Biases in children's and adults' moral judgments

Two experiments examined biases in children's (5/6- and 7/8-year-olds) and adults' moral judgments. Participants at all ages judged that it was worse to produce harm when harm occurred (a) through action rather than inaction (omission bias), (b) when physical contact with the victim was involved (physical contact principle), and (c) when the harm was produced as a direct means to an end rather than as an unintended but foreseeable side effect of the action (intention principle). The youngest participants, however, did not incorporate benefit when making judgments about situations in which harm to one individual resulted in benefit to five individuals. Older participants showed some preference for benefit resulting from action (commission) as opposed to inaction (omission). The findings are discussed in the context of the theory that moral judgments result, in part, from the operation of an inherent, intuitive moral faculty compared with the theory that moral judgments require development of necessary cognitive abilities.     

Understanding and predicting parental decisions about early childhood immunizations.

This research investigated the factors that influence decisions about immunizations. Women in the third trimester of pregnancy (N=195) rated their likelihood of immunizing their child; stated their reasons for and against immunizing; and rated their perceptions of the benefits and risks of immunization, feelings of responsibility, and anticipated regret if harm occurred. Immunization status was determined at follow-up. Stepwise regression analyses demonstrated that immunization decisions are strongly influenced by omission bias factors such as anticipated responsibility and regret variance (which explained more than 50% of variance). It is suggested that parents may benefit from antenatal decision aids that address omission bias and encourage them to assess benefits and risks of immunizations on the basis of scientific evidence.     

Nameless + harmless = blameless: When seemingly irrelevant factors influence judgment of (un)ethical behavior

People often make judgments about the ethicality of others’ behaviors and then decide how harshly to punish such behaviors. When they make these judgments and decisions, sometimes the victims of the unethical behavior are identifiable, and sometimes they are not. In addition, in our uncertain world, sometimes an unethical action causes harm, and sometimes it does not. We argue that a rational assessment of ethicality should not depend on the identifiability of the victim of wrongdoing or the actual harm caused if the judge and the decision maker have the same information. Yet in five laboratory studies, we show that these factors have a systematic effect on how people judge the ethicality of the perpetrator of an unethical action. Our studies show that people judge behavior as more unethical when: (1) identifiable vs. unidentifiable victims are involved and (2) the behavior leads to a negative rather than a positive outcome. We also find that people’s willingness to punish wrongdoers is consistent with their judgments, and we offer preliminary evidence on how to reduce these biases.     

道德困境决策中的忽略偏差:现象与测量

道德困境决策中的忽略偏差效应是指在道德困境中,当作为和不作为都会造成消极结果的情况下,个体认为作为导致的消极结果比不作为导致的消极结果更不道德,从而使人们在道德决策时更倾向于不作为的现象。由于传统道德决策研究范式存在义务论决策倾向性和一般性不作为反应倾向相混淆的局限,道德困境决策中的忽略偏差效应尚未做进一步探索。本文梳理了道德困境决策中忽略偏差效应的表现,通过CNI模型提出甄别和测量道德困境决策中忽略偏差效应的策略:创设研究情景; 分离不作为倾向性和忽略偏差效应; 综合探索忽略偏差效应的群体和个体特征。针对CNI模型的局限性,结合CAN算法和漂移扩散模型对未来的研究方向进行了展望。     

Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations

Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side‐effect ( Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006 ). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side‐effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations and provide evidence that their role in moral judgment is mediated by these nonmoral psychological representations. Specifically, the action/omission distinction affects moral judgment primarily via causal attribution, while the means/side‐effect distinction affects moral judgment via intentional attribution. We suggest that many of the specific patterns evident in our moral judgments in fact derive from nonmoral psychological mechanisms, and especially from the processes of causal and intentional attribution.     

Omission bias in vaccination decisions: Where’s the “omission”? Where’s the “bias”?

