政治理论领域中的"亚里士多德革命"

经历了数百年的"黑暗时代",公元12世纪初之后的近200年,亚里士多德著作先是经过阿拉伯文转译,后来经过希腊文翻译,重新为西方所知晓.亚里士多德理论与基督教信仰和神学构成了全面而深刻的冲突.在政治理论领域体现为亚里士多德理论与奥古斯丁政治传统的冲突.阿奎那的百科全书式神学/哲学体系力图调和亚里士多德理论与基督教神学,教会对阿奎那体系的承认标志着亚里士多德理论的合法化.合法化后的亚里士多德理论爆发出了教会未曾逆料的政治后果,不仅政治学逐渐成为一门独立于神学的学科,生发出许多与现代早期政治理论直接相关的重大论题,而且在教权与王权的斗争中,王权派逐渐占据上风,王国成为"政治实体",为现代民族国家的产生奠定了坚实的形而上学基础."国家论"在此过程中占据了政治理论舞台的中心.     

What Virtue Argumentation Theory Misses: The Case of Compathetic Argumentation

While deductive validity provides the limiting upper bound for evaluating the strength and quality of inferences, by itself it is an inadequate tool for evaluating arguments, arguing, and argumentation. Similar remarks can be made about rhetorical success and dialectical closure. Then what would count as ideal argumentation? In this paper we introduce the concept of cognitive compathy to point in the direction of one way to answer that question. It is a feature of our argumentation rather than my argument or your argument. In that respect, compathy is like the harmonies achieved by an accomplished choir, the spontaneous coordination of athletic teamwork, or the experience of improvising jazz musicians when they are all in the flow together. It is a characteristic of arguments, not a virtue that can be attributed to individual arguers. It makes argumentation more than just the sum of its individual parts. The concept of cognitive compathy is brought into focus by locating it at the confluence of two lines of thought. First, we work up to the concept of compathy by contrasting it with empathy and sympathy in the context of emotions, which is then transplanted into epistemic, cognitive, and argumentative soil. Second, the concept is analytically linked to ideal argumentation by way of authenticity in communication. In the final section, we explore the extent to which argumentative virtues are conducive to producing compathetic argumentation, but reach the unhappy conclusion that the extra value of compathetic argumentation also transcends the evaluative reach of virtue argumentation theory.     

Logical Cornestones of Judaic Argumentation Theory

In this paper, the four Judaic inference rules: qal wa- ? omer, gezerah ? awah, heqe ?, binyan ’av are considered from the logical point of view and the pragmatic limits of applying these rules are symbolic-logically explicated. According to the Talmudic sages, on the one hand, after applying some inference rules we cannot apply other inference rules. These rules are weak. On the other hand, there are rules after which we can apply any other. These rules are strong. This means that Judaic inference rules have different pragmatic meanings and this fact differs Judaic logic from other ones. The Judaic argumentation theory built up on Judaic logic also contains pragmatic limits for proofs as competitive communication when different Rabbis claim different opinions in respect to the same subject. In order to define these limits we build up a special kind of syllogistics, the so-called Judaic pragmatic-syllogistics, where it is defined whose opinion should be choosen in a dispute.     

On Showing in Argumentation

There is a relation between the way we analyse arguments and the consideration we give to the role of showing in argumentation. the concept of showing covers different ideas. Different kinds of showing are present in argumentative practice. This can be exemplified by reference to sensory evidence, logical inference, and analogical arguments. If showing plays an essential role in the argumentative use of language, and analysis which completely replaces that which is shown by that which is said, distorts what it is trying to understand. Analysing argument is interpreting and continuing argumentative practice; it does not operate on a separate level.     

Justice and Civic Friendship： An Aristotelian Critique of Modern Citizenry

Modem moral and political theorists make a sharp separation between justice and civic friendship, arguing that justice deals with the fair terms of co-operation in the social sphere whereas civic friendship is about an individual＇s contingent affections in the political domain. In addition, they also argue that the principles of justice must determine the nature and function of civic friendship in modem liberal society. Even though the historical origin of the above view can be traced to the writings of Immanuel Kant （2007）, John Rawls provides us with its most cogent formulation in recent times. In his book A Theory of Justice （1971）, Rawls argues that the considerations of right are prior to the considerations of good; therefore the principles of justice must determine the limits of civic friendship. Against RaMs, I argue that justice and civic friendship are intrinsically connected and that they cannot be separated in experience. I draw upon Aristotle＇s theory of virtue to strengthen my arguments. Following Aristotle, I show that both justice and friendship are virtues and that all virtues hold together. The Aristotelian coherence of virtues, I argue, can be useful in redefining the obligations of justice and civic friendship in contemporary liberal democracies.     

Building A General Theory of Meta‐Argumentation

This article presents a critical analysis of the main modern approaches to the problem of meta‐argumentation and suggests a method for developing a general conception of meta‐argumentation. A set of theoretical‐methodological difficulties (aporias) along this path is revealed. Overcoming these aporias would constitute the main steps toward developing the body of a theory of meta‐argumentation.     

