HOW TO CONFUSE ORGANISMS WITH MOUSETRAPS: MACHINE METAPHORS AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN

Why do design arguments—particularly those emphasizing machine metaphors such as “Organisms and/or their parts are machines”—continue to be so convincing to so many people after they have been repeatedly refuted? In this essay I review various interpretations and refutations of design arguments and make a distinction between rationally refuting such arguments (Refuting_R) and rendering them psychologically unconvincing (Refuting_P). Expanding on this distinction, I provide support from recent work on the cognitive power of metaphors and developmental psychological work indicating a basic human propensity toward attributing agency to natural events, to show that design arguments “make sense”unless one is cued to look more closely. As with visual illusions, such as the Müller‐Lyer arrow illusion, there is nothing wrong with a believer's cognitive apparatus any more than with their visual apparatus when they judge the lines in the illusion to be of unequal length. It takes training or a dissonance between design beliefs and other beliefs or experiences to play the role that a ruler does in the visual case. Unless people are cued to “look again” at what initially makes perfect sense, they are not inclined to apply more sophisticated evaluative procedures.     

Valence and vertical space: Saccade trajectory deviations reveal metaphorical spatial activation

Concepts of positive and negative valence are metaphorically structured in space (e.g., happy is up, sad is down). In fact, coupling a conceptual task (e.g., evaluating words as positive or negative) with a visuospatial task (e.g., identifying stimuli above or below fixation) often gives rise to metaphorical congruency effects. For instance, after reading a positive concept, visual target processing is facilitated above fixation. However, it is possible that tasks requiring upwards and downwards attentional orienting artificially strengthen the link between vertical space and semantic valence. For this reason, in the present study the vertical axis was uncoupled from the response axis. Participants made eye movements along the horizontal axis after reading positive or negative affect words, while their saccade movement trajectories were recorded. Based on previous research on saccade trajectory deviation, we predicted that fast saccade trajectories curve towards the salient segment of space, whereas slow saccade trajectories would curve away from the salient segment. Examining saccadic trajectories revealed a pattern of deviations along the vertical axis consistent with the metaphorical congruency account, although this pattern was mainly driven by positive concepts. These results suggest that semantic processing of valence can automatically recruit spatial features along the vertical axis.     

The Missing Data Assumptions of the NEAT Design and their Implications for Test Equating

The Non-Equivalent groups with Anchor Test (NEAT) design involves missing data that are missing by design. Three nonlinear observed score equating methods used with a NEAT design are the frequency estimation equipercentile equating (FEEE), the chain equipercentile equating (CEE), and the item-response-theory observed-score-equating (IRT OSE). These three methods each make different assumptions about the missing data in the NEAT design. The FEEE method assumes that the conditional distribution of the test score given the anchor test score is the same in the two examinee groups. The CEE method assumes that the equipercentile functions equating the test score to the anchor test score are the same in the two examinee groups. The IRT OSE method assumes that the IRT model employed fits the data adequately, and the items in the tests and the anchor test do not exhibit differential item functioning across the two examinee groups. This paper first describes the missing data assumptions of the three equating methods. Then it describes how the missing data in the NEAT design can be filled in a manner that is coherent with the assumptions made by each of these equating methods. Implications on equating are also discussed.     

New Equating Methods and Their Relationships with Levine Observed Score Linear Equating Under the Kernel Equating Framework

In this paper, we develop a new curvilinear equating for the nonequivalent groups with anchor test (NEAT) design under the assumption of the classical test theory model, that we name curvilinear Levine observed score equating. In fact, by applying both the kernel equating framework and the mean preserving linear transformation of post-stratification equating, we obtain a family of observed score equipercentile equating functions, which also includes the classical Levine observed score linear equating and the Tucker linear equating as special cases.     

