Are Envy,Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?

Abstract

The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally “negative” emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions.

In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.     

Delusion,Dissociation and Identity

Abstract

Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognise injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life.     

妒忌:一种带有敌意的社会情绪

妒忌是个体因为意识到别人拥有自己所缺乏的优势时体验到的一种消极感受,表现为自卑、敌意和怨恨的一种混合情绪,包括特质和状态两种界定角度.相似性、自我相关是妒忌的近因,资源竞争则是妒忌的远因,前扣带皮层、腹侧纹状体和腹中侧前额叶是妒忌加工和识别的相关脑区.妒忌影响人们的身心健康、攻击行为、道德行为、幸灾乐祸、亲社会性以及业绩表现.未来研究可以在善意妒忌、内在机制、进化视角、文化差异等方面进一步扩展.     

Comprehending envy

The authors reviewed the psychological research on envy. The authors examined definitional challenges associated with studying envy, such as the important distinction between envy proper (which contains hostile feelings) and benign envy (which is free of hostile feelings). The authors concluded that envy is reasonably defined as an unpleasant, often painful emotion characterized by feelings of inferiority, hostility, and resentment caused by an awareness of a desired attribute enjoyed by another person or group of persons. The authors examined questions such as why people envy, why envy contains hostile feelings, and why it has a tendency to transmute itself. Finally, the authors considered the role of envy in helping understand other research domains and discussed ways in which people cope with the emotion.     

The envious mind

This work provides an analysis of the basic cognitive components of envy. In particular, the roles played by the envious party's social comparison with, and ill will against, the better off are emphasised. The ill will component is characterised by the envier's ultimate goal or wish that the envied suffer some harm, and is distinguished from resentment and sense of injustice, which have often been considered part of envy. The reprehensible nature of envy is discussed, and traced back to the analysis of its components. Finally, we explore both points of overlap and distinguishing features between envy and other emotions such as jealousy or emulation, and make a few general remarks, pointing to the necessity of overcoming conceptual looseness in the notion of envy.     

Envy divides the two faces of narcissism

In this article, we test psychodynamic assumptions about envy and narcissism by examining malicious envy in the context of narcissistic grandiosity and vulnerability. In Study 1, students (N = 192) and community adults (N = 161) completed trait measures of narcissism, envy, and schadenfreude. In Study 2 (N = 121), participants relived an episode of envy, and cognitive‐affective components of envy were examined in the context of both self‐ and informant reports of their envy and narcissism. In Study 3 (N = 69), narcissism was linked to reports of envy covertly induced in the laboratory. Vulnerable narcissism was strongly and consistently related to dispositional envy and schadenfreude (Studies 1–2), as well as to all cognitive‐affective components of envy (Study 2). Furthermore, it facilitated envy and schadenfreude toward a high‐status peer (Study 3). Grandiose narcissism was slightly negatively related to dispositional envy (Studies 1–2), and it did not predict informant reports of envy or cognitive‐affective components of the emotion (Study 2). Finally, it did not exacerbate envy, hostility, or resentment toward a high‐status peer (Study 3). The results suggest envy is a central emotion in the lives of those with narcissistic vulnerability and imply that envy should be reconsidered as a symptom accompanying grandiose features in the diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder.     

Equality, Envy, and the Sense of Injustice

This paper attempts to defend the value of equality against the accusation that it is an expression of irrational and disreputable feelings of envy of those who are better off. It draws on Rawls' account of the sense of justice to suggest that resentment of inequalities may be a proper resentment of injustice. The case of resentment of 'free riders' is taken as one plausible example of a justified resentment of those who benefit unfairly from a scheme of cooperation. Further examples then link the case of the free rider to other cases of unjust inequalities which are the appropriate objects of resentment and indignation.     

