IS THERE A DISTINCTIVE QUANTUM THEOLOGY?

Quantum mechanics (QM) is a favorite area of physics to feature in “science and religion” discussions. We argue that this is at least partly because the arcane results of QM can be deployed to make big theological claims by the linguistic sleight of hand of “register switching”—sliding imperceptibly from technical into everyday language using the same vocabulary. We clarify the discussion by deploying the formal mapping of QM into classical statistical mechanics (CSM) via the mathematical device of “Wick rotation.” This equivalence between QM and CSM suggests caution in claiming distinctiveness for quantum theologizing. After outlining two areas in which quantum insights nevertheless resonate with longstanding themes in theological reflection (hiddenness and visualizability), we suggest that both QM and CSM point to a theology of science in which scientists participate in the divine gaze on creation as imago Dei.     

＂I Effaced Myself＂ and ＂The Disappearance of the Subject＂： A Comparison between Zhuangzi and Jean Baudrillard＇s Anti-Subjectivism

In the chapter ＂The Adjustment of Controversies＂ in his eponymous work, Zhuangzi has the character Nanguo Ziqi declare ＂I effaced myself,＂ thereby holding that one can return to the state of naturalness only after breaking with the ＂self＂ that is in opposition to ＂objects,＂ abandoning his subject-object standpoint and entering a state of ＂effacement＂ wherein one fuses with the Dao. Coincidently, the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard also repeatedly stresses the ＂disappearance of the subject＂ in his later philosophy, trying to dissolve subject-centrism by means of a counterattack by the object wherein its logic would entrap the subject. Although they lived in different times, both Zhuangzi and Baudrillard note the same human predicament--the situation wherein the ＂I as subject＂ constantly obscures the ＂real I.＂ Their resolutions of the predicament are similar： both put their hopes in the dissolution of the ＂I＂ or self in subject-object relations, with Zhuangzi declaring ＂I effaced myself＇ and Baudrillard mooting the ＂disappearance of the subject.＂ They differ, however, on how to dissolve the ＂I＂ （myself）. Briefly, Zhuangzi advocates ＂effacing myself through the Dao,＂ that is, quitting one＇s ＂fixed mindset＂ and ＂egoism＂ and returning to the Dao by means of ＂forgetting＂ or ＂effacing＂; Baudrillard, on the other hand, proposes to ＂efface oneself through the object,＂ i.e., replace the supremacy of the subject with that of the object. Baudrillard＇s theory has often been criticized as pataphysics because of its nihilism without transcendence; in contrast, Zhuangzi＇s view, which construes the whole world as the unfolding of the Dao, seems more thought-provoking.     

A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations

In this paper we introduce and discuss some models of bargaining. These have the form of repeated plays of a game among pairs of individuals, with the opponents in each particular game drawn randomly from a large population. The players' information about one another is limited to a single quantity, termed reputation, which summarizes the behavior of a player in previous trials of the game, and so changes endogenously. We distinguish some possible decision rules or “customs” which players might use to determine their moves in the game as a function of their own and their opponent's reputation, and investigate whether or not these actions lead to a suitably defined social equilibrium. We then compare the equilibrium customs from the point of view of the welfare of the population as a whole.     

The Conceptual Fetters of the Mind-Body Problem

The crux of our encounter with the mind-body problem originates from a predicament on the underlying ontological level—from the category of concepts, it seems that the form for grasping the subjective aspects of the mind is incommensurable with the one for understanding the objective level of the brain. This is reflected in the fact that empirical expression is restricted by language, that psychological events cannot be incorporated into strict laws, and that the subject has a path that, with his own mental state, others cannot share. In order to make progress in cracking the mind-body problem, this paper tries to abandon the assumption that “psychology” and “physics” are mutually exclusive and are incompatible ontological categories. The “mind” and “body” are considered as two interchangeable yet non-coexisting perspectives. Therefore, events in the body are represented as conceptions in the mind, and have an expressive correspondence with one another. Meanwhile, the approach for achieving such correspondence involves the entity itself—the ability of the organism to perform purposeful activities constitutes the source of its internal activities. Through the connection of life categories—or rather, the coupling of living beings and their worlds—the mind and body maintain mechanisms which can be jointly realized.     

