Intentions and Causes, Actions and Right Actions

I argue in this essay that belief/desire explanations are not logically true and not causal, and further that the antecedent of a true belief/desire conditional cannot be strengthened in such a way as to transform it into a true causal statement. I also argue that belief/desire explanations are not dispensable: they are presupposed in our justifications of scientific claims. The proposal is not that psychological determinism is false, but that some at least of our activities are not describable in causal terms. These arguments prepare the ground for a puzzle. If all human intentional behaviour is caused, then all actual linkages between psychological states and behaviour should be expressed in causal statements. But neither the action of asserting a causal statement nor the action of justifying the assertion can be described as the result of a cause. Therefore if one accepts that scientific claims can be justified, not all linkages between psychological states and subsequent action are expressible in causal statements. I do not offer a solution to this puzzle.     

Intentional concepts in cognitive neuroscience

In this article, I develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in cognitive neuroscience explanations. As pointed out by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, intentional language abounds in neuroscience theories. According to Bennett and Hacker, the subpersonal use of intentional predicates results in conceptual confusion. I argue against this overly strong conclusion by evaluating the contested language use in light of its explanatory function. By employing conceptual resources from the contemporary philosophy of science, I show that although the use of intentional predicates in mechanistic explanations sometimes leads to explanatorily inert claims, intentional predicates can also successfully feature in mechanistic explanations as tools for the functional analysis of the explanandum phenomenon. Despite the similarities between my account and Daniel Dennett's intentional-stance approach, I argue that intentional stance should not be understood as a theory of subpersonal causal explanation, and therefore cannot be used to assess the explanatory role of intentional predicates in neuroscience. Finally, I outline a general strategy for answering the question of what kind of language can be employed in mechanistic explanations.     

The Causal Organisation of Emotional Knowledge: A Developmental Study

Abstract

Using a theory of emotional understanding, the basis for distinguishing among happiness, anger, and sadness was investigated. Three and six-year-old children and adults predicted and explained people's emotional responses to different types of events. The events varied as to whether a person's goal was to attain or to avoid a state, whether the goal was achieved or not, who or what was responsible for success or failure, and whether the outcome was intentional or accidental. For all groups, the attainment and maintenance of goals was the primary focus of explanations for emotions and for the plans that followed emotions. A distinct set of features was used to infer and explain happiness as opposed to anger and sadness. Happiness was elicited by goal success and was followed by plans to maintain or enjoy current goal states. Anger and sadness were elicited by goal failure and were followed by plans to reinstate, replace, or forfeit goals. Anger occurred more frequently than sadness when an aversive rather than a loss state occurred, when an animate agent rather than a natural event caused a negative outcome, and when attention was focused on the cause rather than the consequence of goal failure. Two dimensions associated with anger changed as a function of age. First grade children, and adults were more likely than preschool children to predict anger in response to intentional harm, and their explanations for anger were more likely to refer to the agent or cause of goal failure. For all age groups, however, the majority of subjects responded to aversive situations with anger responses, independent of the causal conditions that produced the aversive state. The results therefore indicate that anger can be produced without intentional harm, but that intentional harm becomes an important dimension in attributing anger, especially as a function of development.     

Unintentional influences and opposition: A reply to graf

Abstract

People's behaviour is often influenced by processes of which they are not aware or that they do not intend. However, behaviour is also, at least partially, under intentional control. Most task performance is co-determined by these two classes of processes. Placing intentional control in opposition to unintentional influences is useful for understanding the nature of the two forms of processing. However, opposition alone cannot provide a pure measure of automatic influences because, as in most tasks, intentional processes also affect the overall level of performance. The goal of the process dissociation procedure is to disentangle the effects of these two forms of processing on behaviour. It approaches this goal by taking advantage of a unique property of intentionally controlled processes their ability to either oppose or act in concert with automatic processes. The goal of separating the two forms of processing is imperative for both theoretical and applied purposes.     

Normativity is the mother of intention: Wittgenstein, normative practices and neurological representations

To many philosophers, a scientific explanation of our contentful intentional states requires us to identify neurological representations that implement intentional states, and requires a reductive explanation of such representations' contents in terms of objective physical properties. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, however, contentful intentional states are normatively constituted within linguistic, social practices. These cannot be completely accounted for in purely physical terms. I outline this normative thesis, defending it from four objections: that it is not naturalistic, that social norms depend on optional desires to conform, that it over-intellectualizes having intentional states (so excludes animals and infants), and that it cannot account for the causal role of content. I explain the ramifications for scientific psychology and neuroscience, and for interpreting the results of such empirical research. Nothing is objectively a contentful representation, yet some brain states or processes can be normatively constituted as representations with content.     

