“Consistency” and “contradiction” in the development of gender role characteristics

There is currently an increasing amount of theoretical and empirical work arguing that stereotyped sex role behavior is maladaptive in our culture and that “androgyny” or “sex role transcendence” is a preferred mode of being. The latter, however, seems to require individual inconsistency and self-contradiction in behaviors and attitudes (since the individual is both active and passive, both independent and dependent, etc.). Theories of cognitive consistency maintain that individuals avoid self-contradiction and inconsistency, and therefore that androgyny runs counter to important motivational principles. This article examines this issue in some detail, and concludes that theories of cognitive dissonance and consistency reflect particular socio-cultural conditions rather than universal motivation principles. There is nothing inherently uncomfortable or “inconsistent” about androgyny and sex role transcendence.     

Effects of visual familiarity on “same” and “different” decision processes

An experiment was conducted in which subjects matched upper and lower case versions of well-known abbreviations, such as BBC and etc, and meaningless controls. “Same” RT showed a familiarity effect for upper case versions of abbreviations such as BBC and GPO, but not for the lower case versions bbc and gpo. The converse did not occur for abbreviations such as etc, which were thought to occur most frequently in lower case. The “different” RT was inhibited by familiarity, with pairs such as IBM GPO being classified less rapidly than their lower case versions or controls. These effects occurred for subjects instructed to report “No” for “same” displays and “Yes” for “different” displays as well as for subjects given a conventional decision-report assignment. Some implications of these results for an account of the manner in which familiarity affects graphemic comparison processes are considered.     

Identifying components of type-A behaviour: “toxic” and “non-toxic” achieving

Measures of the Type-A behaviour pattern (TABP) have generally failed to distinguish between different components of the construct, some of which may not constitute risk factors at all. Based on the responses of a total of 632 subjects, the present paper reports on the development of student and working adult questionnaires which comprise discrete and unambiguous indices of “toxic” and “non-toxic” behaviour. Both components reflect high achievement motivation, but in the toxic scale this is compounded by hostile competitiveness and impatience. The scales were related in predictable ways to other relevant indices of personality, and while the toxic factor was significantly associated with deterioration in health status during adaptation, the non-toxic factor conferred a protective effect.     

Why psychology needs conceptual analysts: Wachtel's “discontents” revisited

Commenting on Wachtel's “Investigation and its Discontents” [Wachtel, P. L. (1980). Investigation and its discontents: Some constraints on progress in psychological research. American Psychologist, 35, 399–408], I agree that lack of support for a career path of conceptual analysis and critique is a serious problem. Psychology requires a strong conceptual component because it is subject to unusual distortions and self-deceptions in theory formation and evidential evaluation due to issues of power, self-esteem, and social ideology. I agree with Wachtel that pressures for quantity of publication are detrimental to scientific quality, but dispute his suggestion that excessive focus on quantity in assessing productivity can be addressed by having tenure and promotion candidates submit only their three best papers. Such reviews must be based on the entire record, so improvements must involve journals’ acceptance standards. Regarding Wachtel's concern about the influence of grants on reviews, I argue that grants should be relevant only to the extent they bear on the candidate's scholarly goals.     

Spatial cueing and the relation between the accuracy of “where” and “what” decisions in visual search

To study the processes underlying selective attention in visual search, the relation between the accuracy of “where” (location) and “what” (same/different orientation matching) decisions was analysed under various display conditions. Target-non-target discriminability was varied by contrasting single and multiple element displays; further, attention was directly manipulated by spatial cueing. In Experiment 1, analyses for both single and multiple displays showed that localization accuracy remained above chance when same/different matching failed; the inverse also obtained. It seems that accurate matching is not a prerequisite for target localization, nor is accurate localization a prerequisite for same/different matching. However, localization is a prerequisite for the accurate recognition of target orientation (Experiment 2). In this case, it seems that features critical for localization “call” attention to a particular candidate location. This facilitates further (shape) analysis of the stimulus that is found there. This orienting process is by-passed if attention is cued to the location in advance.     

A comparison between “aware” and “naive” conditions in the suppression of GSR activity

“Aware” (A) and “naive” (N) groups received different instructional sets, the former being informed both of the nature of their task and the response-reinforcement contingency. Negative reinforcement was given to these groups whenever a spontaneous GSR was emitted during four 4-min trial periods. Two corresponding yoked-control groups, CA and CN, received non-contingent reinforcement over the same periods. The contingent reinforcement groups both showed learned suppression of spontaneous GSR activity, but comparison between the A and N groups revealed a significant interaction between Time and Instructional Set. It is suggested that the “aware” instructional set had an inhibitory effect upon learning.     