Social Trauma,Nostalgia and Mourning in the Immigration Experience

Immigration and exile can qualify as social traumas. The individual is deprived of a holding, secure environment in which to continue their life. The process of mourning is a necessary step to connect with “going on being.” Another psychic experience in migration is nostalgia; it helps the immigrant defend against the aggression resulting from current frustrations. The feeling of nostalgia can also be used to protect the ego from inadequacy. The complex components of nostalgia come from positive ones such as joy and gratitude connected with sadness about the associated loss of security, familiarity, and historical continuity. At other times, nostalgia cannot evolve, particularly in forced migration or exile. In this case, the individual enters a depressed state with accompanying feelings of self-pity, resentment, envy, and guilt, which prevents the mourning process from developing. To deal with these painful experiences, the person resorts to linking objects or linking phenomena that help them continue having contact with the past, while adjusting to their new environment.

     

‘Hate the sin but not the sinner’: forgiveness and condemnation

Abstract

Forgiveness is traditionally thought of as the forswearing of resentment. Resentment has been argued to be a moral emotion, tightly interrelated with moral protest against a wrongdoing. This has lead to forgiveness being thought of as the forgetting or condoning of wrongdoing. I will argue for a concept of forgiveness that is ‘uncompromising’ for it does not involve giving up one’s judgements about the wrongdoing. I will argue that resentment should be understood as a type of reactive attitude, and that this means that it is not necessarily connected with moral protest. I will show that forgiveness is better understood as the overcoming of reactive attitudes (which includes resentment, but also indignation, anger, and other similar emotions). This will allow for forgiveness to be compatible with maintaining condemnation of wrongdoing.     

Forgiveness or Fairness?

Abstract

Several philosophers who argue that forgiveness is an important virtue also wish to maintain the moral value of retributive emotions that forgiveness is meant to overcome. As such, these accounts explicate forgiveness as an Aristotelian mean between too much resentment and too little resentment. I argue that such an account ends up making forgiveness superfluous: it turns out that the forgiving person is not praised for a greater willingness to let go of her resentment, but rather for her fairness or good judgment. I conclude by arguing that the virtue of fair-mindedness is more compatible with maintaining the value of the retributive emotions than the virtue of forgiveness.     

The parables of a green-eyed monster: Two tales about envy

Abstract

This paper describes how the dynamics of envy infiltrate interactions if envy is not contained. An interactive model of a 'giver' and 'recipient' is presented as a way of looking at envy and is applied to a clinical and organizational example. An analysis is made in terms of utilizing symbiosis defensively in order to avoid coming to grips with envy.     

Explorations in employee envy: Feeling envious and feeling envied

Two aspects of envy at work (i.e., feeling envied by others and feeling envy toward others) were studied with 222 first-level supervisors. Results supported predictions concerning the previously unstudied construct of feeling envied by others (i.e., associations were identified with job longevity, Machiavellianism, and sense of competitive reward), as well as replicated earlier findings for feeling envy toward others (i.e., associations were identified with self-esteem, Machiavellianism, leader-member exchange, sense of competitive reward, and job dissatisfaction). Also, employee Machiavellianism and leader-member exchange were found to interact for the dependent variable of being the target of coworker envy such that in-group members who were highly Machiavellian reported the greatest sense of being envied by coworkers.     

Episodic Envy

Episodic envy, the unpleasant emotion resulting from a specific negative social comparison, is discussed. A new measure designed to assess it is developed, validated, and cross-validated in 3 studies. The implications of episodic envy are also examined. Results show that episodic envy is composed of a feeling component and a comparison component; and is different from unfairness, admiration, and competition. The feeling component is strongly correlated with negative emotional reactions (anxiety, depression, negative mood, hostility) and behavioral reactions (e.g., harming the other, creating a negative work atmosphere) to envy. The comparison component is correlated with behaviors intended to improve one's position in the organization. Episodic envy predicts reactions to envy above and beyond dispositional envy.     

Integrating multiple perspectives on schadenfreude: The role of deservingness and emotions

Schadenfreude, or pleasure in another person’s misfortune, has been linked to a cognitive appraisal that other deserves the misfortune. In the present study we develop a structural model that links schadenfreude to global self-esteem, pain of inferiority, hostile and benign envy, resentment, perceived deservingness, and sympathy. We also examine the effects of ingroup/outgroup membership on schadenfreude and test for the invariance of our structural model between these two conditions. Participants (n = 170) responded to a hypothetical scenario that manipulated ingroup/outgroup membership and perceived deservingness in relation to other’s initial success and subsequent failure. Results supported a structural model that showed invariance. They also showed that more schadenfreude was reported when the outgroup member failed and more sympathy and anger when the ingroup member failed. These results provide an integrated structural approach to the analysis of schadenfreude.     