Several studies have reported that parents are often reluctant to vaccinate their own or other people’s children, even when the balance of health risks and benefits clearly favors vaccination. This reluctance has been interpreted as a manifestation of “omission bias”, a general tendency to prefer inactive to active options even when inaction leads to worse outcomes or greater risks. The research raises significant public health concerns as well as worries about human decision biases in general. In this paper we argue that existing research on vaccination decisions has not convincingly demonstrated any general reluctance to vaccinate nor has it made the case that such a tendency, if found, would constitute a bias. We identify several conceptual and methodological issues that, we argue, cloud interpretation of earlier studies. In a new questionnaire-based study (Experiment 1) we examined the vaccination decisions of undergraduate students (N=103) and non-student adults (N=192). In both groups a clear majority chose to vaccinate when disease and vaccination risks were balanced. Experiments 2 and 3 identify several problems associated with the measures used in earlier studies, and show how these problems could have led to the misleading appearance of majority anti-vaccination preferences. In our data, vaccination intentions appear to be less a function of generalized preferences for action or inaction than they are of the regret respondents expect to feel if vaccination or non-vaccination were to lead to a poor outcome. Regret-avoiding choices led some respondents to favor vaccination, others to oppose it. In two follow-up studies, few respondents mentioned action or inaction per se in explaining their choices. We conclude that there is no convincing evidence that a generalized “omission bias” plays any important role in vaccination decisions.     

Causing harm and allowing harm: a study of beliefs in obsessional problems

This study investigates two factors hypothesised as relevant to obsessional problems because of the way in which they influence decisions whether or not to act to prevent harm. These are (i) the way in which intrusive thoughts increase the internal awareness of harm, and confront the person with the possibility of taking action to prevent such harm and (ii) the extent to which there is some obvious external factor which increases awareness of the possibility of preventing harm. Obsessional patients, anxious and non-clinical controls completed a scale which systematically measured these factors across a wide range of situations. Results across all situations evaluated confirmed previous findings that both obsessionals and nonobsessionals were more likely to report acting to prevent harm when awareness of it is prompted by an intrusion than when it is not. It was also found that participants in all groups acted more ‘obsessionally’ when a scenario is described in ways which suggest that harm may be by ‘commission’ than when it is described in terms of an ‘omission’. When scenarios about which each individual is most disturbed were analysed, anxious and non-clinical controls continued to differentially rate omission and commission situations; as predicted, this differential was not present for obsessional patients.

It is concluded that obsessionals are more sensitive to omission than are nonobsessionals when considering scenarios about which they are concerned, and that this sensitivity is one factor influencing the decision whether to act to prevent harm.     

行为决策中的忽略偏差：心理机制与影响因素

忽略偏差是指在由忽略所导致的损失与由行为所导致的同等的或者更少的损失之间, 个体更容易接受忽略所导致的损失。个体在日常行为决策的各种领域, 特别是在公共政策制定中均会出现忽略偏差。目前忽略偏差的心理机制主要有损失规避和标准理论两种。忽略偏差的影响因素主要包括保护性价值观、选择结果的信息知悉度、负性情绪、社会角色和文化价值观念等。未来的研究则需要从忽略偏差的产生根源, 与决策规避中其他偏差的关系, 群体决策中忽略偏差的影响以及忽略偏差的应用研究领域, 特别是公共管理与公共政策领域等方面进行深入的研究。     

The role of conscious reasoning and intuition in moral judgment: testing three principles of harm

Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not.     

The omission strategy

People are more willing to bring about morally objectionable outcomes by omission than by commission. Similarly, people condemn others less harshly when a moral offense occurs by omission rather than by commission, even when intentions are controlled. We propose that these two phenomena are related, and that the reduced moral condemnation of omissions causes people to choose omissions in their own behavior to avoid punishment. We report two experiments using an economic game in which one participant (the taker) could take money from another participant (the owner) either by omission or by commission. We manipulated whether or not a third party had the opportunity to punish the taker by reducing the taker's payment. Our results indicated that the frequency of omission increases when punishment is possible. We conclude that people choose omissions to avoid condemnation and that the omission effect is best understood not as a bias, but as a strategy.     

Regulatory focus as a predictor of omission bias in moral judgment: Mediating role of anticipated regrets

Omission bias occurs when people are more reluctant to accept negative consequences caused by their actions than by their inaction. Recent research on omission bias in decision‐making has found evidence for individual differences, thus indicating that some people are more likely to show omission inclination than others. The present research aims to explore the role of regulatory focus as individual difference variables in omission bias. Moreover, we examine whether anticipated regret mediates the relationship between regulatory focus and moral judgement. Moral judgement tasks utilized include: (i) moral dilemma scenarios (Study 1); and (ii) ethical scenarios embracing apparent legal rule violations (Study 2). The results of both studies show that only prevention focus is significantly related to omission bias in moral judgement. Specifically, this relationship holds regardless of the nature of the ‘omission’ (whether they are deontological or utilitarian). In addition, anticipated regret/guilt for action was found to mediate the relationship between prevention focus and omission bias. Implications and limitations are discussed based on the results of the current study.     

