Can religious and secular belief be rationally combined?

Sometimes the cognitive part of the human mind is modelled in a simplified way by degrees of belief. E.g., in philosophy of science and in formal epistemology agents are often identified by their credences in a set of claims. This line of dealing with the individual mind is currently expanded to groups by attempts of finding adequate ways of pooling individual degrees of belief into an overall group credence or, more abstractly speaking, into a collective mind. In this paper, we model religious people’s minds as such a collective mind. Religious people are therein identified with a set of degrees of beliefs containing religious and secular credences. E.g., within a religious context a person may be sure that some statement is true, whereas the same person lacks non-religious support for such a credence and hence may doubt the truth of that statement within a secular context. We will also present two results on the adequacy of this model.     

Can religious beliefs combat negative peer influence during adolescence?

The purpose of this study was to identify religiosity dimensions that might be efficacious in helping adolescents combat negative peer influence. In past studies, the protective elements of religiosity were small to non-existent once peer influence was considered. However, peer influence can take many forms and the relation between susceptibility to negative peer influence and religious beliefs is not clear. Two hundred and twenty high school students were surveyed on several dimensions of religiosity via the Attitude to Christianity Inventory, different forms of peer influence (i.e., peer conformity and perceptions of peer behaviours) and their own pro- and anti-social conduct. Through hierarchical regression analyses some religiosity dimensions (i.e., the Bible and social justice) were found to be more protective than others in predicting conduct in the context of peer conformity. Implications for intervention were addressed.     

Can a right to health care be justified by linkage arguments?

Linkage arguments, which defend a controversial right by showing that it is indispensable or highly useful to an uncontroversial right, are sometimes used to defend the right to health care (RHC). This article evaluates such arguments when used to defend RHC. Three common errors in using linkage arguments are (1) neglecting levels of implementation, (2) expanding the scope of the supported right beyond its uncontroversial domain, and (3) giving too much credit to the supporting right for outcomes in its area. A familiar linkage argument for RHC focuses on its contributions to the right to life. Among the problems with this argument are that it requires a positive conception of the right to life that is not uncontroversial and that it only justifies the subset of RHC that seeks to prevent loss of life. A linkage argument for RHC with better prospects claims that a well-realized right to health care enhances the realization of a number of uncontroversial rights.     

Can liberal perfectionism justify religious toleration? Wall on promoting and respecting

Toleration is perhaps the core commitment of liberalism, but this seemingly simple feature of liberal societies creates tension for liberal perfectionists, who are committed to justifying religious toleration primarily in terms of the goods and flourishing it promotes. Perfectionists, so it seems, should recommend restricting harmful religious practices when feasible. If such restrictions would promote liberal perfectionist values like autonomy, it is unclear how the perfectionist can object. A contemporary liberal perfectionist, Steven Wall, has advanced defense of religious toleration that grounds perfectionist toleration in an innovative account of reasons of respect. He thus defends perfectionist toleration on two grounds: (i) the appropriate manner of responding to perfectionist goods like autonomy and membership is to respect the religious choices of others; (ii) citizens can acquire reasons to respect the religious choices of others through internalizing a value-promoting moral and political code. I argue that both defenses fail. The cornerstone of both arguments is the connection Wall draws between reasons to promote value and reasons to respect it. I claim that Wall’s conception of the relationship between promoting and respecting value is inadequate. I conclude that the failure of Wall’s defense of perfectionist toleration should motivate liberal perfectionists to develop more sophisticated accounts of normative reasons. The viability of a truly liberal perfectionism depends upon such developments.     

Are introverts still more religious?

The JEPQ and a religious attitude scale, ASC 4B, were completed by 1715 school children aged 11–17 yrs. Attitude to religion was found to decline across the age range, girls were found to be more religious than boys, and introverts more religious than extraverts. The relationship between introversion and religiosity is consistent with previous research and the present study adds substance to this relationship with the use of a more recent E scale on an extended age range.     

Two skeptical arguments or only one?

The first step in responding to the challenge of external world skepticism is to get clear on the structure of the skeptic’s argument. The most prominent varieties of skeptical arguments either rely on closure principles or underdetermination principles. The relationship between these two sorts of arguments is contentious. Some argue that these arguments can independently motivate skepticism. Others argue that they are really equivalent. I argue that although these two arguments are distinct, their independence is not as obvious as some have thought. The fact that these arguments are not equivalent is important because skeptical arguments that appeal to underdetermination principles cannot be refuted by simply denying closure. So, the strategy for responding to skepticism offered by Nozick/Dretske does not seem an adequate solution.     

Does religious diversity make us unhappy?

I investigate the effect of religious diversity on well-being using the World Values Survey data across 77 countries. Religious diversity is measured as fractionalisation or polarisation. People are unhappy in religiously diverse societies. One explanation is that people have a need to belong and like to live among like-minded individuals. Another explanation is that religion creates bonding social capital as opposed to bridging social capital. Directions for further research are discussed.     

Zambia: multi‐faith religious education?

