Adolescent beliefs about AIDS prevention

Abstract

Four hundred and ten school children, aged between 13 and 16 years, were administered a questionnaire to investigate (a) their perceptions of AIDS and implications of the disease for the victim; (b) beliefs about how best to prevent the spread of disease; (c) sources of information and (d) AIDS relevant topics they would like to learn in school. The results suggested that there were few differences in knowledge or attitude as a function of age, but some significant differences due to sex. Boys were more likely to derogate the AIDS victim compared with girls. In terms of different strategies for prevention, boys were more in favour of “scare” approaches, and girls of information-giving. The success of any AIDS education package may be at least partly determined by individual beliefs about the disease, and preferences for different educational strategies.     

Clients' beliefs about psychological problems

An investigation of clients beliefs about the causes and treatments of their own psychological problems, using a new instrument, the Opinions about Psychological Problems (OPP). We found that, although the beliefs about the various models were positively correlated, clients made clear overall discriminations between them. For causation, they tended to agree with the four psychological models (Behavioural, Cognitive, Humanistic and Psychodynamic) and the Naïve model, and tended to disagree with the Socio-economic and Organic models. For treatment, they endorsed Behavioural, Cognitive and Humanistic most highly, and again disagreed overall with Socio-economic and Organic. Individual difference variables showed that clients reporting a higher level of psychological symptoms tended to endorse all causation beliefs more highly, and also were more likely to agree with Behavioural, Cognitive, Humanistic and Psychodynamic treatments. The structure of clients' beliefs differed from that found in previous studies. There was a single factor which loaded on the four psychological models, with which the Organic, Socio-economic and Naive subscales were less strongly, but still positively, correlated     

Thinking about oneself and others: the relational-interdependent self-construal and social cognition

These studies focus on the relational-interdependent self-construal's association with implicit or indirect cognitive processes. In the relational-interdependent self-construal, the self is defined largely in terms of close relationships, resulting in variation in self-related processes. In Studies 1 and 2, the relational self-construal was associated with positive implicit evaluations of relational concepts and with tightly organized cognitive networks of relational terms. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that this self-construal was associated with memory for and implicit organization of relational information. In Studies 5 and 6, the relational self-construal was positively related to the degree to which participants described themselves and a friend similarly. The implications of the relational self-construal for theories of relationship cognition and for other self-related cognitive processes are discussed.     

Concepts about agency constrain beliefs about visual experience

Recent research exploring phenomena such as change blindness, inattentional blindness, attentional blink and repetition blindness has revealed a number of counterintuitive ways in which apparently salient visual stimuli often go unnoticed. In fact, large majorities of subjects sometimes predict that they would detect visual changes that actually are rarely noticed, suggesting that people have strong beliefs about visual experience that are demonstrably incorrect. However, for other kinds of visual metacognition, such as picture memory, people underpredict performance. This paper describes two experiments demonstrating that both these overpredictions of change detection, and underpredictions of visual memory can be linked with intuitions about the visual experience of different kinds of agents. Subjects predicted more visual change detection and poorer visual memory for mechanical representational systems (e.g. computer programs) when these were anthropomorphized using intentional terminology.     

Essentialist beliefs about personality and their implications

Two studies examine implicit theories about the nature of personality characteristics, asking whether they are understood as underlying essences. Consistent with the hypothesis, essentialist beliefs about personality formed a coherent and replicable set. Personality characteristics differed systematically in the extent to which they were judged to be discrete, biologically based, immutable, informative, consistent across situations, and deeply inherent within the person. In Study 1, the extent to which characteristics were essentialized was positively associated with their perceived desirability, prevalence, and emotionality. In Study 2, essentialized characteristics were judged to be particularly important for defining people's identity, for forming impressions of people, and for communicating about a third person. The findings indicate that people understand some personality attributes in an essentialist fashion, that these attributes are taken to be valued elements of a shared human nature, and that they are particularly central to social identity and judgment.     

Internal-External Control and beliefs about automobile travel

It was hypothesized that the Internal-External Locus of Control dimension (Rotter, 1966) would predict reported feelings about automobile travel and attribution of responsibility for automobile accidents. Relative to Externals, Internals were found (a) to attribute responsibility for automobile accidents more to internal, controllable causes; (b) to report less anxiety when travelling via automobile; (c) to report wearing seatbelts more often; and (d) to experience automobile travel as more interesting and involving.     

Climate change denial and beliefs about science

Synthese - Social scientists have offered a number of explanations for why Americans commonly deny that human-caused climate change is real. In this paper, I argue that these explanations neglect...     

Six-year-olds' contradictory judgments about knowledge and beliefs

By around the age of 4 years, children acknowledge that people can have false beliefs about the world. Six-year-olds are still inclined, however, to confuse their own knowledge with that of more ignorant others. In a recent paper, Hulme, Mitchell and Wood offer a novel explanation for six-year-olds' tendency to make such errors when asked to choose a picture to put in a story character's thought bubble.     

Disputation of irrational beliefs about overeating

Articles

Disputation of irrational beliefs about overeating     

Development of beliefs about storybook reality

The goal of this research was to assess children's beliefs about the reality status of storybook characters and events. In Experiment 1, 156 preschool age children heard realistic, fantastical, or religious stories, and their understanding of the reality status of the characters and events in the stories was assessed. Results revealed that 3-year-olds were more likely to judge characters as real than were 4- and 5-year-olds, but most children judged all characters as not real for all story types. Children of all ages who heard realistic stories made more claims that the events in the stories could happen in real life than did children who heard fantastical stories. Five-year-olds made significantly more claims that events in religious stories could happen in real life than did younger children. In Experiment 2, 136 4- and 5-year-olds heard similar stories. Results replicated those from Experiment 1, and also indicated a growing awareness of the basic nature of realistic fiction.     

Parental beliefs about managing sibling conflict

This study examined the correspondence between parents' beliefs about the most effective ways to manage sibling conflict and their responses to their children's spontaneous sibling conflicts. Eighty-eight 2-child, 2-parent families participated in 3 home sessions. Second-born children were 3-5 years old, and firstborn children were 2-4 years older. Parents' use of a particular conflict management strategy was based, in part, on their perception of how effective the strategy was and how well they could carry out the strategy. For example, mothers' use of child-centered strategies was predicted by their belief that parental control strategies were ineffective. Fathers' use of control strategies was predicted by their low confidence in enacting child-centered techniques. Although both mothers and fathers perceived child-centered and control strategies as more effective than passive nonintervention, parents engaged in passive nonintervention most often.     

Evoking false beliefs about autobiographical experience

In two experiments, we demonstrate that laboratory procedures can evoke false beliefs about autobiographical experience. After shallowly processing photographs ofreal-world locations, participants returned 1 week (Experiments 1 and 2) or 3 weeks (Experiment 2) later to evaluate whether they had actually visited each of a series of new and old pictured locations. Mundane and unique scenes from an unfamiliar college campus (Duke or SMU) were shown zero, one, or two times in the first session. Prior exposure increased participants' beliefs that they had visited locations that they had never actually visited. Furthermore, participants gave higher visit ratings to mundane than to unique scenes, and this did not vary with exposure frequency or delay. This laboratory procedure for inducing autobiographical false beliefs may have implications for better understanding various illusions of recognition.