Virtuous motives,moral luck,and assisted death

Abstract

In this paper I outline a motive-based virtue account of right action, according to which an action is right if it expresses or exhibits virtuous motive, and which defines virtue in terms of human flourishing. I indicate how this account allows us to deal with the problem of consequential luck. By applying this account to the question of whether it is ever morally right or acceptable to assist in someone’s death, I demonstrate how it also allows us to deal with the problem of circumstantial luck, which arises when an agent finds himself in a situation where he is forced to choose between two reprehensible acts.     

The Nature of Evil

Abstract

We readily claim that great moral catastrophes such as the Holocaust involve evil in some way, although it' not clear what this amounts to in a secular context. This paper seeks to provide a secular account of what evil is. It examines what is intuitively the most plausible account, namely that the evil act involves the production of great suffering (or other disvalue), and argues that such outcomes are neither necessary nor sufficient for an act to be evil. Only an appeal to distinctive patterns of motivation, so it is argued, will allow us to accommodate our intuitionsabout which acts are evil, and hence will provide an adequate account of the nature of evil.     

Qualified-agent virtue ethics

Abstract

Qualified-agent virtue ethics provides an account of right action in terms of the virtuous agent. It has become one of the most popular, but also most frequently criticized versions of virtue ethics. Many of the objections rest on the mistaken assumption that proponents of qualified-agent virtue ethics share the same view when it comes to fundamental questions about the meaning of the term ‘right action’ and the function of an account of right action. My aim in this paper is not to defend qualified-agent virtue ethics but to correct this misunderstanding, and this will hopefully leave us in a better position to evaluate it.     

Validation du Questionnaire sur l’implication parentale dans le suivi scolaire (QIPSS) chez des parents d’élèves du primaire en contexte défavorisé et pluriethnique

IntroductionThe effect of parental school involvement on children's academic success has a long-standing basis in research. However, few validated measures of parental involvement exist.ObjectiveThis study aims to assess the validity of the Questionnaire sur l’implication parentale dans le suivi scolaire (QIPSS), an instrument developed from a synthesis of existing parental involvement models in the literature.MethodThe validation sample included 711 parents of elementary students who mostly present an immigrant background. This sample was collected in five schools located in disadvantaged areas. This study includes two time points collected over 2 consecutive school years.ResultsThe QIPSS has good construct validity and satisfactory predictive validity. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses allowed us to generate a model of parental involvement comprising five dimensions, some of which predicting students’ academic performance a year later.ConclusionFindings are discussed in light of previous parental involvement studies. The QIPSS is proved to be a good tool to account for parental involvement in a research context. Nonetheless, children's outcomes other than academic success should be taken into account in future studies.     

Kant’s “I think” and the agential approach to self-knowledge

ABSTRACT

This paper relates Kant’s account of pure apperception to the agential approach to self-knowledge. It argues that his famous claim ‘The I think must be able to accompany all of my representations’ (B131) does not concern the possibility of self-ascribing beliefs. Kant does advance this claim in the service of identifying an a priori warrant we have as psychological persons, that is, subjects of acts of thinking that are imputable to us. But this warrant is not one to self-knowledge that we have as critical reasoners. It is, rather, an a priori warrant we have, as thinkers, to prescribe to given representations their conformity to principles of thinking inherent in our capacity of understanding itself.     

Towards a New Kind of Semantic Normativity

Abstract

Hannah Ginsborg has recently offered a new account of normativity, according to which normative attitudes are essential to the meaningful use of language. The kind of normativity she has in mind –– not semantic but ‘primitive’ — is supposed to help us to avoid the pitfalls of both non-reductionist and reductive dispositionalist theories of meaning. For, according to her, it enables us both to account for meaning in non-semantic terms, which non-reductionism cannot do, and to make room for the normativity of meaning, which reductive dispositionalism cannot do. I argue that the main problem with Ginsborg’s account is that it fails to say what makes it possible for expressions to be governed by conditions of correct application to begin with. I do believe, however, that normative attitudes are essential to meaning, but they have to be thought of as fully semantic. And I suggest that conditions of correct application can be present only when those attitudes are present.     

Medical Family Therapy for a Woman with End-stage Crohn's Disease and Her Son

Medical family therapy grew out of the experiences of family therapists working with other professionals to provide comprehensive, integrated healthcare for patients (McDaniel, Hepworth, & Doherty, 1992). This is the story of one such patient, her son, and those of us who were the three primary participants on her treatment team. To provide an account that comes closest to the experience itself, we have taken quotes from videotaped sessions and electronic mail communications that occurred throughout the course of therapy. Each provider tells part of the story in his or her own voice. The commentary is provided by Susan McDaniel.     