Some Psychological Reflections on the Death of Malcolm Melville*

ABSTRACT: Malcolm Melville died on September 12, 1867, at age 18 from—to quote his death certificate—a “pistol shot wound in [his] right temporal region.” Contemporary designations of the mode of his death changed within hours from suicide, to accident, to death while of unsound mind. Historically, the mode of his death has remained equivocal. In order to approach this enigma a “psychological autopsy” of an equivocal death case as identical to Malcolm Melville's as was possible was conducted as though it were a genuine current “open” case at the Los Angeles Suicide Prevention Center in 1973. That procedure resulted in a near-unanimous judgment by the center staff that the most accurate certification of the death as described was “probable suicide,” which would then be certified as “suicide.” In this paper the assertion is made that Herman Melville himself had been a psychologically “battered child” and, in a way typical for battered children, psychologically battered his own children when it came his turn to be a parent. The further assertion is made that, for Malcolm, his father was suicidogenic; and established this penchant in Malcolm (through his neglect, active rejection, fearsomeness, and his fixed attention to his own writing—Redburn, White Jacke, and Moby Dick) within the first 2 years of Malcolm's life. For Malcolm, the psychological basis of his suicidal state was isolated desperation—a ubiquitous characteristic of most suicides. Malcolm had a deep unconscious feeling of not being wanted by his father; that it would be better if he were out of the way, dead. On the morning of his death, the choice for Malcolm was between the memory of his mother's kiss a few hours before and the terror of (and the need to protect himself against) his father's rage to come.     

Cosmic Mind?

This article explores the remote scientific possibility of something like “cosmic mind” or “cosmic minds.” Descartes proposed his famous dualism, res cogitans (mental reality) plus res extensa (physical reality). With Isaac Newton and classical physics, res extensa won in Western science and with it, we lost our minds; we lost our subjective pole. Quantum mechanics has seemed to many, since its formulation in the Schrödinger equation in 1926, to hint beyond physics to a role for the human conscious observer in quantum measurement. At least two interpretations of quantum mechanics, or its extension—the latter by Penrose and Hameroff, and the former by myself—suggest a new panpsychism where conscious awareness and possibly free will occur at quantum measurements anywhere in the universe. If so, then we live in a vastly participatory universe. More: entangled quantum variables may conceivably share some form of consciousness and free will, whether embodied in us, or living forms elsewhere in the universe, or disembodied; hence, something like cosmic mind or minds are not ruled out. If true, life anywhere in the universe will have evolved with mind and free will. Souls are not impossible.     

From Many into One: Attention,Energy, and the Containing of Multitudes

This paper is an effort to describe and express and the tension between the observing mind and the “wisdom mind,” which has its taproots in the deep and unformulated experience of connectedness. Nominally about the process of writing as a psychoanalyst, it is more like my personal “Credo” in relation to the work of psychoanalysis, the work of writing, and the work of living with contradictions—life. In it I try to bring together disparate reflections, to illustrate in the writing itself the process of making “many into one.” Because so much of this essay relates to themes in Mannie Ghent's work, including his work on surrender and his “Credo,” it seemed to be appropriate to offer it to readers of this issue dedicated to his memory.     

Deepening Psychoanalytic Listening: The Marriage of Buddha and Freud

Freud (1912) delineated the ideal state of mind for therapists to listen, what he called “evenly hovering” or “evenly suspended attention.” No one has ever offered positive recommendations for how to cultivate this elusive yet eminently trainable state of mind. This leaves an important gap in training and technique. What Buddhism terms meditation—non-judgmental attention to what is happening moment-to-moment—cultivates exactly the extraordinary, yet accessible, state of mind Freud was depicting. But genuine analytic listening requires one other quality: the capacity to decode or translate what we hear on the latent and metaphoric level—which meditation does not do. This is a crucial weakness of meditation. In this chapter I will draw on the best of the Western psychoanalytic and Eastern meditative traditions to illuminate how therapists could use meditation to cultivate “evenly hovering attention” and how a psychoanalytic understanding of the language and logic of the unconscious complements and enriches meditative attention.     

