Why the Negation Problem Is Not a Problem for Expressivism

The Negation Problem states that expressivism has insufficient structure to account for the various ways in which a moral sentence can be negated. We argue that the Negation Problem does not arise for expressivist accounts of all normative language but arises only for the specific examples on which expressivists usually focus. In support of this claim, we argue for the following three theses: 1) a problem that is structurally identical to the Negation Problem arises in non‐normative cases, and this problem is solved once the hidden quantificational structure involved in such cases is uncovered; 2) the terms ‘required’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’ can also be analyzed in terms of hidden quantificational structure, and the Negation Problem disappears once this hidden structure is uncovered; 3) the Negation Problem does not arise for normative language that has no hidden quantificational structure. We conclude that the Negation Problem is not really a problem about expressivism at all but is rather a feature of the quantificational structure of the required, permitted, and forbidden.     

Testifying on Eyewitness Reliability: Expert Advice Is Not Always Persuasive1

This study investigates the impact of different types of expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification. In two hypothetical court cases involving eyewitnesses, expert testimony was presented that was either sample-based (presenting the results of a research program on eyewitness identification) or person-based (presenting information about the particular eyewitness under consideration); the expert either offered causal explanations for his unreliability claim or failed to do so. Two additional control groups (with and without eye-witness identification) were not presented with any expert testimony. The results indicate that subjects who had been confronted with an expert statement made more lenient judgments about the offender but did not discount the eyewitness identification completely. Sample-based information had a moderate impact on the subjects' judgments, regardless of whether or not causal explanations were given. Person-based testimony was the most influential type of expert advice when a causal explanation was provided but the least influential one when no reasons were given. The practical (international differences in admissibility of expert testimony) and theoretical implications (processing of base-rate information) of these findings are discussed.     

Two Is Not Always Better Than One: A Critical Evaluation of Two-System Theories

ABSTRACT— Over the past two decades, there has been an upsurge in theoretical frameworks alluding to the existence of two different processing systems that supposedly operate according to different rules. This article critically examines the scientific advance offered by these theories (in particular advances in the domains of reasoning, decision making, and social cognition) and questions their theoretical coherence as well as the evidence for their existence. We scrutinize the conceptual underpinnings of two-system models and explicate the assumptions underlying these models to see whether they are reasonable. We also evaluate the empirical paradigms used to validate two-system models and ponder about their explanatory strength and predictive power. Given the popularity of these models, we discuss the appeal of two-system theories and suggest potential reasons for their prevalence. We comment on the potential costs associated with these models and allude to the desired nature of potential alternatives. We conclude that two-system models currently provide little scientific advance, and we encourage researchers to adopt more rigorous conceptual definitions and employ more stringent criteria for testing the empirical evidence in support for two-system theories.     

On the Misconception of Multicollinearity in Detection of Moderating Effects: Multicollinearity Is Not Always Detrimental

Due to its extensive applicability and computational ease, moderated multiple regression (MMR) has been widely employed to analyze interaction effects between 2 continuous predictor variables. Accordingly, considerable attention has been drawn toward the supposed multicollinearity problem between predictor variables and their cross-product term. This article attempts to clarify the misconception of multicollinearity in MMR studies. The counterintuitive yet beneficial effects of multicollinearity on the ability to detect moderator relationships are explored. Comprehensive treatments and numerical investigations are presented for the simplest interaction model and more complex three-predictor setting. The results provide critical insight that both helps avoid misleading interpretations and yields better understanding for the impact of intercorrelation among predictor variables in MMR analyses.     

The Problem Is Not Professional Publishing,But the Publish-or-Perish Culture

Science and Engineering Ethics - The publication of scientific papers has become increasingly problematic in the last decades. Even if we agree that a renewed model is needed for peer-reviewed...     

Giving Reasons Does Not Always Amount to Arguing

Topoi - Both because of the vagueness of the word ‘give’ when speaking about giving reasons, and because we lack an adequate definition of ‘reasons’, there is a harmful...     

Frege's Cardinals Do Not Always Obey Hume's Principle

Hume's Principle, dear to neo-Logicists, maintains that equinumerosity is both necessary and sufficient for sameness of cardinal number. All the same, Whitehead demonstrated in Principia Mathematica's logic of relations (where non-homogeneous relations are allowed) that Cantor's power-class theorem entails that Hume's Principle admits of exceptions. Of course, Hume's Principle concerns cardinals and in Principia's ‘no-classes’ theory cardinals are not objects in Frege's sense. But this paper shows that the result applies as well to the theory of cardinal numbers as objects set out in Frege's Grundgesetze. Though Frege did not realize it, Cantor's power-theorem entails that Frege's cardinals as objects do not always obey Hume's Principle.     

Not Always Enslaved,Yet Not Quite Free: Philosophical Challenges from the Underside of the New World

This article is the keynote address of the University of the West Indies at Cave Hill, Barbados, philosophy symposium in celebration of the 200th Anniversary of the British outlawing the Atlantic Slave Trade. The paper explores questions of enslavement and freedom through challenges of philosophical anthropology, philosophy of social change, and metacritical reflections posed by African Diasporic or Africana philosophy. Such challenges include the relevance and legitimacy of philosophical reflection to the lives of racialized slaves and concludes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for an understanding of the “face” of political life and the importance of the concept of “home” for a cogent theory of freedom.

Fake Journals: Not Always Valid Ways to Distinguish Them

In their recent paper, Esfe et al. (Sci Eng Ethics, doi: 10.1007/s11948-014-9595-z 2014) present some criteria for fake journals and propose some ‘features’ to recognize them. While I share most of the authors’ concerns about this issue in general, some of the reported criteria are not fit to differentiate fake journals from genuine ones. Here are some examples derived from their list, which illustrate that such criteria are not necessarily specific to fake journals only, but they could also apply to well-established journals and, therefore, should not be considered as is.     

Knowledge Is Not Enough

Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms as analogous to calls for the use of double-blinding in science.     

Projection on Projective Techniques = Pathology: The Problem That Is Not Being Addressed

A replication of the "levels effect" and reported correlation of projection and pathology was undertaken using a selected set of Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, 1943) cards varied for ambiguity and scored for pathology and projection. The levels effect was not found for pathology in either a normal or psychiatric group, but was found for projection in the normal group. The correlation between projection and pathology was again clearly confirmed. It was concluded that failure to take into consideration the stimulus properties of the cards and the context in which the test was administered may lead to false attribution of pathology to normal test-takers.     

Not Everything Is Proportional: Effects of Age and Problem Type on Propensities for Overgeneralization

Previous research (e.g., De Bock, 2002) has shown that-due to the extensive attention paid to proportional reasoning in elementary and secondary mathematics education-many students tend to overrely on proportional methods in diverse domains of mathematics (e.g., geometry, probability). We investigated the development of misapplication of proportional reasoning with the age and the educational experience of students. A paper-and-pencil test consisting of several types of proportional and nonproportional arithmetic problems with a missing-value structure was given to 1,062 students from Grades 2 to 8. As expected, students tended to apply proportional methods in cases in which they were clearly not applicable. Although some errors of overapplication were made in the 2nd grade, their number increased considerably up to Grade 5 in parallel with the growing proportional reasoning capacity of the students. From Grade 6 on, students started to distinguish more often between situations when proportionality was applicable and when it was not, but even in 8th grade, a considerable number of proportional errors were made. The likelihood of error varied with the type of nonproportional mathematical model underlying the word problems.