EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A VIEW TOWARD THE FUTURE

This article reviews recent changes in evidentiary standards in employment discrimination litigation as they relate to disparate impact theory. Precedents established in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio , altering the employee's and the employer's responsibilities in discrimination cases are analyzed. In reaction to these and other Supreme Court rulings, Congress introduced a civil rights bill which was eventually signed into law after numerous compromises. The debate surrounding the development of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the legislation itself are reviewed. With respect to disparate impact, the Act addresses the criteria for establishing a prima facie case (causation), burden of proof standards, and a definition of business necessity. However, a close reading of the Act and a review of recent disparate impact cases suggest the causation and business necessity issues are not fully resolved. Potential implications for managing personnel decision systems in this new environment are discussed.     

LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT TESTING: Albemarle AND BEYOND

Recent court cases have continued to support the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's employee selection guidelines. The most unambiguous support came in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody , decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in 1975. The Court's 1976 opinion in Washington v. Davis set forth more relaxed statutory standards than those of the EEOC Guidelines, but subsequent lower court decisions have continued to support the EEOC Guidelines, and the new Federal Executive Agency Guidelines have not supplanted them. The EEOC Guidelines provisions upheld in Albemarle are compared with the APA Test Standards and with APA Division 14's Personnel Selection Principles, and implications for employment testing are discussed.     

International Law and Morality in the Theory of Secession

In order responsibly to decide whether there ought to be an international legal right of secession, I believe we need an account of the morality of secession. I propose that territorial and political societies have a moral right to secede, and on that basis I propose a regime designed to give such groups an international legal right to secede. This regime would create a procedure that could be followed by groups desiring to secede or by states desiring to resolve the issue of secession. It would give territorial political societies a legally recognized liberty to conduct a plebiscite on secession, and, assuming such a plebiscite is won by the secessionist side, a qualified right in international law to create a state without interference. Alan Buchanan has argued that proposals of this sort would create perverse incentives. I argue that there is no good reason to believe this. The point is to allow the legal regulation of secession in cases where there are active secessionist movements with legitimate moral claims, and to attempt to dampen the desire for secession in cases where secessionist sentiment is not well grounded in social and geographic reality.     

Hare on utilitarianism and intuitive morality

InMoral Thinking R. M. Hare offers a very influential defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections. Hare's argument is roughly that utilitarianism conflicts with defensible moral intuitions only in unusual cases and that, in such cases, even defensible moral intuitions are unreliable. This paper reconstructs Hare's arguments and argues that they presuppose the success of his problematic proof of utilitarianism. Contrary to what many have thought, Hare's negative defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections is not separable from his proof. In the second part of the paper I argue that Hare does not succeed in defending utilitarianism against the objection that it is too demanding. The final section of the paper sketches a substantially revised version of Hare's reply to intuitive objections. So revised, the argument is independent of Hare's proof and affords a plausible answer to the objection that utilitarianism is too demanding.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Loyola University and Saint Olaf College. I am greatly indebted to my colleague Harry Gensler for helpful comments on numerous drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Michael Gorr, Brad Hooker, Shelly Kagan, Heidi Malm, Richard Hare, Peter Singer, Onora O'Neill, George Trey, Joe Sullivan, and an anonymous referee. This paper developed out of a series of discussions with Mark Overvold. I dedicate the paper to his memory. I would also like to thank Loyola University for a paid leave of absence which enabled me to write the paper.     

Do Vague Probabilities Really Scotch Pascal’s Wager?

Alan Hájek has recently argued that certain assignments of vague probability defeat Pascals Wager. In particular, he argues that skeptical agnostics – those whose probability for God's existence is vague over an interval containing zero – have nothing to fear from Pascal. In this paper, I make two arguments against Hájek: (1) that skeptical agnosticism is a form of dogmatism, and as such should be rejected; (2) that in any case, choice situations with vague probability assignments ought to be treated as second-order cases of choice under uncertainty, with the result that belief in God is the favored option in a very wide range of cases.     

On finite approximability of ψ-intermediate logics

The aim of this note is to show (Theorem 1.6) that in each of the cases: = {, }, or {, , }, or {, , } there are uncountably many -intermediate logics which are not finitely approximable. This result together with the results known in literature allow us to conclude (Theorem 2.2) that for each : either all -intermediate logics are finitely approximate or there are uncountably many of them which lack the property.     