Representation of Argumentation in Text with Rhetorical Structure Theory

Various argumentation analysis tools permit the analyst to represent functional components of an argument (e.g., data, claim, warrant, backing), how arguments are composed of subarguments and defenses against potential counterarguments, and argumentation schemes. In order to facilitate a study of argument presentation in a biomedical corpus, we have developed a hybrid scheme that enables an analyst to encode argumentation analysis within the framework of Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST), which can be used to represent the discourse structure of a text. This paper describes the hybrid representation scheme and illustrates its use for investigation of contexts that license omission of elements of an argument. The analyses given in the paper involve reconstruction of enthymemes. Defeasible argumentation schemes serve as a constraint on reconstruction. In addition, the examples illustrate several other types of contextual constraints on reconstruction of enthymemes.     

The Making of Argumentation Theory: A Pragma-dialectical View

In ‘The making of argumentation theory’ van Eemeren and van Haaften describe the contributions made to the five components of a full-fledged research program of argumentation theory by four prominent approaches to the discipline: formal dialectics, rhetoric/pragmalinguistics, informal logic, and pragma-dialectics. Most of these approaches do not contribute to all components, but to some in particular. Starting from the pragma-dialectical view of the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness – the crucial issue in argumentation theory – van Eemeren and van Haaften explain the positions taken by representatives from the approaches discussed and indicate where they differ from the pragma-dialectical approach. It transpires that approaches focusing on dialectical reasonableness are, next to pragma-dialectics, formal dialectics and informal logic; approaches focusing on rhetorical effectiveness are, next to pragma-dialectics, rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, and the informal logician Tindale. When it comes to the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, some interest in it is shown in rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, but only in pragma-dialectics and in Tindale’s work is it a real focus. The main difference between Tindale’s view and the pragma-dialectical view is that in pragma-dialectics the decisive role in deciding about reasonableness is assigned to a code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse and in Tindale’s approach this role is assigned to Tindale’s interpretation of the Perelmanian universal audience.

     

On Argumentation Logic and Propositional Logic

This paper studies the relationship between Argumentation Logic (AL), a recently defined logic based on the study of argumentation in AI, and classical Propositional Logic (PL). In particular, it shows that AL and PL are logically equivalent in that they have the same entailment relation from any given classically consistent theory. This equivalence follows from a correspondence between the non-acceptability of (arguments for) sentences in AL and Natural Deduction (ND) proofs of the complement of these sentences. The proof of this equivalence uses a restricted form of ND proofs, where hypotheses in the application of the Reductio of Absurdum inference rule are required to be “relevant” to the absurdity derived in the rule. The paper also discusses how the argumentative re-interpretation of PL could help control the application of ex-falso quodlibet in the presence of inconsistencies.     

Autonomy as Second Nature: On McDowell's Aristotelian Naturalism

The concept of second nature plays a central role in McDowell's project of reconciling thought's external constraint with its spontaneity or autonomy: our conceptual capacities are natural in the sense that they are fully integrated into the natural world, but they are a second nature to us since they are not reducible to elements that are intelligible apart from those conceptual capacities. Rather than offering a theory of second nature and an account of how we acquire one, McDowell suggests that Aristotle's account of ethical character formation as the acquisition of a second nature serves as a model that can reassure us that thought's autonomy does not threaten its naturalness. However, far from providing such reassurance, the Aristotelian model of second nature actually generates an anxiety about how the acquisition of such autonomous conceptual abilities could be possible.     

儒家德育课程思想对现代思想道德教育的价值

探讨儒家德育课程思想,不仅可以使我们充分认识儒家思想的精华和糟粕,而且可以使我们从中探求其之所以长期占据我国传统思想文化统治地位的原因,寻求其中所蕴含的深刻的民族文化心理,对我国当前思想道德教育提供有益的借鉴和启示。     

儒家修身理论及其现代价值浅析

中国古代儒家修身理论是建立在对人性的善恶问题予以追问的理论基础之上的,只有回答了这一问题,道德修养的可能性和必须性才是题中应有之义.由此形成了独特而丰富的修身原则和方法,即:立志乐道、涵养省察、内省自讼、知行相资.而这些修养原则和方法指向的价值目标则是圣人之境,即"内圣";其外在趋向则是"修己安人",即"外王".二者缺一不可.儒家的这一修身理路以及具体原则方向和趋向目标,具有较强的现代价值.     

Logic and Rhetoric in Legal Argumentation: Some Medieval Perspectives

While the formal treatment of arguments in the late medieval modi arguendi owes much to dialectic, this does not remove the substance and function of the argumentative modes discussed from the realm of rhetoric. These works, designed to teach law students skills in legal argumentation, remain importantly focused on persuasive features of argumentation which have traditionally been strongly associated with a rhetorical approach, particularly in efforts to differentiate from it dialectic as a more strictly scientific and logical form of reasoning. This also sheds some light on the relative roles logic and rhetoric play in the legal discourse of our own time. In their approach to persuasive legal discourse, the modi arguendi stand between the argumentative rhetorics of Antiquity and the rhetoricized dialectics of the Renaissance, and by linking the minute technicalities of professionalized law with broad general considerations of justice, utility, nature, and emotion, they mediate between the modem trend towards atomized field-specific rhetorics and the classical idea of a unified civic rhetoric.     

生命退化论的哲学视野

生命退化是指生命系统从有序到无序或从高有序度到低有序度的转化趋势和过程,主要表现为物种数量减少、种群寿命缩短和个体衰老死亡.关于生命退化的原因,自然科学认为是自然规律和天灾人祸使然,宗教神学认为是人的犯罪和神的惩罚所致,哲学认为是自然、社会和神是的交互影响.生命退化论对人类具有启示和警示的积极作用,可是人们对它一直存在着认识上的误解和价值取向上的误区.