3～6岁儿童“心理理论”的发展

“心理理论”是发展心理学的研究热点,在儿童获得心理理论的年龄和发展阶段问题上仍存在争议。该研究以3所城市幼儿园中的233名3-6岁儿童为被试,采用“意外转移”和“欺骗外表”两个错误信念测验任务考察儿童“心理理论”的获得年龄和发展阶段。研究得出如下结论:3岁之前儿童已理解外表与真实的区别,但还不能理解错误信念。 4岁儿童理解了欺骗外表任务中自己和他人的错误信念,5岁儿童理解了意外转移任务中的错误信念。4-5岁是儿童获得“心理理论”的关键年龄,但这会因测验任务的不同而有所差异。儿童的错误信念理解不存在显著的性别差异。     

学前儿童的“心理理论”在不同ToM任务中的发展特点

考察了72名3～5岁儿童在三个改造过的经典错误信念任务中的表现,结果显示,大部分4岁儿童能够正确认识自我错误信念;大部分5岁儿童能够正确认识他人错误信念;大部分3～4岁儿童的自我错误信念认识显著好于他人（真人和玩偶）错误信念认识,5岁时这两种认识才没有显著差异;学前儿童对真人与玩偶错误信念的认识没有显著差异;学前儿童对“意外地点”任务和“意外内容”任务中错误信念问题回答的一致性较高,而对“外表—真实”任务的回答与前两种任务的一致性较低。     

幼儿心理状态术语的运用与心理理论的发展

本研究目的在于探讨幼儿在假装游戏中心理状态术语的应用,以及与错误信念的理解是否存在相关并具有一定的发展特征。57名3—5岁的幼儿参加了实验。研究程序包括两类标准错误信念任务及假装游戏的拍摄、麦卡锡幼儿言语智力测验。结果发现：(1)幼儿的一般言语能力与错误信念的理解存在显著相关;(2)幼儿心理状态术语的使用存在情境差异,且随年龄的增长具有“指向愿望一指向信念”的维度特征;(3)在控制相关因素之后,幼儿错误信念的理解与心理状态术语的应用及其特定范畴(习惯用语)之间仍然存在显著相关;与“真正涉及心理状态”之间的相关不再显著。     

3～6岁儿童情绪伪装认知能力发展及其与错误信念理解的关系

个体的情绪伪装能力是其情绪社会化发展极为重要的方面,选取某幼儿园123名3～6岁儿童为被试,通过“区分外表-真实情绪”任务和“错误信念”任务考察3～6岁儿童情绪伪装认知能力的发展特点,进而探讨情绪伪装认知与错误信念理解的关系.结果表明：（1）儿童情绪伪装认知能力随年龄增长而提高,3～5岁为儿童情绪伪装认知能力的快速发展期;（2）儿童在消极情境下区分内外情绪的能力显著高于在积极情境中的表现;同时,对两种情绪伪装动机（社会适应、自我保护）的认知能力无显著差异;（3）儿童情绪伪装认知和错误信念理解能力显著相关,两种错误信念（意外内容、意外地点）理解都能很好地预测情绪伪装认知能力.     

学前儿童心理理论及欺骗发展的关系研究

本文采用两种标准心理理论任务和两种欺骗任务,以3~6岁儿童为被试,探讨了学前儿童心理理论与欺骗发展的关系,得出如下结论:(1)在不同的误信念任务中,学前儿童的表现不一致;但仍存在一般发展趋势:3岁儿童不能通过误信念任务,4、5岁是儿童误信念发展的关键时期.(2)3岁儿童不能拥有隐藏意图的欺骗能力,4岁儿童拥有隐藏意图的欺骗能力.(3)3岁儿童能说谎,但假装无知的欺骗直到6岁才出现.(4)误信念理解与隐藏意图的欺骗存在相关,但与说谎和假装无知不存在相关.     

