Gender differences in personal values of national and local Italian politicians,activists and voters

Theorists of politics of presence postulate that women elected to political office would still hold values similar to ordinary women and therefore represent them better than male politicians. Gender differences in personal values, which underline and give coherence to core political values, have been found among voters: males score higher on self‐enhancement values (power and achievement) and females higher on self‐transcendence values (universalism and benevolence). Our study aims to explore if gender differences in personal values are still present among activists, local and national politicians. We administer a shortened version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire to 233 Italian national politicians (46% females), 425 local politicians (56% females), 626 political activists (44% females), and 3249 ordinary citizens (49% females). Our results confirm only partially politics of presence theory: females at all levels of political involvement score higher in self‐transcendent values that emphasise concern for the welfare of others, but no significant gender differences emerge for self‐enhancement, which favour the pursuit of self‐interest. Our findings support ethical struggles for more balanced gender representation: a higher proportion of women in politics could strengthen the political representation of self‐transcendence values.     

Personality and the Policy Positions of Politicians

Politicians’ support of or opposition to concrete policies is uniquely consequential for policymaking, public opinion, and a host of other societal outcomes. Explaining their policy positions is therefore a major research agenda in political science. Here, we evaluate the role of politicians’ personality traits, measured with the Big Five typology, in shaping how liberal or conservative their economic and social policy positions are. While existing research establishes this link among nonelites, it is far from obvious that the same holds for politicians, who have systematically different personality profiles, and whose positions are constrained by party lines. Using an in-person study of 893 legislators in five countries who completed personality questionnaires and provided detailed issue positions, we find that Openness to Experience is strongly and positively predictive of politicians’ liberal positions on both economic and social policies, but a null relationship for Conscientiousness. We also find that Extraversion predicts more conservative economic (but not social) policy positions. We discuss implications for the role of elites’ individual characteristics in policymaking.     

Do Politicians Take Risks Like the Rest of Us? An Experimental Test of Prospect Theory Under MPs

Political psychologists have been quick to use prospect theory in their work, realizing its potential for explaining decisions under risk. Applying prospect theory to political decision‐making is not without problems, though, and here we address two of these: (1) Does prospect theory actually apply to political decision‐makers, or are politicians unlike the rest of us? (2) Which dimension do politicians use as their reference point when there are multiple dimensions (e.g., votes and policy)? We address both problems in an experiment with a unique sample of Dutch members of parliament as participants. We use well‐known (incentivized) decision situations and newly developed hypothetical political decision‐making scenarios. Our results indicate that politicians’ deviate from expected utility theory in the direction predicted by prospect theory but that these deviations are somewhat smaller than those of other people. Votes appear to be a more important determinant of politicians’ reference point than is policy.     

Personality Foundations of Ideological Divide: A Comparison of Women Members of Parliament and Women Voters in Italy

Empirical research is crucial for understanding the personality foundations of political preferences in modern democracies. However, few studies have addressed the personality of top politicians using standard methods to assess basic traits and personal values. In the current research, traits and values of 106 female members of the Italian Parliament were assessed in accordance with the Five‐Factor Model of personality and Schwartz's taxonomy. The same variables were measured in a sample of 864 voters taken from the general population. We investigate the extent to which differences in traits and values contribute to ideological orientation of politicians and voters of rival coalitions. A similar pattern of relations was found in both groups. Yet, traits and values contributed to partisanship of politicians much more than to political preferences of voters. Whereas values fully mediated the contribution of traits to voting, energy/extraversion and agreeableness contributed to political partisanship both directly and indirectly, through values.     

Do Religious Politicians Take Risks Differently? Evidence From Pakistan

Given popular religiosity, the presence of religious parties, and the politicization of religious issues, it is highly likely that politicians with varying levels of personal religiosity are active in politics. Yet, our knowledge of how politicians’ religiosity influences their political choices is still limited, particularly for developing countries. In this paper, I use data from a survey experiment fielded to Pakistani politicians in 2018 to study whether and how politicians’ personal religiosity influences their political risk preferences. Scholars debate whether religiosity is correlated with higher or lower risk aversion among citizens; however, no study has examined this relationship among politicians. I find that higher religiosity systematically predicts which politicians are more risk-averse and highly religious politicians’ decisions under uncertainty are inconsistent with expected utility maximization and prospect theory. These findings suggest that in contrast to existing assumptions of elite decision-making, politicians’ religiosity systematically influences their risk preferences and choices.     

