儒家的仁爱秩序与自爱问题析论

儒家的仁爱秩序是以君、父、夫为中心的差异一体结构,把人的自爱、爱人转化为人伦秩序中的自我角色担当。对于现实人、我关系中的自爱问题,或通过仁者爱人的范围扩大使人、我融合为一个有机整体,使自爱消融于仁者浑然与物同体的境界,或通过对自爱的道德修养论诠释,使之成为仁爱秩序的自觉承担者。但有些儒家学者以自爱作为建构爱的秩序的根本,构成儒家仁爱秩序中的异端思潮。剖析儒家的仁爱秩序与自爱问题,有助于理解儒家思想传统的不同侧面,建构适应现代社会生活的爱的秩序。     

卢梭论公民美德的情感基础与动力机制

公民美德问题在卢梭的政治思想中占有非常重要的地位;在卢梭那里,健康形态的自尊之爱是公民美德的情感基础或人性论基础;而培养公民美德的具体动力机制与思路则是"作为荣誉的利益"或者说以荣誉对抗财富;卢梭关于公民美德的阐述,不同于其同时代的其他许多思想家,而其内在困境则在很大程度上反映了古典共和主义传统在现代社会的命运。     

“自爱”指标与维度的初探——《四库全书》中“自爱”的心理学研究

从《四库全书》中检索到1700部涉及“自爱”的古籍,形成包含2370条句段的语料库并逐条进行内容分析。结果发现,自爱包含自我珍重、自我接纳与自我约束三个主要指标以及个我自爱、小我自爱与大我自爱三个主要维度。未来研究将依据我国社会文化和历史的脉络,结合新时代人们对自爱的理解,编制相应的测量工具,从而为健全人格养成服务。     

仁者自爱:儒家传统的道德生命观及其哲学基础

"仁"是儒家最基本、最核心的道德观念。在"仁者爱人"的层面,儒家仁道的基本精神在于要求行动者为他人而抑制自我、奉献自我。然而,如果仅仅停留在对"为他"向度的单纯强调之上,则儒家的仁道就可能沦为一种对行动者自身缺乏积极价值关怀的片面的自我否定。因而,在"为他"的深处还要体认到"为己",而这一语境之下的"为己"是在"成己"的意义上而言的,其实质内容在于行动者道德生命在深刻意义上的自我实现,这就是儒家"仁者自爱"观念的基本内涵。在伦理学的意义上,只有在仁者自爱的基础之上,仁者爱人方始成之为一种真正出于行动者自律的道德实践。由自律而行为,"爱人"也就具有了"为己"的性质,而不再是单向度的"为人",从而扬弃了道德规范的外在性与异己性,而这也正是孔子所倡导的"仁者安仁"的逻辑基础。     

也论美德伦理学的基本概念

关于美德伦理学是否具有理论上的独立性,是否可以归于以往规范伦理学(如功利主义美德论、义务论的美德论),哲学界一直存有争论。美德伦理学有自己的基本概念,即各种具体的美德概念。美德伦理学对基本概念以及概念还原主义的应用不是严格欧几里得式的机械应用,而是一种类似关联结构式的概念推理应用。以美德概念为基本概念的美德伦理学具有理论独立性,具有与以往规范伦理学理论抗衡的能力。     

论建筑美德

建筑美德是一种物化形态的美德,它是一种通过建造活动展现出来的人为自己造福的重要实现方式,也是人利用人造物来满足生命需求、追求更好生活的外在表征.维特鲁威提出的三个基本建筑美德——坚固、实用和美观,蕴含普适隽永的价值.维特鲁威之后,不同历史时期的建筑师和建筑理论家们对其建筑价值观的认识、评价与发展,折射出西方建筑美德观的流变.追寻当代建筑美德,除了遵守建筑的传统美德外,尤其应强调能够协调建筑与环境关系的美德要求.     

