserl’s analysis of person and its central concepts of position-taking, habitualities, and overall style. The embeddedness of self is elucidated by outlining how person is related to its environment, to other people, and to its past. This relational notion of self is both passively constituted and actively shaped: person mediates between minimal self characterized by perspectival ownership and narrative self based on authorship.     

Accommodating Presuppositions Is Inappropriate in Implausible Contexts

According to one view of linguistic information (Karttunen, 1974; Stalnaker, 1974), a speaker can convey contextually new information in one of two ways: (a) by asserting the content as new information; or (b) by presupposing the content as given information which would then have to be accommodated. This distinction predicts that it is conversationally more appropriate to assert implausible information rather than presuppose it (e.g., von Fintel, 2008; Heim, 1992; Stalnaker, 2002). A second view rejects the assumption that presuppositions are accommodated; instead, presuppositions are assimilated into asserted content and both are correspondingly open to challenge (e.g., Gazdar, 1979; van der Sandt, 1992). Under this view, we should not expect to find a difference in conversational appropriateness between asserting implausible information and presupposing it. To distinguish between these two views of linguistic information, we performed two self‐paced reading experiments with an on‐line stops‐making‐sense judgment. The results of the two experiments—using the presupposition triggers the and too—show that accommodation is inappropriate (makes less sense) relative to non‐presuppositional controls when the presupposed information is implausible but not when it is plausible. These results provide support for the first view of linguistic information: the contrast in implausible contexts can only be explained if there is a presupposition‐assertion distinction and accommodation is a mechanism dedicated to reasoning about presuppositions.     

Autonomy-Connectedness and Gender

The present study aimed to examine gender differences in autonomy-connectedness in a large, Dutch, representative community sample (N?=?2,256). All participants completed the Autonomy-Connectedness-Scale (ACS-30; Bekker and van Assen, J Pers Assess 86:51–60, 2006) with subscales self-awareness (SA), sensitivity to others (SO), and capacity to manage new situations (CMNS), and a scale measuring demographic factors. We found much higher SO in women than in men, and slightly higher scores of men on SA and CMNS. Associations between SO and socio-demographic variables related to caring for others could be completely explained by gender, while the associations between SA and CMNS with socio-economic independence variables could only partly be explained by gender. ACS-30 norm scores are presented, and clinical implications of our results are discussed.     

Dirty work,dirty worker? Stigmatisation and coping strategies among domestic workers

Domestic work can be perceived to be ‘dirty work’ in several ways: it is associated with dirt handling, low occupational prestige, and domestic workers have a servile relationship to their clients/employers. This stigma may negatively affect domestic workers' sense of self, and thus coping strategies appear to be critical. In this article, we explore the coping strategies that moderate the relation between the stigma of dirty work and domestic workers' sense of self, based on the analyses of 43 interviews with domestic workers in Belgium. By using a social stress approach in which stigma is considered a stressor, our results reveal a range of maladaptive and adaptive coping strategies that contribute to a negative or a more positive sense of self. Four main categories of coping strategies are discussed: confronting or countering perceptions and behaviours, occupational ideologies, social weighting and defensive tactics. The first two categories are adaptive coping strategies; the last two can be adaptive or maladaptive. We also reveal that workers used adaptive and maladaptive coping strategies simultaneously, leading to mixed implications for their sense of self.     

Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism

Moral Expressivists typically concede that, in some minimal sense, moral sentences are truth-apt but claim that in some more robust sense they are not. The Immodest Disciplined Syntacticist , a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I here address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction between reducibly and irreducibly truth-apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the Disciplined Syntacticist must either adopt a more modest version of his theory, friendlier to Expressivism, or substantially modify it, abandoning one of its central conditions on truth-aptness. One natural and promising such modification, the Pure Discipline View , is described and its implications for an understanding of Expressivism briefly discussed.     

Sensory attenuation of action outcomes of varying amplitude and valence

Stimuli caused by self-initiated actions are perceived as less intense than those caused externally; this effect is called sensory attenuation (SA). In two experiments, we aimed to assess the impact of the amplitude of outcomes and its affective valence on SA and explicit ratings of sense of agency. This allowed us to test the predictions of the available SA frameworks and better understand the link between SA, affect, and agency. The results indicated that SA can be reversed, and such sensory amplification is driven by low-amplitude and positive-valence outcomes. We also show that intentional action influences the perceived valence of outcomes, and that modulations of explicit sense of agency are divergent from those of SA. Our study shows that valence influences the processing of the amplitude of intentional action outcomes and suggests that none of the currently available frameworks give full justice to SA’s variability.     

The ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ in self-referential awareness: a neurocognitive hypothesis

The nature of the ‘self’ and self-referential awareness has been one of the most debated issues in philosophy, psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Understanding the neurocognitive bases of self-related representation and processing is also crucial to research on the neural correlates of consciousness. The distinction between an ‘I’, corresponding to a subjective sense of the self as a thinker and causal agent, and a ‘Me’, as the objective sense of the self with the unique and identifiable features constituting one’s self-image or self-concept, suggested by William James, has been re-elaborated by authors from different theoretical perspectives. In this article, empirical studies and theories about the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ in cognition and self-related awareness are reviewed, including the relationships between self and perception, self and memory, the development of the self, self-referential stimulus processing, as well as related neuroimaging studies. Subsequently, the relations between self and different aspects of consciousness are considered. On the basis of the reviewed literature and with reference to Block’s distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, a neurocognitive hypothesis is formulated about ‘I’-related and ‘Me’-related self-referential awareness. This hypothesis is extended to metacognitive awareness and a form of non-transitive consciousness, characteristic of meditation experiences and studies, with particular reference to the notion of mindfulness and other Buddhist constructs.     

On being, knowing and having a self

This paper(1) takes the distinction between being conscious ('core consciousness') and knowing that one is conscious (self-reflexive consciousness) as a starting point for differentiating between three different aspects of the self: 1) the overall process of psychosomatic being which we share with all living creatures and which expresses itself through action (self as totality), 2) the conscious awareness of knowing the self that is a peculiarly human phenomenon consequent on the development of symbolic imagination (sense of self including numinous experiences of the self) and 3) having a self (or soul) as an essential attribute of being human that can only be achieved through being endowed with a self in the mind of others (self-identity leading to the self as the centre of the personality). Some clinical implications of these distinctions are considered including the role of interpretation as fostering integration through the provision of alternative self-images, the loss of self-reflexive consciousness in states of overwhelming affect and the attack on the spontaneous psychosomatic being of the self in states of self-hatred and self-division.     

Comparing equity and self‐expansion theory approaches to relational maintenance

Focusing on relational maintenance in heterosexual romantic dyads, this investigation compares the equity theory approach with self‐expansion theory, an alternative approach predicting maintenance behavior when a partner includes the other in the sense of the self. Results supported both theoretical explanations, albeit support for self‐expansion theory was more consistent, predicting all maintenance behavior types. Although relational maintenance constructs were statistically comparable between men and women, a sex difference emerged regarding maintenance behavior's predictors, with self‐expansion theory a stronger explanation for men but not women. The discussion considers how these results inform the distinction between exchange‐ and communally oriented conceptualizations of relationships, as well as development of a communicative theory of relational maintenance.     

What is Literature? Revisited: Sartre on the Language of Literature

This article argues that Sartre's distinction in What Is Literature? between prose and poetry should be understood in the light of his earlier distinction in The Imaginary between two kinds of meaning. Sartre argues against the “Cartesian picture” of consciousness in The Imaginary, specifically concerning our experience of images. Not only is a mental image not an “inner object” mediating between consciousness and the world, even a picture drawn on paper should not be understood as an object standing between the viewer and what this picture represents. Our experience, Sartre argues, is that of seeing things in a picture rather than seeing through it, such that the meaning of pictures and images in general is embodied in them and cannot be separated from them. He then goes on to contrast this kind of embodied meaning (which he calls “sense”) with a kind of meaning that can be completely grasped independently of its expression (which he calls “signification”) and identify the two with painting and language respectively. It is for this reason, this article argues, that Sartre later sees poetry as a deviation from language's proper function. This rigid distinction is maintained by Sartre until the end of his career, and the change that some commentators found in him are its outcome rather than a revolt against it. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty has demonstrated more convincingly that sense and signification are both essential aspects of linguistic meaning, and their relation is much more dynamic and complimentary than Sartre would have allowed.     

Making sense of Turiel's dispute with Kohlberg: the case of the child's moral competence

This study attempts to make conceptual and empirical sense of Turiel's dispute with Kohlberg concerning the child's moral competence. Forty-eight children from two age-levels (24 6-year-olds, and 24 8-year-olds; Experiment 1), and 20 young adults aged between 17 and 21 years (Experiment 2) were confronted with hypothetical situations in which two apparently immoral acts (stealing and lying) were right if a principled or reversible exchange of perspectives were adopted. Contrary to what would be expected from Turiel's claim about the child's sophisticated moral competence, children, but not young adults, judged the acts at hand more in accord with a pattern of pseudo-moral necessity or fuzzy traces of morality than with a pattern of a developing idea of principled morality or “necessary” moral knowledge. The paper also argues that one is in a better position to make sense of Turiel's dispute with Kohlberg when one becomes aware of (a) Wittgenstein's idea of grammatical investigations, (b) Piaget's distinction between false, true, and necessary (cognitive) knowledge, and (c) Kohlberg's distinction between pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional moral reasoning as a distinction that, to an extent, corresponds in the moral domain to Piaget's epistemic types of knowledge in the cognitive domain.     