Estimation of parameters in a truncated trivariate normal distribution

This paper gives maximum-likelihood estimators for certain parameters in a truncated trivariate normal distribution when the values of the other parameters are known. The estimators are functions of a random sample. Approximate variances and covariances of the estimators, when the sample size is large, are also given. The type of truncation considered is merely restriction of the range of one of the variates, whose true mean and variance are assumed to be known. Two cases of such restriction are treated: (a) ( x < + ); (b) (- <x '), where and ' are arbitrary cutoff points which are assumed to be known. A precise statement of the estimation problem is given in Section 1. Section 2 contains preliminary calculations. The estimators appear in Section 3. The asymptotic variances and covariances of the estimators are given in Section 4. The estimators and their asymptotic variances and covariances can be easily specialized to be suitable for the case of a certain truncated bivariate normal distribution (Sections 3 and 4).     

On two arguments for the indeterminacy of personal identity

Both arguments are based on the breakdown of normal criteria of identity in certain science-fictional circumstances. In one case, normal criteria would support the identity of person A with each of two other persons, B and C; and it is argued that, in the imagined circumstances, A=B and A=C have no truth value. In the other, a series or spectrum of cases is tailored to a sorites argument. At one end of the spectrum, persons A and B are such that A=B is clearly true; at the other end, A and B are such that the identity is clearly false. In between, normal criteria of identity leave the truth or falsehood of A=B undecided, and it is argued that in these circumstances A=B has no truth value.These arguments are to be understood counterfactually. My claim is that, so understood, neither establishes its conclusion. The first involves a pair of counterfactual situations that are equally possible or tied. If A=B and A=C have no truth value, a counterfactual conditional with one of them as consequent and an antecedent that is true in circumstances in which either is true should have no truth value. Intuitively, however, any such counterfactual is false. The second argument can be seen to invite an analogous response. If this is right, however, there is an important disanalogy between this and the classical paradox of the heap. If the disanalogy is only apparent, the argument shows at most that the existence of persons can be indeterminate.     

Center of gravity motions and ankle joint stiffness control in upright undisturbed stance modeled through a fractional Brownian motion framework

The authors modeled the center of gravity vertical projection (CG(v)) and the difference, CP - CG(v), which, combined, constitute the center of pressure (CP) trajectory, as fractional Brownian motion in order to investigate their relative contributions and their spatiotemporal articulation. The results demonstrated that CG(v) and CP - CG(v) motions are both endowed in complementary fashion with strong stochastic and part-deterministic behaviors. In addition, if the temporal coordinates remain similar for all 3 trajectories by definition, the switch between the successive control mechanisms appears for shorter displacements for CP - CG(v) and CG(v) than for CP trajectories. Results deduced from both input (CG(v)) and muscular stiffness (CP - CG(v)) thus provide insight into the way the central nervous system regulates stance control and in particular how CG and CP - CG are controlled.     

Three-valued Logic,Indeterminacy and Quantum Mechanics

The paper consists of two parts. The first part begins with the problem of whether the original three-valued calculus, invented by J. ukasiewicz, really conforms to his philosophical and semantic intuitions. I claim that one of the basic semantic assumptions underlying ukasiewicz's three-valued logic should be that if under any possible circumstances a sentence of the form X will be the case at time t is true (resp. false) at time t, then this sentence must be already true (resp. false) at present. However, it is easy to see that this principle is violated in ukasiewicz's original calculus (as the cases of the law of excluded middle and the law of contradiction show). Nevertheless it is possible to construct (either with the help of the notion of supervaluation, or purely algebraically) a different three-valued, semi-classical sentential calculus, which would properly incorporate ukasiewicz's initial intuitions. Algebraically, this calculus has the ordinary Boolean structure, and therefore it retains all classically valid formulas. Yet because possible valuations are no longer represented by ultrafilters, but by filters (not necessarily maximal), the new calculus displays certain non-classical metalogical features (like, for example, non-extensionality and the lack of the metalogical rule enabling one to derive p is true or q is true from pqq is true).The second part analyses whether the proposed calculus could be useful in formalizing inferences in situations, when for some reason (epistemological or ontological) our knowledge of certain facts is subject to limitation. Special attention should be paid to the possibility of employing this calculus to the case of quantum mechanics. I am going to compare it with standard non-Boolean quantum logic (in the Jauch–Piron approach), and to show that certain shortcomings of the latter can be avoided in the former. For example, I will argue that in order to properly account for quantum features of microphysics, we do not need to drop the law of distributivity. Also the idea of reading off the logical structure of propositions from the structure of Hilbert space leads to some conceptual troubles, which I am going to point out. The thesis of the paper is that all we need to speak about quantum reality can be acquired by dropping the principle of bivalence and extensionality, while accepting all classically valid formulas.     