3～5岁幼儿错误信念理解能力的发展趋势

基于以往支持心理理论执行功能表达论的研究结果,对标准错误信念任务修正后采用阶段性错误信念任务,运用实验法对101名3~5岁儿童进行研究。结果发现:(1)新任务保留了标准错误信念任务的优势,能勾勒出幼儿错误信念理解能力的发展趋势;(2)3~5岁儿童表现出不同层次和水平的错误信念理解能力;(3)具体分析儿童错误信念的理解能力发展的心理模式,发现每一年龄组具有的错误信念理解能力,都是其更高水平能力发展的基础,支持表达论。     

自闭症儿童非言语错误信念任务的实验研究

心理理论是指对自己和他人心理状态(如需要、信念、意图、动机、感觉等)的认识,并由此对相应行为做出因果性的预测和解释。国内外心理理论研究较多关注一般儿童的心理理论能力,而对自闭症儿童领域的心理理论的研究不够。本研究在原有的错误信念任务的基础上,对任务进行完全“非言语”改进,以意外内容任务为主要测试内容,将智力落后儿童作为对照组纳入到实验当中,进一步探索自闭症儿童心理理论发展情况。研究结果表明：改编后的非言语意外内容任务适用于自闭症和智力落后儿童;包括低言语能力个体在内的所有自闭症儿童的心理理论能力显著低于智力落后儿童;智力落后儿童的心理理论能力与以往研究结果相一致;相对于智力落后儿童,自闭症儿童在物品转移和调换的注意方面存在更大障碍。     

不同维度的执行功能与早期心理理论的关系

采用意外地点任务、意外内容任务和三种不同类型的执行功能任务来探究执行功能与心理理论之间的关系。共60名被试,3岁和4岁被试各30名,男女各半。区分自己心理状态和他人心理状态能力与执行功能的关系主要体现在混合成分执行功能与这一能力的密切联系上;在错误信念发展的早期,执行功能与错误信念理解能力的关系主要集中在“混合成分的执行功能与对自己错误信念理解能力,工作记忆的执行功能与对他人错误信念理解能力”这两对联系上     

幼儿心理理论水平及其与抑制控制发展的关系

本研究通过经典的错误信念任务首先考察了3与4岁幼儿心理理论的发展水平;然后通过抑制控制任务探讨了幼儿心理理论发展水平与抑制控制能力发展的关系。结果表明,3、4岁在完成错误信念任务时有显著的年龄差异;通过错误信念任务的幼儿在抑制冲突的得分显著地高于没有通过错误信念的幼儿;而且除了他人的错误信念,幼儿在其他错误信念上的水平与抑制冲突成绩有显著的相关。     

幼儿心理理论表现的任务特异性分析

研究以90名3～5岁幼儿为被试,采用相同材料和标准评估幼儿外表-事实的区分和错误信念认识,考察幼儿表现的任务特异性及材料刺激的影响。结果表明;幼儿的表现仍存在任务特异性,并且实验材料对儿童的外表-事实区分和错误信念认识具有重要影响。在解释这些结果时,特殊领域知识习得观似乎优于表征缺失理论。     

Children's understanding of their own and others' mental states. Part B. Understanding of others precedes self‐understanding for some false beliefs

We examined 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children's understanding of their own and another's false beliefs in two experiments using diverse deceptive box and unexpected transfer tasks. Tasks in the first experiment required the child to think about an absent person's responses to questions, whereas those in the second experiment used a confederate present during testing. Children performed better on deceptive box tasks when the other person was present rather than absent; they performed equally on accidental and intentional unexpected transfer tasks. Children understood the other's false beliefs by 4–5 years of age, and their own by 5–6 years of age. Children aged between 4 and 5 years appear to have greater difficulty discounting or ignoring misleading information when thinking about their own beliefs than when thinking about another's, at least for the particular false belief tasks employed. Inconsistencies between our findings and those of a recent meta‐analysis ( Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 ) are easily reconciled.     

Relations Among Preschool Children's Understanding of Visual Perspective Taking,False Belief,and Lying

This study investigated the relations among preschool children's ability to understand that other people see things differently than they do, that other people can believe things differently than the children know to be true, and that they can manipulate others' beliefs through intentional lying. Children between the ages of 3 and 5 were given tasks that tested their knowledge of Level 2 visual perspective taking, understanding of false belief, and the discriminative use of deceptive ploys. The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT-III) was administered as a measure of language proficiency. The children's scores on the three types of tasks were correlated with each other and with children's age, but not with scores on the PPVT-III. Most children either passed all the tasks or failed all the tasks. Regression analyses indicated that scores on visual perspective taking and false belief independently predicted each other, and scores on false belief and the discriminative use of deception independently predicted each other. The results provide evidence that advances in visual perspective taking, false belief understanding, and the discriminative use of deceptive ploys are developmentally related and occur in close synchrony.     

