基于广义谢弗竖的分析性模态公理系统

沿着安德森等人开创的方向,我们将分析性公理系统从经典逻辑推向模态逻辑,所定义的广义谢弗竖混合了模态词和广义析舍。在这篇论文中,我们给出常见的正规模态逻辑的分析性公理系统及其强完全性定理和插值定理,并讨论演绎关系的性质：单调性和切割性。     

他连A都知道--认知逻辑EK1-EK3

首先,我们构造认知系统EK1-EK3,给出它们的一些证明论结果。其次,我们引入邻域语义,给出EK1-EK3的特征公理和规则的框架条件,证明EK1-EK3相对这些框架条件分别是框架可靠的。最后,我们证明EK1-EK3相对这些框架条件分别是框架完全的。     

Eternalism and Propositional Multitasking: in defence of the Operator Argument

It is widely held that propositions perform a plethora of theoretical roles. They are believed to be the semantic values of sentences in contexts, the objects of attitudes, the contents of illocutionary acts, the referents of ??that??-clauses, and the primary bearers of truth. This assumption is often combined with the claim that propositions have their truth-values eternally. Following Kaplan??s and Lewis??s Operator Argument, I argue that the compositional semantic values of sentences do not correspond to eternal propositions. Therefore, we cannot hold on to both assumptions at the same time: either we regard the non-eternal entities that realize the compositional role of propositions as fulfilling the remaining theoretical roles, or we abandon the assumption that there is a unique realizer. The Operator Argument has recently come under attack, mainly for its intensional assumptions. However, rejecting these assumptions is not a sufficient defense of eternal propositions as compositional semantic values of sentences. Firstly, we can give a generalized version of the Operator Argument that seems independent of the contested assumptions. Secondly, the extensional alternative to the intensional framework does not allow us to retain eternal propositions as unique semantic values either.     

Aristotelian Logic Axioms in Propositional Logic: The Pouch Method

A new theoretical approach to Aristotelian Logic (AL) based on three axioms has been recently introduced. This formalization of the theory allowed for the unification of its uncommunicated traditional branches, thus restoring the theoretical unity of AL. In this brief paper, the applicability of the three AL axioms to Propositional Logic (PL) is explored. First, it is shown how the AL axioms can be applied to some simple PL arguments in a straightforward manner. Second, the development of a proof method for PL inspired by the AL axioms is presented. This method mimics the underlying mechanics of the proof method from AL, and offers a complementary alternative to proof methods such as truth trees.     

The Puzzle of Factual Praise

It seems that we are not willing to give up the intuitions that (1) works of fiction are free from the constraints of historical truth and (2) historical inaccuracies sometimes count against the artistic value of works of fiction. Christopher Bartel calls this the puzzle of historical criticism. I argue that this puzzle extends beyond historical facts. While it is especially salient that historical accuracy at times appears relevant to the evaluation of fictional works, such relevance appears to be a feature of facts in general. I then propose a partial strategy for resolving the puzzle.     

The Role of Axioms in Mathematics

To answer the question of whether mathematics needs new axioms, it seems necessary to say what role axioms actually play in mathematics. A first guess is that they are inherently obvious statements that are used to guarantee the truth of theorems proved from them. However, this may neither be possible nor necessary, and it doesn’t seem to fit the historical facts. Instead, I argue that the role of axioms is to systematize uncontroversial facts that mathematicians can accept from a wide variety of philosophical positions. Once the axioms are generally accepted, mathematicians can expend their energies on proving theorems instead of arguing philosophy. Given this account of the role of axioms, I give four criteria that axioms must meet in order to be accepted. Penelope Maddy has proposed a similar view in Naturalism in Mathematics, but she suggests that the philosophical questions bracketed by adopting the axioms can in fact be ignored forever. I contend that these philosophical arguments are in fact important, and should ideally be resolved at some point, but I concede that their resolution is unlikely to affect the ordinary practice of mathematics. However, they may have effects in the margins of mathematics, including with regards to the controversial “large cardinal axioms” Maddy would like to support.

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Analyticity and Justification in Frege

That there are analytic truths may challenge a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Unlike standard conceptions, in which analyticity is couched in terms of “truth in virtue of meanings”, Frege’s notions of analytic and a priori concern justification, respecting a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Where there is no justification these notions do not apply, Frege insists. Basic truths and axioms may be analytic (or a priori), though unprovable, which means there is a form of justification which is not (deductive) proof. This is also required for regarding singular factual propositions as a posteriori. A Fregean direction for explicating this wider notion of justification is suggested in terms of his notion of sense (Sinn)—modes in which what the axioms are about are given—and its general epistemological significance is sketched.     

