The simulation of emotion experience: On the emotional foundations of theory of mind

An argument is developed that supports a simulationist account about the foundations of infants' and young children's understanding that other people have mental states. This argument relies on evidence that infants come to the world with capacities to send and receive affective cues and to appreciate the emotional states of others – capacities well suited to a social environment initially made up of frequent and extended emotional interactions with their caregivers. The central premise of the argument is that the foundation of infants' understanding of other minds is built upon an early-developing capacity to share others' emotion experiences. The emotion experiences elicited in interactions between caregivers and infants enable the elaboration of this primitive understanding into a more fully developed understanding of psychological subjects. The evidence presented in support of these claims derives from a wide range of studies of the phenomena of emotional contagion, affective communication, and emotion regulation involving infants, young children, and adults.     

The emotional integration of childhood experience: physiological, facial expressive, and self-reported emotional response during the adult attachment interview

Attachment researchers claim that individual differences in how adults talk about their early memories reflect qualitatively distinct organizations of emotion regarding childhood experiences with caregivers. Testing this assumption, the present study examined the relationship between attachment dimensions and physiological, facial expressive, as well as self-reported emotional responses during the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI). Consistent with theoretical predictions, more prototypically secure adults behaviorally expressed and reported experiencing emotion consistent with the valence of the childhood events they described. Insecure adults also showed distinctive and theoretically anticipated forms of emotional response: Dismissing participants evidenced increased electrodermal activity during the interview, a sign of emotional suppression, whereas preoccupied adults showed reliable discrepancies between the valence of their inferred childhood experiences and their facial expressive as well as reported emotion during the AAI. Results substantiate a case that the AAI reflects individual differences in emotion regulation that conceptually parallel observations of attachment relationships in infancy.     

Misremembering emotion: Inductive category effects for complex emotional stimuli

Memories of objects are biased toward what is typical of the category to which they belong. Prior research on memory for emotional facial expressions has demonstrated a bias towards an emotional expression prototype (e.g., slightly happy faces are remembered as happier). We investigate an alternate source of bias in memory for emotional expressions – the central tendency bias. The central tendency bias skews reconstruction of a memory trace towards the center of the distribution for a particular attribute. This bias has been attributed to a Bayesian combination of an imprecise memory for a particular object with prior information about its category. Until now, studies examining the central tendency bias have focused on simple stimuli. We extend this work to socially relevant, complex, emotional facial expressions. We morphed facial expressions on a continuum from sad to happy. Different ranges of emotion were used in four experiments in which participants viewed individual expressions and, after a variable delay, reproduced each face by adjusting a morph to match it. Estimates were biased toward the center of the presented stimulus range, and the bias increased at longer memory delays, consistent with the Bayesian prediction that as trace memory loses precision, category knowledge is given more weight. The central tendency effect persisted within and across emotion categories (sad, neutral, and happy). This article expands the scope of work on inductive category effects to memory for complex, emotional stimuli.     

The effects of nonconsciously priming emotion concepts on behavior

Current empirical evidence regarding nonconsciously priming emotion concepts is limited to positively versus negatively valenced affect. This article demonstrates that specific, equally valenced emotion concepts can be nonconsciously activated, remain inaccessible to conscious awareness, and still affect behavior in an emotion-specific fashion. In Experiment 1A, participants subliminally primed with guilty emotion adjectives showed lower indulgence than did participants subliminally primed with sad emotion adjectives; even after the addition of a 5-min time delay, these results were replicated in Experiment 1B. Participants in the different priming conditions showed no differences in their subjective emotion ratings and were unaware of the emotion prime or concept activation. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated these findings using a helping measure, demonstrating that individuals primed with guilt adjectives show more helping than do individuals primed with sadness adjectives. In all studies, effects were moderated by individuals' specific emotion-response habits and characteristics.     

Impression formation: the role of expressive behavior

This research examined the effects of personality/social skills and individual differences in expressive style on impression formation. Particular attention was given to the role of nonverbal behaviors in the formation of initial impressions. Sixty-two subjects were measured on self-report personality and communication skill scales, on posed emotional sending ability, and on physical attractiveness. Subjects were then videotaped while giving a spontaneous "explanation." Trained coders measured five separate nonverbal cue factors displayed by the subjects in the videotapes. Groups of untrained judges viewed the tapes and rated their impressions of the subjects on scales of likability, speaking effectiveness, and expressivity-confidence. Male subjects who were nonverbally skilled and extraverted tended to display more outwardly focused and fluid expressive behaviors, and made more favorable impressions on judges, than did males who scored low on the measures of nonverbal skills and extraversion. Females who were nonverbally skilled displayed more facial expressiveness, which led to more favorable initial impressions. Sex differences may reflect basic differences in the acquisition and use of expressive nonverbal cues by males and females.     