环境美德论

建构环境美德伦理,首要问题是确认人在自然界面前是一个什么样的人。人在自然面前的自我画像不同,人对自然界的道德态度与道德行动也就不同。通过人在宇宙中位置的本体论论证,澄明人是自然界的看护者,看护自然界由此成为人的基本美德。在这个世界上,从来还没有一个物种能够做到看护自然界,唯有人才能够担当如此神圣大任。看护自然界需要人充分运用大智慧,对自然界既要有所作为,又避免胡作非为,因而看护自然界既是对自然界的美好行动,又是对自然界的正确行动。通过看护自然界实现了环境美德伦理与环境规范伦理的有效结合,实现了对自然界道德品质与对自然界正确行动的统一。     

论权利与美德的相容性

在西方政治伦理学术史上,有许多学派认为权利与美德是不相容的。有些社群主义者认为权利主张会导致分散的、原子化的个人,而陷入自私自利,国家越倾向于保护个人权利,人们就越少可能成为有美德的;而有些自由主义者则认为国家鼓励和促进个人的美德的塑造培养,就会造成权利的侵犯。实际上,权利与美德有着基本的同构性,它们都致力于服务于我们对好生活的追求;权利的实践使我们能批判性地反思社群的健全价值,从而为我们自觉参与社群生活实践,进而塑造自己的美德提供价值前提和广阔的空间,所以二者从根本上说是相容的。     

论休谟的道德愉悦感及其理论定位

道德愉悦感是休谟道德哲学的理论核心。休谟认为,道德愉悦感根源于人性中的同情,同情心把个人愉悦和他人(社会)愉悦联系起来并由此产生道德愉悦感。尽管休谟宣称反对道德自爱论,但从他的论述中可看到,他实际上承认自爱是道德愉悦感的另一个来源。同情和理性共同实现了自爱(个人愉悦)向道德愉悦感的转变。休谟道德哲学的主要贡献在于凸显了道德结构的三个要素即自爱、同情和理性;其不足之处是没有讲清三者之间的关系,因而摇摆于情感主义、功利主义和道义论之间。道德理论可以划分为四个基本类型即:情感功利主义、理性功利主义、情感道义论和理性道义论,而休谟的道德理论基本上属于情感功利主义。     

论公正

公正的基准是权利。权利在本质上是一种获得性的社会性资格。公正就是这样的原则 :以权利为本位而义务与权利相对等、对称和对应。公正作为美德就是尊重他人的权利和尊重公共规则。公正作为制度伦理首先就是以权利为本位 ,其次是普遍和平等 ,再次是公开、明确和有既定程序。     

On Political Morality and the Conditions for Warranted Self-Respect

In my recent book Liberalism with Excellence (2017: chapter 7), I have expounded at length a conception of warranted self-respect. That conception, which draws heavily though far from uncritically on the scattered passages about self-respect in the writings of John Rawls, is central to my defense of a variety of liberalism that combines and transfigures certain aspects of Rawlsianism and perfectionism. However, it is also central to the positions taken in some earlier books of mine on capital punishment and torture. (Kramer, The ethics of capital punishment, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; Torture and moral integrity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) Although my understanding of warranted self-respect was presented far more briefly or obliquely in each of those earlier books than in Liberalism with Excellence, it in fact underlies both my limited defense of the death penalty and my absolutist insistence that the use of interrogational torture is never morally permissible. The present paper will recount the gist of my conception of warranted self-respect and will then explain how that conception figures pivotally in my ruminations on the diverse matters of political morality that have been mentioned here.     

Three Types of Self-Respect

According to John Rawls, self-respect is the most important of the primary goods and is essential for the construction of the just society. Self-respect, however, remains a concept which is inadequately theorised, being closely linked to other concepts such as dignity, shame, pride, autonomy and security. Most usually self-respect is considered to be just the self-reflection of the respect we receive from others. In this paper I argue that self-respect consists of both a self-evaluative and a social reflexive element. Using Darwall’s distinction between two types of respect as a building block, I argue that it is worth considering self-respect as having three dimensions. Broadly these are human recognition, status recognition and appraisal.     