Appraisal patterns of envy and related emotions

Envy is a frustrating emotion that arises from upward social comparison. Two studies investigated the appraisals that distinguish benign envy (aimed at improving one's own situation) from malicious envy (aimed at pulling down the superior other). Study 1 found that appraisals of deservingness and control potential differentiated both types of envy. We manipulated these appraisals in Study 2 and found that while both did not influence the intensity of envy, they did determine the type of envy that resulted. The more a situation was appraised as undeserved, the more participants experienced malicious envy. Benign envy was experienced more when the situation was not undeserved, and the most when the situation was appraised as both deserved and controllable. The current research also clarifies how the types of envy differ from the related emotions admiration and resentment.     

Four Dimensions of Envy: Strategies for Managing Its Manifestations in Psychotherapy

Envy is not an amorphous feeling and can be seen as consisting of four distinct dimensions, labeled identification, confrontive, redirecting, and medea. Just as we have to be aware of the traditional stages of psychosexual and psychosocial stages of development, we need to be alert as to what dimension of envy the patient may be experiencing at any given moment in psychotherapy. When these dimensions manifest themselves in therapy we find that each of them requires a different strategy by the therapist. Each dimension has its unique features and what is successful at one stage of treatment may be disastrous at another. If the therapist does not intervene at the beginning stages to prevent envy from increasing in intensity, there is a danger that the patient can slide into a stage in which effective therapy may be doomed.     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">Virtue Ethics and Being Morally Moved</Emphasis>

This essay shall discuss the moral feeling of “being morally moved” (daode gandong 道德感动) and explore its philosophical significances in understanding the nature of virtue ethics, especially that of Confucian ethics as exemplary ethics. I would like to argue that the feeling of being morally moved, similar to other feelings such as resentment or indignation, should be seen as one of the most important testimonies or manifestations of our morality or moral consciousness. It has played a very important role of moral judgment and moral cultivation in the history of Chinese moral philosophy and in its everyday moral practices. Instead of being a testimony of morality as cold laws or norms, “being morally moved” is a testimony to our moral virtues, and it should be a living motive of our moral actions as well.     

When envy leads to schadenfreude

Previous research has yielded inconsistent findings concerning the relationship between envy and schadenfreude. Three studies examined whether the distinction between benign and malicious envy can resolve this inconsistency. We found that malicious envy is related to schadenfreude, while benign envy is not. This result held both in the Netherlands where benign and malicious envy are indicated by separate words (Study 1: Sample A, N = 139; Sample B, N = 150), and in the USA where a single word is used to denote both types (Study 2, N = 180; Study 3, N = 349). Moreover, the effect of malicious envy on schadenfreude was independent of other antecedents of schadenfreude (such as feelings of inferiority, disliking the target person, anger, and perceived deservedness). These findings improve our understanding of the antecedents of schadenfreude and help reconcile seemingly contradictory findings on the relationship between envy and schadenfreude.     

Envy Across Adulthood: The What and the Who

Two studies assessed envy across adulthood. Study 1 (n = 987) examined subjects’ experiences of feeling envy. Study 2 (n = 843) examined being the target of another's envy. Envy primarily occurred between same-gender and similarly aged others. Fewer older adults reported envy incidents. Envy was reported in both distant and close relationships. Both studies found that the likelihood of envying certain domains shifted across the life span: scholastic success, social success, looks, and romantic success were less envied with age, whereas money was more envied with age. Envy in some domains (luck, overall better life) was fairly consistent across the life span.     

Envy,Facts and Justice: A Critique of the Treatment of Envy in Justice as Fairness

A common anti-egalitarian argument is that equality is motivated by envy, or the desire to placate envy. In order to avoid this charge, John Rawls explicitly banishes envy from his original position. This article argues that this is an inconsistent and untenable position for Rawls, as he treats envy as if it were a fact of human psychology and believes that principles of justice should be based on such facts. Therefore envy should be known about in the original position. The consequences for Rawlsian theory—both substantive and methodological—are discussed.