As countries’ populations become more religiously diverse, a need to review the religious education syllabus that operates is often perceived. One such country is Zambia, which was not only traditionally religiously diverse but has become even more so with the advent of Christianity, Islam and Hinduism and other non‐African faiths. This article therefore explores the feasibility of adopting a multi‐faith approach to religious education in Zambia in the light of such increasing religious diversity. In doing so, special reference is made to parallels with what is happening elsewhere, especially in England, for the Zambian religious education situation had a somewhat similar shape as that of England. Among the issues which this paper raises are: what kind of multi‐faith religious education, that preserves its integrity, is likely to enhance social harmony in Zambia, as well as, how might such a religious education be effectively introduced and implemented?     

Is there a religious factor in health?

This paper reviews epidemiologic studies employing religion as an independent construct, and finds that most epidemiologists have an extremely limited appreciation of religion. After a historical overview of empirical religion and health research, some theoretical considerations are offered, followed by clarification of several operational and methodological issues. Next, well over 200 studies are reviewed from nine health-related areas: cardiovascular disease, hypertension and stroke, colitis and enteritis, general health status, general mortality, cancer of the uterine corpus and cervix, all other non-uterine cancers, morbidity and mortality in the clergy, and cancer in India. Finally, an agenda for further research is proposed.     

Are Christian/religious people poor tippers?

A web‐based survey was used to assess the relationships of religious faith and frequency of church attendance with tipping under conditions of good and bad service. Results indicated that Jews and those with no religion tipped more than Christians and members of other religions, but that the vast majority of Christians tipped at or above the normative 15% of bill size. Worship frequency also significantly interacted with service quality such that the tips of those who frequently worship vary with service quality less than the tips of those who worship less frequently. The practical implications of these results for service workers and restaurants or other service businesses with a large religious clientele are discussed.     

Should inter-collegiate football be eliminated? Assessing the arguments philosophically

Recently, there have been discussions about whether or not inter-collegiate football should be eliminated in the US. This article philosophically assesses the arguments for its elimination as well as the arguments proffered against its elimination. While a variety of arguments are discussed, a new one is brought into the foray of philosophical investigation, one that combines the unfairness and economic arguments: the health care and medical costs to others argument. It is believed that this argument is sufficient to justify the elimination of inter-collegiate football.     

Does religious belief promote prosociality? A critical examination

Numerous authors have suggested that religious belief has a positive association, possibly causal, with prosocial behavior. This article critiques evidence regarding this "religious prosociality" hypothesis from several areas of the literature. The extant literature on religious prosociality is reviewed including domains of charity, volunteering, morality, personality, and well-being. The experimental and quasi-experimental literature regarding controlled prosocial interactions (e.g., sharing and generosity) is reviewed and contrasted with results from naturalistic studies. Conceptual problems in the interpretation of this literature include separating the effects of stereotypes and ingroup biases from impression formation as well as controlling for self-report biases in the measurement of religious prosociality. Many effects attributed to religious processes can be explained in terms of general nonreligious psychological effects. Methodological problems that limit the interpretation of religious prosociality studies include the use of inappropriate comparison groups and the presence of criterion contamination in measures yielding misleading conclusions. Specifically, it is common practice to compare high levels of religiosity with "low religiosity" (e.g., the absence of denominational membership, lack of church attendance, or the low importance of religion), which conflates indifferent or uncommitted believers with the completely nonreligious. Finally, aspects of religious stereotype endorsement and ingroup bias can contribute to nonprosocial effects. These factors necessitate a revision of the religious prosociality hypothesis and suggest that future research should incorporate more stringent controls in order to reach less ambiguous conclusions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Can including pros and cons increase the helpfulness and persuasiveness of online reviews? The interactive effects of ratings and arguments

One guideline given to online reviewers is to acknowledge a product's pros and cons. Yet, I argue that presenting two sides is not always more helpful and can even be less persuasive than presenting one side. Specifically, the effects of two- versus one-sided arguments depend on the perceived consistency between a reviewer's arguments and rating. Across a content analysis and three experiments that vary the information provided in the online review and whether the ratings are positive or negative, the results support these predictions. Furthermore, beliefs that the reviewer is able (vs. willing) to tell the truth mediated the effects.     

Can Evil Attract?

It has sometimes been claimed that the perceived badness of an act can in some circumstances, or for some agents, be a reason for performing it. The present paper challenges this claim, arguing that it is hard to make sense of the idea that a negative evaluation of an action can provide an intelligible reason for doing it. Apparent counter-examples are discussed and dismissed and the paper concludes with some general reflections on the relationship between evaluation and motivation.     

Can dogs count?

Numerical competencies have been thoroughly examined in several species, yet relatively few studies have examined such processes in the domestic dog. In an initial experiment, procedures from numerical studies of chimpanzees (0010 and 0015) were adapted for use with 27 domestic dogs. Subjects in these experiments watched as different quantities of food were sequentially dropped into each of two bowls. The subjects were then allowed to select and consume the contents of one of the bowls. Although dogs excelled in a 1 vs 0 condition, their performance failed to significantly surpass chance across all other ratios. In a second experiment with a single subject (a rough collie named Sedona), the procedure was revised so that non-food stimuli were presented simultaneously to the dog on two magnet boards. If Sedona chose the board with the majority of the items, she was rewarded with a piece of food hidden underneath the board. If she made an incorrect choice, she received no reinforcement. Interestingly, Sedona's performance far exceeded that of the dogs in Experiment 1. Implications of these findings for the study of domestic dogs are discussed.