Logic of Knowledge and Utterance and the Liar

We extend the ordinary logic of knowledge based on the operator K and the system of axioms S₅ by adding a new operator U, standing for the agent utters , and certain axioms and a rule for U, forming thus a new system KU. The main advantage of KU is that we can express in it intentions of the speaker concerning the truth or falsehood of the claims he utters and analyze them logically. Specifically we can express in the new language various notions of lying, as well as of telling the truth. Consequently, as long as lying or telling the truth about a fact is an intentional mode of the speaker, we can resolve the Liar paradox, or at least some of its variants, turning it into an ordinary (false or true) sentence. Also, using Kripke structures analogous to those employed by S. Kraus and D. Lehmann in [3] for modelling the logic of knowledge and belief, we offer a sound and complete semantics for KU.     

Axiomatic Theories of Partial Ground II

This is part two of a two-part paper in which we develop an axiomatic theory of the relation of partial ground. The main novelty of the paper is the of use of a binary ground predicate rather than an operator to formalize ground. In this part of the paper, we extend the base theory of the first part of the paper with hierarchically typed truth-predicates and principles about the interaction of partial ground and truth. We show that our theory is a proof-theoretically conservative extension of the ramified theory of positive truth up to ?? ₀ and thus is consistent. We argue that this theory provides a natural solution to Fine’s “puzzle of ground” about the interaction of truth and ground. Finally, we show that if we apply the truth-predicate to sentences involving our ground-predicate, we run into paradoxes similar to the semantic paradoxes: we get ground-theoretical paradoxes of self-reference.     

The link between composition and balance in masterworks vs. paintings of lower artistic quality

In painting, composition is commonly defined as the two‐dimensional arrangement of elements within the canvas. Each element is considered to have a perceptual weight. The arrangement of these weighted elements determines how balanced a painting is. It has been suggested that due to superior composition, masterworks may be more balanced than works of lower artistic quality. We tested this hypothesis by instructing our participants to rate masterworks and selections of lower artistic quality on balance. This hypothesis was not supported. Second, it has been suggested that rearranging elements within a painting may have a more detrimental effect on composition (and by extension balance) in masterworks than in selections of lower artistic quality. This view associates works of higher artistic quality with visual rightness, thereby predicting that compositional change would be more likely to cause deviations from a visually right state in masterworks. We tested this hypothesis by displacing an element within each painting to a different location, and measuring the effect on balance. In accordance with recent findings in the literature, we also took into account the severity of the compositional alterations. The results demonstrated that compositional alteration affected balance ratings equally across masterworks and selections of lower artistic quality. These results demonstrate that, although balance is a function of compositional structure, balance on its own is not sufficient to distinguish between works of varying artistic quality. To the extent that balance is considered a function of composition, the results suggest that masterworks are distinguished from works of lower artistic quality for reasons other than solely composition.     

Linearization of the BCK-logic

In the paper we obtain a new characterization of the BCK-algebras which are subdirect product of BCK-chains. We give an axiomatic algebraizable extension of the BCK-calculus, by means of a recursively enumerable set of axioms, such that its equivalent algebraic semantics is definitionally equivalent to the quasivariety of BCK-algebras generated by the BCK-chains. We propose the concept of "linearization of a system" and we give some examples.     

论基础公理与反基础公理

"循环并不可恶"。本文在此基础上讨论基础公理和反基础公理。首先指出基础公理原本就是一条有争议的公理;第二,说明基础公理的局限性;第三,详细论述反基础公理家族中的三个成员,并给出它们两两不相容的一个证明;第四,分析反基础公理导致集合论域在V=WF上不断扩张的方法,并指出这种扩张的方法与数系扩张的方法相同;最后结论:良基集合理论(ZFC)与非良基集合理论(ZFC~-+AFA(或者ZFC和ZFC~-+FAFA或者ZFC和ZFC~-+SAFA))之间的关系类似于欧几里得几何学与非欧几何学之间的关系。     