Das Ding as Object of Melancholia

While Freud’s account of melancholia stresses the role of a lost object, a Lacanian approach draws attention to the role of an intruding and excessive “real” object and the inability of the psychotic subject to adequately shield themselves from the traumatic jouissance associated with it. While initially these approaches seem to contradict one another, this short commentary argues that the loss of an imaginary (ego-supporting) object (as per Freud’s conceptualization of psychosis) may be coterminous with the invasive presence of an object of a different order—that of the Lacanian real. We are able to better appreciate the particularity of this invasive object by reference to Lacan’s notion—itself derived from Freud—of das Ding. Das Ding is that “object” of amassed primal jouissance, which—like a black hole—corresponds to its own absence and which, in its terrifying and sublime materializations, brings together the three crucial Freudian concepts of libidinal overproximity, unmodulated jouissance, and the death drive.     

Feature Statistics Modulate the Activation of Meaning During Spoken Word Processing

Understanding spoken words involves a rapid mapping from speech to conceptual representations. One distributed feature‐based conceptual account assumes that the statistical characteristics of concepts’ features—the number of concepts they occur in (distinctiveness/sharedness) and likelihood of co‐occurrence (correlational strength)—determine conceptual activation. To test these claims, we investigated the role of distinctiveness/sharedness and correlational strength in speech‐to‐meaning mapping, using a lexical decision task and computational simulations. Responses were faster for concepts with higher sharedness, suggesting that shared features are facilitatory in tasks like lexical decision that require access to them. Correlational strength facilitated responses for slower participants, suggesting a time‐sensitive co‐occurrence‐driven settling mechanism. The computational simulation showed similar effects, with early effects of shared features and later effects of correlational strength. These results support a general‐to‐specific account of conceptual processing, whereby early activation of shared features is followed by the gradual emergence of a specific target representation.     

Is it Possible and Desirable for Theologians to Speculate after Barth?

This essay asks what Karl Barth meant by ‘speculation’ in volume two of the Church Dogmatics. Rather than equating speculative theology with metaphysical theology in general, Barth views speculation not as a monolithic act but as a conglomeration of modes of theological speech that undermine God's revelation in Jesus Christ. This essay argues that Barth's views of speculation, rather than undercutting the use of metaphysics in theology, pave the way for a responsible Christian use of metaphysics by tying one's use of categories and concepts in theology closely to the text of Scripture.     

BEMBA MYSTICO-RELATIONALITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE (AGI) PARTICIPATION IN IMAGO DEI

This article interrogates the challenge artificial general intelligence (AGI) poses to religion and human societies, in general. More specifically, it seeks to respond to “Singularity”—when machines reach a level of intelligence that would put into question the privileged position humanity enjoys as imago Dei. Employing the Bemba notion of mystico-relationality in dialogue with the concepts of the “created co-creator” and Christ the Key, it argues for the possibility of AI participating in imago Dei. The findings show that imaging is a fluid, participatory activity that aims at likeness, but also social harmony. It also argues that God is the only original creator, humans are created creators, and that every aspect of visible existence, including AI, is inherently divine imaging. However, strong imaging is only attainable based on the only One and True Image—Christ, whose union of the material and the divine means that all creation can image, excluding nothing, even AI.     

An Experiment in Judging Personalities

Use of the semantic differential technique has largely been restricted to “paper and pencil” settings and student populations. In this study, adult respondents in an interview setting were asked to evaluate two concepts—use of lake (a) as a source of electric power and (b) as a recreational area—by means of eight seven-point scales. Results indicated considerable conceptscale interaction, suggesting that Osgood's interpretation of the semantic differential may be restricted by both technique of data collection and subpopulation. Respondent hostility might be an intervening variable. The semantic differential technique appeared to yield a preliminary evaluation of the two concepts, suggesting its use as an indicator of orientation.     

Contradictions of emotion in schizophrenia

This paper considers contradictory features of emotional or affective experience and expression in schizophrenia in light of the “Kretschmerian paradox”—the fact that schizophrenia-spectrum patients can simultaneously experience both exaggerated and diminished levels of affective response. An attempt is made to explain the paradox and explore its implications. Recent research on emotion in schizophrenia is reviewed, including subjective reports, psychophysiological measures of arousal or activation, and behavioural measures, focusing on flat-affect and negative-symptom patients. After discussing relevant concepts and vocabulary of emotion (“affect”, “emotion”, “mood”, “feelings”, the “passions”), the need for a phenomenological approach focusing on subjective experience is proposed. Four modes of nonparanoid experience in schizophrenia are discussed: Bodily Alienation, Disengagement, Unworlding, and Subjectivisation. Each mode involves withdrawal from functional contexts—temporal, practical, and interpersonal—normally associated with emotional reactivity and expression; each may be accompanied by forms of non-emotional affectivity no less intense than the emotions they replace. Possible relationships between psychophysiological measures, expressive behaviour, and subjective emotional or affective response are considered.     

Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)?

A recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant's theory of perception. Roughly, proponents of a conceptualist interpretation argue that for Kant, the possession of concepts is a prior condition for perception, while nonconceptualist interpreters deny this. The debate has two parts. One part concerns whether possessing empirical concepts is a prior condition for having empirical intuitions. A second part concerns whether Kant allows empirical intuitions without a priori concepts. Outside of Kant interpretation, the contemporary debate about conceptualism concerns whether perception requires empirical concepts. But, as I argue, the debate about whether Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts does not show whether Kant is a conceptualist. Even if Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts, it could still be that a priori concepts are required. While the debate could show that Kant is a conceptualist, I argue it does not. Finally, I sketch a novel way that the conceptualist interpreter might win the debate—roughly, by arguing that possessing a priori concepts is a prior condition for having appearances.     

Once More Unto the Breach: Type B Physicalism,Phenomenal Concepts,and the Epistemic Gap

Type B, or a posteriori, physicalism is the view that phenomenal-physical identity statements can be necessarily true, even though they cannot be known a priori—and that the key to understanding their status is to understand the special features of our phenomenal concepts, those concepts of our experiential states acquired through introspection. This view was once regarded as a promising response to anti-physicalist arguments that maintain that an epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical concepts entails that phenomenal and physical properties are distinct. More recently, however, many physicalists have lost confidence in the view, and have proposed less promising defences of physicalism—or have become outright sceptical about its prospects. I argue here that these physicalists have underestimated the resources of Type B physicalism and are thereby retreating too quickly—or fighting battles that have already been won.     

Straight to heaven: Rectitude as spatial representation of morality

Abundant literature in cognitive sciences has shown that morality is grounded in bodily experience. Four studies tested the perceptual association between the spatial dimension of straightness and the abstract concept of morality. Study 1 (n = 61) employed an IAT and revealed an association between straight figures and moral related words. Study 2 (n = 83) employed a similar paradigm and further revealed that the effect we found in Study 1 cannot be attributable to the general association between straight figures and positivity. Study 3 (n = 64) revealed that participants showed a stronger preference for straight figures after recalling moral (vs. immoral) deeds. Study 4 (n = 183) showed the specific role of morality, in this sense, as recalling sociable (vs. unsociable) deeds had no significant influence on figure preferences. A small‐scale meta‐analysis confirmed the robustness of our findings. Results are discussed in light of the embodiment theory.     

Relationship of Inglehart's and Schwartz's value dimensions revisited

This study examines the relationship between Inglehart's and Schwartz's value dimensions—both at the individual and the country levels. By rotating one set of items towards the other, we show that these value dimensions have more in common than previously reported. The ranking of countries (N = 47) based on Schwartz's Embeddedness—Autonomy and the Survival—Self‐Expression dimensions reached a maximum of similarity, r = .82, after rotating Inglehart's factor scores 27 degrees clockwise. The correlation between the other pair of dimensions (Schwartz's Hierarchy‐Mastery—Egalitarianism‐Harmony and Inglehart's Traditional—Secular‐Rational values) was near zero before and after rotation. At the individual level (N = 46,444), positive correlations were found for Schwartz's Conservation—Openness dimension with both of Inglehart's dimensions (Survival—Self‐Expression and Traditional—Secular‐Rational values). The highest correlation with this Schwartz dimension was obtained at the Secular‐Rational/Self‐Expression diagonal, r = .24, after rotating the factor scores 45 degrees clockwise. We conclude that Schwartz's and Inglehart's originally proposed two‐dimensional value structures share one dimension at the country level and some commonality at the individual level, whereas the respective other pair of dimensions seem to be more or less unrelated.     