Editorial Notice

Abstract

John McDowell has claimed that the rational link between perceptions and empirical judgements allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality, one which extends beyond the objects perceived. In this way, we can be said to have a perceptual awareness of the world. I argue that McDowell's account of this perceptual awareness does not succeed. His account as it stands does not have the resources to explain how our perceptions can present objects as belonging to a wider reality, regardless of the judgements we make about that reality. I suggest that we can give a better account of this perceptual awareness of the world by appealing to transcendental phenomenology. A phenomenological study of perceptual experiences describes how they are structured by a sense of the perceived objects as belonging to a world containing other objects of possible perception. I shall outline this sense we have of the world, and argue that it allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality. Transcendental phenomenology can thus help to explain our perceptual awareness of the world.     

Spécificité des stratégies de coping des patients en rémission de la maladie de Crohn : une étude qualitative

IntroductionCrohn's disease (CD), a chronic inflammatory bowel disease, has strong psychological and social repercussions related to the specificity of the symptomatology. To better understand how patients cope with the disease, coping strategies have been studied but without taking into account the specificity of the CD experience.ObjectiveOur objective is to identify the perceived coping strategies used by patients in relation to their illness experience.MethodUsing a qualitative approach, semi-structured interviews and thematic content analysis with 33 CD patients in remission were conducted.ResultsOur results highlight that some of the coping strategies used are not taken into account by the coping scales frequently used in the literature. Indeed, the illness experience appears to be fundamental in the establishment of new strategies based on the experiential knowledge patients use to reduce the stress induced by a potential relapse. Moreover, coping strategies based on positive emotions are also implemented, and they enable patients to make sense of the disease.ConclusionThe coping strategies, i.e., “experiential knowledge” and “positive emotions”, may shed more light on the complexity of the illness experience of CD patients and allow us to make recommendations concerning the psychological support of patients.     

We,Heirs of Enlightenment: Critical Theory,Democracy and Social Science

Abstract

My goal here is to come to terms with the Enlightenment as the horizon of critical social science. First, I consider in more detail the understanding of the Enlightenment in Critical Theory, particularly in its conception of the sociality of reason. Second, I develop an account of freedom in terms of human powers, along the lines of recent capability conceptions that link freedom to the development of human powers, including the power to interpret and create norms. Finally, I show the ways in which the social sciences can be moral sciences in the Enlightenment sense. This account provides us with a coherent Enlightenment standard by which to judge institutions as promoting development, understood in terms of the capabilities necessary for freedom. The relevant social science in this area might include the robust generalization that there has never been a famine in a democratic society.     

The Universe as a Saturated Phenomenon: The Christian Concept of Creation in View of Modern Philosophical and Scientific Developments

Abstract

The article develops an argument that the Christian concept of creation of the world, being an issue of the modern dialogue between theology and science, must be rethought and reformulated along the lines of recent advancements in cosmology and philosophy. It is argued that the prevailing natural attitude to the issue of the creation of the universe (whether based on Biblical hermeneutics or scientific theories) is philosophically inadequate because it does not account for the facticity of the articulating consciousness, which itself is the modality of the created. Correspondingly, the issue of creation receives a different interpretation: it is the coming into existence of personal life in the Divine image, capable of recognizing its createdness, and articulating creation as hypostatically distant from the comprehending subjectivity. Creation as inseparable from the life of subjectivity thus acquires the status of a saturated phenomenon to which neither successive quantitative, nor qualitative synthesis, nor temporal synthesis can be applied; it also escapes a rubric of relation. The created world, or the universe as a whole, gives itself to us from its own “self” to such an extent that it affects us, changes us and almost constitutes us, and stages us out of its own giving itself to us. The universe is present in the background of our existence through relationship and communion in such a way that we can express this presence ecstatically—through music, painting, poetry etc.—that presence which cannot be formalized in definitions of physics and mathematics. It is the living humanity that is the only and ultimate manifestation of God through its creation.     

Narrating the self: Freud,Dennett and complexity theory

Abstract

Adopting a materialist approach to the mind has far reaching implications for many presuppositions regarding the properties of the brain, including those that have traditionally been consigned to “the mental” aspect of human being. One such presupposition is the conception of the disembodied self. In this article we aim to account for the self as a material entity, in that it is wholly the result of the physiological functioning of the embodied brain. Furthermore, we attempt to account for the structure of the self by invoking the logic of the narrative. While our conception of narrative selfhood incorporates the work of both Freud and Dennett, we offer a critique of these two theorists and then proceed to amend their theories by means of complexity theory. We argue that the self can be characterised as a complex system, which allows us to account for the structure of the material self.     

