How accurate is size and distance perception for very far terrestrial objects? Function and causality

This study investigated absolute estimation of size and distance for natural and artificial objects at viewing distances of 1.1–15.3 km (Experiments 1 and 2) and 0.4–5.0 m (Experiment 3). The main results were that, regardless of distance range, size and distance estimates (S′ andD′) were related to objective size and distance (S andD), respectively, by a power function with an exponent of unity, but great individual differences in exponent were obtained for the far objects. The ratioS′/D′ was reasonably represented byS′/D′ =Kθ ⁿ andS′/D′ = tan(aθ +b), rather thanS′/D′ = tan θ, where θ is the visual angle. Partial correlations were obtained to examine whether (1) apparent size is determined by taking apparent distance into account or (2) both apparent size and apparent distance are determined directly by external stimuli. The combined data for the far objects and the data for the close objects showed that there were high correlations betweenS andS′ and betweenD andD′ and a low correlation betweenD′ andS′. The data of Experiment 2 showed that bothD′ andS′ were highly correlated withS D, and θ, and there was a high positive correlation betweenD′ andS′. It was suggested that the direct-perception model is valid under some situations, but the taking-into-account model is not supported in any set of data.     

Local axioms in disguise: Hilbert on Minkowski diagrams

While claiming that diagrams can only be admitted as a method of strict proof if the underlying axioms are precisely known and explicitly spelled out, Hilbert praised Minkowski??s Geometry of Numbers and his diagram-based reasoning as a specimen of an arithmetical theory operating ??rigorously?? with geometrical concepts and signs. In this connection, in the first phase of his foundational views on the axiomatic method, Hilbert also held that diagrams are to be thought of as ??drawn formulas??, and formulas as ??written diagrams??, thus suggesting that the former encapsulate propositional information which can be extracted and translated into formulas. In the case of Minkowski diagrams, local geometrical axioms were actually being produced, starting with the diagrams, by a process that was both constrained and fostered by the requirement, brought about by the axiomatic method itself, that geometry ought to be made independent of analysis. This paper aims at making a twofold point. On the one hand, it shows that Minkowski??s diagrammatic methods in number theory prompted Hilbert??s axiomatic investigations into the notion of a straight line as the shortest distance between two points, which start from his earlier work focused on the role of the triangle inequality property in the foundations of geometry, and lead up to his formulation of the 1900 Fourth Problem. On the other hand, it purports to make clear how Hilbert??s assessment of Minkowski??s diagram-based reasoning in number theory both raises and illuminates conceptual compatibility concerns that were crucial to his philosophy of mathematics.     

Discussions with Bocheński concerning Soviet Marxism–Leninism, 1952–1986

Boche??ski??s lucid, unpartisan, and judiciously critical discussion of Soviet Marxism?CLeninism in his book Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (1950) filled a major gap in our understanding of that influential movement. Prior to its publication there had been only two works on the subject in English, John Somerville??s Soviet Philosophy (1946) and the Handbook of Philosophy (1949), edited and adapted by Howard Selsam from the Kratkij filosofskij slovar?? (2nd ed. 1940). Both are marked by strong partisanship and ideological bias. Somerville is uncritically pro-Soviet and abjectly Stalinist. Selsam, although he tones down the adulation of Marx, Stalin et al. of the KFS, retains that work??s abuse of such ??reactionary?? and ??idealist?? thinkers as Plato and such ??reactionary?? and ??bourgeois?? thinkers as Hegel. The benign influence of Boche??ski??s work increased with the publication of the English translation, Soviet Russian Dialectical Materialism, in 1963.     

Confucian Ritual as Body Language of Self, Society, and Spirit

This article explains how li ?Y or ??ritual propriety?? is the ??body language?? of ren ?? or the authentic expression of our humanity. Li and ren are interdependent aspects of a larger creative human way (rendao ???) that can be conceptually distinguished as follows: li refers to the ritualized social form of appropriate conduct and ren to the more general, authentically human spirit this expresses. Li is the social instrument for self-cultivation and the vehicle of harmonious human interaction. More, li must mean something that is effectively communicated to others for an authentic, human (ren) interaction to occur. Li is the body language of ren in being the ritual vehicle for its?? expression; however, li is underdetermined by ren and so must be distinguished from it in on further grounds: authentic human activity must not just be equivocated with social convention because conclusively establishing whether a particular action is li (or is a truly ren action) is impossible. As a result, li is often confused with social power and privilege that is easier to empirically identify than ren conduct is, but this is a mistake since li has to express ren or it is not li at all. The inescapable ambiguity of li ?C an ambiguity that attaches to any language ?C can be critiqued by the Western view that sees something ??essential?? to the ??self,?? and that makes one a ??self?? in and of oneself and not in a way that depends on others. I show that such Western individualism ?C while resting on a fundamentally different way of thinking of being a person and living a good life ?C does not reduce Confucian ritual to being an instrument for social discrimination and subordination. My argument is indebted to twentieth-century philosophy of language in the West that offered the idea that some words are actions.     