A study of position habits induced by reward and “frustration”

Predictions from Maier's theory of “frustration”-instigated behaviour have been tested in an experimental situation differing significantly from that in which the theory was propounded yet containing the central element of “frustration”—the insoluble problem.

A water discrimination unit was employed in which the performance of rats would be observed during attacks on insoluble problems, position problems or symbol problems.

Two groups, each containing ten Wistar albino rats, served as subjects. The research design consisted of the following phases: preliminary training, development of position responses, exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 50 per cent, punishment and exposure to a symbol-reward problem with 100 per cent, punishment. The design differed for the two groups only at the phase in which the position responses were established. During this phase one group was exposed to a position-reward problem and the other to an insoluble problem.

Position responses were established as frequently under position-“frustration” (position stereotypes) as under position-reward (position habits) conditions. Position stereotypes were more rigid—more resistant to extinction—than position habits under conditions of 50 per cent, punishment. Position stereotypes were as readily extinguished under 100 per cent, punishment as were position habits under 30 per cent, punishment.

The first two observations conform to predictions made from Maier's theory. The third does not. That is to say, not all situations containing the basic elements of “frustration” give rise to stereotyped behaviour patterns which are as rigid or “fixated” as Maier's theory would predict. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the characteristics of stereotyped responses established in certain “frustration” situations may be described adequately in terms of conventional learning principles without the necessity of resorting to a distinction between “goal-motivated” and “frustration-instigated” behaviour.     

Discrimination of “W” and “V” shapes by goldfish

Goldfish were trained to discriminate between “W” and “V” shapes; different groups were trained with the shapes in different orientations. Transfer tests were given after training and the following conclusions were drawn. Animals learned to discriminate between the training shapes by detecting the difference in the number of points present in each; they learned the difference in the relative number of points rather than the absolute number present in each shape; the subjects transferred well to pairs of shapes bearing points facing in different directions from those on the training shapes; knobs were treated as practically equivalent to points; animals relied more heavily on differences at the tops of the shapes than on differences in the bottom halves.     

“Enacted” auditory images are ambiguous; “pure” auditory images are not

Previous research indicates that visual images are inherently unambiguous. The present study extends this argument to auditory imagery. In Experiment 1, subjects were able to reinterpret an imaged ambiguous auditory figure, but covert subvocalization apparently aided this reinterpretation. When subvocalization was blocked, reinterpretations were eliminated. Experiments 2 and 3 generalize this finding to different procedures and stimuli. Experiment 4 explores further the role of subvocalization, by showing that the likelihood of reinterpreting an imaged stimulus is directly proportional to the degree of enactment allowed. We argue that subvocalization or enactment provides an internal stimulus that is subject to reinterpretation. Without enactment, the “pure” auditory image is as unambiguous as a visual image. Thus, in both visual and auditory modalities, images come into being as representations and so are inherently meaningful.     

The contribution of “cool” and “hot” components of decision-making in adolescence: Implications for developmental psychopathology

Impairments in either “cool” or “hot” processes may represent two pathways to deficient decision-making. Whereas cool processes are associated with cognitive and rational decisions, hot processes are associated with emotional, affective, and visceral processes. In this study, 168 boys were administered a card-playing task at ages 13 and 14 years to assess response perseveration. This task was designed to initially reward playing and gradually associate playing with punishment. Measures of subjective ordering (cool processes) and neuroticism (hot processes) at age 13 years were used to examine how these individual characteristics relate to perseveration over time. A decrease in perseveration from age 13 to 14 was associated with cool processes whereas hot processes were associated with response perseveration only over time. A complementary but simultaneous assessment of cool and hot processes, such as neuropsychological and personality tests, could facilitate treatment planning of children with behavioral problems.     

“I think it, therefore it’s true”: Effects of self-perceived objectivity on hiring discrimination

A sense of personal objectivity may prompt an “I think it, therefore it’s true” mindset, in which people assume that their own beliefs and introspections are, by definition, valid and therefore worthy of being acted on. In the present studies, priming a sense of personal objectivity increased gender discrimination, particularly among decision-makers who endorsed stereotypic beliefs or who had stereotypic thoughts made cognitively accessible through implicit priming. Implications for discrimination in organizational contexts, and for theories of attitude–behavior consistency, are discussed.     

