The effect of thematic content on the ‘Wason selection task’

This paper concerns the differential effects of use of ‘thematic’, rather than abstract (symbolic), content on the ‘Wason selection task’. An effect of thematic content has been reported several times, originally by Wason & Shapiro (1971), but Manktelow & Evans (1979) report five experiments that failed to obtain an effect and argue against the validity of the content effect in general. However, it is pointed out that four of their experiments use a novel content and that there are previous reports of non-effective content in the literature. It is concluded that a particular type of thematic content cannot be treated as a ‘random sample’ of thematic content in general, and that their argument thus rests upon their failure to produce an effect of the specific (’towns and transport’) content used by Wason and Shapiro. This produces an essentially empirical controversy which is settled in two ways. First, Manktelow and Evans’s criticisms of two previous replications are shown to be misleading. Second, an experiment is reported that exactly copies the Wason and Shapiro design and produces a significant effect of content. It is concluded that the Manktelow and Evans result most probably was due to a Type 2 error. Finally, a hypothesis is developed to account for both the effect of certain types of content and the lack of effect of others, including that used in Manktelow and Evans’s first four experiments.     

Transfer of conditional reasoning: Effects explanations and initial problem types

Transfer of reasoning on Wason's (1966) selection task was explored in three experiments. Experiment 1 tested the effects of problem explanations and verbalization instructions on transfer from abstract or thematic problems to abstract problems. Explanations facilitated transfer only when the initial problems were abstract; verbalization did not produce transfer between problems. Experiment 2 explored the effects of problem similarity and explanations on transfer between problems. Although transfer occurred following explanations, no effect of similarity was found for thematic problems. In both of these experiments, the thematic effect (Wason & Shapiro, 1971) was observed. Experiment 3 examined the effects of explanations to abstract or thematic problems on transfer to subsequent abstract or thematic problems. Transfer of reasoning occurred from both initial problem types, particularly to problems of the same type; however, transfer occurred to a greater extent from abstract problems than from thematic problems. The results are discussed in terms of problem similarity and Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) pragmatic reasoning schema hypothesis.     

Vague Objects Without Ontically Indeterminate Identity

The supporter of vague objects has been long challenged by the following ‘Argument from Identity’: 1) if there are vague objects, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3) there are no vague objects. Some supporters of vague objects have argued that 1) is false. Noonan (Analysis 68: 174–176, 2008) grants that 1) does not hold in general, but claims that ontically indeterminate identity is indeed implied by the assumption that there are vague objects of a certain special kind (i.e. vague objects*). One can therefore formulate a ‘New Argument from Identity’: 1′) if there are vague objects*, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3′) there are no vague objects*. Noonan’s strategy is to argue that premiss 1′) is inescapable, and, as a consequence, that Evans’s alleged defence of 2) is a real challenge for any supporter of vague objects. I object that a supporter of vague objects who grants the validity of Evans’s argument allegedly in favour of 2) should reject premiss 1′). The threat of the New Argument from Identity is thus avoided.     

Defending the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober’s empirical approach

Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”: If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with B). In their “Epiphenomenalism: The Dos and the Don’ts,” Larry Shapiro and Elliott Sober employ a novel empirical approach to challenge the piggyback principle. Their empirical approach pulls from the experiments of August Weismann regarding the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Through an examination of Weismann’s experiments, Shapiro and Sober extract lessons in reasoning about the epiphenomenalism of a property. And according to these empirically drawn lessons, the piggyback principle is a don’t. My primary aim in this paper is to defend the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober’s empirical approach.     

Gavagai again

Quine (1960, Word and object. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, ch. 2) claims that there are a variety of equally good schemes for translating or interpreting ordinary talk. ‘Rabbit’ might be taken to divide its reference over rabbits, over temporal slices of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits, without significantly affecting which sentences get classified as true and which as false. This is the basis of his famous ‘argument from below’ to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the matter as to how reference is to be divided. Putative counterexamples to Quine’s claim have been put forward in the past (see especially Evans 1975; 1975, Journal of Philosophy, LXXII(13), 343–362. Reprinted in McDowell (Ed.), Gareth Evans: Collected papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press.), and various patches have been suggested (e.g. Wright (1997, The indeterminacy of translation. In C. Wright & B. Hale (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of language (pp. 397–426). Oxford: Blackwell)). One lacuna in this literature is that one does not find any detailed presentation of what exactly these interpretations are supposed to be. Drawing on contemporary literature on persistence, the present paper sets out detailed semantic treatments for fragments of English, whereby predicates such as ‘rabbit’ divide their reference over four-dimensional continuants (Quine’s rabbits), instantaneous temporal slices of those continuants (Quine’s rabbit-slices) and the simple elements which compose those slices (undetached rabbit parts) respectively. Once we have the systematic interpretations on the table, we can get to work evaluating them.     

The Journeys of Generation Y Missionaries from the United Kingdom: A Modification of Lewis Rambo’s ‘Stages of Religious Change’ Model

The metaphorical journeys of GenY missionaries from the United Kingdom towards commitment to long-term, cross-cultural missionary work overseas were studied using data collected by interview and questionnaire. Lewis Rambo’s ‘stages of religious change’ model describes many aspects of these journeys. The addition of two new dimensions—recognising events that deflect a person from a straight-line trajectory (‘deflection’) and events that provide the encouragement to go on (‘support’)—produces a model that describes these journeys more accurately. The model is further improved by adding new aspects to the ‘quest,’ ‘commitment’ and ‘consequences’ dimensions, and by the identification of differences between men and women. The modified model provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the journey of GenY-ers toward a missionary career.     

How Causal is Downward Causation?

Summary  The purpose of this paper is to lay bare the major problems underlying the concept of downward causation as discussed within the perspective of the present interest for phenomena that are characterized by self-organization.In our discussion of the literature, we have focussed on two questions: (1) What sorts of things are said to be, respectively, causing and caused within the context of downward causation? And (2) What is the meaning of ‘causing’ in downward causation? We have concluded that the concept of ‘downward causation’ is muddled with regard to the meaning of causation and fuzzy with regard to the nature of the causes and the effects. Moreover, we have concluded that ‘causation’ in respect of ‘downward causation’ is usually understood in terms of explanation and determination rather than in terms of causation in the sense of ‘bringing about’. Thus, the term ‘downward causation’ is badly chosen.     

Narratives of Mastery and Resistance: Lay Ethics of Nanotechnology

This paper contributes towards a lay ethics of nanotechnology through an analysis of talk from focus groups designed to examine how laypeople grapple with the meaning of a technology ‘in-the-making’. We describe the content of lay ethical concerns before suggesting that this content can be understood as being structured by five archetypal narratives which underpin talk. These we term: ‘the rich get richer and the poor get poorer’; ‘kept in the dark’; ‘opening Pandora’s box’; ‘messing with nature’; and ‘be careful what you wish for’. We further suggest that these narratives can be understood as sharing an emphasis on the ‘giftedness’ of life, and that together they are used to resist dominant technoscientific and Enlightenment narratives of control and mastery which are encapsulated by nanotechnology.