Laws,causality and the intentional explanation of action

Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel Thesis, which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for the claim “reason is not a cause of action,” namely, the “proper logical” argument, the “logical relation” argument, and the “rule-following” argument. This rebuttal suggests that the causal relationship between reason and action can provide a justification for intentional explanations.     

Both sides of the story: explaining events in a narrative

Our experience of narrative has an internal and an external aspect--the content of the narrative’s representations, and its intentional, communicative aetiology. The interaction of these two things is crucial to understanding how narrative works. I begin by laying out what I think we can reasonably expect from a narrative by way of causal information, and how causality interacts with other attributes we think of as central to narrative. At a certain point this discussion will strike a problem: our judgements about what is a relevant possibility within the narrative’s story depend on our judgements of probability; but these latter judgements depend, in turn, on factors external to the world of the story, and cannot be explained in terms of causal relations available within the story. We need the external, author-centred perspective at this point. These different perspectives, the internal and the external, correspond to different types of explanations we may give of events in a story; I call these internal and external explanations. I show how these different explanations are made use of in two contrasting arthistorical projects. I use these examples as the basis for a generalisation about the structure of the two explanatory forms. Finally, I suggest some ways in which explanations of these two kinds relate to one another, and to our thinking when we are engaged by a narrative.

Action explanation and its presuppositions

In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation.     

Causal explanations for lack of pregnancy applying the common sense model of illness representation to the fertility context

Abstract

Objectives: The current study explored causal explanations for lack of pregnancy and association with help-seeking behaviour. Differences based on gender and country Human Development Index were examined.

Design: A mixed method design was used.

Main outcome measures: Data were drawn from the International Fertility Decision-Making Study, a cross-sectional study of 10,045 individuals (1690 men; 8355 women) from 79 countries. Respondents rated to what extent they believed their lack of pregnancy was due to something they or their partner had done/not done or other factors and described their reasons for making this rating.

Results: Respondents were aged 18–50 (M?=?31.83) years, partnered and had been trying to achieve a pregnancy/father a child for over six months (M?=?2.8 years). Men and women primarily believed their lack of pregnancy was due to medical problems or chance/bad luck. Thematic analysis of textual responses from 29.7% of the sample found that respondents focused on their personal experience or a salient life event when describing the cause of their lack of pregnancy. Women expressed more regret and helplessness about causes than men. Significant country differences were observed.

Conclusions: Individuals may develop inaccurate causal explanations based on their personal experiences. Access to accurate information is necessary to facilitate timely help-seeking.     

The explanatory potential of artificial societies

It is often claimed that artificial society simulations contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. At the hand of a particular example, this paper argues that artificial societies often cannot provide full explanations, because their models are not or cannot be validated. Despite that, many feel that such simulations somehow contribute to our understanding. This paper tries to clarify this intuition by investigating whether artificial societies provide potential explanations. It is shown that these potential explanations, if they contribute to our understanding, considerably differ from potential causal explanations. Instead of possible causal histories, simulations offer possible functional analyses of the explanandum. The paper discusses how these two kinds explanatory strategies differ, and how potential functional explanations can be appraised.     

Attributional retraining and achievement goals: An exploratory study on theoretical and empirical relationship

IntroductionAchievement goals and attribution theory are theoretically and empirically linked, but existing literature lacks to explore the link between achievement goals and attributional retraining (AR), a motivational intervention based on the causal attribution theory.Objective(s)The aims of this field study were to determine the effectiveness of an AR treatment aimed to restructure college students’ dysfunctional causal explanations of poor performance and to explore whether achievement goals are predictive of the use of adaptive causal attributions.MethodsStudents’ achievement goals orientation and causal attributions were assessed and AR treatment was provided to a sample of second-year college students with maladaptive attributional schemas.ResultsFindings confirmed the effectiveness of AR treatment in restructuring self-defeating stable attributional explanations and suggested that achievement goals are implicated in the adoption of adaptive causal dimensions.ConclusionThe importance of integrating the two discussed theoretical models in order to provide efficacious AR interventions with students at risk is discussed.     

Nomic Universals and Particular Causal Relations: Which are Basic and Which are Derived?