The effect of an irrelevant dimension on “same-different” judgements of multi-dimensional stimuli

Subjects made “same”-“different” judgements of simultaneously presented pairs of visual stimuli which could vary either in shape and colour independently, or in shape alone. In both conditions only shape was relevant to the “same”-“different” judgement. In the former condition “same” and “different” reaction times (RTs) were shorter when the states (“same” or “different”) of the relevant and the irrelevant dimension, colour, were the same. This result is interpreted as support for either a perceptual or a response interference hypothesis. The presence of an irrelevant dimension did not appear to affect differentially “same” and “different” judgements. The need for a re-evaluation of the results from other studies of multi-dimensional stimulus discrimination is discussed.     

Against “Transracialism”: Revisiting the Debate

This article critically reflects on some of the themes and assumptions at stake in the “transracialism” controversy, and connects them to important works in critical race theory: namely Rey Chow's notion of “coercive mimeticism” and Sara Ahmed's critique of white liberal multiculturalism. It argues that the analytic account of “race” that Tuvel draws upon in her article—Sally Haslanger's—is politically problematic, both on its own terms and in light of broader reflections on racialized and gendered power relations. In particular, I critique Haslanger's assumption that all racial identities exist on the same conceptual plane: that a single variable definition of “race” can be applied to any particular racialized group—including white and nonwhite racial identities. This erases racialized power relations, especially where, in liberal “multicultural” nations, whiteness constitutes the implied standard against which an appearance of “racial difference” is conjured. Finally, I extend my argument to the issue of treating “race” and gender analogously. Rejecting this move, I propose an alternative way of conceptualizing these as analytically distinct, yet constitutively interdependent, phenomena. In order to situate the debate historically, I consider an example of “racial transgression” from twentieth‐century China.     

“Handedness” and skill

The variability of handedness with different tasks is discussed. Experiments are described which show under what conditions handedness becomes evident. Tasks involving three different levels of complexity were used. The simplest task measured the accuracy with which a particular pressure could be reproduced in isometric contraction of the flexors of the index finger on each side in 21 female subjects. In the second situation, the maximum speed of making an attempted tapping movement under the same conditions, was measured in ten of the same subjects using the same muscle group alternating with its antagonists. The same ten subjects were also tested on an aiming task which provided the third level of complexity. The results suggest that differences in performance between the two sides only occur where “timing” or the serial organization of muscle activity is required and that such differences may be due to training.

Whether handedness is inherited or acquired is briefly discussed, and a second series of experiments using the same tasks as before were carried out on one female and nine male subjects. In this instance, the first two tests were used on the big toe of each side as well as the index finger. The results confirm that differences in performance between the two sides on these tasks can be adequately explained in terms of usage or training.

The hypothesis that “timing” is therefore important in the learning of any movement where serial muscle contractions arc involved was tested and confirmed in a third experimental series. The consistency of timing of the application of force in turning a crank handle at maximum speed was measured in five male subjects before and after training. The implications of the results are discussed in relation to other researches on skills.     

The effect of orthographic structure and lexical meaning on “same-different” judgments

Pairs of high frequency English words, orthographically acceptable pseudo-words, and non-word letter strings were presented in a “same”-“different” task. The mean reaction times for “same” judgments were ordered; real words were faster than pseudo-words, and pseudo-words were faster than non-words. The RTs for the “different”, judgments showed no differences among the three types of words, except in the first two days of practice in a blocked presentation condition when the difference between the real words and non-words was marginally significant. These and other results suggest that “same” judgments are based upon a comparison process which efficiently uses higher order semantic and orthographic information in words, whereas “different” judgments are based upon comparison process which performs a self-terminating search of the graphemic information in words. The results were also discussed with reference to hierarchical models of word perception and reading.     