The Virtue of Dialogue,Dialogue as Virtue in Plato's Protagoras

Abstract

This article interprets Plato's Protagoras as a defense, against the claim of the sophists to possess a skill of teaching virtue, of Socrates’ claim in the Apology (38a) that the greatest good for a human being is examining oneself and others every day with regard to virtue. Attention to the often-neglected complex series of prologues as well as the dispute about method at the dialogue's center shows both the erotic and the dialogical character of Socratic virtue. Specifically, human virtue turns out to be a process of becoming as opposed to being good that can be carried out only in constant dialogue with others. In this context, the ‘science of measurement’ Socrates describes on behalf of Protagoras and the other sophists is exposed for what it is: a delusion that continues to exert its power over us today on account of the recurrent human wish to possess a skill or technique that could save us by guaranteeing the goodness and happiness of our lives.     

Transformative Choice,Practical Reasons and Trust

Abstract

In this article I reflect on the question of whether we can have reason to make transformative choices. In attempting to answer it, I do three things. First, I bring forward an internalist account of practical reasons which entails the idea that agents should deliberate to the best of their ability. Second, I discuss L.A. Paul’s views on transformative choice, arguing that, although they present a real problem, the problem is not as profound as she believes it is. Third, I argue that, given the situation in which we face transformative choices (a situation of principled uncertainty though not cluelessness), trust is an appropriate response to transformative choices, and that when one’s trust that one’s current desires will be fulfilled in making a transformative choice is reasonable, one has a reason to make it. Thus, trust turns out to be a crucial response to a profound problem each of us will face during our lives.     

E-mail and Eudaimonia: Global Justice and Moral Concern

Abstract

In his recent book, Happiness, Pedro Tabensky has argued for an Aristotelian account of happiness as eudaimonia or flourishing. However, his account of happiness appears to have the unfortunate implication that both individual eudaimonia and global justice are in principle unattainable. I examine Tabensky’s reasons for believing that his account has such unfortunate implications, and suggest that, if appropriately modified, he would be able to avoid them.     

Trust in the Guise of Belief

Abstract

What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state. This has even lead some philosophers to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit, or to give up on the idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had. Here, I propose that ‘trust’ is the name we give to mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was to be thought of in ‘pragmatist’ terms (that is, as a state posited primarily to explain agents’ actions) and belief resists ‘pragmatist’ treatment. Only such an account, I argue, can univocally account for all the diverse features of trust. As such, I also propose that the explanation of trust provides us with a case for understanding the limitations of a comprehensively ‘pragmatist’, or ‘Neo-Wittgensteinian’ conception of the mental.     

Empathy and transformative experience without the first person point of view (a reply to L. A. Paul)1

Abstract

In her very interesting ‘First-personal modes of presentation and the problem of empathy’ (2017, 315–336), L. A. Paul argues that the phenomenon of empathy gives us reason to care about the first person point of view: that as theorists we can only understand, and as humans only evince, empathy by appealing to that point of view. We are skeptics about the importance of the first person point of view, although not about empathy. The goal of this paper is to see if we can account for empathy without the ideology of the first person. We conclude that we can.     

The prescriptive power of the television host. A transposition of Milgram's obedience paradigm to the context of TV game show

IntroductionToday's fascination with television makes us wonder whether it might not represent an authority capable of leading people in a television studio to inflict cruel acts on others, even though they condemn those acts.ObjectiveThe experiment reported here allows us to answer this question in the affirmative. Therefore, we transposed Milgram's famous experimental obedience paradigm to the context of a “real” TV game show, in the studio of a large television production company, with a live audience and no prizes.MethodWe set up several experimental conditions designed to tell us if, in such contexts, obedience was the dominant response, as it is in the often-replicated classic situation. We also wished to know if the introduction of variations would reduce obedience.ResultsThe results show that obedience to the host is the dominant response, as it is in Milgram's classic situation. However, variations that are assumed to reduce this obedience do not in fact demonstrate the expected effects. An additional experimental condition appears to demonstrate that a determining factor of obedience is the physical proximity of the host incarnating the televisual power.ConclusionWe offer a conclusion addressing the societal aspects of obedience.     

Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples

Abstract

I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt‐type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt‐type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing to considerations of responsibility and luck, I then show that the global cases survive Kane's objections