Abstract art and emotion: expressive form and the sense of wholeness

This paper limits itself to abstract art the better to concentrate on the relation between the emotionally expressive power of esthetic form--apart from its narrative content--and emotional responsiveness. The emotionally expressive power of art--not to be confused with the artist's own emotions--has to do with the way sensuous esthetic forms highlight the rhythmic changes of tension and release inherent in ordinary perceptual experience. Tension and release are useful terms in thinking about how the perception of an esthetic structure is transformed (transduced) into feelingful psychological meanings, and contributes to the subjective sense of wholeness. The sense of wholeness may be illusory and/or authentic depending on the mix of elements in the individual's responsiveness. It comes about through a unified organization of tension and release, as embodied in expressive forms such as rhythm and rhyme, resonating with tension and release evoked in the observer's associations to such psychological issues as separation and reunion. Having stirred the viewer's emotional responsiveness, the art work provides a reliable "container" for the objectification of latent emotions.     

Relative contributions of expressive behavior and contextual information to the judgment of the emotional state of another

This study used a technique for assessing the relative impact of facial-gestural expressions, as opposed to contextual information regarding the elicitor and situation, on the judgment of emotion. In Study 1, 28 undergraduates rated videotapes of spontaneous facial-gestural expressions and separately rated the emotionally loaded color slides that elicited those expressions. The source clarities of the expressions and slides were matched using correlation and distance measures, and 18 expressions and 9 slides were selected. In Study 2, 72 undergraduate receivers were shown systematic pairings of these expressions and slides and rated the emotional state of the expresser, who was supposedly watching that slide under public or private situational conditions. Expressions were found to be more important sources for all emotion judgments. For female receivers slides were relatively more important in the public than in the private situation.     

The primacy of perceiving: emotion recognition buffers negative effects of emotional labor

There is ample empirical evidence for negative effects of emotional labor (surface acting and deep acting) on workers' well-being. This study analyzed to what extent workers' ability to recognize others' emotions may buffer these effects. In a 4-week study with 85 nurses and police officers, emotion recognition moderated the relationship between emotional labor and work engagement: Workers with high emotion recognition engaging in emotional labor did not report lower work engagement after 4 weeks, whereas those with low emotion recognition did. These effects pertained to both surface and deep acting. The results suggest that emotional labor be not necessarily detrimental to workers' engagement. Instead, the impact of emotional labor hinges upon workers' ability to correctly identify interaction partners' emotions.     

青少年与成人不同情绪刺激调节效应的差异

旨在探究增强调节和减弱调节调节效应量的年龄差异。通过两个实验系统考察青少年和成人对不同情绪刺激使用不同调节策略时,调节效应的差异。实验一采用“情绪反应性—调节图片任务（REAR-I Task）”考察了35名青少年和35名成人情绪调节的效应量。实验二进一步对情绪图片的唤醒度进行分组（高唤醒/低唤醒）,考察了59名青少年和59名成人情绪调节的效应量。结果验证了研究假设：整体而言,对不同效价和唤醒度情绪刺激采用增强调节或减弱调节时,成人的调节效应量均大于青少年,对正性情绪的减弱调节方面尤为明显。     

The experience of positive emotion is associated with the automatic processing of positive emotional words

The current study examines the relationship between attention bias for positive emotional words and self-reported emotional experience. Previous research suggests that the experience of positive emotion momentarily broadens cognitive processes, potentially allowing individuals to build an array of enduring personal resources. However, it is unknown whether the experience of positive emotion also broadens emotional information processing. Participants included 60 healthy undergraduate students who completed measures of psychopathology, self-reported emotional experience, and an emotional Stroop task designed to measure attentional bias to positive and negative emotional information. Results indicate significant associations between reaction times for high-intensity happiness words and self-reported high levels of positive emotion and low levels of negative emotions. These associations were not present for low intensity happiness words. Findings suggest that individuals who experience high levels of positive emotion and low levels of negative emotion demonstrate an attention bias for positive information and, from an information processing perspective, provide insight into the manner in which positive emotions broaden cognitive processes.     