Certainty and Uncertainty: The Two Faces of the Hindsight Bias

“Hindsight Bias” is a person's tendency, after learning about the actual outcome of a situation or the correct answer to a question, to distort a previous judgment in the direction of this new information. In the literature, hindsight bias has been mostly discussed as an inevitable result of a “judgment under uncertainty.” We think that the hindsight bias is due to memorial as well as inferential processes: Whereas certainty about the recollection is memorial and concerns the recollective experience, certainty at the time of the judgment is inferential and concerns the individual's metaknowledge (“I know that I knew that”). In two experiments participants' feelings of certainty were measured indirectly (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) by giving participants the option of leaving those questions unanswered about which they felt uncertain. This free-report option was offered to half of the participants in the first estimate phase (concerning time of judgment) and to the second half in the memory phase (concerning the recollective experience). At the end of the session, participants were presented again with the questions they had skipped and were now required to answer them. This procedure allowed us to compare the amount of hindsight bias for the skipped, uncertain items to the spontaneously answered, certain ones. Both experiments demonstrated that the hindsight bias is a result of the interaction of both uncertainty and certainty.     

Omission bias and perceived intention in children and adults

Omission bias refers to the tendency to judge acts of commission as morally worse than equivalent acts of omission. Children aged 7–8 and 11–12 years, as well as adults, made moral judgements about acts of commission and omission in two conditions in which the protagonist obtained a self‐directed benefit. In the antisocial condition, the other person was harmed; in the selfish condition, the other person was not harmed. The results showed that adults and both age groups of children judged that the agent who did something (act of commission) was morally worse than the agent who did nothing (omission) for both antisocial and selfish conditions, although this judgement tendency was clearer in the selfish condition than in the antisocial condition. Agent intention was held constant across commission and omission, but most participants rated the intention of the agent who did something as stronger than that of the agent who did nothing. These results suggest that omission bias occurs regardless of differences in age and situation. In addition, perceived intention appears to change in conjunction with omission bias.     

On the assessment of the test–retest of Riding’s CSA: A commentary on Peterson, Deary, and Austin

Peterson, Deary, and Austin (2003) considered the reliability of the Cognitive Styles Analysis (CSA) (Riding, 1991). The CSA seeks to assess an individual’s position on each of two fundamental style dimensions – the Wholist-Analytic and the Verbal-Imagery dimensions. It presents a series of simple cognitive tasks, which the subjects may choose to process according to their preferred style. Performance on these test items is in terms of response times. The CSA comprises 40 items to assess the Wholist-Analytic and 48 for the Verbal-Imagery and typically takes 15–20 min to complete. It is intended to be suitable for a wide age and ability range, and applicable to a variety of contexts and cultures.The most important characteristic of any test of cognitive style is its temporal stability. Studies which attempt to establish test validity without definitive evidence of test reliability are lacking a basic foundation. Riding has not published any statistical data on the test–retest reliability of the CSA.Peterson et al. (2003) and Peterson (2003) claim to have carried out the primary evaluation of the CSA’s reliability. However we were the first to publish accurate test–retest reliability data on Riding’s CSA (Redmond, Mullally, & Parkinson, 2002).This brief report addresses the issue as to who initially established the unreliability of the CSA in the first place and why Peterson, Deary and Austin’s claims are misleading and unsubstantiated.     

Protected values: No omission bias and no framing effects

Previous studies have suggested that people holding protected values (PVs) show a bias against harmful acts, as opposed to harmful omissions (omission bias). In the present study, we (1) investigated the relationship between PVs and acts versus omissions in risky choices, using a paradigm in which act and omission biases were presented in a symmetrical manner, and (2) examined whether people holding PVs respond differently to framing manipulations. Participants were given environmental scenarios and were asked to make choices between actions and omissions. Both the framing of the outcomes (positive vs. negative) and the outcome certainty (risky vs. certain) were manipulated. In contrast to previous studies, PVs were linked to preferences for acts, rather than for omissions. PVs were more likely to be associated with moral obligations to act than with moral prohibitions against action. Strikingly, people with strong PVs were immune to framing; participants with few PVs showed robust framing effects.     