The Role of Implicit Attitudes in Populist Radical‐Right Support

Previous research on the populist radical right (PRR) has focused exclusively on explicit measures in explaining support for these contested political players. In this study, we explore the role of implicit attitudes in predicting vote likelihood for a PRR party. We use an online survey (n = 773) among Dutch respondents in which we measured implicit attitudes towards the Dutch PRR Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) with a Single‐Target Implicit Association Test (ST‐IAT). The results show that the implicit measure predicts vote likelihood in general, as well as in ways beyond that accounted for by traditional explanations of PRR party support. Importantly, the results also show that the impact of implicit attitudes on intended vote choice is greater for less extreme voters; in other words, those voters less likely to say they would vote for the PVV are more heavily influenced at an implicit level, beyond their awareness. This suggests that implicit attitudes of the PRR party may be quite useful for explaining support among voters who would not normally self‐report it.     

Fear,Anger, and Voting for the Far Right: Evidence From the November 13, 2015 Paris Terror Attacks

The conjecture that negative emotions underpin support for far‐right politics is common among pundits and scholars. The conventional account holds that authoritarian populists catalyze public anxiety about the changing social order and/or deteriorating national economic conditions, and this anxiety subsequently drives up support for the far right. We propose that while emotions do indeed play an independent causal role in support for far‐right parties and policies, that support is more likely built upon the public’s anger rather than fear. This article explores the relative impact of fear and anger in reaction to the 2015 Paris terror attacks on the propensity to vote for the French far‐right party, the Front National, in the 2015 regional elections. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that anger is associated with voting for the Front National, while fear is associated with voting against the Front National. Moreover, anger boosts the Front National vote most powerfully among far‐right and authoritarian voters. On the other hand, fear reduces support for the far right among those same groups.     

An Experimental Investigation of Election Promises

We analyze the effect of election promises on electoral behavior in a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, politicians can make nonbinding election promises about how to split an endowment between themselves and the group. We find that promises affect both voting and voter beliefs about how much the politician will contribute to the public fund. The relationship is inverted U‐shaped with decreasing credibility of higher promises. Contributions of politicians are correlated with their promises in a similar pattern. The election promises are generally credible unless particularly high. Politicians keep promises more often if a reelection is possible and if the politician came into power by vote rather than by random draw. Voters reward high contributions in the previous period and punish promise breaking even after controlling for the contribution in the previous period or voters' beliefs about future contributions. By controlling for voters' beliefs, we distinguish retrospective from prospective voting. Our results suggest that voters both use promises for prospective voting and retrospectively punish broken promises.     

Leadership Perceptions in Relation to a Presidential Vote1

In the 1988 American presidential election, leadership perceptions and perceived platforms were used to predict votes for one of the two final candidates (Governor Michael Dukakis and Vice President George Bush). Both leadership perceptions and perceived platforms were found to be related to voting. However, political involvement moderated the relationship between the perceived platforms and the votes, while leadership perceptions were found to be a consistent predictor of voting across levels of political involvement. Leadership perceptions, perceived platforms, and the interaction between involvement and perceived platforms predicted voting above and beyond the voters’ political affiliations. Consistent with a categorization model of leadership perceptions, the prototypicality of perceived leader traits was found to be strongly related to a tendency to vote for a candidate who was perceived to possess those traits. In comparing general favorability of characteristics versus prototypicality with respect to an effective political leadership category, general favorability played a larger role in uninvolved voters’ decisions than in involved voters’ decisions. Differences in mean leadership prototype ratings were also explored as a function of political affiliation and political involvement. The implications of these findings for campaign strategies and for leadership in organizational contexts are discussed.     

The Scope of Partisan Influence on Policy Opinion

Politicians often support policies that diverge from public preferences. How effectively can partisan cues lead public opinion in these settings? Using survey experiments that examine how partisan cues affect support for policies that diverge from the initial views of party supporters, I argue for two important limitations on the scope of partisan influence over public opinion. First, while cues from copartisan politicians produce modest increases in the support policy proposals receive, the effect of policy divergence outstrips the effect of cues, constraining elites’ ability to generate support for proposals at odds with public preferences. Second, while partisan cues increase mass partisans’ support for specific policy proposals, they fail to pull the underlying preferences of party supporters toward divergent elite‐endorsed positions. This offers new insight into the mechanisms behind party‐cues effects and demonstrates a check on the influence of partisan elites in a polarized era.     