Contemplative/emotion training reduces negative emotional behavior and promotes prosocial responses

Contemplative practices are believed to alleviate psychological problems, cultivate prosocial behavior and promote self-awareness. In addition, psychological science has developed tools and models for understanding the mind and promoting well-being. Additional effort is needed to combine frameworks and techniques from these traditions to improve emotional experience and socioemotional behavior. An 8-week intensive (42 hr) meditation/emotion regulation training intervention was designed by experts in contemplative traditions and emotion science to reduce "destructive enactment of emotions" and enhance prosocial responses. Participants were 82 healthy female schoolteachers who were randomly assigned to a training group or a wait-list control group, and assessed preassessment, postassessment, and 5 months after training completion. Assessments included self-reports and experimental tasks to capture changes in emotional behavior. The training group reported reduced trait negative affect, rumination, depression, and anxiety, and increased trait positive affect and mindfulness compared to the control group. On a series of behavioral tasks, the training increased recognition of emotions in others (Micro-Expression Training Tool), protected trainees from some of the psychophysiological effects of an experimental threat to self (Trier Social Stress Test; TSST), appeared to activate cognitive networks associated with compassion (lexical decision procedure), and affected hostile behavior in the Marital Interaction Task. Most effects at postassessment that were examined at follow-up were maintained (excluding positive affect, TSST rumination, and respiratory sinus arrhythmia recovery). Findings suggest that increased awareness of mental processes can influence emotional behavior, and they support the benefit of integrating contemplative theories/practices with psychological models and methods of emotion regulation.     

Beyond the emotional event: Six studies on the social sharing of emotion

Abstract

We argue that emotion cannot only be conceived of as a short-lived and intrapersonal phenomenon. Rather, based on five theoretical arguments, we propose that the social sharing of an emotional experience forms an integral part of the emotional processes. A series of six studies investigated different aspects of this hypothesis. Study 1 showed that an overwhelming majority of people reported sharing their emotional experiences and that the memories of these experiences tended to come back spontaneously to their consciousness. No difference was found among emotions. Using a different procedure, Studies 2 and 3 replicated these findings in two different populations. In addition, these studies provided indications that women share their experiences with a wider array of individuals than do men. The first three studies did not find any differences among emotions, but they did not include shame. It could be argued that people are less inclined to socially share shame experiences which are typically elicited by breaking social rules. Study 4 specifically investigated this hypothesis. No differences among shame and other emotions were found except for the delay of the first sharing of the experience. Study 5 constituted a first investigation of whether the social sharing of emotion is also a significant process in now Western cultures. A comparison between Dutch and Surinamese people failed to reveal any significant difference. Based on the findings of the first five studies, a correlational model was designed in Study 6. It tested the interrelationships among disruptiveness of the emotion, social sharing, mental rumination, and recovery from the emotion disruption. A coherent pattern of findings emerged, showing that social sharing can be conceived as a bi-dimensional concept defined by features of amount and delay of sharing. In addition, both social sharing and mental rumination varied according to the disruptiveness of the emotion. Surprisingly, however, recovery could not be related to social sharing, mental rumination, or to the time elapsed since the episode.     

The effect of modification of expressive displays on vicarious emotional arousal

Several recent experiments have demonstrated that modulation of the facial expressive response is accompanied by changes in autonomic arousal and subjective response to painful stimuli. The present study asked whether facial self-regulation may also bring about changes in covert vicarious emotional experience. Three groups of subjects were exposed to a videotaped model displaying intermittent pain to shock in a differential vicarious autonomic conditioning paradigm. Subjects in the inhibit and amplify groups were asked, respectively, (a) to inhibit their facial muscles or (b) to pose a facial response of pain when the model was shocked. It was predicted that the inhibit group would show less autonomic arousal to the model's expressive display (empathy) and less conditioning (as measured by skin conductance and heart rate change), and the amplify group more empathy and conditioning, than a third group who was given no facial instruction. In fact, the amplify group showed more skin conductance arousal, heart rate acceleration, and activity in response to the model's expressive display of pain than did the other two groups (which were not different from each other), but no more autonomic or facial conditioning. The overall pattern of physiological data is interpreted as generally supportive of a facial feedback theory of emotion: where significant between-groups' differences were obtained in facial activity, as in vicarious instigation, autonomic arousal differences also emerged; where no expressive differences were obtained, as in vicarious conditioning, no differences in autonomic arousal were found.     