Partial avoidance contingencies: Absolute omission and punishment probabilities

Avoidance contingencies were defined by the absolute probability of the conjunction of responding or not responding with shock or no shock. The “omission” probability (ρ₀₀) is the probability of no response and no shock. The “punishment” probability (ρ₁₁) is the probability of both a response and a shock. The traditional avoidance contingency never omits shock on nonresponse trials (ρ₀₀=0) and never presents shock on response trials (ρ₁₁=0). Rats were trained on a discrete-trial paradigm with no intertrial interval. The first lever response changed an auditory stimulus for the remainder of the trial. Shocks were delivered only at the end of each trial cycle. After initial training under the traditional avoidance contingency, one group of rats experienced changes in omission probability (ρ₀₀>0), holding punishment probability at zero. The second group of rats were studied under different punishment probability values (ρ₁₁>0), holding omission probability at zero. Data from subjects in the omission group looked similar, showing graded decrements in responding with increasing probability of omission. These subjects approximately “matched” their nonresponse frequencies to the programmed probability of shock omission on nonresponse trials, producing a very low and approximately constant conditional probability of shock given no response. Subjects in the punishment group showed different sensitivity to increasing absolute punishment probability. Some subjects decreased responding to low values as punishment probability increased, while others continued to respond at substantial levels even when shock was inevitable on all trials (noncontingent shock schedule). These results confirm an asymmetry between two dimensions of partial avoidance contingencies. When the consequences of not responding included occasional omission of shock, all subjects showed graded sensitivity to changes in omission frequency. When the consequences of responding included occasional shock delivery, some subjects showed graded sensitivity to punishment frequency while others showed control by overall shock frequency as well.     

Outcome Knowledge,Regret, and Omission Bias

Subjects made or evaluated decisions in hypothetical scenarios. We manipulated knowledge about the outcome and act vs omission in four cases. In case 1 (production processes), acts (changing the process) were considered better than omissions when the decision maker did not know the outcome or knew that it was better than the status quo. Acts were considered worse than omissions once the decision maker learned that the foregone option would have led to an even better outcome. In case 2 (medical treatment), act vs omission again interacted with gain vs loss (relative to the status quo) unless the outcome of the foregone option was known, in which case act vs omission interacted with better vs worse (of the two options). In case 3 (fetal testing), subjects tolerated less risk of miscarriage when a potential for regret was present (because the test with the risk of miscarriage, although better, might miss disorders that another test would detect). This effect was greater for actions than omissions. In case 4 (vaccination), subjects showed less tolerance of vaccine risk when the decision maker would know about the outcome of vaccination or nonvaccination. Thus, the bias toward omission (not vaccinating) is greater when potential regret is present, and potential regret is greater when knowledge of outcomes is expected.     

Harm: The counterfactual comparative account,the omission and pre-emption problems,and well-being

The concept of “harm” is ubiquitous in moral theorising, and yet remains poorly defined. Bradley suggests that the counterfactual comparative account of harm is the most plausible account currently available, but also argues that it is fatally flawed, since it falters on the omission and pre-emption problems. Hanna attempts to defend the counterfactual comparative account of harm against both problems. In this paper, I argue that Hanna’s defence fails. I also show how his defence highlights the fact that both the omission and the pre-emption problems have the same root cause – the inability of the counterfactual comparative account of harm to allow for our implicit considerations regarding well-being when assessing harm. While its purported neutrality with regard to substantive theories of well-being is one of the reasons that this account is considered to be the most plausible on offer, I will argue that this neutrality is illusory.     

Gender Bias in Medical Implant Design and Use: A Type of Moral Aggregation Problem?

In this article, I describe how gender bias can affect the design, testing, clinical trials, regulatory approval, and clinical use of implantable devices. I argue that bad outcomes experienced by women patients are a cumulative consequence of small biases and inattention at various points of the design, testing, and regulatory process. However, specific instances of inattention and bias can be difficult to identify, and risks are difficult to predict. This means that even if systematic gender bias in implant design is an ethical issue, it is one with no clearly blameworthy player. From a practical perspective, there is no single obvious point at which to intervene. Philosophers working in other areas have explored structurally similar moral problems—sometimes referred to as “moral aggregation problems”—such as the type of environmental harm caused by small actions of many players. I describe key features of these type of problems and strategies to address them. I then draw on these to suggest an approach to gender bias in medical implant design and use.