Neurolaw: Neuroscience,Ethics, and Law. Review Essay

Neurolaw is a new, rapidly developing area of interdisciplinary research on the meaning and implications of neuroscience for the law and legal practices. In this article three recently published volumes in this field will be reviewed.     

Analytical methods in the theory of psychophysical discrimination II: The Near-miss to Weber's Law, Falmagne's Law, the Psychophysical Power Law and the Law of Similarity

We examine the possibility of accounting for an empirical phenomenon in auditory psychophysics called the “Near-Miss to Weber's Law” [Jesteadt, W., Weir, C., & Green, D. (1977). Intensity discrimination as a function of frequency and sensation level. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, A, 61, 169-177], within the framework of Fechner's Psychophysics. To this end, we introduce a pair of Psychophysical Laws governing the behavior of Weber sensitivities. One of these, the Power Law, embodies ideas that Jesteadt et al. introduced in their original discussion of the near-miss phenomenon. Falmagne's Law captures ideas of Falmagne and colleagues [Falmagne, J.-Cl. (1985). Elements of psychophysical theory. New York: Oxford University Press; Doble, C., Falmagne, J.-Cl., & Berg, B.G. (2003). Theoretical note: Recasting (the near-miss to) Weber's Law. Psychological Review, 110, 365-375]. These two laws, which account for the near-miss phenomenon in quite different ways, are shown to be special cases of a more general Psychophysical Law of Similarity. We find all (smooth) solutions of this Law of Similarity that are compatible with Fechnerian psychophysics. Of the 11 solutions, four are relevant to the near-miss phenomenon; two of these solutions reproduce the models of Jesteadt et al. and Doble et al. and the other two solutions each provide a new accounting of the near-miss phenomenon. We discuss the possibility of distinguishing among these four models in empirical data.     

Law, liability, and the school psychologist: Malpractice and liability

A variety of court decisions and laws relevant to malpractice and liability of school psychologists are presented. Terms are defined and examples of faulty psychological testing, defamation, withholding information, and inferred incompetence are provided. Suggestions regarding litigation and legal defenses are made and issues related to professional liability insurance are discussed.     

The Autopsy Imperative: Medicine, Law, and the Coronial Investigation

The central purpose of this paper is to address the tension between legal and medical discourses within the coronial system. Medical expertise, based largely upon internal autopsy, becomes positioned as providing the more important information, rather than the legal model which focuses on evidence gathering at the scene. This paper will examine the aspects of the history, philosophy and consequences of the processes by which the medical model gained its current dominance and will conclude that, while autopsies are necessary, they are also over-used in the coronial system.     

Neuroprediction,Truth-Sensitivity,and the Law

A recent argument by Nadelhoffer et al. defends a cautious optimism regarding the use of neuroprediction in relation to sentencing based, in part, on an assessment of the offender’s dangerousness. While this optimism may be warranted, Nadelhoffer et al.’s argument fails to justify it. Although neuropredictions provide individualized, non-statistical evidence they will often be problematic for the same reason that basing sentencing on statistical evidence is, to wit, that such predictions are insensitive to the offender’s dangerousness in relevant counterfactual situations and, accordingly, fail to provide the court with knowledge of the offender’s dangerousness. Admittedly, it could be replied that standard clinical assessments of dangerousness possess the same objectionable feature, but doing so undermines a different part of Nadelhoffer et al.’s argument. Finally, I criticize an incentives-based rationale for sentencing informed by neuropredictions of dangerousness.     

Williams,Pragmatism, and the Law

Res Publica - This paper views Bernard Williams through the lens of the pragmatist tradition. The central insight of pragmatism is that philosophy must start with human practice, in contrast to...     

Debunking Antipsychiatry: Laing,Law, and Largactil

The term “psychiatry” refers to two radically different ideas and practices: curing–healing “souls” and coercing–controlling persons. It is important that critics of psychiatry clarify whether they object to the former or the latter or both, and why. Because I believe coerced psychiatric relations are like coerced labor relations called “slavery,” and like coerced sexual relations called “rape,” I spent the better part of my professional life criticizing involuntary-institutional psychiatry and the insanity defense. In 1967, my effort to undermine the medical-political legitimacy of the term “mental illness” and the moral-legal legitimacy of depriving individuals of liberty by means of psychiatric rationalizations suffered a serious blow: the creation of the antipsychiatry movement. Despite their claims, “antipsychiatrists” rejected neither the idea of mental illness nor coercion practiced in the name of “treating” mental illness. Sensational claims about managing “schizophrenia” and pretentious pseudophilosophical pronouncements diverted attention from the crucial role of the psychiatrist as an agent of the state and as an adversary of the denominated patient. The legacy of the antipsychiatry movement is the creation of a catchall term used to delegitimize and dismiss critics of psychiatric fraud and force by labeling them “antipsychiatrists.”

Guns,Mental Illness,and the Law: Introduction to This Issue

Firearm violence is a top-tier public health problem in the U.S., killing 33,563 and injuring an additional 81,396 people in 2012 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC, 2015 ). Given constitutional protection and the cultural entrenchment of private gun ownership in the U.S., it is likely that guns will remain widely accessible – and largely unrestricted – for the foreseeable future. Therefore, most policies and laws intended to reduce firearm violence focus selectively on preventing “dangerous people” from having access to guns. That is a formidable challenge. How do we think productively about guns and mental illness in this context, and about the role of law in lessening the toll of gun violence? Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reproduction,Ethics, and the Law: Feminist Perspectives (Book)

It is often claimed that if technology becomes too intrusive it can be reigned in by better technologies and laws that restrict access. This article argues through a series of propositions and observations why these standard solutions will invariably fall short, and why civility--and the placed communities out of which civility arises--is our best hope against technological assaults on privacy. The article ends with a brief discussion of what sorts of personal and professional commitments a civil culture entails.