Task structure,need for structure,and creativity

Although creativity is often seen as requiring spontaneity and flexibility, recent work suggests that there is creative potential in a structured and systematic approach as well. In a series of four experiments, we show that when Personal Need for Structure (PNS) is high, either chronic (Study 1) or situationally induced (Study 2), creative performance benefits from high task structure. Further, in line with earlier work on cognitive fixation effects, we show that when high task structure contains an example of noncreative task execution, creative performance is impaired, regardless of individuals' PNS. Nevertheless, participants high in PNS react relatively favorably to high task structure (Study 3) and are more likely to adopt a structured task approach when given the choice (Study 4). In sum, our results show that task structure can both stimulate and inhibit creative performance, particularly for people high in need for structure. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The structure of interests as a structure of occupational stimuli and as a structure of affective responses

The structure of interests has usually been perceived as a structure of occupational stimuli, but it can also be conceived of as a structure of the affective responses that occupational stimuli elicit, or as a structure of these stimuli embedded within the matrix of affective responses which they produce. Each of these three structural representations was examined in this study. The semantic differential technique was used to rate a set of 10 occupational stimuli with 15 bipolar scales. A factor analysis of the stimuli yielded three occupational factors called Science, Things vs. People, and Social Welfare; a factor analysis of the scales indicated that the stimuli elicited Evaluation, Potency, and Activity responses. The three dimensions of affect were then used as the axes of a semantic space within which the occupational stimuli were located according to the unique affective meaning of each. The desirability of studying the structure of interests as a structure of occupational stimuli embedded within a structure of the responses they elicited was discussed.     

Trees with structure

We investigate M-trees, that is, trees with structure possible at each node or level. M is a mathematical structure such as a set or a Cartesian product. An extension of Pólya's theorem is proved which allows the number of M-trees for a given number of nodes to be counted. The special case of componential trees is investigated. Here M is a Cartesian product of 0's and 1's. A componential analysis is a componential tree of depth 1, that is, there is no hierarchy. We prove that for any componential tree there exists a componential analysis which makes the same predictions on a triad test of judged similarity. A brief empirical example is given, in which a componential tree is applied as a model of a sernantic domain.     

Concepts and conceptual structure

Research and theory on categorization and conceptual structure have recently undergone two major shifts. The first shift is from the assumption that concepts have defining properties (the classical view) to the idea that concept representations may be based on properties that are only characteristic or typical of category examples (the probabilistic view). Both the probabilistic view and the classical view assume that categorization is driven by similarity relations. A major problem with describing category structure in terms of similarity is that the notion of similarity is too unconstrained to give an account of conceptual coherence. The second major shift is from the idea that concepts are organized by similarity to the idea that concepts are organized around theories. In this article, the evidence and rationale associated with these shifts are described, and one means of integrating similarity-based and theory-driven categorization is outlined.     

Inferring hidden causal structure

We used a new method to assess how people can infer unobserved causal structure from patterns of observed events. Participants were taught to draw causal graphs, and then shown a pattern of associations and interventions on a novel causal system. Given minimal training and no feedback, participants in Experiment 1 used causal graph notation to spontaneously draw structures containing one observed cause, one unobserved common cause, and two unobserved independent causes, depending on the pattern of associations and interventions they saw. We replicated these findings with less-informative training (Experiments 2 and 3) and a new apparatus (Experiment 3) to show that the pattern of data leads to hidden causal inferences across a range of prior constraints on causal knowledge.     

Comprehension and belief structure

Abstract.— A reader's belief structure is suggested to affect the way he processes incoming information. It is analyzed in terms of what propositions the reader regards as true (the truth values) and of how the reader discriminates between propositions as to truth value (the discrimination index). In a study on 20 psychology students, the comprehension task involved matching single statements to a previously read text. The statements represented two different ideas, whereas the text represented only one. The subjects' belief structure in terms of statements accepted (truth value) and statements discriminated as to truth value (discrimination index) was related to the way in which they matched the same Statements to the previously read text (comprehension). Truth values and discrimination indices together were found to account for 39% of the interindividual variation in comprehension after the first reading and for 50 % of that variation after the second reading. It is suggested that a reader, when confronted with a new text, arrives at the most probable interpretation of that text by turning to his own belief structure.     

The structure of choice

An unsolved fundamental problem in decision science concerns the extent to which the nature of the perceived relationships among items in a set of alternatives influences how they are chosen. More specifically, given a choice set with n items, how does human choice behavior differ as a function of the perceived relationships between the items of the set? In what follows, we study this problem empirically and theoretically from the standpoint of the dimensional structure of the choice set. In particular, we use generalized invariance structure theory (GIST; Vigo, 2013, 2014) to propose an inverse relationship between the degree of concept learning difficulty of a choice set (as determined by its degree of invariance or internal coherence) and choice response times on its members. To our knowledge, this is the first model that precisely unifies these two fundamental constructs. On average, the model, without free parameters, accounts for nearly 90% of the variance in the data from our two response-time experiments.     

Realism and social structure

Social constructionism is often considered a form of anti-realism. But in contemporary feminist philosophy, an increasing number of philosophers defend views that are well-described as both realist and social constructionist. In this paper, I use the work of Sally Haslanger as an example of realist social constructionism. I argue: (i) that Haslanger is best interpreted as defending metaphysical realism about social structures; (ii) that this type of metaphysical realism about the social world presents challenges to some popular ways of understanding metaphysical realism.     

Prosodic structure and wh-questions

This study examines the influence of wh-gaps on the prosodic contour of spoken utterances. A previous study (Nagel, Shapiro, & Nawy, 1994) claimed that the phonological representation of a sentence containing a filler-gap dependency explicitly encodes the location of the syntactic gap. In support of this hypothesis, Nagel et al. presented evidence that the word immediately preceding a gap is lengthened and that there is a reliable increase in pitch excursion across the gap location. Our study challenges Nagel et al.'s claim. We argue that their materials confounded the presence/absence of a gap with other factors that are known to affect intonational phrasing independently. We show that, when these factors are separated, the evidence that syntactic gaps are explicitly encoded in the phonological representation of a sentence disappears.