Incentives, Inequality and Self-Respect

Rawls argues that ‘Parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect’. But what are these social conditions that we should so urgently avoid? One evident candidate might be conditions of material inequality. Yet Rawls seems confident that his account of justice can endorse such inequalities without jeopardising citizens’ self-respect. In this article I argue that this confidence is misplaced. Unequalising incentives, I claim, jeopardise the self-respect of those least advantaged—at least under a Rawlsian schema—by undermining the very processes by which Rawls hopes to make distributional inequalities and self-respect compatible. I begin by setting out Rawls’s distinct account of self-respect before moving to describe how Rawls expects the difference principle to support citizens’ in this regard. I then draw upon GA Cohen’s distinction between ‘strict’ and ‘lax’ interpretations of the difference principle to argue that the presence of unequalising incentives undermines both the direct and indirect support that the difference principle can offer to citizens’ self-respect. As such, I claim that Rawls must either weaken his endorsement of unequalising incentives, or risk violating his ‘prior commitment’ to avoiding social conditions harmful to citizens’ self-respect.     

Basic Income, Self-Respect and Reciprocity

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Hate Speech,Dignity and Self-Respect

This paper engages with the recent dignity-based argument against hate speech proposed by Jeremy Waldron. It’s claimed that while Waldron makes progress by conceptualising dignity less as an inherent property and more as a civic status which hate speech undermines, his argument is nonetheless subject to the problem that there are many sources of citizens’ dignitary status besides speech. Moreover, insofar as dignity informs the grounds of individuals’ right to free speech, Waldron’s argument leaves us balancing hate speakers’ dignity against the dignity of those whom they attack. I suggest instead that a central part of the harm of hate speech is that it assaults our self-respect. The reasons to respect oneself are moral reasons which can be shared with others, and individuals have moral reasons to respect themselves for their agency, and their entitlements. Free speech is interpreted not as an individual liberty, but as a collective enterprise which serves the interests of speakers and the receivers of speech. I argue that hate speech undermines the self-respect of its targets in both the agency and entitlement dimensions, and claim, moreover, that this is a direct harm which cannot be compensated for by other sources of self-respect. I further argue that hate speakers have no basis to respect themselves qua their hate speech, as self-respect is based on moral reasons. I conclude that self-respect, unlike dignity, is sufficient to explain the harm of hate speech, even though it may not be necessary to explain its wrongness.     

Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect

The concept of self-respect is often invoked in feminist theorizing. But both women's too-common experiences of struggling to have self-respect and the results of feminist critiques of related moral concepts suggest the need for feminist critique and reconceptualization of self-respect. I argue that a familiar conception of self-respect is masculinist, thus less accessible to women and less than conducive to liberation. Emancipatory theory and practice require a suitably feminist conception of self-respect; I propose one such conception.     

尊严:自尊、受尊重与尊重

尊严是个体的一种权利。尊严包括自尊、受尊重、尊重三个成分。早在上个世纪初,斯金纳就对尊严与个体的自由、自主,与社会的控制和公正的关系进行过认真的思考。后来的研究发现,尊严也与人们在社会互动中的能力、力量、权势、地位有关联。     

The Politics of Self-Respect: A Feminist Perspective

Recent liberal moral and political philosophy has placed great emphasis on the good of self-respect. But it is not always evident what is involved in self-respect, nor is it evident how societies can promote it. Assuming that self-respect is highly desirable, I begin by considering how people can live in a self-respecting fashion, and I argue that autonomous envisaging and fulfillment of one's own life plans is necessary for self-respect. I next turn to the question of how societal implementation of rights may affect self-respect, and I urge that discretionary rights, which allow people to decline the benefits they confer, support self-respect more effectively than mandatory rights, which forbid people to refuse the benefits they confer. I conclude by examining the import of these contentions for feminist theory. I believe that my arguments are of particular concern to women because women have traditionally been victimized by a mandatory right to play a distinctively “feminine” role which has undermined their self-respect.     

Workplace Democracy,Market Competition and Republican Self-Respect

Is it a requirement of justice to democratize private companies? This question has received renewed attention in the wake of the financial crisis, as part of a larger debate about the role of companies in society. In this article, we discuss three principled arguments for workplace democracy and show that these arguments fail to establish that all workplaces ought to be democratized. We do, however, argue that republican-minded workers must have a fair opportunity to work in a democratic company. Under current conditions, this means that a liberal order must actively promote workplace democracy.