Armstrong holds that a law of nature is a certain sort of structural universal which, in turn, fixes causal relations between particular states of affairs. His claim that these nomic structural universals explain causal relations commits him to saying that such universals are irreducible, not supervenient upon the particular causal relations they fix. However, Armstrong also wants to avoid Plato’s view that a universal can exist without being instantiated, a view which he regards as incompatible with naturalism. This construal of naturalism forces Armstrong to say that universals are abstractions from a certain class of particulars; they are abstractions from first-order states of affairs, to be more precise. It is here argued that these two tendencies in Armstrong cannot be reconciled: To say that universals are abstractions from first-order states of affairs is not compatible with saying that universals fix causal relations between particulars. Causal relations are themselves states of affairs of a sort, and Armstrong’s claim that a law is a kind of structural universal is best understood as the view that any given law logically supervenes on its corresponding causal relations. The result is an inconsistency, Armstrong having to say that laws do not supervene on particular causal relations while also being committed to the view that they do so supervene. The inconsistency is perhaps best resolved by denying that universals are abstractions from states of affairs.

Normativity,naturalism and perspectivity

Abstract

Normative links have been considered a problem for reductionist theories of mind, primarily because of lack of isomorphism between intentional and non‐intentional conceptual schemes. The paper suggests a more radical tension between normative rationality and scientific naturalism. Normative explanations involve the recognition that agents are also subjects of experience. The distinctive form of intelligibility they bestow requires engagement with such subjectivity.     

Causal Co-personality: In defence of the psychological continuity theory

Abstract

The view that an account of personal identity can be provided in terms of psychological continuity has come under fire from an interesting new angle in recent years. Critics from a variety of rival positions have argued that it cannot adequately explain what makes psychological states co-personal (i.e. the states of a single person). The suggestion is that there will inevitably be examples of states that it ascribes wrongly using only the causal connections available to it. In this paper, I describe three distinct attacks on the psychological continuity theory along these lines. While I acknowledge that a number of interesting issues arise, I argue that the theory can withstand all three attacks.     

Interpreting cross-sectional data on stages of change

Abstract

The vast majority of studies investigating stage theories of health behaviour such as the transtheoretical model have used a cross-sectional research design. Participants are classified into stages and compared on theoretically relevant variables. This paper discusses the proper interpretation of cross-sectional data on stages of change. Linear patterns are not consistent with the stage model assumption that different causal factors are important at different stages but discontinuity patterns (patterns that do not show consistent increments or decrements across stages) can be diagnostic of a stage model. Researchers who use cross-sectional designs should specify predictions concerning the patterns to be expected under a stage model and under possible rival models, and interpret their data accordingly. Wherever possible, they should conduct prospective longitudinal and experimental studies which enable stronger inferences to be drawn.     

A teleonomic explanatory scheme

Abstract

The paper takes the form of a dialogue between an advocate of conventional causal modelling (A) and an advocate of an expanded conception of forecasting modelling that unifies causal and teleonomic explanations (B).     

The Senses Considered as One Perceptual System

ABSTRACT

J. J. Gibson (1966) rejected many classical assumptions about perception but retained 1 that dates back to classical antiquity: the assumption of separate senses. We suggest that Gibson's retention of this assumption compromised his novel concept of perceptual systems. We argue that lawful, 1:1 specification of the animal–environment interaction, which is necessary for perception to be direct, cannot exist in individual forms of ambient energy, such as light, or sound. We argue that specification exists exclusively in emergent, higher order patterns that extend across different forms of ambient energy. These emergent, higher order patterns constitute the global array. If specification exists exclusively in the global array, then direct perception cannot be based upon detection of patterns that are confined to individual forms of ambient energy and, therefore, Gibson's argument for the existence of several distinct perceptual systems cannot be correct. We argue that the senses function as a single, irreducible perceptual system that is sensitive exclusively to patterns in the global array. That is, rather than distinct perceptual systems there exists only 1 perceptual system.     

BUDDHISM,COMPARATIVE NEUROPHILOSOPHY,AND HUMAN FLOURISHING

Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain represents an ambitious foray into cross‐cultural neurophilosophy, making a compelling, though not entirely unproblematic, case for naturalizing Buddhist philosophy. While the naturalist account of mental causation challenges certain Buddhist views about the mind, the Buddhist analysis of mind and mental phenomena is far more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize the Buddhist claim that there could be mental states that are not reducible to their neural correlates; however, when the mental states in question reflect the embodied patterns of moral conduct that characterize the Buddhist way of being‐in‐the‐world, an account of their intentional and normative status becomes indispensable. It is precisely this synthesis of normativity and causal explanation that makes Buddhism special, and opens new avenues for enhancing, refining, and expanding the range of arguments and possibilities that comparative neurophilosophy can entertain.