Generativity and Erikson's “belief in the species”

Generativity is the concern for guiding and promoting the next generation through such creative behavior as parenting, teaching, mentoring, leading, and generating products and outcomes that benefit others. Erikson (1963) has argued that in order to be generative in adulthood, people must have a fundamental “belief in the species” or a faith that human progress is possible and worth working toward. The present study focuses on hope and trust concerning the self and others (Erikson's “belief in the species”). In addition, however, the study examines the relation between generativity and personality traits, in this case, dominance, leadership, self-absorption, and nurturance. A sample of 70 adults was administered (1) a series of self-report questionnaires converging on Erikson's idea of belief in the species, (2) a self-report scale assessing generativity, (3) measures of personality traits, and (4) two open-ended measures of generativity requiring subjects to describe life commitments and creative endeavors. The results provide modest support for Erikson's claim of a link between belief in the species and generativity, with significant positive correlations obtained (1) between self-report generativity and two measures of belief in species and (2) between generativity assessed through life commitments and one measure of belief in the species. In addition, the personality trait of nurturance was positively related to all three generativity measures. Problems and issues in the assessment of generativity are discussed.     

Gadamer and the Otherness of Nature: Elements for an Environmental Education

In this work I search for elements that contribute to the development of the ethical dimension of environmental education. I start with the existence of what C.A. Bowers calls “areas of silence” in the curriculum in both schools and universities. The reason for this silence, I argue, is to be found in the Cartesian conceptual structures of curricula. I suggest that the works of Bacon, Galileo and Descartes provoke a twofold process that I have termed the forgetting of tradition and objectification of nature. As a corrective to this process, I explore the possibilities that the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer opens for rehabilitation of tradition and de-objectification of nature. I work with the concept of the “dignity of things” present in Greek dialectics: that nature is not simply a projection of mind (as the neo-Kantians claim), but something that thought suffers. In my conclusions I argue that for nature to be reinserted into almost all areas of knowledge it is necessary that we respect “the otherness of nature.”     

On the significance of “double encoding” for the superior recall of pictures to names

Ten-year-old children who were shown pictures of objects immediately preceded by the object's name recalled the material no better than those exposed to the names of the stimuli alone. Both conditions yielded significantly poorer retention than those in which pictures alone were presented or pictures followed by their names. A second study replicated this result. In addition this demonstrated, by a picture and name recognition task, that the effects could not be due to subjects in the “name prior to picture” condition ignoring the pictorial component. These results were interpreted as contradicting the “double encoding” explanation of the superiority of pictures to names in free recall. Parallel visual and verbal encoding of a pictured object does not facilitate retention unless the verbal cue is actively elicited from the subject by the stimulus. The implications of this result for other studies which have employed either simultaneous or sequential presentation of pictures and names are briefly discussed.     

Context, categorization, and recall: The “change-of-standard” effect

A psycholinguistically based conception of the relation among context, categorization, and memory is tested by examining what happens to people's memory of an object when the object is initially categorized in terms of the context in which it appears, but, when the object is later recalled, this context is no longer salient. Subjects read about the sentencing decisions of a target trial judge in the context of other trial judges who consistently gave either higher sentences or lower sentences than the target judge. As predicted, subjects tended to categorize the target judge as “lenient” in the former, harsh context condition, and as “harsh” in the latter, lenient context condition. A week later, subjects read about the sentencing decisions of some additional judges, and then recalled the sentencing decisions of the target judge they had read about the week before. Across the two sessions, either a harsh, moderate, or lenient category norm for judges' sentencing decisions was established by having subjects read about decisions that involved either high, medium, or low sentences, respectively. The results indicated that subjects recalled the target judge's decisions by interpreting their prior categorization of his behavior in terms of the category norm established across the two sessions rather than the original context. Thus, subjects who were exposed to the same target in the same circumstances, and initially categorized the target in the same way, nevertheless remembered his behavior differently if their category norm was different at the moment of recall. Other types of “change of standard” and their implications for human judgment and memory are discussed.     

An assessment of the potential utility of “scientific jury selection”: A “thought experiment” approach

The efficacy of “scientific jury selection” (the use of social science methodology to aid the jury selection process) has been a subject of considerable contention. Unfortunately, such issues are difficult to address empirically, especially at the level of jury rather than juror decisions. One means of addressing some of these questions is through the use of “thought experiments” or computer simulations that are based not on intuition or conventional wisdom alone but guided by relevant empirical data. This paper reports the outcomes of simulations that explore jury verdict consequences from the use of scientific jury selection to (a) obtain changes in venue, (b) select jurors, and (c) accomplish both of the preceding. The results indicated that the potential effects of scientific jury selection are strongest when the techniques are successful in bringing about changes of venue or more representative jury panels. Somewhat weaker, albeit still consequential, effects were observed in those instances where scientific jury selection techniques are used to select particular jurors. The psychological and legal implications of these results, and the thought experiment approach in general, are discussed.