Are Digital Images Allographic?

Nelson Goodman's distinction between autographic and allographic arts is appealing, we suggest, because it promises to resolve several prima facie puzzles. We consider and rebut a recent argument that alleges that digital images explode the autographic/allographic distinction. Regardless, there is another familiar problem with the distinction, especially as Goodman formulates it: it seems to entirely ignore an important sense in which all artworks are historical. We note in reply that some artworks can be considered both as historical products and as formal structures. Talk about such works is ambiguous between the two conceptions. This allows us to recover Goodman's distinction: art forms that are ambiguous in this way are allographic. With that formulation settled, we argue that digital images are allographic. We conclude by considering the objection that digital photographs, unlike other digital images, would count as autographic by our criterion; we reply that this points to the vexed nature of photography rather than any problem with the distinction.     

Transformation and alignment in similarity

This paper contrasts two structural accounts of psychological similarity: structural alignment (SA) and Representational Distortion (RD). SA proposes that similarity is determined by how readily the structures of two objects can be brought into alignment; RD measures similarity by the complexity of the transformation that “distorts” one representation into the other. We assess RD by defining a simple coding scheme of psychological transformations for the experimental materials. In two experiments, this “concrete” version of RD provides compelling fits of the data and compares favourably with SA. Finally, stepping back from particular models, we argue that perceptual theory suggests that transformations and alignment processes should generally be viewed as complementary, in contrast to the current distinction in the literature.     

Self-Other Differentiation and the Mother-Child Relationship: The Effects of Sex and Birth Order

We examined the effect of sex and birth order on the experience of a separate sense of self and its connection to mothers' differential involvement with sons and daughters. Results from two samples of college-age students are reported. Men showed a more separate sense of self than women, and mothers were reported to be more highly involved with and intrusive in the lives of their daughters than their sons. Results for birth order were consistent though not always statistically significant: First-born women had the least separate sense of self and reported the greatest degree of maternal involvement and intrusiveness. Implications of these findings for developmental theory and criteria of Psychological well-being are discussed.     

When dyads act in parallel,a sense of agency for the auditory consequences depends on the order of the actions

The sense of agency (SA) is the perception of willfully causing something to happen. Wegner and Wheatley (1999) proposed three prerequisites for SA: temporal contiguity between an action and its effect, congruence between predicted and observed effects, and exclusivity (absence of competing causal explanations). We investigated how temporal contiguity, congruence, and the order of two human agents’ actions influenced SA on a task where participants rated feelings of self-agency for producing a tone. SA decreased when tone onsets were delayed, supporting contiguity as important, but the order of the agents’ actions (lead, follow, or simultaneous) also mattered. Relative contiguity was the main determinant of SA, as delayed tones were usually attributed to the most recent action. This was unaffected by contingencies between the two actors’ actions (Experiment 2), showing that contiguity has a powerful influence on SA, even during joint action in the presence of other cues.     

Searching for commonalities in human judgement: The parametric unimodel and its dual mode alternatives

The question of why even a minimal ingroup is typically evaluated more positively than the respective outgroup has stimulated extensive theoretical and empirical work in social psychology. Integrating findings from various domains of research, this chapter summarises a comprehensive research programme that focuses on cognitive rather than motivational factors that contribute to positive ingroup distinctiveness. More specifically, evidence is presented showing that (a) there is a positive ingroup default, such that novel ingroups are immediately associated with positive affect; (b) people make inferences from the self in order to define their novel groups; and (c) this process of using the self as a means of cognitive structuring is based on heuristic rather than systematic information processing. Implications for our understanding of the role of self in intergroup evaluations and of factors determining ingroup favouritism in both minimal and real groups are discussed.     

On Abolishing “Death”: An Etymological Note

The distinction is made between two uses of the word “death,” specifically, your death (the death of the other) and my death (the death of the self). It makes (logical, epistemological and phenomenological) sense for me to speak of your death, but not for me to speak of my death—inasmuch as, by reasonable definition, I cannot possibly ever experience my death. Dying is experienceable—although one can never be certain. The word death is a perfectly good word for the demise of the other; the word omega is suggested to allude to that non-event (the cessation of the self) now routinely spoken of as “my death,”