Feelings of dread and intertemporal choice

It frequently has been observed that people discount future rewards relative to present rewards. However, the literature on intertemporal choices involving emotional upsets and losses is fraught with inconsistencies, with some studies finding similar discounting of gains and losses, and others reporting that participants elect to undergo negative experiences sooner rather than later. To help resolve these contradictions, time preferences for different types of aversive experiences (social rejection, embarrassment, pain, monetary and property loss) were examined in five studies. Most participants preferred to postpone monetary and property losses, but intertemporal choices for other unpleasant experiences showed highly variable responses, with some participants deferring them as long as possible, and many electing to experience them immediately. Time preferences for these negative experiences were correlated, but were independent of time preference for rewards. It is argued (following Loewenstein, 1987 ) that anticipation of dread plays a key role in many people's choices about timing of aversive experiences. This interpretation was supported by choices about when to learn of a very unpleasant event whose timing was fixed (Study 3), and by a novel preference reversal (Study 4). Study 5 examined how actual and hypothetical experiences of dread unfolded over time; the results were consistent with a dread‐based interpretation of choices in the preceding studies. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When getting angry is smart: emotional preferences and emotional intelligence

People who prefer to feel useful emotions, even when they are unpleasant to experience, must understand emotions and seek to regulate them in strategic ways. Such people, therefore, may be more emotionally intelligent compared with people who prefer to feel emotions that may not be useful for the context at hand, even if those emotions are pleasant to experience. We tested this hypothesis by measuring emotional intelligence and preferences to feel pleasant and unpleasant emotions in contexts in which they are likely to be useful or not. We found significant positive associations between emotional intelligence and preferences for useful emotions, even when controlling for trait emotional experiences and cognitive intelligence. People who prefer to feel anger when confronting others tend to be higher in emotional intelligence, whereas people who prefer to feel happiness in such contexts tend to be lower in emotional intelligence. Such findings are consistent with the idea that wanting to feel bad may be good at times, and vice versa.     

“时间流”:概念、维度及影响因素初探

"时间流"(timeflow)是指从行为体验的角度来定义时间,即个体在当前某项活动中所感知到行为体验的时间过程,塑造"时间流"的维度包括:外部场景的塑造、自身肢体动作的配合、活动规则的初步感知、目标情感的逐渐融入、文化喻义的深入联想。影响个体"时间流"的主要因素包括感知和情绪,"时间流"也会影响消费体验和幸福体验。未来应关注时间"双扭结"价值函数如何影响人们的行为决策及验证"时间流"五个维度之间的耦合关系。     

Group belongingness and procedural justice: social inclusion and exclusion by peers affects the psychology of voice

The authors focus on the relation between group membership and procedural justice. They argue that whether people are socially included or excluded by their peers influences their reactions to unrelated experiences of procedural justice. Findings from 2 experiments corroborate the prediction that reactions to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures are affected more strongly when people are included in a group than when they are excluded from a group. These findings are extended with a 3rd experiment that shows that people who generally experience higher levels of inclusion in their lives respond more strongly to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures. It is concluded that people's reactions to procedural justice are moderated by people's level of inclusion in social groups.     

The role of attribution of motivation in producing postsuppressional rebound

Three studies demonstrated that postsuppressional rebound (PSR) may be both reduced and enhanced by manipulating people's attributions about why they experience difficulty during suppression. Telling participants that suppression failures indicate a high motivation to use the suppressed construct produced more PSR than telling them that suppression failures indicate a low motivation to use the construct (Study 1). Telling participants that an external stimulus would make suppression easy produced more PSR than telling them that it would make suppression difficult (Study 2). Telling participants that suppressing a stereotype is difficult and unindicative of prejudice eliminated PSR (Study 3). These results support the notion that PSR occurs because people infer from the difficulty experienced during suppression and from suppression failures that they are motivated to use the suppressed construct.     

Bias in memory predicts bias in estimation of future task duration

Both anecdotal accounts and experimental evidence suggest that people underestimate how long it will take them to complete future tasks. A possible reason for this tendency is that people remember tasks as taking less time than they actually did, with these biased memories causing a corresponding bias in prediction. Two experiments were performed to determine whether or not a systematic bias in memory could explain a similar systematic bias in prediction. In support, it was found that (1) the tendency to underestimate future duration disappears when the task is novel, (2) there is similar bias in estimation of both past and future durations, and (3) variables that affect memory of duration, such as level of experience with the task and duration of delay before estimation, affect prediction of duration in the same way. It appears that, at least in part, people underestimate future event duration because they underestimate past event duration.     