Objective chance,indicative conditionals and decision theory; or,how you can be smart,rich and keep on smoking

In this paper I explore a version of standard (expected utility) decision theory in which the probability parameter is interpreted as an objective chance believed by agents to obtain and values of this parameter are fixed by indicative conditionals linking possible actions with possible outcomes. After reviewing some recent developments centering on the common-cause counterexamples to the standard approach, I introduce and briefly discuss the key notions in my own approach. (This approach has essentially the same results as the causal approach in common-cause cases.) I then discuss the Rule of Dominance and find, in the context of the present proposal, that it cannot serve as an independent source of action justification. Turning next to Newcomb's Problem, I argue that the much discussed issue of back-tracking counterfactuals is something of a red herring for decision theory. Once the twin distractions of back-tracking counterfactuals and Dominance Reasoning are set aside the 1-box solution emerges as a natural consequence of the present proposal. It is of interest that this proposal agrees with the causal approach in the standard common-cause examples and the expected-utility approach in the Newcomb case: one can be smart and rich and keep on smoking.I wish to thank the members of the Philosophy Departments at Dalhousie and Simon Fraser Universities and two anonymous referees for much helpful criticism on earlier drafts.     

A generalization of the theory of subjective probability and expected utility

A generalization of the usual approach to the expected utility theory is given, with the aim of representing the state of belief of an agent who may decline on grounds of ignorance to express a preference between a given pair of acts and would, therefore, be considered irrational from a Bayesian point of view. Taking state, act, and outcome as primitive concepts, a utility function on the outcomes is constructed in the usual way. Each act is represented by a utility-valued function on the states — but not all such functions are taken to represent acts. A weaker than usual set of axioms on preferences between acts is now postulated. It is shown that any agent can be represented by a risk function that assigns to each (mixed) state a number that gives the maximum loss (in utility) the agent might expect should be the actual state of the world. The form of the risk function is determined, both in general and in important particular cases. The results show that any rational agent behaves as though he were acting under the guidance of a set of Bayesian (or, more generally, pseudo-Bayesian) advisors.     

Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States Supreme Court on Mental Health Issues Associated With “Physician‐Assisted Suicide”

After providing background material related to the Supreme Court cases on “physician‐assisted suicide” (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, and Vacco v. Quill, 1997), this article presents the amicus curiae brief that was submitted to the United States Supreme Court by 2 national mental health organizations, a state psychological association, and an ad hoc coalition of mental health professionals. The document focuses on the role mental health professionals can play in discussions about hastened death. In particular, it is asserted that mental health professionals can assess capacity the decision‐making process, and the role of coercion in such decisions. The effect of the brief on the Supreme Court and within the organizations involved is also discussed.     

The Weight of Context: Headscarves in Holland

This paper explores the potential of a contextual approach to multicultural conflict. It reconstructs two cases that were hotly debated in the Netherlands—Islamic headscarves for police officers and for court officers—and asks whether a contextual approach reaches compromises and thus promotes social stability more easily than a deductive approach. The argument is that a deductive approach accepts standing interpretations of normative principles, whereas a contextual approach reinterprets these principles in the light of the circumstances and that, whether or not it promotes social stability, a contextual approach makes us attend to otherwise neglected perspectives and thus yields greater normative insights.     

Crews: A Distinct Type of Work Team

Distinctions among different types of work teams have been emerging in the theoretical literature as a key to understanding important work team processes. This has been precipitated by an increased appreciation of the importance of a work team's operating environment on such processes. Moreover, such distinctions are felt to be useful to practice in such areas as team staffing, training, and establishing leadership requirements. The present study investigates the concept of crews and contrasts it with other types of work teams by empirically assessing crewness, the extent to which a work team can be classified as a crew. A new scale of crewness was developed and administered to various collectives of workers including fire fighter crew members and project team members in order to establish the unique qualities of crews to show that they are a distinct type of work team. Construct and discriminant validity evidence is offered in support of the crewness scale. Approaches for further investigation of this distinction are also provided in order to guide both research and practice in this area.     