Arbitrary reference

Two fundamental rules of reasoning are Universal Generalisation and Existential Instantiation. Applications of these rules involve stipulations (even if only implicitly) such as ??Let n be an arbitrary number?? or ??Let John be an arbitrary Frenchman??. Yet the semantics underlying such stipulations are far from clear. What, for example, does ??n?? refer to following the stipulation that n be an arbitrary number? In this paper, we argue that ??n?? refers to a number??an ordinary, particular number such as 58 or 2,345,043. Which one? We do not and cannot know, because the reference of ??n?? is fixed arbitrarily. Underlying this proposal is a more general thesis: Arbitrary Reference (AR): It is possible to fix the reference of an expression arbitrarily. When we do so, the expression receives its ordinary kind of semantic-value, though we do not and cannot know which value in particular it receives. Our aim in this paper is defend AR. In particular, we argue that AR can be used to provide an account of instantial reasoning (one that is better than the prominent alternatives), and we suggest that AR can also figure in offering new solutions to a range of difficult philosophical puzzles.     

Relational Buddhism: Wedding K.J. Gergen’s Relational Being and Buddhism to Create Harmony In-Between-Selves

The Psychology of Relational Buddhism is a cutting-edge practical understanding of life rooted in two trailblazing paradigms: (1) mind is not gridlocked in the skull but spaced outside the body in-between people??s interactions and (2) all that is observed in science (and noted in mindfulness) are conceptualizations which boil down to social constructions. In Dependent Origination, through parental lustful intercourse (kamadathu), sensing-emoting/thinking-talking capability is embodied. Speech gets form by the syllable during meaning-making exchange (rupadathu). As ??languaging?? progresses formless thoughts transform into fickle mind (arupadathu) and self-organize illusory ??independent self?? that fails to see inseparable ??selves?? spaced-in-between-people-embedded-in-culture. Thus, at bottom, to act is to inter-act and to be is to inter-be: ??I am linked, therefore I am?? (K.J. Gergen). Usually unbeknownst, intentional or premeditated action (karma) arises non-independently, moves Body/Speech/Mind, and could result in psychological malaise. In search for awakened mind (absolute bodhicitta), we encounter the smallest unit of experience (dharma). Relational Buddhism invites the co-creation of inter-being-in-between-selvesand of a ??non-foundational morality of coordinated action?? to render ??team spirit for humanity?? with congenial bonds as lifeline. Imbibed in-depth, this mentality (in line with the Gandavyuha Sutra) will likely enable us, whenever mind blowing AHA and HAHA transform karma. In synergy with the UN-adage ??think globally, act locally??, we might want we need grass root collaborative practice toward bottom-up societal harmony by realizing awakened mind of loving-kindness (relative bodhicitta) via on-going front-burning mindfulness of speech including self-talk.     

The Zhuangzi and You 遊: Defining an Ideal Without Contradiction

You ?[ is a crucial term for understanding the Zhuangzi. Translated as ??play,?? ??free play,?? and ??wandering,?? it is usually defined as an ideal, playful Zhuangzian way of being. There are two problems with this definition. The first is logical: the Zhuangzi cannot consistently recommend playfulness as an ideal, since doing so vitiates the essence of you??it becomes an ethical imperative instead of an activity freely undertaken for its own sake. The second problem is performative: arguments for playful Zhuangzi as exemplar resemble those of the logicians and philosophers who appear to come in for Zhuangzian criticism. This essay addresses these tensions by demonstrating how the Zhuangzi ambiguates the nature and value of you. Apparent endorsements of you are not freestanding, instead occurring in grudging replies of teachers to overly zealous students. In light of this recontextualization, a new version of you is offered that accommodates ??non-playful?? ways of being.     