The local problem of God’s hiddenness: a critique of van Inwagen’s criterion of philosophical success

In regards to the problem of evil, van Inwagen thinks there are two arguments from evil which require different defenses. These are the global argument from evil—that there exists evil in general, and the local argument from evil—that there exists some particular atrocious evil X. However, van Inwagen fails to consider whether the problem of God’s hiddenness also has a “local” version: whether there is in fact a “local” argument from God’s hiddenness which would be undefeated by his general defense of God’s hiddenness. This paper will argue that van Inwagen’s present account contains no implicit response to the “local” argument from God’s hiddenness, and, worse, the “local” argument brings to the fore crucial inconsistencies in van Inwagen’s account. These inconsistencies concern van Inwagen’s criterion for philosophical success—his methodological use of an “ideal audience” in an ideal debate—and a crucial premise in his argument: namely, that people who do not believe in God are culpably deceiving themselves regarding the manifest presence of God. These considerations will be a platform for my arguing that the failures of van Inwagen’s account amount to his ignoring the extra-rational, concrete aspect of grasping “spiritual propositions”—propositions which, in order to be affirmed, require the full self-understanding which precipitates out of the mind, body, and will of a particular existing individual.     

“Crunches,” “(K)nots,” and Double Binds—When What Isn't Happening Is the Most Important Thing: Commentary on Paper by Barbara Pizer

This discussion compares Pizer's concept of “relational (k)nots” with “crunches” and double bind impasses. It argues that all of these constructs capture what happens when conventional analytic method—the exploration, elucidation, and interpretation of transference—fails to work. In this context a “last-ditch effort” emerges, a necessary crisis of treatment. The situation is a plea that something must occur “now or never” or the “charade of therapy is over.” This plea is extraordinarily challenging since it embodies contradictory elements wherein the patient's very call for involvement with the analyst is embedded in a process that obfuscates their connection. Notably this sets the stage for the “damned if one ‘gets it’ and damned if one doesn't” experience that is a part of the paradox of recognition/mis-recognition that befuddles many analyses.

Extrication from such impasses requires the analyst's recognition that she is colluding in a kind of avoidance or distraction from recognizing their disconnection. Her second act involves meta-communication about their process. That is how their “relational knot” both binds them together while negating their connection. While this observation may be necessary it is recognized as insufficient on its own. Thus her third move out of the impasse requires her to enter into a state of improvisation. That is, to use some part of herself that must surrender from the one-up one-down impasse position of “either your version of reality or mine.” Instead, she must cultivate through her action a third way in which both she and her patient can think about their impasse and do something about it, including something different from what either one might have imagined before.     

Subverting utilitarian subject-object relations in video games: A philosophical analysis of Thatgamecompany’s Journey

In this article, I analyse the self-other relations that underpin the gameplay design of the majority of popular video games. Specifically, these self-other relations can be described as “utilitarian subject-object relations”, in which the player assumes the perspective of the player-character, or subject of the video game, while all the other elements of the video game, including the digital environment and the non-player characters and creatures, are treated as separate objects that merely exist to be used by the player-character. These subject-object relations are usually driven by the violent accumulation of power, which can, in turn, be channelled by the player-character into further violent actions against the so-called objects within the video game. In contrast to this typical model of gameplay, the gameplay of Thatgamecompany’s Journey does not include a subject that merely acts on and uses the other elements within the video game world for its own ends, but rather entails a relation of “becoming-other” in which the player-character and the other elements are involved in constant processes of reciprocal determination. In order to analyse the “becoming-other” relations that underpin Journey’s gameplay, I employ specific concepts from the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, including the concepts of “becoming-other”, “percepts” and “affects”. Ultimately, I argue that Journey not only subverts the utilitarian, often violent, subject-object relations that have become an industry trope in the majority of video games, but also promotes self-other relations that are arguably far more positive and creative for video game design in general.     