Procedural Fairness,the Economy,and Support for Political Authorities

A vast literature in social and organizational psychology suggests that support for authorities is driven both by the outcomes they deliver to people and by the extent to which they employ fair decision making processes. Furthermore, some of that literature describes a process‐outcome interaction, through which the effect of outcome favorability is reduced as process fairness increases. However, very few studies have been conducted to determine whether such interaction is also present in the explanation of support for political authorities. Here, we start by analyzing whether individual perceptions of the political system’s procedural fairness moderate the well‐known individual‐level relationship between perceived economic performance and government approval. Then, we explore the implications of such process‐outcome interaction to the phenomenon of “economic voting,” testing whether impartiality in governance moderates the effect of objective economic performance on aggregate incumbent parties’ support. In both cases, we show that the interaction between processes and outcomes seems to extend beyond the organizational contexts where it has been previously observed, with important implications for the study of political support.     

The Federal Face of Voting: Are Elected Officials Held Accountable for the Functions Relevant to Their Office?

Federalism is designed to enhance democratic representation because it gives citizens the opportunity to shape policymaking at multiple levels of government. This design feature is premised on the assumption that individuals make distinctions in the responsibilities that pertain to different levels of government and link these distinctions to their voting decisions. Citizens are expected to sanction politicians for those policy decisions over which their level of government has responsibility. This paper draws on work in both political and social psychology to develop a theoretical framework consistent with the federalist view of democratic representation to explain how people make voting decisions. Individuals who were able to vote in elections at all three levels of government (national, state, and local) in 2002 were surveyed, allowing a full test of the federalist voting model. Findings show that while citizens do make distinctions among levels of government when evaluating issues, they only link these distinctions to their voting decisions if those issue attitudes are highly accessible. Implications for democratic representation and future research are discussed.     

If they were to vote, they would vote for us

In two field studies, we examined whether voters overestimate support for their political party among nonvoters. In Study 1, voters estimated the percentage of votes their party would receive in an upcoming election, and this percentage increased when voters estimated the percentage of votes their party would receive if nonvoters also were to vote. In Study 2, participants overestimated support for their party even when we made them explicitly aware of current levels of this support by presenting them with poll-based forecasts of election results. Furthermore, Study 2 demonstrated that commitment to vote for a specific party predicted the degree of overestimation. Our results imply that highly committed voters are particularly likely to project support for their party onto nonvoters. Implications for the literature on social projection and social identity are discussed.     

Encountering Dissimilar Views in Deliberation: Political Knowledge,Attitude Strength,and Opinion Change

Conversing with diverse points of view stands as the central tenet of deliberative democracy, yet empirical evidence has suggested mixed outcomes related to perspective change as a result of deliberative encounters. I propose a difference‐driven model that suggests individual predispositions moderate the processing of dissimilar views when changing policy preferences. My analysis is based on a random sample of over 400 voters at a California‐wide deliberative event, where participants discussed proposals for reforming the state politics. I find that encountering more and different arguments transforms policy attitudes. Yet it is more difficult for people to change their minds on issues about which they hold strong beliefs. Some evidence suggests that different psychologies are at play for people who enter deliberation with substantial or weak political knowledge and for those who deliberate while holding strong or moderate prior opinions. Well‐grounded strong opinions are resistant to change, while well‐grounded moderate opinions are persuadable in deliberative groups. Uninformed positions can become entrenched in like‐minded groups, yet they can be adjusted once participants deliberate with dissimilar views, especially opinions that are held strongly without good informational ground. The findings urge deliberative forums that introduce participants to diverse perspectives to foster a considered public opinion.     

Republican Voters Prefer Candidates Who Have Conservative‐Looking Faces: New Evidence From Exit Polls

Research shows people share common political facial stereotypes: They associate faces with political ideologies. Moreover, given that many voters rely on party affiliation, political ideology, and appearances to select political candidates, we might expect that political facial stereotypes would sway voting preferences and, by extension, the share of votes going to each candidate in an election. And yet few studies have examined whether having a stereotypically conservative‐looking (or liberal‐looking) face predicts a candidate's vote shares. Using data from U.S. election exit polls, we show that the Republican voters within each state are more likely to vote for a candidate (even a Democrat) the more that person has a stereotypically Republican‐looking face. By contrast, the voting choices of the Democratic voters within each state are unrelated to political facial stereotypes. Moreover, we show that the relationship between political facial stereotypes and voting does not depend on state‐level ideology: Republican voters in both right‐leaning (“red”) and left‐leaning (“blue”) states are more likely to vote for candidates with conservative‐looking faces. These results have several important practical and theoretical implications concerning the nature and impact of political facial stereotypes, which we discuss.     