On A- and B-theoretic elements of branching spacetimes

This paper assesses branching spacetime theories in light of metaphysical considerations concerning time. I present the A, B, and C series in terms of the temporal structure they impose on sets of events, and raise problems for two elements of extant branching spacetime theories??McCall??s ??branch attrition??, and the ??no backward branching?? feature of Belnap??s ??branching space?Ctime????in terms of their respective A- and B-theoretic nature. I argue that McCall??s presentation of branch attrition can only be coherently formulated on a model with at least two temporal dimensions, and that this results in severing the link between branch attrition and the flow of time. I argue that ??no backward branching?? prohibits Belnap??s theory from capturing the modal content of indeterministic physical theories, and results in it ascribing to the world a time-asymmetric modal structure that lacks physical justification.     

Observance of Forms: An Aesthetic Analysis of Analects 6.25

This essay analyzes how the zhengming ???? theory of Confucius is linked to the problem of ??observances of form?? in light of the methodology of Confucian aesthetics. This essay argues that the ??name-shape?? combination in the zhengming paradigm is ultimately connected with the ??name-role?? combination. The ??name-shape?? paradigm continuously maintains and strengthens the ??name-role?? paradigm. However, the ??name-shape?? paradigm itself ultimately becomes more meaningful than the ??name-role?? paradigm. This is because the aesthetic structure that appears peculiar in the Analects constitutes the ??name-shape?? paradigm. In this aesthetic structure, what is ultimately important is ??form.??     

Capacity and Potentiality: Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ.6–7 from the Perspective of the De Anima

The notion of a capacity (dunamis) in the sense of a power to bring about or undergo change plays a key role in Aristotle??s theories about the natural world. However, in Metaphysics ?? Aristotle also extends ??capacity??, and the corresponding concept of ??activity?? (energeia), to cases where we want to say that something is in capacity, or in activity, such and such but not, or not directly, in virtue of being capable of initiating or undergoing change. This paper seeks to clarify and confirm a certain view of how Aristotle wishes us to see the relationship between the two uses of ??capacity?? and ??activity??. To that end, I consider also Aristotle??s employment of the terms in the De Anima, which sheds light on the key examples which direct the discussion in Metaph. ??.     

Exemplarization and self-presentation: Lehrer and Meinong on consciousness

Alexius Meinong??s specific use of the term ??self-presentation?? had a significant influence on modern epistemology and philosophical psychology. To show that there are remarkable parallels between Meinong??s account of the self-presentation of experiences and Lehrer??s account of the exemplarization of experiences is one of this paper??s main objectives. Another objective is to put forward some comments and critical remarks to Lehrer??s approach. One of the main problems can be expressed by the following: The process of using a particular experience as a sample, that is, an exemplar that we use to stand for and refer to a plurality of experiences, Lehrer calls ??exemplarization??. As concrete experiences are multifarious (red and round, for example), how can we single out a specific sort of experiences (the red ones) by the process of exemplarization when we use such a multifarious experience as a sample?     

Rousseau’s Emile, or the Fear of Passions

Notwithstanding the general accepted understanding that Rousseau is the master of modern education reflecting the progress by enlightenment this articles suggests that Rousseau??s Emile is??as most of Rousseau??s other writings are, too??testimony to a brilliant and passionate writer expressing thoughts about his concern how to deal with passions??passion being one of the most disputed concepts in late seventeenth and in eighteenth century. The reading of Emile has therefore take into account polemic as a literary trope in Rousseau??s style of writing.     

Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira, Krishek and the ‘God filter’

Kierkegaard??s Works of Love has often been accused of being unable to deal adequately with ??special relationships??. This debate has re-emerged in a fresh form in a recent disagreement in the secondary literature between M. Jamie Ferreira and Sharon Krishek. Krishek charges Ferreira with failing to acknowledge some important conflicts in Kierkegaard??s account of preferential love. In this article, I argue that some key passages are indeed insufficiently addressed in Ferreira??s account. Yet ultimately, I argue, Krishek ends up condemning the Kierkegaard of Works of Love unfairly. As a solution to Krishek??s concerns, I present a defence of Kierkegaard??s position centred round the image of God as a ??filter?? through which our loves must pass. Also, while acknowledging that Krishek raises some important questions for Ferreira??s account, I outline a possible response, based in part on Kierkegaard??s idea that neighbour love is only a ??sketch?? until brought to fruition in any given manifestation of concrete love. Ultimately, I claim, Kierkegaard??s position in Works of Love can indeed be defended from Krishek??s critique.     

Li (Ritual/Rite) and Tian (Heaven/Nature) in the Xunzi: Does Confucian li need metaphysics?