Partial monotonicity and a new version of the Ramsey test

We introduce two new belief revision axioms: partial monotonicity and consequence correctness. We show that partial monotonicity is consistent with but independent of the full set of axioms for a Gärdenfors belief revision sytem. In contrast to the Gärdenfors inconsistency results for certain monotonicity principles, we use partial monotonicity to inform a consistent formalization of the Ramsey test within a belief revision system extended by a conditional operator. We take this to be a technical dissolution of the well-known Gärdenfors dilemma.In addition, we present the consequential correctness axiom as a new measure of minimal revision in terms of the deductive core of a proposition whose support we wish to excise. We survey several syntactic and semantic belief revision systems and evaluate them according to both the Gärdenfors axioms and our new axioms. Furthermore, our algebraic characterization of semantic revision systems provides a useful technical device for analysis and comparison, which we illustrate with several new proofs.Finally, we have a new inconsistency result, which is dual to the Gärdenfors inconsistency results. Any elementary belief revision system that is consequentially correct must violate the Gärdenfors axiom of strong boundedness (K^*8), which we characterize as yet another monotonicity condition.This work was supported by the McDonnell Douglas Independent Research and Development program.     

The Logic of Location

I consider the idea of a propositional logic of location based on the following semantic framework, derived from ideas of Prior. We have a collection L of locations and a collection S of statements such that a statement may be evaluated for truth at each location. Typically one and the same statement may be true at one location and false at another. Given this semantic framework we may proceed in two ways: introducing names for locations, predicates for the relations among them and an “at” preposition to express the value of statements at locations; or introduce statement operators which do not name locations but whose truth-conditional effect depends on the truth or falsity of embedded statements at various locations. The latter is akin to Prior’s approach to tense logic. In any logic of location there will be some basic operators which we can define. By ringing the changes on the topology of locations, different logical systems may be generated, and the challenge for the logician is then in each case to find operators, axioms and rules yielding a proof theory adequate to the semantics. The generality of the approach is illustrated with familiar and not so familiar examples from modal, tense and place logic, mathematics, and even the logic of games.

相似文献   

From IF to BI

We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Väänänen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges’ semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O’Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural rôle, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural rôle.     

Axiomatizing the Logic of Imagination

In a recent paper Berto introduces a semantic system for a logic of imagination, intended as positive conceivability, and aboutness of imaginative acts. This system crucially adopts elements of both the semantics of conditionals and the semantics of analytical implications in order to account for the central logical traits of the notion of truth in an act of imagination based on an explicit input. The main problem left unsolved is to put forward a complete set of axioms for the proposed system. In the present paper I offer a solution to this problem by providing a complete axiomatization of a generalization of the original semantics. The difficulty in proving completeness lies in the fact that the modalities that capture the notion of truth in an act of imagination are neither standard nor minimal, so that the construction of the canonical model and the proof of the truth lemma are to be substantially modified.

     

On extremal axioms

In the paper translated here, Carnap and Bachmann shows that the apparently metalinguistic ‘extremal' axioms that are added to some axiom systems to the effect that the foregoing axioms are to apply as broadly, or as narrowly, as possible may be formulated directly as proper axioms. They analyze such axioms into four fundamental types, with the help of a concept of ‘complete’ isomorphism.     

Same-race faces are perceived more holistically than other-race faces

This article presents an argument that a primary function of attention in humans is to support cognition. Abundant evidence from cognitive science suggests that human cognition depends on “propositional representations”. Propositions consist of compositional representations called predicates, and truth values. A primary function of attention, from a cognitive perspective, is to create propositions by assigning truth values to predicates. The attentional processes necessary to support propositional representations are identified and the implications for current and future theoretical and empirical approaches to attention are discussed.     

No Fact of the Matter

One familiar form of argument for rejecting entities of a certain kind is that, by rejecting them, we avoid certain difficult problems associated with them. Such problem-avoidance arguments backfire if the problems cited survive the elimination of the rejected entities. In particular, we examine one way problems can survive: a question for the realist about which of a set of inconsistent statements is false may give way to an equally difficult question for the eliminativist about which of a set of inconsistent statements fail to be ‘factual’. Much of the first half of the paper is devoted to explaining a notion of factuality that does not imply truth but still consists in ‘getting the world right’. The second half of the paper is a case study. Some ‘compositional nihilists’ have argued that, by rejecting composite objects (and so by denying the composition ever takes place), we avoid the notorious puzzles of coincidence, for example, the statue/lump and the ship of Theseus puzzles. Using the apparatus developed in the first half of the paper, we explore the question of whether these puzzles survive the elimination of composite objects.