The simplicity of politicians' personalities across political context: An anomalous replication

Modern politics is becoming increasingly personalized. The personal qualities of political candidates, in fact, account for a considerable amount of the variance in the candidate preference of voters, often more than the political issues in their electoral programs. Despite the emphasis that both the media and campaign leaders place on the ways in which the personalities of politicians are portrayed, people tend to view the personalities of politicians in remarkably simple ways. Here we show that, although people tend to use five personality dimensions to characterize their own personalities, they rely upon only two dimensions to characterize the personalities of politicians. This finding holds across countries (i.e., Italy and the US), and across political figures (i.e., Prodi and Berlusconi in Italy, and Bush and Kerry in the US). The two factors obtained from evaluations of Prodi, Berlusconi, and Kerry were respectively a blend of Energy/Extraversion and Openness and a blend of Friendliness, Conscientiousness, and Emotional Stability. The two factors obtained from evaluations of the US president, though, were respectively a blend of Openness, Conscientiousness, and Friendliness, and a blend of Energy/Extraversion, Emotional Stability, and Friendliness. Thus, the present study is novel in suggesting that while the personalities of politicians may be reduced by voters, they are not always reduced to the same basic factors. Alternative explanations of this “simplification effect” are discussed.     

Personalizing politics: a congruency model of political preference

Modern politics become personalized as individual characteristics of voters and candidates assume greater importance in political discourse. Although personalities of candidates capture center stage and become the focus of voters' preferences, individual characteristics of voters, such as their traits and values, become decisive for political choice. The authors' findings reveal that people vote for candidates whose personality traits are in accordance with the ideology of their preferred political party. They also select politicians whose traits match their own traits. Moreover, voters' traits match their own values. The authors outline a congruency model of political preference that highlights the interacting congruencies among voters' self-reported traits and values, voters' perceptions of leaders' personalities, politicians' self-reported traits, and programs of favored political coalitions.     

Cognitive biases in moral judgments that affect political behavior

Cognitive biases that affect decision making may affect the decisions of citizens that influence public policy. To the extent that decisions follow principles other than maximizing utility for all, it is less likely that utility will be maximized, and the citizens will ultimately suffer the results. Here I outline some basic arguments concerning decisions by citizens, using voting as an example. I describe two types of values that may lead to sub-optimal consequences when these values influence political behavior: moralistic values (which people are willing to impose on others regardless of the consequences) and protected values (PVs, values protected from trade-offs). I present evidence against the idea that voting is expressive, i.e., that voters aim to express their moral views rather than to have an effect on outcomes. I show experimentally that PVs are often moralistic. Finally, I present some data that citizens’ think of their duty in a parochial way, neglecting out-groups. I conclude that moral judgments are important determinants of citizen behavior, that these judgments are subject to biases and based on moralistic values, and that, therefore, outcomes are probably less good than they could be.     

Church Voting Recommendations,Voter Preferences,and Political Decisions

In Switzerland, two key church institutions—the Conference of Swiss Bishops and the Federation of Protestant Churches—make public recommendations on how to vote for certain referenda. We leverage this situation to directly measure religious organizations’ power to reflect and shape human decision making. That is, using a direct measure of voters’ commitment to their religious institution, we analyze whether they are more likely to vote in line with this organization's voting recommendation. We find that these recommendations do indeed wield influence, implying that even in a secularized world, religion plays a crucial role in voting decisions. Our results hold for both aggregate and individual-level voting decisions.     

Beyond personal responsibility: Effects of causal attributions for overweight and obesity on weight-related beliefs,stigma, and policy support

Objective: The objective of this research was to compare the effects of different causal attributions for overweight and obesity, among individuals with overweight and obesity, on weight-related beliefs, stigmatising attitudes and policy support.

Design: In Study 1, an online sample of 95 US adults rated the extent to which they believed various factors caused their own weight status. In Study 2, 125 US adults read one of three randomly assigned online passages attributing obesity to personal responsibility, biology, or the ‘food environment.’ All participants in both studies were overweight or obese.

Main outcome measures: All participants reported beliefs about weight loss, weight-stigmatising attitudes, and support for obesity-related policies.

Results: In Study 1, biological attributions were associated with low weight-malleability beliefs and blame, high policy support, but high internalised weight bias. ‘Food environment’ attributions were not associated with any outcomes, while ‘personal responsibility’ attributions were associated with high prejudice and blame. In Study 2, participants who received information about the food environment reported greater support for food-related policies and greater self-efficacy to lose weight.

Conclusion: Emphasising the role of the food environment in causing obesity may promote food policy support and health behaviours without imposing the negative consequences associated with other attributions.