Ritual (li) is central to Confucian ethics and political philosophy. Robert Neville believes that Chinese Philosophy has an important role to play in our times by bringing ritual theory to the analysis of global moral and political issues. In a recent work, Neville maintains that ritual ??needs a contemporary metaphysical expression if its importance is to be seen.?? This paper examines Neville's claim through a detailed study of the ??ethics of ritual?? in one of the early Confucian texts, the Xunzi. This text has sometimes been read as offering a form of naturalism in its discussions of ??heaven (tian)?? as analogous to Western, even modern, concept of ??nature,?? while other interpreters insist that tian is a normative notion. Does this concept of tian offer a metaphysical ground for ethics of ritual advocated in the text? If so, what kind of metaphysics is it? Does Confucian ritual ethics need any metaphysical grounding? There is no specific metaphysical theory in the Xunzi and passages which could be referring to or implying metaphysical assumptions are open to hermeneutical debates. Even if metaphysical assumptions are necessary or beneficial to an ethics of ritual, the paper argues that the ??metaphysical flexibility?? of the text could work to its advantage in remaining relevant in contemporary context. The conclusion explores some possible directions for further exploring the metaphysics of ritual in a modern understanding of Xunzi.     

Objects with a past: Husserl on “ad-memorizing apperceptions”

In a late notation from 1932, Husserl emphasizes the fact that a broad concept of ??apperception?? should also include, alongside his usual examples, the apprehension of objects as bearers of an individual or inter-subjective past, specifically ??indicated?? with them; thus, he distinguishes between apperceptions ??appresenting?? a simultaneous content (co-presentations), anticipatory apperceptions pointing to future incidents, and retrospective apperceptions referring to ??ad-memorized?? (hinzuerinnert, ad-memoriert) features and events. The latter sort of apperceptions are involved not only in our apprehension of historical traces and relics, but also in that of causal relations, familiar objects, and cultural objects in general. Following several later notations of Husserl concerning the topic of ??apperceptions,?? this paper outlines the specific intentional structure of retrospective or evocative apperceptions, analyzing their various possible forms.     

Interrogative Belief Revision Based on Epistemic Strategies

I develop a dynamic logic for reasoning about ??interrogative belief revision??, a new branch of belief revision theory that has been developed in a small number of papers, beginning with E. J. Olsson and D. Westlund??s paper ??On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change?? [12]. In interrogative belief revision, epistemic states are taken to include a research agenda, consisting of questions the agent seeks to answer. I present a logic for revision of such epistemic states based on the notion of an epistemic strategy, a stable plan of action that determines changes in the agent??s research agenda. This idea is a further development of an idea put forward in [6], that changes in the research agenda of an agent should be determined by stable, ??long term?? research interests. I provide complete axioms and a decidability result for the logic.     

Psychotherapy Supervision in the New Millennium: Competency-Based, Evidence-Based, Particularized, and Energized

Psychotherapy supervision has increasingly become or is on the fast track to becoming competency-based, evidence-based, particularized, and accountable. In this paper, I explore how that appears to be so by: (1) briefly considering the concepts of ??competencies?? and ??evidence-based practice?? as preeminent guides for psychotherapy supervision practice and training; and (2) briefly reviewing the current status, pressing needs, and future possibilities of psychoanalytic, cognitive-behavioral, humanistic-existential, and integrative psychotherapy supervision. Based on my examination, the following conclusions are proposed: (1) the supervision relationship, individualization, developmental differentiation, and self-reflection (for supervisee and supervisor) appear to be crucial cornerstones for the conceptualization and actuation of supervision process and practice across psychotherapy-based supervision approaches; (2) all indications suggest that three emphases??competency-based supervision, evidence-based practice, and accountability??will continue to substantially influence, affect, and inform psychotherapy supervision practice for its near and distant future; (3) psychotherapy-based supervision approaches will need to be and indeed appear to now be in the process of becoming increasingly particularized in how each of their respective approach-specific competencies are defined and explicated; and (4) psychotherapy supervision has come to be increasingly viewed as an educational process and practice that is best facilitated by: (a) a rich and enriching supervision training environment that vigorously addresses and attempts to meaningfully integrate declarative, procedural, and reflective knowledge bases throughout the supervisory endeavor; and (b) the considered and deliberate utilization of facilitative technology that has the potential to substantially enhance and expand the value of the supervisee??s training/supervision experiences. Some discussion is provided about those four conclusions, and a retrofitted psychotherapy supervision for the new millennium is considered.