Do not drop your gloves: “Winning” a fight in the National Hockey League does not improve chances to win the game

Sanctioned fighting has played an integral role in the National Hockey League (NHL) since its early days. Proponents argue that this practice helps teams win games. More specifically, they contend that when a player triumphs decisively in a fight, the outcome creates momentum or a spark for his teammates and thus increases his team’s odds of victory. We used on-line fans’ voting (validated by objective fight data) to assess fight outcome and demonstrated that “winning” the fight did not lead to winning the game when the score was tied. Additionally, in contrast with the “change in momentum” hypothesis, prevailing in a fight did not sway game outcome when the home or away team was one goal behind early enough in the game. Lastly, prevailing in a fight was not associated with scoring the next goal. We discuss the results in light of the strong conviction held by NHL players that fighting boosts momentum and explain possible mechanisms working to preserve this false belief.     

Meaning and Conversational Impropriety in Sceptical Contexts

According to “disjunctivist neo‐Mooreanism”—a position Duncan Pritchard develops in a recent book—it is possible to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, even though it is conversationally inappropriate to claim such knowledge. In a recent paper, on the other hand, Pritchard expounds an “überhinge” strategy, according to which one cannot know the denials of sceptical hypotheses, as “hinge propositions” are necessarily groundless. The present article argues that neither strategy is entirely successful. For if a proposition can be known, it can also be claimed to be known. If the latter is not possible, this is not because certain propositions are either “intrinsically” conversationally inappropriate (as Pritchard claims in his book) or else “rationally groundless” (as Pritchard claims in his paper), but rather that we are dealing with something that merely presents us with the appearance of being an epistemic claim.     

Gendered Reason: Sex Metaphor and Conceptions of Reason

Reason has regularly been portrayed and understood in terms of images and metaphors that involve the exclusion or denigration of some element—body, passion, nature, instinct—that is cast as “feminine.” Drawing upon philosophical insight into metaphor, I examine the impact of this gendering of reason. I argue that our conceptions of mind, reason, unreason, female, and male have been distorted. The politics of “rational” discourse has been set up in ways that still subtly but powerfully inhibit the voice and agency of women.     

Hegel,modal logic,and the social nature of mind

ABSTRACT

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in the light of modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood.     

Defense,dreams and rationality

Are some mental activities rational but unconscious? Psychopathological symptoms, it is said, have a sense — they are seen as “compromise-formations” which express the “intentions” of agents even though the agents are totally unaware of “bringing about” such symptoms. Philosophers, who often claim that such a conception is simply contradictory or incoherent, have shed little light on the puzzles and apparent paradoxes that surround the issue. It is argued here that Freud's two models of explanation — the mechanistic and the intentionalistic — each fail to provide a basis for an explanatory account of the phenomenon of unconscious defense. An examination of the problem of dream “composition” helps explain why Freud's dependence upon “rational homunculi” is inappropriate and misleading. Finally, an alternative model which depends neither upon Freud's version of mechanism nor upon his lavish anthropormorphism is suggested. Ladies and Gentlemen, — It was discovered one day that the pathological symptoms of certain neurotic patients have a sense. On this discovery the psychoanalytic method of treatment was founded. It happened in the course of the treament that patients, instead of bringing forward their symptoms, brought forward dreams. A suspicion thus arose that the dreams too had a sense.     

MIND WITHIN MATTER: SCIENCE,THE OCCULT,AND THE (META)PHYSICS OF ETHER AND AKASHA

The intersection between quantum theory, metaphysical spirituality, and Indian‐inspired philosophy has an established place in speculative scientific and alternative religious communities alike. There is one term that has historically bridged these two worlds: “Akasha,” often translated as “ether.” Akasha appears both in metaphysical spiritual contexts, most often in ones influenced by Theosophy, and in the speculative scientific discourse that has historically demonstrated a strong affinity for the brand of monistic metaphysics that Indian‐derived spiritualities tend to foster. This article traces the relationship between these groups with special attention to the role of Indian concepts and terminology. More specifically, it argues that Akasha‐as‐ether comes to operate in a manner that bridges gross matter (of which the individual mind is part and parcel) with the notion of a subtle material and transpersonal mind—a version of panpsychism allowing for a coherent quantum monism.