共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 46 毫秒
1.
David Morris 《Human Studies》2008,31(4):399-421
This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and
freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to
ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another
sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being and Time, shedding light on the latter’s concept of ecstatic temporality. It also discusses implications for self-management of chronic
illness, especially in children.
相似文献
David MorrisEmail: |
2.
In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses”
(instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially
understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific
representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also
of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument
against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure
of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving
us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability.
相似文献
Xavier de Donato RodríguezEmail: |
Jesús Zamora Bonilla (Corresponding author)Email: |
3.
Mathematizing phenomenology 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jeffrey Yoshimi 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(3):271-291
Husserl is well known for his critique of the “mathematizing tendencies” of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that
mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in
phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines
which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper
I focus on a particular example of Husserl’s “mathematized phenomenology”: his use of concepts from what is today called dynamical
systems theory.
相似文献
Jeffrey YoshimiEmail: |
4.
This article examines the common-sense and methodical ways in which “the citizen” is produced and enrolled as an active participant
in “sustainable” regional planning. Using Membership Categorization Analysis, we explicate how the categorization procedures
in the Foreword of a draft regional planning policy interactionally produce the identity of “the citizen” and “civic values
and obligations” in relation to geographic place and institutional categories. Furthermore, we show how positioning practices
establish a relationship between authors (government) and readers (citizens) where both are ascribed with the same moral values
and obligations toward the region. Hence, “the citizen” as an active participant in “sustainable” regional planning is viewed
as a practical accomplishment that is underpinned by a normative morality associated with the task of producing orderliness
in “text-in-interaction.”
相似文献
Barbara AdkinsEmail: |
5.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
相似文献
David BraunEmail: |
6.
Enactive appraisal 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Giovanna Colombetti 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(4):527-546
Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion
known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and
personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.”
I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective
notion of personhood.
相似文献
Giovanna ColombettiEmail: |
7.
Chris R. Schlauch 《Pastoral Psychology》2006,55(1):61-80
This essay considers how we “create meaning” in the interplay of “felt sense” and “symbols,” and examines the direct and immediate interplay between some common everyday experiences and a series of concepts from psychoanalytic perspectives to reveal how this interplay has affinities with religion. Psychoanalysis and religion are overlapping projects. Psychoanalytic symbolizing of experience facilitates our knowing features of religion not previously known, as well as knowing features previously known, in new ways.
相似文献
Chris R. SchlauchEmail: |
8.
“Ontological emergence” of inherent high-level properties with causal powers is witnessed nowhere. A non-substantialist conception
of emergence works much better. It allows downward causation, provided our concept of causality is transformed accordingly.
相似文献
Michel BitbolEmail: |
9.
10.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):379-380
This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”
相似文献
Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
11.
Victoria S. Harrison 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):97-110
Internalist pluralism is an attractive and elegant theory. However, there are two apparently powerful objections to this approach
that prevent its widespread adoption. According to the first objection, the resulting analysis of religious belief systems
is intrinsically atheistic; while according to the second objection, the analysis is unsatisfactory because it allows religious
objects simply to be defined into existence. In this article, I demonstrate that an adherent of internalist pluralism can
deflect both of these objections, and in the course of so arguing, I deploy a distinction between “conceptual-scheme targetability”
and “successful conceptual-scheme targeting”.
相似文献
Victoria S. HarrisonEmail: |
12.
Wolfgang Fasching 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(2):131-148
In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic
and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization.
Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”,
but should be conceived of as a dimension, namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences.
相似文献
Wolfgang FaschingEmail: |
13.
J. Angelo Corlett 《Journal of Academic Ethics》2008,6(3):205-209
This paper amounts to a reply to Professor Donald G. Brown’s thoughtful comment on my “Ethical Issues in Journal Peer-Review”,
which appeared in this journal.
相似文献
J. Angelo CorlettEmail: |
14.
Mahin Chenari 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):17-31
In contemporary philosophy and psychology there is an ongoing debate around the concept of theory of mind. Theory of mind
concerns our ability to understand another person. The two approaches that dominate the debate are “Theory Theory” (TT) and
“Simulation Theory” (ST). This paper explores the connection between theory of mind and hermeneutics. Although both speak
of the nature of understanding, and the way we gain and organize our knowledge of others, certain aspects of Schleiermacher’s
hermeneutics reflect a theory approach, long before TT itself was developed. In contrast, Dilthey’s hermeneutics reflects
a simulation approach. In contrast to both of these approaches, I propose a contextual theory, as a parallel to Gadamer’s
work in hermeneutics, and as a view that offers the basis for an important critique of both TT and ST.
相似文献
Mahin ChenariEmail: |
15.
Igor Douven 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):361-375
It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining
in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival
rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis
of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside,
it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.
相似文献
Igor DouvenEmail: |
16.
Gregory Landini 《Axiomathes》2009,19(2):115-142
This is a critical discussion of Nino B. Cocchiarella’s book “Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism.” It focuses on paradoxes
of hyperintensionality that may arise in formal systems of intensional logic.
相似文献
Gregory LandiniEmail: |
17.
Jason Kawall 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):153-156
In my “Promising and Supererogation” I argue that one cannot fulfill promises to perform supererogatory actions (such as “I hereby promise to perform one supererogatory action every month”). In a response to my paper, David Heyd argues that there is an alternative solution to the problem I raise. While I agree with much that Heyd says about the examples he discusses, his proposed solution involves a crucial alteration of the problem; his proposed solution does not solve the problem I present.
相似文献
Jason KawallEmail: |
18.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):273-295
19.
Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):567-574
In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired
debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued
that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different
answers.
相似文献
Stephen MaitzenEmail: |