The relationship superiority effect is moderated by the relationship context

Previous research has identified the perceived superiority effect, defined as the tendency to regard one's own relationship as better than other people's relationships, as a cognitive maintenance mechanism that supports commitment to close relationships. The present research was designed to test the hypothesis that the perceived superiority effect is moderated by the relationship context — that is, to whom one's relationship is being compared. Two different measures based on a spontaneous thought-listing procedure demonstrated that the perceived superiority effect is significantly stronger when comparing one's own relationship to the relationships of people in general than to the relationships of close friends. Correlational analyses suggested that this difference may reflect people's tendency to experience close friends' outcomes as personal outcomes.     

People avoid situations that enable them to deceive others

Information advantage enables people to benefit themselves by deceiving their counterparts. Using a modified ultimatum bargaining game with an exit option, we find that people are more likely to avoid settings enabling them to privately deceive their counterparts than settings which do not enable deception. This tendency is explained by people's reduced desire to become responsible for the other's outcomes when deception is possible. Results of three experiments show that people avoid entering a setting that enables deception by appearing fair while being unfair (Exp. 1–3). Experiment 2 showed that this tendency was reduced when interaction partners were displayed as competitive rather than cooperative. Experiment 3 showed a stronger tendency to avoid tempting situations that enable private deception than to approach situations in which one can privately benefit others. We conclude that when navigating through social space, people avoid situations enabling them to deceive others.     

Understanding extraverts' enjoyment of social situations: the importance of pleasantness

Extraversion is a broad, multifaceted trait, yet researchers are still unsure of its defining characteristics. One possibility is that the essential feature of extraversion is the tendency to enjoy social situations. An alternative possibility is that extraversion represents sensitivity to rewards and the tendency to experience pleasant affect. In three studies, participants rated situations that varied on two dimensions: (a) whether they were social or nonsocial and (b) whether they were very pleasant, moderately pleasant, moderately unpleasant, or very unpleasant. Extraverts only rated social situations more positively than introverts did when the situations were pleasant, and extraverts also rated nonsocial situations more positively than introverts did if the situations were pleasant. Thus, the pleasantness of situations was more important than whether they were social or nonsocial in determining extraverts' and introverts' enjoyment.     

Is there an epistemic advantage to being oppressed?

Do the oppressed have an epistemic advantage when it comes to knowing about the systems that oppress them? If so, what explains this advantage? In this paper, I consider whether an epistemic advantage can be derived from the oppressed's contingent tendency to have more relevant experiences and motivation than the non-oppressed; or, alternatively, whether an advantage derives from the oppressed's very lived experience, thus being in principle unavailable to the non-oppressed. I then explore the potential role of knowledge-how for explaining an epistemic advantage. Ultimately, I conclude that the oppressed tend to have a contingent advantage, while rejecting that they have one in principle, except for when their phenomenological experience has an effect on the veracity of the claims they make. This has the important upshot that privileged people are not epistemically disadvantaged in principle and are thus often blameworthy for their ignorance about oppression.     

Children's strategies for controlling affective responses to aversive social experience

It was hypothesized that one mechanism of self-control that children develop is the strategic capacity to select the experiences they encounter. This hypothesis led to the prediction that children would deal with certain aversive social experiences by seeking out or taking advantage of opportunities for nurturant experiences. Young children were exposed to an aversive social experience in which they received less nurturance than a peer, a positive experience in which they received more nurturance, or a neutral experience in which nurturance was equal. Subsequently, an opportunity was provided for children to control the length of time they watched a highly nurturant television program. As predicted, boys experiencing an aversive social encounter increased the length of time they exposed themselves to the nurturant television show, and their level of reduced positive affect was related to how long they watched the nurturant content, further supporting the interpretation that they did so in response to their own affective state. Girls did not adopt the strategy of self-exposure to nurturant television but did appear to engage in self-distraction during the aversive social experience. Despite the apparent use of control strategies, there was no indication that these strategies were effective for the amelioration of reduced positive affect resulting from the aversive social experience. Discussion focuses on the sex differences observed in the adoption of strategic behavior and factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of the control strategies. A general model is proposed for personal and environmental factors requisite for the selection, employment, and effectiveness of strategies to control experiences and their affective consequences.     

Looking forward to looking backward: the misprediction of regret

Decisions are powerfully affected by anticipated regret, and people anticipate feeling more regret when they lose by a narrow margin than when they lose by a wide margin. But research suggests that people are remarkably good at avoiding self-blame, and hence they may be better at avoiding regret than they realize. Four studies measured people's anticipations and experiences of regret and self-blame. In Study 1, students overestimated how much more regret they would feel when they "nearly won" than when they "clearly lost" a contest. In Studies 2, 3a, and 3b, subway riders overestimated how much more regret and self-blame they would feel if they "nearly caught" their trains than if they "clearly missed" their trains. These results suggest that people are less susceptible to regret than they imagine, and that decision makers who pay to avoid future regrets may be buying emotional insurance that they do not actually need.     