Illegitimate concept equating in the partial fusion of construct validation theory and latent variable modeling

There has come to exist a partial fusion of construct validation theory and latent variable modeling at the center of which is located a practice of equating concepts such as construct, factor, latent variable, concept, unobservable, unmeasurable, underlying, hypothetical variable, theoretical term, theoretical variable, intervening variable, cause, abstractive property, functional unity, and measured property. In the current paper we: a) provide a structural explanation of this concept equating; b) provide arguments to the effect that it is illegitimate; c) suggest that the singular reason for the presence of construct in the literature of the social and behavioral sciences is to mark an allowance taken by the social and behavioral scientist to obliterate the concept/referent distinction that is foundational of sound science.     

Freedom and Disability Rights: Dependence,Independence, and Interdependence

The increasing focus on disability rights—as found, for instance, in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)—challenges philosophical imaginaries. This article broadens the philosophical imaginary of freedom by exploring the relation of dependence, independence, and interdependence in the lives of people with disabilities. It argues (1) that traditional concepts of freedom are rather insensitive to difference within humanity, and (2) that the lives of people with severe disabilities challenge philosophers to argue and conceptualize freedom not only as independence and interdependence but also as dependence. After tracing this need through a Hegelian understanding, via Julia Kristeva's work on disability, and finally the CRPD, it concludes that a unified solution might not be possible. Hence, it argues that disability issues necessitate philosophical modesty.     

Cross-Cultural Counseling: An Existential Approach

Counselors continue to express concern about problems inherent in cross-cultural counseling. Despite the large literature on the subject, counseling members of ethnic groups different from that of the counselor remains problematic. Three concepts— Umwelt (the physical environment), Mitwelt (the interpersonal world), and Eigenwelt (one's inner world)—offer significant philosophical assistance to counselors wishing to overcome cultural encapsulation because, although surface cultural differences exist, humans are fundamentally more alike than they are different. The counselor needs to accept this reality to be effective in counseling culturally different clients, whether they are American minorities or foreign visitors.     

Response to Stuart Rennie's ‘Elegant variations’

Abstract

In Happiness, Tabensky equates the notion of happiness to Aristotelian eudaimonia. I shall claim that doing so amounts to equating two concepts that moderns cannot conceptually equate, namely, the good for a person and the good person or good life. In §2 I examine the way in which Tabensky deals with this issue and claim that his idea of happiness is as problematic for us moderns as is any translation of the notion of eudaimonia in terms of happiness. Naturally, if happiness understood as eudaimonia is ambiguous, so will be the notion of a desire for happiness, which we find at the core of Tabensky’s whole project. In §3 I shall be concerned with another aspect of the desire for happiness; namely, its alleged self-justifying nature. I will attempt to undermine the idea that this desire is self-justifying by undermining the criterion on which Tabensky takes self-justifiability to rest, i.e. its basicness, but also by shedding doubt on the idea that there is such a thing as an ultimate basic principle and, even if there were, that it is what Tabensky calls the eudaimon principle.     

Freedom and Respect in a Multicultural Society

ABSTRACT Martin Hollis, in Market Equality and Social Freedom [1], used the Dewsbury case to illustrate the tension between individual freedom and the public good. Like others engaged in the public debate on multicultural education in general, and Dewsbury in particular, Hollis avoided the main issue: “What should be the curriculum in a school attended by pupils from different cultural backgrounds?’’Rational debate in this highly controversial area requires an analysis of two fundamental concepts—multicultural education and respect. The former can take three forms, each corresponding with a distinctive curriculum model. One—the Equality option—is inimical to parental rights as guaranteed under the European Convention, but it attracts support because of a widespread failure to recognise that one can respect someone's right to hold and propagate a particular faith (or opinion) without necessarily respecting that faith (or opinion). It is shown that this failure has come about through very lax usage of ‘respect’. It is argued that by respecting persons whatever their values the potential conflict between liberty and equality can be resolved in a free society.     

Experience and Theory

N. R. Hanson's discussion of experience is criticized. Experience, though necessary for knowing, is insufficient as a basis for understanding in either science or religion. Experience alone can be misleading. We may begin with experience, but we cannot claim to understand until experience has been mediated by theory. The article is excerpted from Metaphoric Process: The Creation of Scientific and Religious Understanding (Gerhart and Russell 1984), Chapter 2.