Self-focused attention,facial behavior,autonomic arousal and the experience of emotion

Two experiments examined alternative explanations for the Scheier and Carver(1977) results linking self-focused attention to increased responsivity to emotional stimuli. In both studies autonomic, expressive, and self-report measures of emotional arousal failed to confirm the earlier findings. An individual difference measure reported by others to parallel the effects of situationally manipulated self-attention also failed to confirm the previously reported findings. Though in direct contradiction to Scheier and Carver's results, the results are consistent with a facial feedback hypothesis and with previous findings on the effects of expressive inhibition on self-reports of emotional arousal.This research was supported in part by NSF grant 77-08926 to the first author and by NIMH grant MH 29446 to the third author, as well as by funds from the Lincoln Filene Endowment to Dartmouth College.     

The structure of emotional expressivity: each emotion counts

Several models of the dimensionality of emotional expressivity were examined in a multitrait-multimethod study. Targets and peer raters completed measures of the target's emotional expressivity (Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire. BEQ; J. J. Gross & O. P. John, 1995; and a measure of emotion-specific expression) and the Big 5 personality dimensions. The results of structural equation modeling and analysis of variance revealed that an emotion-specific model was superior to models of valence-specific or unidimensional expressivity. The distinct emotions differed in their relations with the dimensions of the 5-factor model. These results were corroborated by self- and other reports. Finally, the degree of convergence between self- and other ratings differed between emotions, demonstrating the multidimensional character of emotional expressivity.     

The organisation of emotional experience: Creating links among emotion,thinking, language,and intentional action

Abstract

This paper discusses how emotional experience is interpreted, understood, and represented. Changes in the status of valued goals, and whether or not these goals can be attained or maintained are key conditions in determining the occurrence of an emotional experience. In addition, assessing the certainty with which goals can be maintained is critical as to which emotion is experienced. This small set of dimensions can be used to identify, and differentiate emotions that are considered to be basic. Basic emotion categories share features, and their elicitation is contingent on a number of components coming into conjunction with one another simultaneously. Thus, for any one basic emotion to be elicited, at least three converging components need to be activated. This view of the conditions for emotion is discussed with reference to componential theories of emotion, and to its developmental and cross-cultural implications.     

Personality and emotional memory: How regulating emotion impairs memory for emotional events

In everyday life, individuals actively regulate their emotions in a variety of ways. One common form of emotion regulation is expressive suppression, which entails inhibiting outward signs of emotion. Although expressive suppression is often undertaken with an eye to looking calm despite feeling emotional, an analysis of its self-regulatory demands suggests that this form of emotion regulation may come at a cognitive price. We tested this hypothesis in two studies. In Study 1, we measured spontaneously occurring expressive suppression during a film that depicted a surgical procedure, and then assessed memory for the film. Greater use of suppression predicted worse memory. In Study 2, we examined expressive suppression during a film that depicted a conflictual conversation, and we measured memory for what was said during the conversation. To gauge the magnitude of any cognitive costs, we compared expressive suppression with self-distraction, which entails intentionally trying not to think about something. Both spontaneously occurring and experimentally induced suppression were associated with worse memory. Strikingly, these effects were comparable to the effects of spontaneously occurring and experimentally induced distraction. These studies suggest that “simply” keeping a stiff upper lip during an emotional event exacts a cognitive toll that is as great as intentional cognitive avoidance. We argue that efforts to understand links between emotion and memory must consider emotion regulation.     

Distinct emotional abilities converge: Evidence from emotional understanding and emotion recognition through the voice

One key criterion for whether Emotional Intelligence (EI) truly fits the definition of “intelligence” is that individual branches of EI should converge. However, for performance tests that measure actual ability, such convergence has been elusive. Consistent with theoretical perspectives for intelligence, we approach this question using EI measures that have objective standards for right answers. Examining emotion recognition through the voice—that is, the ability to judge an actor’s intended portrayal—and emotional understanding—that is, the ability to understand relationships and transitions among emotions—we find substantial convergence, r = .53. Results provide new data to inform the often heated debate about the validity of EI, and further the basis of optimism that EI may truly be considered intelligence.