Framing effects on metacognitive monitoring and control

Three experiments explored the contribution of framing effects on metamemory judgments. In Experiment 1, participants studied word pairs. After each presentation, they made an immediate judgment of learning (JOL), framed in terms of either remembering or forgetting. In the remember frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would remember each pair on the upcoming test. In the forget frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would forget each pair. Confidence differed as a result of the frame. Forget frame JOLs, equated to the remember frame JOL scale by a 1-judgment conversion, were lower and demonstrated a smaller overconfidence bias than did remember frame JOLs. When judgments were made at a delay, framing effects did not occur. In Experiment 2, people chose to restudy more items when choices were made within a forget frame. In Experiment 3, people studied Spanish—English vocabulary pairs ranging in difficulty. The framing effect was replicated with judgments and choices. Moreover, forget frame participants included more easy and medium items to restudy. These results demonstrated the important consequences of framing effects on assessment and control of study.     

The Case for Mixed Emotions

How do people feel when they experience bittersweet events comprised of pleasant and unpleasant aspects (e.g., good news accompanied by bad)? Just as acids immediately neutralize bases, some have suggested that bittersweet events' pleasant aspects might neutralize their unpleasant aspects, thereby resulting in fairly neutral emotional reactions. Some contemporary theorists also contend that happiness and sadness are mutually exclusive. We review research on the alternative possibility that bittersweet events can elicit pairs of opposite‐valence, mixed emotions, with particularly close attention to the growing body of evidence that people can feel happy and sad at the same time while watching films, listening to music, and experiencing meaningful endings. We also review evidence that people sometimes experience other types of mixed emotions, including disgust accompanied by amusement and fear by enjoyment. Taken together, these data indicate that positive and negative affect are separable in experience.     

The Spotlight Effect and the Illusion of Transparency: Egocentric Assessments of How We Are Seen by Others

We review a program of research that examines people's judgments about how they are seen by others. The research indicates that people tend to anchor on their own experience when making such judgments, with the result that their assessments are often egocentrically biased. Our review focuses on two biases in particular, the spotlight effect, or people's tendency tooverestimate the extent to which their behavior and appearance are noticed and evaluated by others, and the illusion of transparency, or people's tendency to overestimate the extent to which their internal states "leak out" and are detectable by others.     

Building false memories without suggestions

People can come to remember doing things they have never done. The question we asked in this study is whether people can systematically come to remember performing actions they never really did, in the absence of any suggestion from the experimenter. People built LEGO vehicles, performing some steps but not others. For half the people, all the pieces needed to assemble each vehicle were laid out in order in front of them while they did the building; for the other half, the pieces were hidden from view. The next day, everyone returned for a surprise recognition test. People falsely and confidently remembered having carried out steps they did not; those who saw all the pieces while they built each vehicle were more likely to correctly remember performing steps they did perform but equally likely to falsely remember performing steps they did not. We explain our results using the source monitoring framework: People used the relationships between actions to internally generate the missing, related actions, later mistaking that information for genuine experience.     

Identity and expression memory for happy and angry faces in social anxiety

We examined the influence of social anxiety on memory for both identity and emotional expressions of unfamiliar faces. Participants high and low in social anxiety were presented with happy and angry faces and were later asked to recognise the same faces displaying a neutral expression. They also had to remember what the initial expressions of the faces had been. Remember/know/guess judgements were asked both for identity and expression memory. For participants low in social anxiety, both identity and expression memory were more often associated with "remember" responses when the faces were previously seen with a happy rather than an angry expression. In contrast, the initial expression of the faces did not affect either identity or expression memory for participants high in social anxiety. We interpreted these findings by arguing that most people tend to preferentially elaborate positive rather than negative social stimuli that are important to the self and that this tendency may be reduced in high socially anxious individuals because of the negative meaning they tend to ascribe to positive social information.     

What Do People Want to Feel and Why?: Pleasure and Utility in Emotion Regulation

ABSTRACT— It is typically assumed that people always want to feel good. Recent evidence, however, demonstrates that people want to feel unpleasant emotions, such as anger or fear, when these emotions promote the attainment of their long-term goals. If emotions are regulated for instrumental reasons, people should want to feel pleasant emotions when immediate benefits outweigh future benefits, but when future benefits outweigh immediate benefits, people may prefer to feel useful emotions, even if they are unpleasant. In this article, I describe an instrumental account of emotion regulation, review empirical evidence relevant to it, and discuss its implications for promoting adaptive emotional experiences.