儿童理解误信念的心理机制假设

儿童心理理论是近20年来发展心理学研究热点,对其研究主要是在误信念实验范式之下进行的。儿童理解误信念的心理机制问题是误信念研究的核心问题之一,研究者从不同的角度出发,采用不同的方法,提出了儿童如何理解误信念的几个重要假设,包括：元表征假设、事实掩盖假设、心理理论机制假设、计算资源假设。此文综述了这些假设,以期借鉴使用。     

孤独症个体的谎言理解及其与对自我/他人错误信念理解的关系

选取言语智力匹配的孤独症个体（19名）、典型发展个体（20名）、智力迟滞个体（19名）为被试,动画呈现以言语和非言语信息为线索的两个谎言情景,考察了孤独症个体谎言理解中的谎言行为判断、真假信息辨别、谎言意图理解及其与自我/他人错误信念理解的关系。结果表明：（1）孤独症个体能够进行谎言行为判断,其困难主要表现在辨别真假信息及对谎言意图的理解上;（2）孤独症个体对他人错误信念理解越好,对真假信息辨别也越准确,而谎言意图理解则与对自我错误信念的理解有关;（3）谎言线索以言语或非言语方式呈现对孤独症谎言理解并无影响。     

False Beliefs or False Positives? Limits on Children's Understanding of Mental Representation

We designed several modified false belief tasks to eliminate a confound present in the traditional tasks. The confound would allow children to answer correctly without reasoning about beliefs, by using a "perceptual access" approach to knowing in which they reason that a person who has not seen the true state of affairs will not know and will act incorrectly. The modified tasks incorporated 3 response alternatives (knowledge of the real state of affairs, the false belief, and an irrelevant or unjustified belief), and a yes-no question asked of each alternative. They included versions of the common Maxi, Smarties(r), representational change, and appearance-reality tasks, plus a new ("plate") task. In 3 studies (N = 164), children at both 5 and 6 years performed substantially worse on modified tasks compared to traditional versions and gave perceptual access responses in addition to belief-based and reality-based responses. These findings call into question the validity of the traditional false belief task and suggest that more research employing a variety of methods is needed to determine the robustness of young children's understanding of beliefs.     

特定句法提示对3－4岁儿童错误信念理解的影响

通过在错误信念任务中,为儿童提供关于错误信念表征的特定句法,考察这种句法理解对儿童的错误信念理解成绩是否有促进作用。124名3-4岁幼儿参加实验,每个年龄组幼儿随机分配到零级提示,一级提示和二级提示等三个句法提示条件组,并完成4个错误信念任务。结果发现,一级提示条件和二级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩显著高于零级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩,而一级和二级两种提示条件之间没有显著差异。句法提示对不同的错误信念任务的影响是相同的,对错误信念的预测问题和解释问题的影响模式是一致的。表明对错误信念表征的特定句法提示,有效促进了儿童的错误信念成绩,提示这种句法结构可能有助于儿童的错误信念理解     

Guessing versus choosing – and seeing versus believing – in false belief tasks

Three‐ and 4‐year‐old children were tested using videos of puppets in various versions of a theory of mind change‐of‐location situation, in order to answer several questions about what children are doing when they pass false belief tests. To investigate whether children were guessing or confidently choosing their answer to the test question, a condition in which children were forced to guess was also included, and measures of uncertainty were compared across conditions. To investigate whether children were using simpler strategies than an understanding of false belief to pass the test, we teased apart the seeing‐knowing confound in the traditional change‐of‐location task. We also investigated relations between children's performance on true and false belief tests. Results indicated that children appeared to be deliberately choosing, not guessing, in the false belief tasks. Children performed just as well whether the protagonist gained information about the object visually or verbally, indicating that children were not using a simple rule based on seeing to predict the protagonist's behaviour. A true belief condition was significantly easier for children than a false belief condition as long as it was of low processing demands. Children's success rate on the different versions of the standard false belief task was influenced by factors such as processing demands of the stories and the child's verbal abilities.     

Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge,Ignorance, and False Belief

The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3–7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research.