Nonstandard combinatorics

Ramsey type theorems are theorems of the form: if certain sets are partitioned at least one of the parts has some particular property. In its finite form, Ramsey's theory will ask how big the partitioned set should be to assure this fact. Proofs of such theorems usually require a process of multiple choice, so that this apparently pure combinatoric field is rich in proofs that use ideal guides in making the choices. Typically they may be ultrafilters or points in the compactification of the given set. It is, therefore, not surprising that nonstandard elements are much more natural guides in some of the proofs and in the general abstract treatment.In Section 1 we start off with some very natural examples of Ramsey type exercises that illustrate our idea. In Section 2 we give a nonstandard proof of the infinite Ramsey theorem. Section 3 tries to do the same for Hindman's theorem, and points out, where nonstandard analysis must use some hard standard facts to make the proof go through.In Section 4 we describe a general theory of Ramsey Properties, identifying a Ramsey Property with its nonstandard kernel in the enlargement.In Section 5 nonstandard analysis is used again to deduce the finite Ramsey theorems from their infinite counterpart. More generally, a compactness theorem is proved to work for all theorems of this type.     

Who Is I?

Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom I refers, we show that there are occasionswhen it is not always obvious. In demonstratingthis we challenge Kaplan's assumptionthat the utterer, agent and referent of I arealways the same person.We begin by presenting what weregard to be the received view about indexicalreference popularized by David Kaplan in hisinfluential 1972 Demonstratives before goingon, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle'sanswering machine paradox which may be thoughtto threaten this view, and his deferredutterance method of resolving this puzzle. Insection 3 we introduce a novel version of theanswering machine paradox which suggests that,in certain cases, Kaplan's identification ofutterer, agent and referent of I breaks down.In the fourth section we go on to consider arecent revision of Kaplan's picture by Predelliwhich appeals to the intentions of the utterer,before arguing that this picture is committedto unacceptable consequences and, therefore,should be avoided if possible. Finally, insection 5, we present a new revision ofKaplan's account which retains much of thespirit of his original proposal whilst offeringa intuitively acceptable way to explain all ofthe apparently problematic data. In doing so,we also show how this picture is able toexplain the scenario which motivated Predelli'saccount without appealing to speakerintentions.     

When words lose their power: Shiatsu as a strategic tool in psychotherapy

A psychotherapist sometimes reaches the edge of his abilities, the point at which he/she realizes that for a certain client, words lose their power. The therapist may try a variety of psychological approaches, but with no effect, until he/she comes to feel that perhaps the patient simply cannot be helped. This article points the possibility that in certain cases, when psychotherapy is not bearing fruit, the psychotherapist can make use of additional tools to break through the barrier to treatment. These tools can include psychodrama, movement or dance therapy, and many other non- verbal techniques. The additional tool discussed here is Shiatsu (Acupressure), whose integration in certain cases was found to bring about the desired breakthrough, ultimately bringing the patient to the point at which talking was meaningful and effective again.     

Differential method of characterizing gait strategies from step lengths and frequencies: strategy of velocity modulation

The differential method consists of the analysis of the variation of gait parameters length, frequency, and velocity with respect to their mean values, respectively, Delta L = L - L(m), Delta f = f - f(m), and Delta v = v - vm, where L(m), f(m), and v(m) represent the mean values of those parameters. Assuming that the strategy of modulation of velocity implies that L and f are functions of v and that statistical analyses of ratios Delta L/Delta v and Delta f/Delta v have established that there is a very significant linear correlation, close to 1, between those ratios, the mathematical procedure allows one to determine the equation of step length, L = a x f + b x v + K, where a and b are the slope and the intercept of the linear regression and K is close to L(m). The equation was experimentally tested on 140 gait sequences performed by 6 participants and for gait velocities ranging from 0.6 to 2.2 m/s and was found to be very representative of all individual values. The differential method provides another way of using the derivative of velocity, v = L x f, to characterize the strategy of velocity modulation, which then permits one to determine the linear equation of velocity, v = f x L + L x f(m) - L(m) x f(m), and to show that the respective parts played by each parameter in the progression velocity are approximately equal. The author establishes the uniqueness of the different linear adjustments and discusses the differential method's own modes of use, that is, interindividually or globally.     

From Brouwerian Counter Examples to the Creating Subject

The original Brouwerian counter examples were algorithmic in nature; after the introduction of choice sequences, Brouwer devised a version which did not depend on algorithms. This is the origin of the creating subject technique. The method allowed stronger refutations of classical principles. Here it is used to show that negative dense subsets of the continuum are indecomposable.